Enhancing collective security through action

Beatrice Fihn and Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During the Conference on Disarmament (CD)’s Thursday morning plenary meeting, Ambassador Akram of Pakistan made a comprehensive statement explaining the reasoning behind his government’s position on a programme of work for the CD as well as on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials. This statement sparked a debate, resulting in replies from the delegations of Norway,India, Japan, Pakistan again, Germany, and Belarus, as well as the Secretary-General of the CD, Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Pakistan a third time, and Ordzhonikidze again. In addition, the new Australian ambassador, Mr. Peter Woolcott, delivered a statement on his delegation’s positions on the CD’s agenda items.

Highlights
Pakistan’s Ambassador Akram explained his government’s opposition (rooted in its regional security concerns) to the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) that would only stop the future production of fissile materials. He indicated that the CD would need to clarify the question of existing stocks before negotiations can begin. He also suggested that if there is no agreement on this issue, the CD could get to work by beginning negotiations on one of its other core issues.

The ambassadors from Japan and Germany argued that an FMCT would be both a disarmament and non-proliferation measure.

Germany’s Ambassador Hoffman also argued that there is no need to have the objectives of the treaty clarified before negotiations begin and that the FMCT seems to be the next logical step toward nuclear disarmament and thus should be negotiated now, rather than one of the other core issues.

India’s Ambassador Rao objected to references to India’s record of nuclear proliferation in Ambassador Akram’s statement.

The Secretary-General of the CD, Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, once again reminded delegations that a programme of work is just a piece of paper and that its adoption will not hamper the strategic security concerns of any country.

Norway’s deputy permanent representative announced that the 30th ratification needed for entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions had been achieved and the treaty will enter into force on 1 August 2010. Norway’s representative highlighted some lessons from the Oslo process leading to this Convention that are applicable to the current situation in the CD and argued that the world cannot it to nuclear-armed states alone to decide when the time would be ripe to start a nuclear disarmament process.

Pakistan’s opposition to a fissile material cut-off treaty
Five weeks into the first part of the CD’s 2010 session, Ambassador Zamir Akram of Pakistan offered a comprehensive rationale for his delegation’s reluctance to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) without a specific reference to the inclusion of existing stocks. He placed this reluctance in the context of the history of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and the subsequent security issues this has raised for his country. He argued that the transfer of fissile material to India via the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exemption on nuclear trade with India (which allows India to use more of its indigenous fissile materials for nuclear weapon production), coupled with the existing asymmetries between the Indian and Pakistani stockpiles of fissile materials and his delegation’s perception that the current proposal for an FMCT is intended only to stop future production of such materials, makes the negotiation of this treaty contrary to Pakistan’s security interests.

Implications for the possibility of substantive work in the CD
Responding to ongoing criticism that Pakistan is blocking negotiations from commencing in the CD, Ambassador Akram pointed out that those advocating for an FMCT have already shaken the foundations of the non-proliferation regime by granting the NSG waiver to India—violating their own national and international commitments, including those made under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the process. He argued that in this context, these states’ “exhortations” in favour of protecting the non-proliferation regime through an FMCT “ring hollow”. He further argued that an FMCT as currently envisaged would be cost-free to the nuclear-armed states that have already declared moratoriums on the production of fissile materials, and that in terms of the three “de facto” nuclear weapon states, Israel has a special status and India has been given a waiver. In Pakistan’s view, this leaves Pakistan to bear to cost of an FMCT alone.

Ambassador Akram emphasized that before negotiations can begin on a treaty on fissile materials, CD member states must clarify whether they are negotiating an FMCT, which will just stop future production, or a fissile material treaty (FMT), which will also reduce existing stocks. Pakistan’s government is unwilling to engage in negotiations on an FMCT, which they see as strictly a non-proliferation and not a disarmament measure.

However, Ambassador Akram argued that there is no reason for an impasse in the CD even if there is no consensus on beginning negotiations on an FMCT. He suggested that the CD begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament instead.

Responses
In response to Ambassador Akram’s statement, Japan’s Ambassador Suda argued that an FMCT would “limit the total volume of nuclear arsenals of the world and enable a further reduction of the total nuclear arsenals in the world,” and should therefore be considered both a disarmament and non-proliferation step. Ambassador Hoffman of Germany agreed with this assessment.

