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First Committee Monitor, Vol. 20, No. 1

Editorial: Working for Peace at the First Committee
30 September 2022


Ray Acheson

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Last year’s First Committee was somewhat mellow compared to 2020, but nevertheless underscored the stark divisions and tensions between the world’s most heavily militarised states. Since then, nuclear weapon modernisation has continued apace, with billions of dollars continuing to be invested in these weapons of mass destruction; military spending as a whole has skyrocketed to an unprecedented 2.1 trillion USD; perpetual war profiteering through the international arms trade has been unrelenting; and certain states have persisted in using prohibited weapons such as cluster munitions, landmines, and incendiary weapons.

In the context of war

This already troubling situation has been massively exacerbated by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Along with the devastation of cities and towns through explosive violence and the use of banned weapons, horrific acts of sexual and gender-based violence, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, the conflict has also increased the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. Russian President Putin ordered the country’s nuclear forces to be put on heightened alert status and he and other government officials made several remarks over many months indicating their readiness to use nuclear weapons if other countries “interfered” in the war.

War profiteering has surged as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with many Western states shipping billions of dollars of weapon systems to Ukraine and diplomatic solutions being diminished as impractical. Civil society and other experts have warned of the likelihood that these weapons or their ammunition will either be diverted into illicit markets, as is common in contexts of instability and was already a problem in Ukraine, or be claimed by Russian forces. Questions have also been raised about the expedited pace of arms export control processes, meant to anticipate concerns such as diversion or human rights impact. Beyond Ukraine, many of these same weapons exporters were also already profiting from ongoing armed conflicts around the world, selling weapons to governments engaged in violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law—thus violating their own obligations as arms exporters under the Arms Trade Treaty.

While the cyber component of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been less severe than predicted, the digital dimensions of the conflict are nonetheless present; they have been the focus of political statements of attribution from other governments, raise unique questions for international humanitarian law, and are causing human harm.

Meanwhile, Russia’s war has definitively demonstrated the inherent insecurity of nuclear power plants. With Russian forces occupying the Zaporizhzya Nuclear Power Plant, bombing and shelling has taken place at and near the facility. Despite international law against attacks on nuclear facilities, the risks of a radioactive catastrophe like Chernobyl are very real. This situation has demonstrated once again that nuclear power is not a safe or sustainable solution to climate change but instead is an expensive, environmentally destructive, and potentially devastating source of energy that must be phased out.

Russia’s warmongering played a major role in the failure of the Tenth Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in August 2022. The Russian delegation blocked the adoption of the conclusions and recommendations of the final document, citing among other things that states opposed to its war against Ukraine had taken the Review Conference “politically hostage”. It accused those states of ensuring their priorities and perspectives were reflected in the outcome while working to ensure that the views of their opponents were not reflected.

While there is some truth to that—in that other nuclear-armed states and some of their allies fought to keep out any commitments or reflections contrary to their own positions—Russia was part of this effort of taking the Conference “hostage”. Despite all the divergences among those playing at geopolitics, Russia was fully aligned with the other NPT nuclear-armed states in actively preventing any meaningful commitment to advance nuclear disarmament, stop nuclear threats, or reduce nuclear risks from being included in the outcome document. While the nuclear-armed states may not be a monolith, they can certainly agree on a few things: they want to continue to possess and modernise their nuclear arsenals, they do not believe they are legally obligated to eliminate their nuclear weapons, and they really dislike the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

Accomplishments of disarmament diplomacy

But as Austria said at the conclusion of the NPT Review Conference, the four weeks of fruitless negotiation and backtracking from commitments were “a validation of and promotion for the TPNW.” Austria called “on all states who want to achieve actual progress on Article VI of the NPT to join the TPNW.” Indeed, the TPNW, which outlaws the development, possession, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons, is a bright spot amidst the challenges. The Treaty continues to garner new states parties and inspire divestment from and local legislation against nuclear weapons. The First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW met in Vienna in 21–23 June 2022, where participants adopted a strong Declaration and Action Plan setting the path for the Treaty’s effective implementation.

There are other bright spots. Just a few days before the TPNW meeting, delegations at the UN in Geneva agreed to the text of a political declaration to protect civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA). The culmination of a multiyear process of negotiations and consultations led by Ireland, the declaration stands as an important contribution to ending the horrific practice of bombing towns, cities, and villages. It will open for signature later this year; civil society groups with the International Network on Explosive Weapons, which helped advance this issue and participated actively in negotiating the text, stand ready to assist states and hold them to account for its effective implementation.

The Eighth Biennial Meeting of States of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNPoA) adopted an outcome document by consensus in July 2022. The document saw progress on several issues, including in relation to gender perspectives, national action plans, the effects of armed violence on youth and vulnerable communities, and the need for sustainable international cooperation and assistance. However, because some states treat consensus as their personal veto, the inclusion of ammunition and efforts to introduce discussion on topics like the impact of technology and measuring progress of national UNPoA implementation remains elusive despite overwhelming majority support for its consideration. Concerns about transparency have also started to emerge in this process.

Casualties of consensus

The misuse of the rule of consensus over the past year has caused many disarmament diplomacy failures. The Convention on Certain Convention Weapons (CCW) Review Conference in December 2021 adopted a watered down final document after Russia insisted on the deletion of everything it did not support. The CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts on autonomous weapon systems likewise adopted yet another hollowed out report, void of any meaningful conclusions or commitments, in July 2022. It remains to be seen if the recommendations agreed here will be accepted by the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties to be held in November 2022.

The Second Open-ended Working Group on information and communications technology (ICT) managed to adopt an annual progress report, but the tense negotiations getting there underscored longstanding differences of opinion about cyber peace and security, on the role and purpose of the group, and about how to connect the group’s work with real-world instances of ICT misuse—in a uniquely challenging geopolitical context.

The Eighth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty was dominated by discussions about how some states parties in the global south have not paid their dues, which some global north countries used to argue that they should not receive Voluntary Trust Fund support. Meanwhile, many of these same global north countries are profiting from their own non-compliance with the Treaty’s provisions on arms exporting, as noted above; thus, the dues payment issue appears as a distraction from addressing the rampant global arms trade and consequent human suffering.

Building back better

Between the death grip that the rule of consensus has against producing meaningful outcomes and the geopolitical gamesmanship and warmongering, this year’s First Committee is facing a mix of challenges that will shape its work. As in recent years, these challenges affect the ways in which the United Nations operates. Fortunately, First Committee is not beholden to consensus. This gives its members an opportunity to work around those states that are being disruptive, disingenuous, and destructive.

Allowing the governments with the most weapons to dictate what is possible to the world is not acceptable. They have led us to violence; we must refuse to follow them any further and embark instead on a new road to peace, building our future through collective actions and investments not in weapons but in collective care for each other and the planet.

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