NPT News in Review, Vol. 18, No. 3

Editorial: Sharing Responsibility Intead of Weapons
6 August 2023

Ray Acheson

Seventy-eight years ago today, the United States (US) government dropped a nuclear weapon on Hiroshima, decimating the city, killing more than 140,000 people, and leaving a radioactive legacy that harmed many more for generations. This horrific act was repeated three days later in Nagasaki. These war crimes stand as the last time an atomic bomb was used in conflict, but they preceded thousands of global nuclear detonations leading to death, displacement, and devastation around the world. Today, threats to use these weapons are once again on the rise, and all the nuclear-armed states and some of their allies stand ready to unleash catastrophic nuclear violence on the world if they decide it suits their political interests. This is an unacceptable way to live in our shared world.

Attending a meeting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) during the anniversaries of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should put additional pressure on states parties to make meaningful progress for nuclear disarmament. To fulfill the appeal of the survivors, the hibakusha, of Never Again. Yet, as we reach the halfway point of the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), it is clear this pressure is not felt by those who possess these bombs. Instead, they continue to stall on fulfilling their legal obligation to disarm.

Breaking the nuclear chains

The perpetual stalemate has made it clear for decades that changes to how the NPT operates as a process are necessary. The review structure has not been updated since 1995, and it needs some serious work. It’s with this common understanding that NPT states parties decided to convene a Working Group before the PrepCom to strengthen the review process. While the Working Group failed to reach agreement on recommendations, the discussions there reportedly generated some useful ideas for making better use of time and engaging in more meaningful work at future NPT meetings.

One of these is the suggestion that NPT states parties engage in a structured process to assess the nuclear-armed states’ compliance with their Article VI obligation and related commitments. Aotearoa New Zealand, Ireland, and Switzerland submitted a joint paper to the Working Group outlining a possible framework for this, upon which Aotearoa New Zealand further elaborated during last week’s Cluster One discussion. It explained the nuclear-armed states should report on a specific set of issues in a standardised form, which would be sent to all NPT states parties ahead of the relevant meeting, providing enough time for interactive dialogue at the meeting, and establishing a follow-up evidence-based evaluation of compliance at Review Conferences, in addition to agreement on next steps.

This could improve the utility of both PrepComs and RevCons, help build trust among states, and foster a spirit of transparency and collaboration that could in turn break some of the intrenched deadlocks that have been building for decades. On the other hand, it could also just turn into another fruitless exercise of nuclear-armed states asserting their compliance with Article VI and refusing to undertake any further action for nuclear disarmament, whilst building up their arsenals and collectively careening toward nuclear war. Given the current situation, it seems worth it to try to do things differently, with the hope that changing processes can help build momentum for changing policies and practices.

However, the inability of the Working Group to adopt any recommendations highlights the crux of the problem with the NPT as a whole: a small minority of countries, or even a single state, can block the rest of the Treaty’s membership from advancing the effective implementation of the Treaty. Until the matter of “consensus” is resolved, it is not clear what NPT states parties can do to improve the review process’ working methods, let alone achieve the goals and objectives of the Treaty.

This is why, in our statement to the Working Group, WILPF recommended that consensus no longer be treated as a requirement of unanimity. Instead, NPT states parties should change their decision-making processes. The UN High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism suggests qualified majority, double majority, or non-unanimous definitions of consensus voting systems as possible options.

Of course, those benefiting the most from having a veto in multilateral forums are resistant to such proposals. Right now, that appears to be Russia, which has used its veto across multiple disarmament forums over the past few years to block progress on many different issues. But Russia is historically not the only nuclear-armed state to use its veto to single-handedly block multilateral disarmament initiatives—the US has stymied work on preventing an arms race in outer space, Pakistan prevents work on prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, etc.

Thus, the attachment to veto is short sighted. One state might use it today to “protect its interests;” another state may use it tomorrow to undermine those interests. Eliminating vetoes means protecting the interests of all states at all times, rather than just one state some of the time. And, if disarmament and demilitarisation are actually allowed to advance, states may find their perceptions of the interests shift, from one of violent competition to nonviolent cooperation. Much more importantly, it could lead to the protection of people and planet, beyond the “state security” paradigm.

