NPT News in Review, Vol. 18, No. 4

Editorial: Proliferating Double Standards
8 August 2023

Ray Acheson

Beginning on Friday afternoon and continuing through Monday, NPT states parties addressed issues related to “cluster two” on nuclear non-proliferation, and the cluster two specific issue of a Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone. States highlighted specific cases of proliferation concern, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, and Syria, as well as the new military alliance and transfer of nuclear material among Australia, the United Kingdom, and United States. As many delegations pointed out, there is a serious asymmetry in the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, and in the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and other non-proliferation norms by certain states parties. These double standards, and the perpetuation of nuclear deterrence doctrines, undermine the NPT and create unnecessary risks for the world.

Nuclear deterrence does not deter proliferation

Many delegations emphasised the mutually reinforcing relationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and the double standards at play in the implementation of these obligations.

“The NPT has been more successful in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons than as a framework for nuclear disarmament,” said the Austrian delegation. Most states implement their non-proliferation obligations. The proliferation challenges that do exist, Austria argued, are because of the structural problem created by the continued possession of nuclear weapons and perpetuation of nuclear deterrence doctrines. “It is difficult to promote and uphold the norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons while a significant number of states insists on the necessity of nuclear weapons as a means to guarantee their own security,” Austria explained. “This is nothing less than proliferating the alleged ‘value’ of these weapons of mass destruction and contradicts the non-proliferation norm itself. We hold that this is the most significant challenge to the integrity of the NPT, which erodes its credibility and must be addressed frankly and with urgency.”

Malaysia likewise argued that nuclear deterrence doctrines have negatively impacted non-proliferation efforts, while Thailand said that nuclear weapon modernisation and nuclear threats have significantly heightened nuclear proliferation risks. Iran, Malaysia, South Africa, and others argued that nuclear sharing and extended nuclear deterrence arrangements also undermine non-proliferation efforts.

Austria noted that the states parties of the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) have addressed this structural problem of imbalance in the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. “The comprehensive and unequivocal rejection of nuclear weapons due to their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks,” said Austria, is “a powerful measure to prevent and disincentivize the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” It argued that TPNW states parties “have not only taken on responsibilities on non-proliferation going beyond the NPT requirements but the TPNW also foresees important safeguards provisions for nuclear armed states in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.”

Indonesia and Thailand also highlighted the TPNW as essential—along with the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and nuclear weapon free zones—for implementing non-proliferation obligations.

HEU troubles the waters

In contrast to the strengthened non-proliferation commitments undertaken by TPNW states parties, some NPT states parties are creating new non-proliferation concerns. The Australian-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) military alliance, under which the United States and United Kingdom are planning to transfer nuclear-powered submarines and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Australia, is posing new risks. While this is not explicitly prohibited by the NPT nor by the IAEA safeguards systems, many delegations highlighted that this unprecedented decision raises challenges for non-proliferation.

Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States said their nuclear submarine deal reflects the highest safeguards standards, and Brazil, which is seeking its own naval nuclear propulsion system, argued that this technology is not inherently military in nature. But others have expressed concerns about the transfer of weapons-grade fissile material to a non-nuclear-armed state, which even if not a violation of the letter of the NPT still undermines the spirit of the Treaty, risks setting a precedent for other such transfers, and builds up infrastructure for the future acquisition of nuclear weapons.

One key concern for states is the loophole in paragraph 14 of the IAEA safeguards system, which allows fissile material utilised for non-explosive military use, including naval propulsion, to be exempt from inspections and monitoring by the IAEA. During cluster two discussions, Switzerland said any approach to nuclear naval propulsion needs to strengthen global non-proliferation norms and safeguards and aim for the highest verification standard. It argued that “Australia and Brazil will need to conclude new arrangements with the IAEA under their respective Safeguards Agreements. These arrangements will have to be submitted to the Board of Governors for appropriate action.” South Africa likewise called for equitable verification and monitoring of all nuclear naval propulsion programmes, while Indonesia called for international cooperation to make sure such programmes are line with existing norms under the IAEA.

