Small Arms Monitor, Vol. 11, No. 2
Editorial: Act today for a better tomorrow
4 August 2021
Allison Pytlak
The Seventh Biennial Meeting of States (BMS7) of the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) on small arms and light weapons opened with ambitious words from its chairperson, Ambassador Martin Kimani of Kenya:
We are here this week to save the lives of innocent citizens, to protect the common peace, and to show the most vulnerable that we stand with them. We have a moral and ethical duty to hasten action … while much has been achieved, we can do more to realise the potential of the PoA and the ITI. Let us use this week to leave a legacy using the substantive issues agreed upon in our agenda.
Indeed, there can be little doubt that small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition continue to be a significant cause of human suffering just as they were 20 years ago when the UNPoA was adopted. A Small Arms Survey report from 2020 notes, “The financial value of reported small arms exports in 2017 was USD 6.5 billion. While this represents a slight decrease compared to 2016, the reported trade remains at a high level when compared with the previous 15 years.” Diverse delegations at BMS7, from Ukraine to Sierra Leone, and civil society from Nepal, described the impact of these weapons and their ammunition on human security, safety, or socio-economic development in their countries or regions.
But, SALW are changing too—how they are made, what they are made of, how they are traded and trafficked, marked and traced. The environment in which SALW and ammunition control is being discussed is also changing. There are new instruments and frameworks that offer complementarity to the provisions of the UNPoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Recognition of SALW’s differentiated impact, whether by age, gender, ability, or other characteristics, and the need to respond accordingly, has come a long way since 2001. There are also now decades worth of practical learnings about how to prevent diversion and illicit trading, coupled with greater public scrutiny and pressure on legal arms transfer decision-making.
Given these changing circumstances, ambitious words must be accompanied by bold action for the UNPoA and ITI to maintain relevance and have impact. A good many member states recognise this and seem ready to move in that direction, but BMS7 was encumbered by the same politicisation and rigidity that has come to characterise so many past UNPoA meetings.
“Collaboration, compromise, and consensus"
The Chair urged for collaboration, compromise, and consensus when BMS7 began. The latter two inevitably take the wind out of any sails of bold action because consensus (in UN settings) has been interpreted over time as meaning unanimity, which effectively gives any member state a veto and the ability to hold up a positive outcome—or in some cases, any outcome at all.
This is what nearly happened (again) in the final hour of BMS7.
Going into BMS7, states had already had several rounds of closed informal consultations about the contents of the outcome document that this meeting would hopefully adopt. Most of the final day of BMS7 was spent in closed consultations about the version that was released in the morning of 30 July.
We are unable to report on what occurred throughout the day, or to report well on states’ positions in relation to specific parts of the draft outcome document as it evolved over the week, because most of BMS7 was held in a closed format.
On Friday, the UN WebTV link flickered to life in the late afternoon and after about 45 minutes of live streaming delegates waiting in a nearly empty conference room, the final session of BMS7 was called to order. A final version of the outcome report had just been made available online and was presented as the one tabled for adoption. In presenting it, the Chair stressed how far he had seen delegations come on the many issues contained in the document, and said that compromises had been made by all.
Iran quickly requested the floor. It reiterated that it had shared many concerns and observations throughout the meeting, but in the spirit of consensus tried to have a “constructive approach” and not object to all issues. It then provided an oral amendment to paragraph 92, which is the paragraph relating to ways forward for addressing “recent developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design”. The Iranian oral amendment would have removed any reference to progress on this issue at the BMS8 in 2022 (which was already a step back from an earlier proposal to establish a technical working group now) and move decision-making and proposals to the 2024 review conference. Iran explained in a subsequent intervention that this is because of the mandates that are given to BMSs versus those given to review conferences around decision-making.
Germany responded to say that it too is not happy with the draft but it has been striving for “compromise and consensus”. The German representative added that it has a hard time understanding how the one delegation that talks about the importance of consensus at each meeting is “trying to open a Pandora’s Box” at the last moment by introducing an oral amendment that could trigger other amendments. Germany also requested a legal opinion around how the BMS7 can take a decision on establishing a fellowship programme (a proposal that originated with Non-Aligned Movement states) but not a technical expert group.
As if a Pandora’s Box had in fact been opened, Indonesia requested an oral amendment to paragraph 31, which is about ensuring that international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) are taken into consideration in national small arms and light weapons transfer decisions. Its amendment would reframe the paragraph to be about enhancing capacity to assess for overriding risk that “may emerge” from transfers, “with a view to preserving the implementation of IHL and IHRL.”