The alternative is what Russia called for during the general exchange of views, which is for NPT outcomes to be based on lower common denominator agreements. This will mean a perpetual attachment to nuclear deterrence theory and all the destruction that goes along with it. It will mean more nuclear stockpile build-ups and arms racing, more destabilisation, more threats to use nuclear weapons, and will likely lead the world straight into a radioactive abyss.

Spreading the nuclear “burden”

The lowest common denominator at best preserves the status quo—but that itself is an illusion. In reality, the situation is deteriorating rapidly. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the horrific human suffering and environmental damage that has generated, its threats to use nuclear weapons, and now, reportedly, it’s consideration of withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to achieve “full parity” with the United States, all accelerate the severe downward spiral that was already ongoing.

Furthermore, with Russia’s announcement of deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, the practice of nuclear sharing is spreading quickly. Mexico warned that some nuclear-armed states allies “have increasingly dangerously fallen into the orbit of military alliances, both old and perhaps new.” By not putting an end to these practices, we risk a return to the era of widespread nuclear weapon deployment within many countries around the world, and all of the heightened tensions and risk of use that entails.

As noted in the previous edition of the NPT News in Review, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) also “shares” US nuclear weapons among some of its members. This practice used to be even more extensive than it is today. As Moritz Kütt, Pavel Podvig, and Zia Mian point out in a recent article in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the United States formerly stationed its nuclear weapons on the territories of many more countries. So did the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

The fight about nuclear sharing continued in the cluster one discussions last week. While Russia argued that it is hypocritical for the United States and NATO members to critique its stationing of weapons in Belarus, given their own nuclear sharing practice, the US delegation and NATO allies reiterated that their “nuclear burden sharing arrangement” predates and is fully consistent with the NPT. They also continued to argue that because the Soviet Union accepted this during the negotiation of the NPT, Russia today has no right to criticise this practice.

However, as noted in the previous editorial, the issue of nuclear sharing has in fact always been contentious. As Ambassaor Mohamed Shaker explained in his three-volume study of the NPT, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins and Implementation, 1959-1979, NATO nuclear sharing was one of the main controversies during negotiations of the Treaty. And as Kütt, Podvig, and Mian articulate in the Bulletin, it has long been an issue within the NPT review cycle.

The risks of rhetoric

At its core, the argument about which nuclear sharing arrangements violate the NPT and which don’t is just another iteration of violent states asserting which one is more violent. On Thursday the US delegation claimed that it is not the one that has attacked another country without provocation or undermined bilateral arms control or engaged in dangerous nuclear rhetoric or moved nuclear weapons closer to others’ borders. This denies the history of US military interventions in dozens of countries, its unilateral abrogation of numerous arms control agreements, its previous threats to use nuclear weapons and its nuclear war planning, as well as its nuclear sharing.

None of this is justification for any other country to engage in the same behaviour; but the attempted rewriting of history is dangerous. It is only by acknowledging the past and righting those wrongs—not by denying them—that human civilization can have any chance at survival.

Otherwise, as long as the nuclear-armed states keep accusing each other of breaking the law and creating a dangerous situation, they will continue to put us all at risk. As Austria noted during the cluster one discussions, nuclear deterrence theory relies on the constant threat to actually use these weapons. “This means the constant readiness to potentially end the world as we know it. And this despite the many risks, uncertainties, assumptions and the risk of confirmation bias on which deterrence theory is based. We cannot rely with any degree of certainty that nuclear deterrence is or will be effective but we know for sure that nuclear deterrence can fail.”

On this basis, Brazil criticised the attempts to distinguish between “responsible” and “irresponsible” nuclear-armed states, arguing that the concept of “responsible” possession of weapons of mass destruction is an oxymoron. “Responsibility is not binary,” said Brazil. “Neither are behaviors. Nuclear deterrence doctrines, even the most defensive in nature, always rest upon a credible threat of use of nuclear weapons.” Thus, as Thailand argued, nuclear deterrence doctrines “do not guarantee the absence of war but rather the absence of trust.”

