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Small Arms Monitor, Vol. 11, No. 1

Editorial: More of the same, or can things change? Prospects for BMS7
25 July 2021


Allison Pytlak

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The sun was already rising on a steamy New York summer day in 2018 when the last meeting of the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) on small arms and light weapons concluded work. Delegates blinked their way out of the UN Headquarters after a marathon, eighteen-hour final day of the UNPoA’s Third Review Conference (RevCon3), which was “marked by unexpected surprises and developments and dogged by procedural confusion.” Yet many felt that ultimately, the conference had produced a commendable final report.

A lot has changed over the last three years, not least in connection to the health pandemic that has swept the world, taking and disrupting lives in startling ways. Yet other things remain the same, including in the context of the UNPoA. Many of the historic dynamics and differences of positions that are linked to this instrument inevitably surfaced during the course of informal consultations and preparations for this Seventh Biennial Meeting of States (BMS7). They, plus a few new issues, have complicated and prolonged the adoption of an agenda and decisions on what format the meeting should take.

The current draft of the BMS7 outcome document, alongside various proposals made in recent months as part of its informal preparatory process, also demonstrate growth and a maturity of approach to some topics in ways that recognise the importance of ensuring the UNPoA’s relevance, 20 years after its adoption. The world is changing rapidly and unpredictably, but it is still a world in which small arms and light weapons are at the centre of armed violence, conflict, and human suffering. Action is imperative.

Looking back

The BMS7 was originally scheduled to take place in 2020 and, like most other UN processes, was postponed and ultimately had to adapt to new working methods and formats. In this time, the Chair-designate took up a new post and his successor, Ambassador Martin Kimani of Kenya, took over the role.

A series of consultations with UN member states took place in the intervening period to agree an agenda and begin drafting the final conference report. It may seem unusual to begin drafting a meeting report before the meeting occurs and any “debate” can happen, but some processes take this approach to maximise the actual meeting time available. Unfortunately, this approach forces a focus on negotiated outcomes, as will be discussed later.

Reportedly, during these consultations there was significant dispute over the substantive agenda items. The agreed version of the agenda includes four carefully worded, painfully qualified items for consideration:

  • The implementation of the UNPoA at all levels, and “including considerations to prevent and combat diversion and illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons”;
  • The implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), including “an exchange of views on the implications of the developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology and design, taking into account all views and proposals of Member States, as well as relevant deliberations during previous meetings and relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus.”;
  • Cooperation and assistance, “including the proposals on the establishment of a dedicated fellowship training programme on small arms and light weapons as well as national, regional and global target-setting, where applicable”; and
  • An exchange of views on BMS8.

The remainder of this editorial will try to unpack what this means, why such careful wording, and what real-world impact may (or may not) come out of this long-postponed meeting.

It is worth noting that all the informal consultations were closed to civil society, which complicates our ability to preview the meeting ahead. It’s regrettable that an instrument which came about in large part because of civil society-led advocacy, and in which civil society expertise is so welcomed and utilised in national and regional implementation, often marginalises and sidelines some of its strongest proponents during international meetings.

“New” technologies

Not much is necessarily new about the technologies and “recent developments” that are being discussed in the lead up to BMS7, nor is it a new topic for the UNPoA community. As outlined in an annex document prepared for BMS7, new technologies were the focus of the 2015 Meeting of Governmental Experts, which built on concerns raised by some member states in 2011 about polymer and modular weapons, as well as the implications of 3D printing for arms production.

At RevCon3, a technical annex to the ITI was proposed as a mechanism to update the ITI vis-à-vis technological change, but that annex was challenged and, ultimately, dropped. So too was a proposal for a guidance document to take into account new technologies. Instead, states agreed to a series of actions in relation to new technologies (see paragraphs 52–58 of the Final Report) and requested a report from the UN Secretary-General on “recent developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology and design, particularly polymer and modular weapons,” before the end of 2018. The RevCon3 report stressed the importance of resolving this issue in advance of BMS7.

That has proven extremely challenging, as reportedly even incorporating this topic into the BMS7 agenda was difficult. It may be one of the most contested subjects at BMS7.

It is a subject with multiple dimensions: how are certain new materials and techniques impacting marking and tracing activities (for good and bad)? How are some technologies making production of SALW easier? What role do some other technologies play in facilitating illicit trade, including online? Precisely which technologies are relevant, and how have those that were originally identified in 2014 evolved since then? What are the challenges, and what are the opportunities?

Views on the subject across states are likewise multi-dimensional. Some states have reportedly expressed that their biggest challenges come from addressing “traditional” SALW and they don’t see this as a national concern or priority; others noted in past meetings that the focus on 3D printing, for example, was overly specific and that the conversation should be broader. Other governments feel it is crucial to account for the challenges and opportunities of technology within UNPoA and ITI implementation; their suggestions and ideas are contained in a summary of an informal consultation that Belgium facilitated on the subject in June.