Ireland took the floor and echoed the points made by Germany, including its call for a legal opinion.
At this juncture the Chair stated that as there was clearly no consensus on the two proposed oral amendments, the text must be taken as is and reservations can be issued. He moved for adoption, at which point Iran stated it could not join consensus and requested a vote on paragraph 92. Indonesia withdrew its amendment, explaining that while it would like to hear more reactions to its proposal it would not call for a vote on it, and instead put its positions on record.
Brazil and Mexico appealed to Iran to not break consensus and when the Chair asked Iran a final time if it was determined to break consensus, Iran responded to say that it wished its issue was not so contentious and that if others would accept its amendment, it could go along with consensus. Iran stressed that it was working under the instructions of its capital and had no other option except to decide by voting.
Then, an unusual moment in diplomacy occurred. Ambassador Kimani spoke with uncharacteristic frankness to the representative of Iran, explaining that “our attempts at consensus were successful, until you disrupted it with negativity.” He went on to say that he found Iran’s position to be “disruptive, negative, and not speaking to the facts,” noting that he worked hard to bring forward a balanced draft document in which “all delegations with passionately held views” found a way to work with each other. The Chair then moved swiftly to commence voting, having explained that in the new UN (i.e. per COVID-related restrictions) there cannot be anymore “midnight runs”.
Ahead of voting, Yemen on behalf of the Arab Group stated that it accepts the current text and would vote in favour of paragraph 92.
Paragraph 92 was adopted by a vote of 100-1-10, and the document as a whole was adopted by a vote of 114-0-0. Iran, on behalf of Belarus, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela began to give an explanation of vote, but was stopped for reasons of time and in order to proceed with adoption of the full outcome document (substantive plus procedural contents).
After the vote, Russia took the floor to deliver a vehemently anti-gender statement in which it refuted the document’s provisions relating to gender, which are discussed later in this editorial. Costa Rica strongly defended the gender provisions and noted the statement from 64 countries delivered mid-meeting in support of retaining them.
Cuba disassociated from paragraph 92 and registered that paragraph 31 should not be interpreted to hinder the right of states to possess weapons for their legitimate defense, in line with Article 51 of UN Charter. Romania clarified its understanding of the word “license” as contained in paragraph 27 as being the same as an authorisation, and not a manufacturing license which is not a matter for multilateral fora.
The Chair invited states with other explanations of vote or closing statements to submit them in writing, as by this point there were few minutes left in the meeting and because of COVID-19 protocols, the meeting could not go after-hours.
While it’s very rare (and was somewhat refreshing) to hear a conference chairperson and senior diplomat speak with such candour, it is not rare for UNPoA meetings to end in a stand-off. The final day of the 2018 Review Conference concluded work around 5:00am, with much of the hours between midnight and dawn spent in procedural delaying tactics after some of the hardest fought substantive issues had been reconciled and prolonging the meeting unnecessarily. Going further back in time, our reporting on the 2008 BMS describes another challenging final meeting in which Iran’s insistence on a paragraph by paragraph read of the final document and blocking of its adoption by consensus was met with direct and charged appeals from multiple states, alongside practical suggestions to bridge the impasse.
Playing politics with human security is unacceptable. When this happened in 2008, Nigeria reminded delegates that they represent millions of people who are dying daily from SALW and that complaints about process and procedure should not “clog the wheels” and prevent success. At that meeting, Liberia also reminded delegates that the issues they face are not theoretical but are rather a matter of life and death. This is no less true today.
Painful negotiation and consensus-imposed limitations did yield some concrete and specific contents within the outcome document, even if in many places there was qualifying and limiting language added (i.e. “as appropriate”) and an emphasis on national priorities and prerogatives. Elsewhere in this edition we provide an overview of some key aspects in the outcome document as well as analysis of how analysis of how the draft text evolved during BMS7.
Gender panic redux
Russia’s blistering repudiation of the gender-related provisions of the BMS7 outcome document was shocking in its bluntness. It’s known of course that not all member states are on board with accounting for gender perspectives within disarmament and arms control, but so far, no state has been so hostile toward it in an open setting. Among the fora that WILPF monitors, none have ever said on record that “if someone is shot, it doesn’t make a difference if you’re a man or a woman.”
