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June 27, 2005

Under the second session of the Conference on Disarmament's (CD) rotating Presidency of Norway, 28 delegations delivered statements on the floor, including the Netherlands, Japan, Egypt (on behalf of the Arab Group), China, Russia, Ireland, Syrian, Ethiopia (on behalf of the Group of 21), Pakistan, Switzerland, Mexico, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Chile, Germany, India, New Zealand, South Africa, Peru, Brazil, France, Argentina, South Korea, Algeria, Cuba, United Kingdom and Malaysia. All statements are available at:http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches05/index.html#second. 

This plenary session was the first of four planned by Ambassador Strømmen to address the main issues of the CD: 1) Nuclear Disarmament, 2) Fissile Materials, 3) Outer Space and 4) Security Assurances.

Of these 28 States, most expressed support for familiar issues, such as the commencement of negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an Ad Hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as well as one exclusively focused on security assurances. Many reiterated their commitment to already-agreed upon principles, such as irreversibility and transparency in their application to nuclear disarmament measures. Japan, China, Russia, Ireland, Syria, Mexico, the Group of 21, Canada, Germany, Cuba, South Africa, Malaysia, Chile and other countries supported establishing within the Conference an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with nuclear disarmament, as is proposed in the A5 agenda, the most widely-supported proposed agenda for the long stalemated Conference.

Some Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), including France, China, the UK and Russia, used this focused plenary to once again reiterate their commitment to nuclear disarmament, and rehash some well-rehearsed policies on the matter. (The US was the only recognized NWS that chose not to address the issue of nuclear disarmament.) China, however, recognized the growing tendency to stress non-proliferation while downplaying nuclear disarmament, an unusual perspective from a NWS. Ambassador Hu called for the implementation of appropriate intermediate measures of nuclear disarmament, maintaining that the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament was the preferable platform for such action. He also asserted that the link between preventing an arms race in outer space(PAROS) and progress on nuclear disarmament went hand in hand. 

Ambassador Skotnikov of the Russian Federation insisted that his country has no objection to the program of work proposed in the A5 agenda or in Ambassador Sanders’ Food-For-Thought paper. However, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate only “to deal with” PAROS is not Russia’s optimal strategy. Ambassador Skotnikov also announced that Russia is prepared to study a possible solution of security assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States within the framework of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament.

Some countries used the opportunity to present newer ideas and proposals for moving the regime forward. In his farewell address to the CD, the Netherlands’ Ambassador Chris Sanders warned that the consensus rule in the UN system was increasingly misused by a small number of countries to veto proposals on minor issues. He also expressed concerned with the vitality of the UN disarmament machinery, which was created under very different circumstances than that of today. He suggested rethinking the mandates of the CD and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), and proposed that governments “settle for one single universal body… (such as) the (General Assembly) First Committee” which “seem(s) capable of negotiating treaties”. 

In the same vein, Ambassador Bonnier of Sweden expressed hope that the reform of the United Nations, to be discussed at the September Millennium+5 (M+5) Summit, would be an opportunity to address the failure of existing machinery. She also proposed that the Conference take stock of what disarmament efforts had already been made or were on-going in other contexts, a proposal that Mexico's Ambassador Macedo thought was a good idea. 

In an appeal for greater transparency, Ambassador Caughley of New Zealand asserted that the standing of this forum and its gravity of purpose should be conducted under the critical eye of the public. He, too, expressed hope for the M+5 Summit in New York, which can assess multilateral disarmament and arms control machinery and determine whether, and how, new parameters can be set.

Canada's Ambassador Meyer proposed that the Conference consider other issues, such as those of compliance and how best to implement principles or irreversibility and transparency and address the verification dimension. Non-strategic nuclear weapons and confidence building could also be addressed at the CD. 

Ambassador Whelan of Ireland suggested that the Conference provide a forum where countries which have not ratified the NPT (Israel, India and Pakistan) could engage meaningfully in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues. These views and others were also supported by Ambassador Streuli of Switzerland.

Ambassador Mtshali of South Africa stated that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS was incompatible with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security. He drew attention to a proposal of the 12 inter-related measures contained in its statement to the general debate of the NPT Review Conference.

Others, however, used the opportunity to reiterate long-standing positions. Ambassador Fonrouge of Argentina, for instance, used his time on the floor to reiterate its commitment to nuclear energy, the CTBT and further nuclear disarmament, which it viewed as dependent upon progress made on conventional weapons. 

Syria and Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, once again condemned Israel for failing to subscribe to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to promote a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), as called for in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. The Arab Group also asserted the continued validity of the 13 steps to disarmament, as agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, a point reiterated by Group of 21 and Peru.

Ambassadors Trezza and Rivasseau of Italy and France, respectively, referred to the EU common position established for the Review Conference. While noting the efforts made by NWS to present in a more transparent way figures on their nuclear arsenals and on their reduction, Ambassador Trezza also expressed his country's aspirations for more strengthened efforts by the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. 

Pakistan, like many of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) speaking that day, also expressed concern with the slow pace of disarmament, the lack of movement on the interrelated issues of test ban, fissile materials, outer space and negative assurances, and the stalled debate and dialogue on disarmament. He, too, expressed concern with the "gradual emaciation" of the existing multilateral forums, and voiced the need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, as well as the need to fight terrorism and deny weapons of mass destruction access to terrorists. Concerning the need for his own country to disarm, Ambassador Khan noted that India and Pakistan are pursuing a "strategic restraint regime" and are making some progress. 

Ambassador Prasad of India stated that as an NWS, India was conscious of its special responsibility towards nuclear disarmament. India's "defensive" security posture was marked by responsibility, restraint and predictability and was predicted on a minimum credible deterrence that precluded the doctrines of first use or pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, or the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. India had continued to advocate legally binding international instruments to enshrine these commitments, and also to negotiate a legally binding instrument on security assurances to NNWS. 

Speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, Ethiopia's Ambassador Yimer reaffirmed the Group's priority for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific framework of time, and expressed support for a Nuclear Weapon Convention. 

With so many States speaking on so many issues in just one plenary, it may be difficult to separate and understand each of these nuanced positions. It is for this reason that, at the end of each session, Reaching Critical Will updates our Summary of Statements by Topic, a useful resource that helps activists understand where each country stands on each of the issues discussed at the Conference on Disarmament. 

Tomorrow, the CD will meet to discuss issues relating to Fissile Materials. On Thursday, it will look at the ongoing struggle to prevent the weaponization of outer space.