The current draft outcome document includes a range of references to a range of issues that relate to technology, or “developments” mainly found in paragraphs 86–94. Some references are more specific in describing precise technologies and outlining how they relate to small arms control than how this subject has been presented in earlier UNPoA conference reports, and many contain tangible and measurable recommendations. It also notes the problem of online trade in SALW. Significantly, the draft calls for the establishment of an “open-ended technical expert group that is tasked to develop action-oriented and consensually-agreed next steps on a way forward for consideration by the Fourth Review Conference.” The draft further outlines three specific tasks for the group.

Synergies

In the UNPoA context, the word “synergy” has become code for a reference to other instruments that not all member states support (and that some may even oppose) but that are relevant to the UNPoA practically and normatively. This has traditionally been applied to the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime’s Firearms Protocol (despite being named in the text of the UNPoA) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

At RevCon3, specific references to the Firearms Protocol and the ATT were excluded from the final report and replaced with the vague formulation “other relevant instruments to which a State is a Party.”

The BMS7 draft outcome document uses similar language in two places. In paragraph 53 in the subsection on improving measurability, states resolve, “To identify and take advantage of complementarities in the national implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument and other relevant sub-regional, regional and global instruments to which a State is a Party, including on national reporting.” And in the section on international cooperation for diversion prevention, paragraph 102 makes note of “other relevant information exchange mechanisms.”

It’s regrettable that states that are not party to those treaties find reason to deny any reference to them, even if done in a way that clarifies those instruments are not binding on those not party to them. In many ways it is a missed opportunity to encourage a sustained, integrated, and collaborative approach toward addressing common objectives.

But, this also points to the importance of not getting overly caught up in the words on the page. The on-the-ground reality is that much of the work of operationalising the UNPoA, on one hand, and implementing the ATT and the Firearms Protocol, on the other hand, overlap in practice and involve many of the same actors. As another article in this edition outlines, this becomes especially evident when looking at the recommendations and commitments on diversion and information exchange contained in the draft outcome document, for example. Diversion has become a significant focus of work within the ATT ecosystem in recent years, through working groups, as a thematic focus for annual conferences, and in the establishment of new bodies for information exchange to prevent diversion. In fact, WILPF and others have criticised the heavy focus on illicit transfers and diversion within those meetings, noting it is a distraction from the Treaty’s intended regulation of legal transfers. In 2021, the ATT’s conference of states parties (CSP7) will focus on “strengthening efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and ensure efficient stockpile management” as its theme, which is a core element of the UNPoA.

A working paper from the CSP7 president on this subject describes these connections between the instruments, stating that many of them “have already made significant progress in developing good practice in tackling the illicit trade in SALW and enhancing stockpile security, which can inform and support efforts to prevent diversion under the ATT.” His working paper also puts forward a series of recommendations that aim to strengthen cooperation and information exchanges among ATT states parties to prevent the illicit tracking of SALW and their diversion—including through targeted international assistance. This is also an agenda item for BMS7 and could be a key opportunity for states to consider and address any overlap and gaps in international assistance available for the implementation of the two instruments.

Synergy has also been a way to describe how the UNPoA relates to the instruments beyond arms control, notably the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to a lesser extent, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. At RevCon3, a surprising amount of airtime was given over to debating whether the final report should refer to synergies with the 2030 Agenda as a whole, or to just Goal 16 and its target 16.4. It’s not discernible to what extent this is still an issue. There are some very explicit recommendations on how to integrate UNPoA and Agenda 2030 implementation, including around reporting. These are found within a subsection of the draft outcome document titled “Armed violence and the broader peace, security, and sustainable development nexus.”

Gender

The gendered impacts of small arms violence and gender diverse participation in small arms control are topics that have come a very long way since the UNPoA’s adoption in 2001. The instrument’s sole recognition of “gender” comes from a preambular reference to the negative impact on women (and “the elderly”). Fast forward to 2021, and one quarter of total BMS7 side events relate to women or gender and the draft outcome document includes several specific and action-oriented recommendations for gender-responsive small arms control (see paragraphs 65–76).

The recommendations build on big gains made at RevCon3 in this area, as well as changes made after BMS6 to the UNPoA report templates to include a new section on gender. The draft BMS7 recommendations relate to gender-differentiated impact and harm, and gender-based violence as caused by small arms; as well as to information exchange; sex-disaggregated data collection (along with age and disability); harmonising national actions plans on WPS and on small arms; and for the “equal, full and effective participation of women” in all levels and aspects of small arms control.

While one or two states have apparently objected to some (or all?) of the above, it feels that “gender considerations”—however that is defined—are in fact now so mainstreamed in small arms control that it would be difficult to imagine this being seriously contested.

