UN General Assembly plenary on revitalizing multilateral disarmament negotiations indicates continued deadlock ahead unless decisive action is undertaken soon

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

At the request of 49 member states, the UN General Assembly convened three plenary meetings on 27–29 July 2011 under agenda item 162, entitled “Follow-up to the high-level meeting held on 24 September 2010: revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral  disarmament negotiations.” Statements from the meeting are available on the Reaching Critical Will website.

The plenaries acted as a gauge for state positions on the critical issues related to advancing disarmament through multilateralism, such as, should negotiations be pursued outside of the CD? Should the CD itself be reformed? What is the next logical treaty that should be attempted?

Unlike the regular editions of the CD Report issued by Reaching Critical Will, we begin here with “notes from the gallery” and follow with acomprehensive overview of state positions on the issues discussed. In addition, Dr. Robert Zuber of Global Action to Prevent War has written a brief article on the plenary meetings.

Notes from the gallery

The UN General Assembly plenary meetings indicate that while the international diplomatic community is frustrated over the continued deadlock, the majority of countries—including many of those in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and most of permanent five members of the UN Security Council (P5)—appear unwilling to consider actions that could potentially disrupt the status quo.

Judging by their statements to the plenary meetings, neither the majority of NAM countries (assuming that the NAM statement delivered on 27 July reflects the position of most NAM countries) nor most of the P5 (with the exception of the United States) have signaled willingness to start negotiations on any of the CD’s four core issues outside of the CD. At the same time, most of the NAM and at least two of the P5 (China and Russia) are also opposed to reforming the CD’s working methods or rules of procedure.

(Note: Despite issuing a collective statement on this topic that indicated unwillingness to reform or circumvent the CD, the NAM’s position on this matter cannot be considered uniform. Several members of the Movement spoke in their individual capacity with remarks contradictory to this position, including Chile, Colombia, the Philippines, and South Africa. Based on this sample, it could be concluded that other NAM states may also disagree with the umbrella NAM statement.)

Most countries argue that the problem with the CD is not procedural but political. They’re not wrong. The CD has, in the past, managed to negotiate international disarmament and arms control treaties, with the same working methods it operates under today. Furthermore, with all nuclear weapon-possessors currently undertaking or planning modernization programmes for their nuclear weapon arsenals, delivery systems, and related facilities, it is clear that genuine political will to achieve nuclear disarmament is a missing key ingredient.

However, the solution of continuing to call for “more political will,” after fifteen years without negotiations, is like calling for another bucket of water to put out a fire that’s been blazing for months. What is needed is a massive downpour, a change in climate—or in the case of the CD, a fundamental shift of governmental thinking around disarmament, arms control, and national security.

Many of the states delivering statements to the plenary meetings recognize this. The Costa Rican and Swiss delegations in particular emphasized the need for a new approach to these critical topics.

“We are living in a global, interdependent world that faces as a community a multitude of disarmament and non-proliferation challenges,” said Swiss Counsellor Serge Bavaud. “It is important to move from one-dimensional approaches to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation to more holistic approaches.” He also noted, “It is critical to recognize that disarmament and nonproliferation affect numerous areas of concern to the international community besides peace and security, notably human security and human rights, development, the environment and health to name just a few. Only if we further include these aspects will we be able to confront the challenges we are facing.”

Similarly, Costa Rica’s Ambassador Eduardo Ulibarri said that “disarmament is not an isolated event of an exclusively militaristic nature. It is an organic process that interests and affects us all, and in which we must constantly advance through productive negotiations.”Arguing that “an essentially militaristic approach on security and disarmament could bring us closer to arms regulation and the control of international arsenals, but never to global disarmament,” he urged that “any action taken in the process of revitalization and restructuring of the multilateral disarmament negotiations must prioritize a focus on human security.”

Highlighting the relationship between human rights, international law, and disarmament and arms control, Ambassador Ulibarri also suggested that the CD “could begin to interact and cooperate with the bodies in charge of the promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law, with the goal of carrying out a more effective follow up to the fulfillment of the States’ duties in those subjects in light of their commitments to disarmament.” For example, “the fulfillment of the agreements on disarmament [should] be incorporated as a variable to the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council.”

The NAM itself recognized the need for a paradigm shift, arguing that part of realizing a world free of nuclear weapons will require the “colossal global expenditures and energies” devoted by nuclear weapon-possessors to the “possession, development and modernization of nuclear weapons” to instead be “used to further global development and peace.”

Yet for the most part, discussions related to the substantive work of the CD continue to be firmly predicated on a narrow, traditional view of “national security”.