During its closing statement (for which it switched in a woman speaker), Russia tried to distance itself from paragraph 77, which relates to the four pillars of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda as established by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. It argued that the Council’s resolutions pertain only to countries in situations of armed conflict, which Russia does not fall under. It was not clear if Russia meant all Council resolutions or those comprising the WPS Agenda, but either way, this is inaccurate. UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent WPS resolutions are not applicable only during armed conflict, but are applicable to all member states, at all times, including (but not limited to) armed conflict.
In its closing statement, Costa Rica stated that a “gendered approach is here to stay”. But it also underscored that it was a fight to get to this point, a fight that included defending previously agreed upon language including from BMS6, the Third Review Conference, and the UN General Assembly. This was made clear by the joint statement from 64 countries delivered in the middle of BMS7, calling for the retention and strengthening of all the paragraphs with a gender-related acknowledgement or recommendation—the majority of which were based on prior agreements and commitments.
Beyond the concern about undoing of language is the one that comes from the reality check provided by the Russian statement about the world beyond the conference room. “Small arms continue to be used in criminal and armed violence, and if we are to use a gender lens, we cannot ignore how they are used to facilitate sexual and gender-based violence and to reinforce violent, gendered social norms,” Namibia highlighted, a messaged later reinforced by Costa Rica: “In a world in where gender or sex is still a reason to be killed, to be shunned, to be maimed, trafficked, and exploited, Costa Rica decries that a few refuse to acknowledge that their safety and security is only as strong as that enjoyed by our most vulnerable.”
The patriarchy is real and dismantling it will not come solely through words on a page. It will come through challenging prevailing norms and attitudes around gender, power, and security and transformative action. Demilitarisation, including through disarmament, is vital, and getting there will require addressing some uncomfortable realities and familiar positions, even among some the most ardent “gender champions”. “The continued association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament,” writes Ray Acheson, WILPF’s disarmament programme director. “Disarmament requires that we change the way we think about and confront war and violence as social and economic institutions, and we can’t do that just by giving some privileges to those who do not challenge the thinking or the behaviour of those who have the most privilege.”
A tale of two meetings
BMS7 was also, in many ways, a tale of two meetings. As noted in our preview edition, the outcome document was pre-cooked via a series of informal consultations that had been taking place among member states over the last several months. It continued to be negotiated in closed settings throughout the week while the “actual” meeting unfolded somewhat simultaneously through a discussion of several agenda items that relate to themes and components of the outcome document—but were never used to discuss or negotiate the document. As well, with the time and meeting constraints imposed by COVID-19 safety procedures, nearly half of the scheduled BMS7 meeting time was taken offline and used to negotiate the report even if, as Russia remarked, states hadn’t actually yet delivered their thematic statements corresponding to topics contained in the report.
This is poor for transparency. It’s not at all unusual that states will have closed consultations on a resolution or conference report, but it is unusual for it to come at the expense of so much of the scheduled open meetings. Throughout the pandemic, diverse processes across the UN system have had to adapt to new working methods that involve remote participation by states and other stakeholders or using alternative ways to input. Closing out civil society—particularly given its historic role in advocating for and assisting to implement the UNPoA—is damaging to the effectiveness of meeting outcomes and undermines the praise for civil society contained in such documents.
It can also make one question the purpose of having the meeting when there is such a clear bifurcation between the negotiation of its “outcome” and its actual assembly. Viewed in this light, the open sessions started to feel performative as the week wore on. Delegates delivered statements in which they outlined their positions on key BMS7 themes and proposals, but not in a way that corresponded to changes emerging in the text. This approach serves to increase the existing gap between the BMS’ mandate to consider implementation of the UNPoA and ITI, and the premium that has been given to adopting a negotiated outcome, which contributes to the politicisation described earlier in this editorial. It is this gap which led to the suggestion of reforming UNPoA meeting formats and measurements for progress, although reportedly this has not been taken on board.
The time for bold action is now
Because BMS7 was delayed due to COVID-19 there will be a shorter than usual gap until BMS8. Undoubtedly familiar tensions will surface there as well. Positively, the BMS7 outcome document gives BMS8 a mandate to again consider progress on UNPoA and ITI implementation, while it will also have to give time to prepare for the Fourth Review Conference.
This editorial began with a quote emphasising the moral and ethical duty to hasten action and reiterating the deadly impact that SALW and their ammunition still pose. No outcome document may ever be able to capture all the strongest and life-saving provisions but that shouldn’t stop states from acting on what has been agreed, and recommended, and taking steps that they know are necessary to prevent human suffering. We have words on the page aplenty—the time for bold action is now.