Ambassador Hoffman also expressed confusion about why the Pakistani government will not let negotiations begin, arguing that “it would not be the first time in history that negotiations start with positions that are very far apart from one another” and where the objectives of the negotiations are not clearly laid out in advance. He also articulated the two pivotal practical and political questions at hand: “How much can this body do at the same time” (practical) and “What is right for this negotiation?” (political). He argued there is “a certain intrinsic logic” to proceeding with a treaty on fissile materials, following the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, the Secretary-General of the CD, intervened in the discussion to argue that: a) all states have security concerns vis-à-vis each other on other issues but that these states show flexibility; and b) it is hard to imagine that a programme of work would hamper the strategic stability of any statement, for it is just a document for further discussion. He pointed out that “if you do not try, you will never succeed” and urged all member states to demonstrate flexibility in order to fulfil the CD’s mandate.

Ambassador Akram replied to Mr. Ordzhonikidze, arguing once again that the FMCT is not the only item on the CD’s agenda. He asked why the Conference does not ask the countries that are blocking progress on those items to show flexibility.

Alternatives to the impasse
Ambassador Akram of Pakistan stated that his delegation was not isolated in the CD, but instead that a large number of delegations do in fact recognize Pakistan’s position as legitimate and justified. He also emphasized that there is a broad agreement within the CD that a treaty banning the production of fissile material should be a disarmament measure rather than a non-proliferation arrangement. However, Ambassador Akram clarified, the Pakistani delegation is “ready to stand in splendid isolation if we have to” and “any attempt to take the FMCT out of the CD, will be an empty initiative.”

The Norwegian deputy permanent representative, Ms. Hilde Skorpen, who took the floor on the occasion of the 30th ratification needed for the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, suggested that relevant lessons could be drawn from the negotiation of that treaty. Acknowledging the belief of some states that consensus is vital when it comes to nuclear disarmament, Ms. Skorpen argued that “it could could be possible to develop norms against the use of nuclear weapons and even to outlaw them without a consensus decision and that such norms will eventually be applied globally.” She insisted, “We cannot leave it to the nuclear states alone to decide when it is time for them do away with these weapons. The destructive power of these weapons would affect us all if put to use and their threat would continue to affect us all. Therefore, nuclear disarmament is everybody’s business.” Further, she noted that the CD is “failing to include relevant stakeholders such as civil society representatives,” and is “thus cheating [itself] from their experience and knowledge.”

The new Australian ambassador, Mr. Woolcott, noted that for too long, the CD has been “negotiating about whether to negotiate, how to negotiate, when to negotiate. Some call it sleepwalking.” He argued that to break the impasse and fulfill its mandate, CD member states need to “work together, practically and with a clear focus.”

Notes from the gallery
Reaching Critical Will agrees that the NSG waiver granted to India constituted another blow to an already beleaguered NPT and global non-proliferation regime and that it is damaging to nuclear disarmament efforts. Our forthcoming publication, Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear disarmament, includes a chapter on the US-India nuclear deal and the subsequent NSG waiver. A sneak preview of this chapter is already available on DisarmamentActivist.org.

However, this situation does not justify another unproductive year of the CD. Instead, it reinforces the need for finding shared objectives and pursuing negotiations that lead to real and effective nuclear disarmament in order to strengthen our common security. Such security will be found in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, reducing fissile material stocks, reducing the number of nuclear warheads. It will not be found by maintaining any size of arsenal for nuclear “deterrence”. The states that possess nuclear weapons do not appear to feel any more secure than those that belong to one of the world’s several nuclear weapon free zones.

It is worth reminding the delegates in the CD of what has been argued since the invention of nuclear weapons and was most recently stated in the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’s report:

Nuclear weapons are the most inhumane weapons ever conceived, inherently indiscriminate in those they kill and maim, and with an impact deadly for decades. Their use by anyone at any time, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, would be catastrophic. They are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess—combining their blast, radiation and potential “nuclear winter” effects—are able to do so many times over.

As Ms. Skorpen from Norway said, it cannot be left up to the nuclear-armed states alone to decide when they are ready to start disarming. Therefore, the scope of a future FMCT must not be determined by nuclear-armed states only. A programme of work might be just a paper, but this paper would give the world an opportunity to engage in negotiations on nuclear weapons for the first time since the conclusion of the CTBT. All states and civil society have a responsibility to make sure that the issue of existing stocks is on the table once negotiations start, but to make that possible, the CD must adopt of a programme of work.

Next meeting
The next plenary meeting of the CD is scheduled for Thursday, 25 February at 10:00 AM.