At the plenary meeting, as it has before, Pakistan’s delegation stated, “No treaty can be negotiated in the CD which is contrary to the security interests of any of its member states.”

Indeed, this has been held as a truism in the CD—and not just by Pakistan. The US delegation is single-handedly blocking negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and during the Bush administration, it blocked negotiations on an FMCT because of the inclusion of verification in the negotiating mandate. The US and Pakistani administrations both relied on the argument that such treaties would undermine their security interests.

However, how can a government possibly know this before negotiations even begin, let alone conclude? Pakistan is not the only country with concerns about negotiating a fissile material treaty that does not include stocks. However, those others are willing to engage in negotiations and to insist on the inclusion of stocks in due course. If the treaty does not, in the end, include stocks, delegations can walk away from negotiations at any time, or refuse to ratify the resulting treaty. But stating that a treaty that does not yet exist undermines one’s national security in fact undermines the principles of good faith, multilateralism, and collective security. Furthermore, blocking negotiations of treaties on such critical matters as disarmament and non-proliferation threatens the national security interests of the majority of the countries in the world, especially since, as Ireland’s delegation noted, small states that depend on the rule of law and international treaties to ensure their security.

Pakistan’s delegation is not wrong that the FMCT sought by the majority of nuclear weapon-possessors is indeed “cost free” for those that already possess major stocks of fissile materials. This makes it all the more important to negotiate the treaty in a multilateral forum where the interests of all states, including those that do not possess any fissile materials at all, are on the table.

Pakistan’s delegation is also not wrong that the US, which is now open to options outside the CD for negotiating the FMCT, at one time firmly rejected taking any issues outside the CD when it was the sole obstacle to progress in that forum. But just as the United States was incorrect in 2005, in saying that taking the issues of the CD will “retard the very international non-proliferation and disarmament objectives that [those countries] want to advance,” Pakistan is likewise incorrect about that now.

Ambassador Ulibarri of Costa Rica described the CD as “going through the ‘illusion of disarmament’,” arguing, “It is the illusion that destroying certain weapons signifies an advance, despite their being immediately replaced by more powerful ones; it is the illusion of proscribing certain weapons because the strategic advantage they may have is exponentially inferior to the one offered by newer and more advanced ones; it is the illusion of fulfilling the requirements of civil society, when the only result is a paralyzed and paralyzing process.”

The states that are most actively seeking to break this status quo of illusion and paralysis do not want to “circumvent” the CD so that they can “get their way”. These states are also not pursuing action simply for the sake of negotiating an FMCT—most of them actually probably prefer negotiations directly on nuclear disarmament. Rather, these states seek to break through the rigid conception of national security and pursue collective security, human security in a multilateral forum that respects the views and concerns of all states but does not allow the interests of the few to outweigh the interests of the many.

Mr. Bavaud of the Swiss delegation argued, “Our institutions should not be based upon, and continuously favor, a clearly outdated conception of an all-prevailing national security paradigm.” Instead, he called for “institutions that are designed to produce results and do not favor the preservation of the status quo. They must be both responsive and preventive and thus be able to produce the instruments needed to address current as well as future challenges.”

Furthermore, those that seek to reform the CD and/or go outside the body to begin negotiations do believe that political will is essential. They do not assume that taking up negotiations in a different venue will magically eliminate the political problems faced by the CD. However, as Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, Austria’s Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, argued, “political will can also be created through process.” That is, “by starting to address the issues that have been stuck on the CD agenda for all these years,” states that are resistant to engage can be encouraged to join in by the reality of the international community moving along without them. This has been seen in other negotiation process and with treaty ratifications. Furthermore, a different negotiating environment or under different working methods could enable states to find new compromises and overcome some of the political difficulties currently facing the CD.

Before the plenary meetings, Reaching Critical Will and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy drafted a possible formulation to advance multilateral disarmament negotiations. We suggest that the UN General Assembly establish two open-ended working groups: one on nuclear disarmament and the other on prevention of an arms race in outer space. The open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament could have three main committees: a convention or framework agreement on nuclear disarmament; fissile materials; and negative security assurances and the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons.

In addition to cutting off future production for weapons purposes, we argue that an agreement on fissile materials must prevent the use of existing materials, civilian and military, in weapons, and contribute directly to irreversible disarmament. Its negotiation must not be treated as a step to be completed before negotiations on elimination of nuclear forces are commenced.  A convention or framework agreement on nuclear disarmament could have a protocol on fissile materials, or provide for its subsequent negotiation. The policy of sequentialism, which has not proved to be an efficient way to achieve nuclear disarmament, must be abandoned, and a policy of integration and parallelism adopted.