Moreover, the work is happening. Elsewhere in this edition is an outline of relevant work undertaken by WILPF National Sections across Africa with the Gender Equality Network on Small Arms Control (GENSAC) under the theme of #BulletProofInclusion. WILPF and GENSAC are collaborating on a side event that will lift up some of the real challenges—and opportunities—for research and advocacy in this area. WILPF has also collaborated with the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) on an analysis of how states have reported on gender in their national UNPoA reports. Around 60 per cent of reports submitted answered positively that they do consider gender in their UNPoA implementation, but the subsequent questions indicate that gaps remain and there is room for improvement. Some suggestions for how to do so are outlined in a separate article in this edition.

Fellowships

The draft outcome document takes forward another RevCon3 recommendation to establish a dedicated fellowship training programme on small arms and light weapons “in order to strengthen technical knowledge and expertise in areas related to the implementation of the Programme and Action and the International Tracing Instrument, particularly in developing

Countries.” This is identified in the BMS7 agenda and proposed within the draft outcome document. While this should be relatively uncontroversial, apparently this proposal has raised questions from other member states, including in light of other similar existing programmes, and budgetary implications.

Ammunition

Ammunition has arguably been the most contested topic in UNPoA meetings since its adoption in 2001 when it was excluded from the scope of the instrument. A tiny grouping of less than five countries has for years blocked any linkage of ammunition management and the UNPoA, despite appeals from the majority of countries to the contrary. These appeals are based on national experiences with both conflict and crime. At RevCon3, debate over including reference to ammunition was among the few topics which prolonged adoption of the final report and the duration of the final meeting. However, it did lead to a very small step forward, in that the final report acknowledges that states that apply provisions of the PoA to ammunition can exchange and apply relevant experiences, lessons learned, and best practices.

As IANSA notes in its new briefing paper, “BMS7 provides an important opportunity to strengthen the PoA by directly including ammunition as part of its consideration of “the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.” At present, paragraph 35 of the draft outcome report calls on states, “To acknowledge that States that apply provisions of the Programme of Action to small arms and light weapons ammunition can integrate applicable policies and practices into their small arms and light weapons control efforts with a view to strengthening the implementation of the Programme of Action across all sectors.” A reference also exists to the Group of Governmental Experts on surplus ammunition, which was established by the UN General Assembly.

While this one word on a page may again spark a political fight in the conference room, there are many practical ways for states to address ammunition as part of SALW control. A second IANSA paper prepared for BMS7 presents some next steps and priorities to take appropriate measures to combat the illicit trade in ammunition used in SALW.

Moving forward

Which brings us to a final, yet crucial point: what determines a successful UNPoA meeting, and how are we measuring its impact?

This is not by any means a new question for the small arms community; in fact, the intensely politicised international meetings (BMSs and RevCons) and their emphasis on adopting a final report at any cost has come under criticism for several years. But the dramatic RevCon3 prompted a 2018 informal food-for-thought paper from the UN Secretariat, which explored alternative approaches to meetings that would allow for a “bottom up approach,” including through the setting of voluntary implementation targets, doing away with negotiated outcome documents, and emphasising international assistance. 

Some of these ideas have been taken up and reportedly discussed during informal consultations. The word on the street is that many states have not responded positively to these suggestions and want to retain the political process and negotiation of outcome documents, although others are favourable to new approaches. Many states are apparently wary of target setting, because the UNPoA is a politically binding instrument, not a legal one. 

Without having been in the consultations, it is difficult for civil society to assess the current status of this agenda item as we head into the meeting.  But after 20 years, it does feel like the UNPoA has reached an inflection point and the time is ripe to make some changes. Examples abound from other fora; for instance, the Firearms Protocol has recently adopted a peer review mechanism, which is loosely modelled on those used in human rights instruments. The ATT meetings have their faults, but a lot of substantive knowledge-sharing and work has been facilitated through the establishment of working groups that meet intercessionally. An approach like this could benefit forward action on UNPoA specific issues, like new technology, and alleviate some of the weight put on the biennial and review meetings. The 2030 Agenda is also not legally binding but has elaborated and works through a set of agreed targets. The voluntary UNPoA reports could also be utilised or reviewed more robustly than they currently are.

Yet in the search for measurability, we must look beyond the UN conference rooms and look for impact. Impact on lives, impact on livelihoods. The UNPoA was driven by a strong humanitarian imperative to reduce human suffering, poverty, armed conflict, violence, and crime. Its title is clear in seeking to prevent, and to combat, the illicit trade in small arms but also to eradicate it. We clearly haven’t.

As BMS7 opens, states need to honour the original spirit of the UNPoA but also bring fresh energy and ideas to its meaningful implementation.

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