NPT News in Review, Vol. 18, No. 2

Editorial: Overcoming the Legacy of Annihilation
3 August 2023

Ray Acheson

Seventy-eight years after the detonation of the first nuclear weapon, the world is back in a nuclear arms race. While we haven’t yet reached the arsenal sizes at the height of the Cold War, the billions of dollars being spent on nuclear weapon modernisation, arsenal expansions, and production facility re-builds make it very clear that the nuclear-armed states are careening forward with a reckless competition for mass destruction. This reality underpins the work of the NPT Preparatory Committee, making a mockery of the good faith of most states seeking dialogue and implementation of legally binding disarmament obligations.

Drowning in the dangerous waters of arms racing

Throughout the NPT Preparatory Committee’s general exchange of views, most delegations expressed grave concern with the rampant nuclear arms race underway, as well as with the retrenchment of nuclear deterrence doctrines and increasing threats to use nuclear weapons. Coupled with the failure of the last two NPT Review Conferences, the nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-supportive allies have plunged the world “into uncharted and dangerous waters, posing serious questions about the indefiniteness of the NPT,” as South Africa’s delegation warned.

The nuclear-armed states, meanwhile, spent the general debate perpetuating false narratives about the situation. The United States’ delegation, for example, warned that if the international community doesn’t negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty, it risks “a return to an era of nuclear arms racing.” This ignores the fact that we are already firmly in that era. It also ignores the fact that there is already a treaty that prohibits the production of fissile material and every other activity related to nuclear weapon development and possession—the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). As the delegation of Ireland noted, since the entry into force of the TPNW, nuclear weapons themselves “are now illegal under conventional international law.”

The nuclear-armed states reject this, unsurprisingly. It is one of the only things the nuclear-armed states agree upon. The United Kingdom (UK) delegation reiterated the nuclear-armed common position that the NPT provides the only credible route to nuclear disarmament. The other thing the nuclear-armed states agree on is that the “international security environment” is not right for nuclear disarmament, as the UK again asserted during general debate. So, in this perspective, the NPT is the only way forward, but the conditions are not ripe to move forward.

It does not matter, of course, to these states that they are the ones creating a volatile international security environment, or that eliminating nuclear weapons would improve global security. Their perception of security through massive nuclear violence trumps any reality of human security or planetary survival.

The deviance of deterrence

The nuclear-armed states, however, assert that they are “responsible” with their capacity to commit nuclear violence, while simultaneously accusing others of being irresponsible with the same. The French delegation argued that nuclear weapons should only be used as “deterrents” to prevent war and not as instruments of coercion, and condemned Russia’s “abuse of the principles of nuclear deterrence”.

But as Austria’s delegation pointed out, “The belief in nuclear deterrence relies on the credible threat of the actual use of nuclear weapons.” Thus, as long as some states purport the value of nuclear deterrence, “there cannot be a real or credible taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.” The doctrine of deterrence “is logically based on concrete plans and the intention of using these weapons of mass destruction and inflicting unthinkable suffering with potentially catastrophic global consequences.” Similarly, the delegation of El Salvador argued that building security on nuclear deterrence is not sustainable, because it could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

While a great many delegations rightly condemned Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons over the past year, the only logical and consistent position would be then to condemn all nuclear threats, including the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, as the TPNW First Meeting of States Parties did in its Declaration last year. Selective condemnation of policies and practices that put the world in peril is what has led to the imbalanced implementation of the NPT and to the renewed arms race.

Sharing mass destruction

The same is true when it comes to the deployment of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-armed states, which has been the practice within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for decades and is now being taken up by Russia and Belarus. Each “side” accuses the other of violating the NPT while engaging in the same behaviour. NATO’s argument is that those negotiating the NPT took its nuclear sharing into account, and thus it cannot contravene the Treaty—but this could neither be described as a multilateral decision, nor one that is in keeping the principles and objectives of the NPT.

NATO member states expressed shock and outrage that anyone would dare critique their radioactive umbrella, arguing that their nuclear sharing is meant to “prevent coercion” and “preserve peace” and is “NPT compliant,” while Russia’s nuclear sharing is a grave threat to international peace and security and a violation of international law. The Netherlands even claimed, in a right of reply, that no one used to critique NATO’s nuclear sharing and even said that everyone accepted it up until 2015. This can be easily proven false with a look at the historical record within the NPT review cycle.