Egypt called for nuclear partnerships such as AUKUS to be closely examined by NPT states parties. It argued that “partnerships that involve the transfer of large quantities of unsafeguarded weapon-grade fissile material from nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to any NNWS pose an unprecedented threat to the credibility and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and set precedents that will have far-reaching ramifications on the IAEA Safeguards System.”

Russia and China were even more explicitly against the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal, arguing that it will undermine the NPT safeguards system. Russia said it will create another category of states with nuclear material that are exempt from safeguards, while China said the arrangement has “crossed the threshold of nuclear proliferation” and is a “typical act of double standards.”

It is indeed difficult not to suspect that a double standard is being exercised here, given the extensive inspections, sanctions, political pressure, and occasional military action that other cases of “non-proliferation concern” have garnered. While those cases do not involve the same arrangements as the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal, one can easily imagine what reactions states within AUKUS might have if this deal was being made among certain other countries.

Furthermore, questions of using HEU in submarines that, through leaks or accidents, could end up depositing this material into the sea, as well as the implications of Australia hosting the nuclear waste from the submarines, are other concerns that First Nations groups and civil society organisations in Australia have raised. And of course, many are concerned with the geopolitical tensions that will be exacerbated by the deployment of US and UK nuclear-powered submarines in the Asia Pacific region. Last year, ICAN Australia released a report outlining many of the domestic and regional concerns posed by the AUKUS submarine agreement.

Of these, perhaps the most confronting for NPT states parties in this moment is that the non-proliferation commitments do not meet the “highest standards” alleged by the AUKUS members. As Toby Dalton and Ariel Levite write in Arms Control Today, the AUKUS states have put cost and convenience ahead of non-proliferation considerations. One key problem, they argue, is that the non-proliferation commitments that Australia has made thus far in the AUKUS context “reflect narrow, inherently reversible, unilateral or trilateral policy choices.” They note that this is disconcerting “because a future Australian government, perhaps in consultation with its partners, may opt to walk them back with the same ease and speed that the previous government reversed the earlier contract to acquire French diesel electric submarines, opting for UK/U.S. nuclear-powered ones instead.”

They explain that nothing in the AUKUS implementation plan released in March 2023 precludes Australia from developing a parallel nuclear fuel cycle, nor from deciding to convert the AUKUS submarines to carry nuclear weapons under a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States. While this is not the stated intention of the current Australian government, Dalton and Levite note that Australia already has an extended nuclear deterrence arrangement with the United States, is planning for the deployment of US nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to Australia, and has pursued nuclear weapons itself in the past. While few states believe that Australia harbours any aspiration of becoming a nuclear-armed state today, the authors argue, “the mere perception that the arrangement could provide a path to this future is provoking regional concerns and creates an unhelpful precedent with which the nonproliferation regime to contend.”

Dalton and Levite also argue that Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol do not constitute a sufficient non-proliferation reassurance in the context of AUKUS. “IAEA safeguards were not expressly designed for activities and cooperation of this nature and scope,” they point out, explaining:

The security sensitivities inevitably associated with such military applications of nuclear technology and the impracticality of inspecting submarines that are to be deployed stealthily for extended periods at sea will result in substantial restrictions on transparency and IAEA access to the information, facilities, people, and materials involved in the AUKUS cooperation. Such access and information restrictions circumscribe traditional modalities for reassuring the international community about a state’s intent to forswear nuclear weapons and raises questions about the IAEA’s ability to do so for Australia. In this case, Australia’s dependence on highly secretive UK and U.S. naval propulsion and weapons technologies, much of it also supporting UK and U.S. nuclear weapons-carrying submarines, greatly narrows the options available to Australia and its AUKUS partners to persuade others that statements about their non-nuclear strategic intentions are credible.

