NPT News in Review, Vol. 17, No. 6

Editorial: Disarmament Needs Determined Action
16 August 2022

Ray Acheson 

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As the draft texts from Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies started getting released over the weekend, states parties have entered into negotiating mode. Most are keen to strengthen the reports. Some want to weaken them. In particular, those states parties that possess or support the possession of nuclear weapons are set on denying reality and deferring commitments in the reports focusing on nuclear disarmament. But this, as countless delegations said during Monday’s meetings, is not acceptable. “Undiminished security” cannot just be about the security of some states, said Austria. It must be about the security of all, including all non-nuclear armed states “that are currently threatened by nuclear weapons and the policy of nuclear deterrence.” The outcome of this Review Conference must reflect this, and advance meaningful actions for change.

One overarching problem relates to transparency. Since the Subsidiary Body meetings are closed to civil society, we don’t know what’s being said there. But even in the open Main Committee meetings, especially in Main Committee I (MCI), most of the nuclear-armed states indicated they will make their “corrections” to the MCI draft report in writing to the Chair. Some made a few brief remarks in MCI’s meeting on Monday but said they would provide details in writing. What is clear from the remarks they made is that they want more reflection of what they have already and done and less attention to the fact that they haven’t done very much.

Dismal disarmament implementation

This relates to the other overarching problem, which is the nuclear-armed states’ attitude that their proposed amendments are “corrections” to the report. This suggests they believe the report is factual incorrect and needs to be amended to reflect reality. This is, of course, not the case. If anything, as many non-nuclear armed states pointed out, the MCI draft report treads lightly when reflecting the reality of the dismal state of affairs of nuclear disarmament. It could be—and should be—much more precise in outlining the catastrophic failure of the nuclear-armed states to comply with their legal obligations for the past fifty years, and the fact that this has led the world to brink of nuclear disaster and ever more war.

But even the relatively timid reflection of the problems facing the nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT are too strong for the nuclear-armed states, who want to add some paragraphs talking about how difficult it is for them to disarm in the current context. Some of the brief remarks also indicated that they will be calling for conditionalities on their obligations; the United States, for example, even tried to argue that the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s ruling that the nuclear-armed states are legally obligated to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons is not legally correct. As Sri Lanka noted: actually, the ICJ is correct, but also, the nuclear-armed states shouldn’t need the ICJ opinion to compel them to do the right thing and comply with the obligations and commitments under the NPT.

The draft is also light when it comes to disarmament. While it reaffirms past commitments and obligations and stresses the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, it does not add any timelines, benchmarks, or indicators by which to measure progress or mechanisms to hold states parties to account. In Main Committee II, delegations have also noted that the list of non-proliferation related commitments and outcomes in the draft report of that Committee outweigh what is being set out for nuclear-armed states in MCI.

As Costa Rica argued, the persistent lack of a clear timeline and firm deadlines “has provided the nuclear-armed States with a pathway to disregard their disarmament commitments as flagrantly as they have since the last Review Conference.” Thus, the report must “reaffirm that these are not open-ended commitments, and that concrete and urgent progress towards eliminating all nuclear arsenals by the nuclear-weapon States is essential for the credibility of the Treaty.”

Acknowledging but not stopping modernisation

The MCI draft report is also very easygoing when it comes to nuclear weapon modernisation. It recognises concerns expressed but does not reflect a call for the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons to stop. It is not accompanied by an action to stop modernisation in the Subsidiary Body 1 (SB1) draft report. The SB1 draft report only commits the nuclear-armed states to acknowledge concerns with modernisation—but even this is too much for the nuclear-armed states.

The US, for example, tried to argue its modernisation programme actually helps reduce the role of nuclear weapons doctrines—even though this is clearly not the case, based on the US doctrine as well as its nuclear weapon deployments—and the UK said it doesn’t recognise the concept of “vertical proliferation,” even though this term has been used in the NPT context for years.

No threat to nuclear threats

The report also goes very lightly on nuclear threats and risks. It does not even contain a clear condemnation of nuclear threats—even though several nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states tried to claim the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in June 2022 wasn’t strong enough in condemning threats. The Declaration adopted by TPNW states parties provides an unequivocal condemnation of any and all nuclear threats, irrespective of the circumstances. The first draft of the MCI one report just welcomes the nuclear-armed states’ “reaffirmation of the importance of addressing nuclear threat.” For all the bluster about how “weak” the TPNW declaration is, this is quite striking.

