Assurances and zones

Gabriella Irsten and Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
26 March 2013

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) met on Tuesday, 26 March, for the last plenary of the first part of the 2013 session. The focus of this plenary meeting was on negative security assurances (NSAs). Statements were delivered by the delegations of European Union, Iran, Japan, United States, Myanmar on behalf of ASEAN, Kazakhstan, Algeria, China, India, Syria, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), Pakistan, Russian Federation, Chile, and the Republic of Korea.

In addition, the CD President, Ambassador Triyono Wibowo of Indonesia, presented a plan for the coming six week break for the CD. He stated that he would continue to conduct consultations with CD member states in order to try to reach a possible draft programme of work. He noted that if no programme of work can be reached during the break, the CD will continue discussing agenda items five, six, and seven in the second part of its 2013 session.

He also announced that Indonesia and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) will organize an informal seminar during the break in order to “explore ways to overcome the stalemate” in the CD.

Negative security assurances
Delegations expressed a wide acceptance that NSAs would be a good contribution to nuclear disarmament, as well as stability and confidence.

Five of the nine nuclear armed states, the US, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India, took the floor. Ambassador Kennedy of the United States explained that her government “has provided such assurances to states that have renounced nuclear weapons and that are in full compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” She continued by highlighting that the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review stated that any chemical or biological weapons attack would be retaliated by conventional military response.

Ambassador Vasiliev noted that Russia is prepared to engage in efforts to develop NSAs within the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT. He stated that positive security assurances have been given through United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 984 from 1995 and highlighted that legally-binding NSAs exist through the nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) treaties.

Ambassador Haitao of China believed that NSAs would be an important intermediate step for disarmament; that such arrangements would strengthen the NPT regime; and that non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are entitled to such assurances. The delegations of China and India reiterated their no-first use policy. Mr Vipul also stated that India would be ready to “convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements”. Ambassador Akram of Pakistan stated that his government has since 1978 continued to seek legally-binding NSAs and remained ready to negotiate legally-binding assurances.

However, many NNWS have for many years explicitly argued that existing instruments on this topic are not enough to guarantee their security. 

While the statements from Japan and the EU called for strengthening of existing NSAs and commended some nuclear armed states for adjusting existing nuclear postures, Iran, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Syria, Turkey, and Chile emphasised that only a legally-binding treaty could guarantee that nuclear weapons wouldn’t be used on NNWS. 

Ambassador Seyed Mohammad Reza Sajjadi from the Iranian delegation stated that “if there would have been political will and honesty rather than hypocrisy and duplicity, this negotiation has been very simple and should have been reached to concrete results many years ago.” Mr. Khelif of the Algerian delegation emphasised that despite numerous calls for the CD to negotiate legally-binding NSAs, including from the General Assembly resolutions and the NPT Review Conferences, the nuclear armed states have not responded.

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ)
The majority of states also emphasised the valuable contribution that NWFZs have had on NSAs. US Ambassador Laura Kennedy stated that although the US is not supportive of a global NSA treaty, it is “prepared to continue to consider providing legally binding negative security assurances in the context of specific nuclear weapon free zone treaties.”

However, Ambassador Tileuberdi of Kazakhstan recognized that NWFZ represent a positive step towards disarmament and NSAs, but highlighted that such zones cannot replace universal and legally-binding NSAs. In addition, he pointed out that although NWFZ now cover more than half of the world, most NSA protocols attached to these treaties have not been ratified by nuclear weapon states. Ms Issas from Syria also pointed out that the NSAs provided through NWFZ are conditional and geographically bound, and therefore insufficient.  

Ambassador Wai from Myanmar spoke on behalf of the ASEAN region and said that NWFZ contribute significantly to strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He also wished that the nuclear weapon states would sign the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) without any reservations as soon as possible.

Many delegations reiterated the disappointment of establishing the conference on the weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. The EU and the ASEAN statement also reiterated their commitment to a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons and condemned nuclear test conducted on the 13 February by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Notes from the gallery
As the first part of the 2013 session comes to an end, there are few new conclusions that can be made. The Conference is no closer to beginning substantive work than it was at this point last year. This is also true with the progress on the issue of NSAs. Although some nuclear armed states have tweaked the language in defence policies in regard to NSAs in the last few years, only China, India, and Pakistan have indicated support for legally-binding NSAs.

As the ambassador of Kazakhstan mentioned, although the NWS have expressed their support for the NWFZ treaties in theory, the Tlateloco Treaty is the only one that has had its protocols signed and ratified by all NPT NWS. In addition these ratifications have all been accompanied with reservations.

NWFZ are a great contribution to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. And NSAs could be another significant step in the right direction too. However, it is important that these initiatives do not continue to implicitly contribute to legitimizing nuclear weapons.

A nuclear weapon free zone or a negative security assurance will not protect any state from the humanitarian and environmental effects of a nuclear detonation. Such effects are oblivious to the existence of such political boundaries. Even though nuclear weapons are firmly banned within the geographical regions of a nuclear weapon free zone, these countries will face the consequences of any use. No amount of treaty protocols or security assurances would be able to protect states from the effects of a nuclear exchange.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, no state or region will be immune from the effects of their use. The main focus of nuclear-weapon-free states, and in particular the 115 states that are part of a NWFZ, should therefore be to base their argumentation on a humanitarian discourse and to work towards the goal of a comprehensive international treaty banning nuclear weapons globally.

Next plenary meeting
The second part of the 2013 session will begin on 13 May.