During the 2010 NPT Review Conference, several delegations, including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), repeatedly urged the Conference to address nuclear sharing (see for example the NAM’s cluster one statement). A draft of the action plan even committed the nuclear-armed states to “Address the question of all types of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure stationed on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.” In the final version, this was watered down to “Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.” It should be noted that only the US, Italy, and the Netherlands called for the deletion of the reference to nuclear sharing in the 2010 outcome. No other NATO states called for its removal, not even the other three NATO states that host US nuclear weapons on their territories.

Compromising to achieve an outcome document does not, in any way, indicate that states “accepted” NATO nuclear sharing. As Egypt said in a right of reply to the Netherlands, the NAM, the Arab Group, the African Group, and many states in their national capacities have consistently articulated an outspoken principled position against “extended nuclear deterrence” policies and practices, which are in part exemplified by nuclear sharing.

Indeed, NATO nuclear sharing practices were also critiqued during the 2000 and 2005 NPT review cycles, which is as far back as Reaching Critical Will reporting goes. And, it’s also worth noting that nuclear sharing was historically a contentious issue within NATO itself, where some NATO members objected to not only hosting nuclear weapons but also to NATO adopting a nuclear deterrence doctrine as part of its military strategy.

Attempts to rewrite history will only further undermine the NPT. Instead of arguing who did what first and whose violations of the treaty are worse, all states acting in contravention with the spirit of the Treaty should put their energies into reducing the tensions and threats that their policies and practices create. In 2010, all NPT states parties committed, in Action 1 of the Action Plan, to “pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.” Nuclear sharing, regardless of which states engage in it or when they started, is not compatible with achieving a nuclear weapon free world.

Perpetuating nuclear injustices

The question of compatibility with the NPT’s purpose and objectives is also relevant for emerging situations that risk undermining the Treaty and further stoking geopolitical rivalries and risks. This applies to, among other things, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) plan to share nuclear-powered submarines and highly enriched uranium, and to Japan’s plans to discharge contaminated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. In both cases, radioactive materials are being introduced to the sea, putting people and planet at risk. The concerns raised globally about these plans—especially from governments and civil society in the Pacific region—are virtually ignored, while geopolitical rivalries determine the nature of the “discussions” on these issues.

In contrast, when states affected by nuclear activities do speak, they are clear about the grave injustices that have been perpetuated against Indigenous Peoples, land, and water. The delegations of Kiribati and Kazakhstan, for example, delivered a joint statement about their shared experiences as states affected by nuclear weapon testing. They highlighted the harmful impacts of nuclear weapons on their populations and urged nuclear-armed states to recognise the need to assist survivors and victims and to remediate contaminated environments. They urged states to support nuclear justice initiatives to address harm from development, testing, and use of nuclear weapons, highlighting the TPNW’s provisions in this regard.

Resolving contradictions of the NPT

Can the NPT review process resolve the contradictions between the actions of those who believe nuclear weapons provide security and those who see them as death warrants? The Working Group to strengthen the review process, which met behind closed doors last week, could not reach agreement on how to improve the system. With two failed Review Conferences, crumbling arms control architecture, and rampant arms racing, unaware observers might be shocked that states parties could not get it together enough to amend methods of work that are clearly not working. But those immersed in the multilateral disarmament machinery are unfortunately not at all surprised.

Some states support the elimination of vetoes over outcome documents, while others, like Russia, believe that the only way to ensure the adoption of an outcome document “is to prepare it according to the principle of the lowest common denominator.” This is yet another contradiction that would need to be resolved under the current system, where the most militarized, violent states in the world try to dictate what the rest of the world has to accept.

Preventing future remorse

As Austria frequently says, we need a paradigm shift. “We must not resign ourselves to the idea that contemporary threats to international peace and security do not allow for nuclear disarmament,” urged Colombia’s delegation this week. “The world is not safer with nuclear weapons, as they challenge the very existence of humanity!” It argued that a peaceful future is possible—“not the illusion of peace created by the threat of nuclear weapons, but the genuine peace that we long for.” The question is how to build this world when a small handful of states is dead set on building a patriarchal world of death and destruction, where “might makes right” and violence equals power.

Many delegations emphasised the importance of learning from the past—past arms races, past devastation, past risks and threats. As Indonesia’s delegation said, the international community should learn from Oppenheimer’s remorse. “We must not ignore his profound regret,” urged Indonesia, “as it serves as a powerful reminder to all of us of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.” Unfortunately, the nuclear-armed governments and their allies are propelling us straight onto a path of even more profound regrets to come. This does not mean the rest of the world has to accept it. What legacy do governments at this PrepCom wish to leave: that of complacency and complicity in massive nuclear violence, or that of peace and justice through nuclear abolition?

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