Critiquing conditions

This absence of trust has contributed to building an “international security environment” that the nuclear-armed states and their apologists, as Brazil described them, claim is not conducive to nuclear disarmament. For example, Russia argued that nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament cannot be isolated from the general geopolitical and military-strategic context, while Belgium asserted, “The current geopolitical situation forces us to adopt a realistic vision of what is achievable in the field of nuclear disarmament.”

The states that believe nuclear weapons bring them power in the international system have been making these same claims for years. But now, certain NATO states speak as if this has only been an issue since Russia launched its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. It is clear this is just the latest in the long line of excuses to retain nuclear weapons and retrench them in security doctrines.

The majority is not buying it. The Arab Group, the New Agenda Coalition, Algeria, Aotearoa New Zealand, Austria, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, and others refuted the idea that nuclear disarmament is contingent upon the nuclear-armed states’ assessment of the security environment. As Algeria said, the NPT must be implemented unconditionally, with Iraq noting that it is because of the challenges in international security that urgent steps must be taken for nuclear disarmament.

The Philippines highlighted the hypocrisy of the “security environment precludes disarmament” argument, noting that “such arbitrariness deviates from the predictability and stability of the rules-based international order that some of these Nuclear Weapon States profess to defend.” It also undermines the concept of “undiminished and increased security of all,” which other nuclear-armed states insist upon in their conditionalities. As Austria noted, “Nuclear armed states have tried to focus all attention on security perspectives of nuclear possessors. But undiminished and increased security concerns the security of all of us. And all our common security is being critically and potentially catastrophically diminished by nuclear weapons.” Thus, the principle of undiminished security for all must “be seen correctly as a call for acceleration of disarmament efforts, rather than as a conditionality or a means to delay or avoid the implementation of Art 6.”

For most governments, the ongoing armed conflicts, geopolitical tensions, and threats to use nuclear weapons are a compelling reason to disarm, not to build back massive nuclear arsenals. “We are not naïve to the point of denying that the security environment has a bearing on disarmament,” said Brazil. “But disarmament—and expressions of willingness to engage towards that goal—shapes and alters said environment by breeding confidence and good will.”

Banning the bomb in challenging times

This belief that nuclear disarmament helps improve global peace and security is why the majority of states negotiated and voted for the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. In a joint statement to the NPT PrepCom, the states parties of the TPNW reiterated that the establishment of a legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons is a necessary and effective measure preventing a nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. They expressed hope “that the TPNW’s rejection of nuclear weapons and its support for international humanitarian law will positively influence the discussions towards the effective implementation of the NPT, in particular, its Art. VI.”

Joining the TPNW would be the most straightforward way to improve the security environment, by committing all countries to eliminate their nuclear weapon programmes. But the nuclear-armed states and their apologists continue to refuse to accept this, calling instead for “steps” they deem more appropriate for the security environment—even though it has been decades without achieving any of the goals contained within their alleged “progressive” agenda. Making excuses for the relentless inaction of the “building blocks” or “step-by-step” approach, Germany explained that “steps like this don’t beam us into a nuclear-weapons’ free world immediately. But they are necessary and would be important to embark us on a pathway to nuclear disarmament and ultimately to a safer world without nuclear weapons again.”

There is some irony to such remarks, given that Germany and others have previously tried to ridicule TPNW supporters for being utopian in their alleged insistence on “immediate” nuclear disarmament through prohibition, as if any TPNW state party ever thought they could just snap their fingers and make nuclear weapons disappear. But of the two agendas, only the TPNW offers a roadmap for disarmament, with clear timelines and categorical prohibitions that make the rules equal for everyone.

The TPNW is fully complementary with the NPT, serving as a key step in the implementation of Article VI and in preventing proliferation. It was negotiated, adopted, and entered into force within the security environment that the states with nuclear weapons assert is too dangerous to disarm. Likewise, the NPT itself, as Ireland said, shows what can be achieved at times of great danger: “Instigated by Ireland at the height of the Cold War, when the accepted wisdom was that the number of nuclear-armed states would grow rapidly, the [NPT] represents what is possible through effective multilateralism.” NPT states parties need to embrace the spirit of determination and resilience that both these treaties represent and take the actions needed now to prevent catastrophe.

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