Moreover, as the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy has pointed out, states should be seeking to strengthen the NPT by opposing any extension of uses for HEU. The US government has previously sought to limit the use of HEU globally and domestically; the AUKUS arrangement thus undermines its only policies regarding HEU minimisation. “With international tensions mounting, arsenals being modernized and in some cases expanded, and experts warning that developing technologies are increasing the dangers of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation,” LCNP argued, “there is simply no excuse for permitting this preventable source of nuclear risk to continue.”

Proliferation of double standards

AUKUS is not the only double standard facing NPT states parties. Another specific asymmetry that needs to be addressed, South Africa noted, is the limitations of safeguards over fissile materials in the nuclear-armed states. “Even if all civilian materials were safeguarded and fully secured to the highest standards, this would only cover an estimated 15% of the weapons-usable material around the world, leaving a critical gap in the nuclear non-proliferation architecture,” South Africa explained. It urged states not to “lose sight of the remaining 85%, which is categorized as military materials and are not subject to any international security standards or oversight mechanisms.”

The 2010 NPT Review Conference agreed to develop legally binding verification arrangements with the IAEA to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-armed state as no longer required for military purposes. But this commitment has not yet been implemented; nor has there been progress in the additional declarations of stockpiles of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In fact, the IAEA recently reported that some nuclear-armed states have withdrawn such material. South Africa called for a discussion on this worrying development and urged states to stop these withdrawals.

The proliferation concerns related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran are also situations requiring more nuance than most NPT states parties seem willing to afford them. While the DPRK should immediately stop its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development and completely denuclearise, the United States and other countries of the region should negotiate a formal peace agreement with the DPRK and stop joint military exercises and other activities that further militarise the Korean Peninsula. The US delegation critiqued the DPRK for describing its missile tests as trial runs for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. DPRK should stop these tests immediately—and so should the United States stop its ballistic missile tests, which it regularly launches from California to the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.

Similarly, while Iran should fully implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US government and its allies also need to undertake and fully comply with the agreement. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 despite IAEA assurances at the time that Iran was implementing its end of the deal. While Iran should return to full compliance with the JCPOA, so should the United States and the other European governments involved in the deal.

Middle East zone

One of the most persistent double standards of the NPT is that related to establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. In 1995, NPT states parties agreed to pursue such a zone, but Israel’s rejection of these efforts—and protection of its “interests” by the United States—have led to the repeated failure of efforts within the NPT structure. The international community has since taken the issue forward through a series of UN General Assembly conferences, which Israel and the United States have so far boycotted. In the meantime, NPT states parties have continued nuclear cooperation with Israel, in violation of the NPT’s provisions related to such cooperation with non-state parties.

Most states participating in the cluster two and special issue discussions reiterated their support for the creation of a Middle East WMDFZ and for the UN General Assembly conferences. In its statement to the NPT Preparatory Committee last week, the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) argued the UN process shows signs of great potential. It welcomed the efforts of participating states and civil society organisations to accelerate the process towards establishing the zone and called on all states to avoid actions that could hamper this process. “We remind states that disarmament is a process that starts with a conversation,” said METO. “The mere existence of this conversation taking place in the UN conference on the zone, means that disarmament in the Middle East has already begun. This precious process must be protected in whatever way possible.”

Protecting process

This call for protecting dialogue and political processes cuts across all issues related to the NPT. The PrepCom provides a space for conversations, but the hypocritical way that some NPT states parties approach their obligations and commitments has led to an increasingly fraught atmosphere. Above all else, it is impossible to reconcile the defence of nuclear weapon possession within a Treaty meant to achieve the total elimination of these very weapons. For example, as long as states parties continue to assert, as Italy did in a right of reply on Monday, that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,” it will remain extremely difficult to meet the obligations and principles of the NPT. Continuing to put the treaty under indefinite strain will only serve to weaken its non-proliferation goals. As Malaysia said, non-proliferation derives its legitimacy from nuclear disarmament. There is only one way to ensure nuclear weapons are not used and that they do not spread, and that is to eliminate them.

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