Meltdown over mentioning military alliances

Meanwhile, the nuclear-supportive states demanded the deletion of the first ever, and also rather mild, recognition that they have responsibility when it comes to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. They opposed paragraph 23 of the MCI report, which recognises the importance of states parties that are part of military alliances that include nuclear-armed states to report “on steps taken to reduce and eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security doctrines.” It doesn’t even call on them to reduce and eliminate the role, just to report on steps taken to that end.

In protesting this paragraph, the nuclear-allied states argued this creates a “third category” of states parties, alongside nuclear-armed and non-nuclear armed states. As Germany articulated, they see this as contrary to the word and spirit of the NPT. Yet, these same states have repeatedly said that they don’t see nuclear sharing or their self-described nuclear alliance as contrary to the word and spirit of the Treaty. How can both be true? In a classic case of wanting to have their cake and eat it to, these states are effectively arguing that while their actions do not contradict the Treaty, any mention of their actions does contradict the Treaty.

The nuclear-supportive allies themselves act as if they are in a “third category”—they include nuclear weapons in their doctrines, accept strategic concepts that assert they are part of a “nuclear alliance,” expect nuclear weapons to be used in their “defence,” and five even station US nuclear weapons on their territories. As Malaysia said, paragraph 23 does not create a new category of states under the NPT but is a factual refection of the relationship between states under existing military alliances linked to nuclear weapons. Such alliances perpetuate the continuation of nuclear doctrines and weapons; thus, these states have a shared responsibility to report on steps to reduce and eliminate the role of these weapons.

Humanitarian impacts

The MCI draft includes much more language on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons (HINW), which most delegations welcomed. However, the language from the 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirming “the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law” is not in the text—but as it has been added to the revised SB1 draft, it might be added to the next MCI report too, as was requested by several declarations.

The paragraphs on the HINW could also be strengthened by mentioning the humanitarian and environmental impacts from the development of nuclear weapons in addition to detonations; this would capture the impacts from uranium mining, fuel processing, weapons manufacturing, radioactive waste storage, etc. However, even without such references France and the UK have already indicated they will be trying to remove or water down these paragraphs through their secret written submissions to the Chair.

Recognising the TPNW

There is a factual recognition of the existence of the TPNW in the draft MCI report, though as many delegations pointed out, this could be strengthened by including an also factual reference to its complementarity with the NPT and its contributions to achieving Article VI. As Sri Lanka noted, the resistance by some states to acknowledge this is politically motivated and needs to be settled.

Inclusivity in the NPT

Similarly, the references to gender should be strengthened—the draft includes a good reference to the relevance of gender perspectives but could also recognise the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and call for the participation of all genders. It could also be more intersectional and inclusive by also referring to racial diversity and the participation of affected communities, among others.

Related to this, as Costa Rica pointed out, the outcome of this Review Conference needs to reflect that it needs to do better when it comes to participation in the work of the NPT. As things stand now, “Civil society does not have the right to speak during [Main Committee meetings], to attend the subsidiary body meetings, or to receive the documents we are discussing presently,” Costa Rica noted. Supported by Colombia and Ireland, it called for a more inclusive process for civil society and reflection of this in the final report.

Ambition need apply

When it comes to both the MCI draft report and the SB1 revised draft report, the bottom line is while the documents are quite strong in places and reflective of the need for compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, they do not have sufficient ambition. They lack timebound commitments and accountability mechanisms. They recognise many of the problems, but don’t adequately provide solutions—they call more for nuclear-armed states to acknowledge things or being more transparent about things, but not to actually do things to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

It's hard not to feel like it’s 2010 all over again, adopting some good language and lots of actions. But now we have another seven years without implementation of the nuclear disarmament commitments, let along the core disarmament obligations of the Treaty. And during these past seven years, arsenals have increased, modernisation has run rampant, there are new proliferation challenges, and nuclear rhetoric and threats are at an all-time high.

We are not just treading water; we are on the verge of drowning. The NPT Review Conference cannot just be treated as an academic exercise. With the world at stake, we need more than words on paper. We need the nuclear-armed states to accept reality and fulfill their obligations, now. As Sri Lanka said, NPT states parties are trusties. But the world is watching.

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