As many delegations have pointed out over the years, the FMCT is not the only item “ripe” for negotiation. The majority of CD member states appear ready to work on any of the other core issues of the CD’s agenda—very few would block the commencement of negotiation on any particular issue, even if they might prefer one over another.

There are also actions that can be undertaken while the international community establishes some sort of negotiating framework. As the European Union urged, all nuclear weapon possessors should declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In our joint paper, RCW and LCNP suggest that until a fissile material treaty is negotiated, all nuclear weapon possessors should act as if it is already in force, as they do with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All states possessing nuclear weapons should also engage in collaborative transparency and verification measures regarding their fissile material production facilities and stockpiles in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Furthermore, as the Costa Rican delegation suggested, “To build trust and signal good intentions in order to achieve the commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament or a parallel process, nuclear weapons States should drop their plans for modernization, replacement, refurnishing and upgrading of these arsenals and their facilities, amongst others.” Ambassador Ulibarri argued, small reductions of nuclear weapons are not conducive to disarmament when they “command robust resources towards the research and modernization of facilities capable of maintaining or multiplying these threats.”

The question now is what happens next. Almost every single delegation taking the floor at the plenary meetings said they wanted to revitalize the CD. It is unclear what this means to those delegations that do not wish to reform its working methods or rules of procedure. Unfortunately, many of the delegations participating on the plenary meetings did not offer concrete proposals for moving forward, leaving uncertainty about what will be tried—and what will succeed—at the UN General Assembly in a few months time. The US and UK indicated that the P5 would be engaging in consultations ahead of the next UNGA, and it’s clear that many non-nuclear weapon states are interested in pursuing something concrete during First Committee in October. But if a decision is not made before the end of year about what should happen with the CD and with multilateral disarmament negotiations, are we doomed to waste another year in 2012? There seems to be very little to be done in terms of “revitalization” if states are unwilling to change the way the CD operates or to consider creative, alternative methods and venue of work. It is the sincere hope of civil society that the states take a bold step this year by taking a concrete decision at the General Assembly’s upcoming session to begin multilateral negotiations with an integrated approach that links disarmament and non-proliferation to human security.

Report

Where to conduct negotiations

Could go outside the CD

• European Union
• Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates)
• Austria
• Canada
• Chile
• Colombia
• Ireland
• Italy
• Japan
• Kazakhstan
• Mexico
• Morocco
• New Zealand
• Philippines
• South Africa
• Switzerland
• Uruguay
• UN Secretary-General
• Secretary-General of the CD

The Swiss delegation had the most concrete suggestion of the plenary, which was that the next UN General Assembly could “consider launching issue-specific processes,” such as by establishing “open-ended working groups, on nuclear disarmament issues, including fissile material, or on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Counsellor Bavaud specified that such processes “should be anchored in Geneva, making use of the unparalleled expertise available in and around the CD. To be sustainable and to provide an incentive to the CD to resume its work, such processes should be complementary with possible future breakthroughs in this forum and be designed in a way that allows relevant results to be transmitted to the CD at an appropriate stage.”

Equally firm if less specific, the Austrian delegation encouraged states to explore options “outside the framework of the CD,” including having the General Assembly play “a more active and central role in disarmament negotiations.” The Philippines’ ambassador indicated it was open to any suggestion, arguing that it does not matter what body negotiates treaties but only that negotiations are conducted.

The Mexican delegation noted that repeated calls from the General Assembly for the CD to start substantive work have gone unheeded, arguing that if this continues, it is logical for the General Assembly to adopt “relevant measures to take over the prerogatives granted to a body that no longer complies with its wishes.” Ambassador Heller indicated his delegation would be ready to try again with the draft resolution it and other countries proposed in the margins of the 2005 UNGA First Committee, or to consider any other option “that offers real possibilities.”

Likewise, the Chilean delegation said it would be difficult to challenge the legitimacy of the UNGA taking action on the CD. It emphasized that the machinery is not an ends but a means, that disarmament is a global good but that this not the case with the mechanisms or machinery that help achieve it.

The Kazakh ambassador suggested the General Assembly “may consider having open ended groups to see how the CD can start work on the FMCT, control the arms race in outer space, a legally-binding treaty for negative security assurances, and work on a Declaration/Convention outlawing nuclear weapons.” The Canadian delegation expressed support for negotiating the FMCT outside of the CD, with the “active participation” of nuclear weapon possessors, including through the UNGA’s First Committee.

On behalf of the ten-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, the Australian delegation said that if agreement cannot be reached on a programme of work in the CD, “we are determined to ask the 66th UN General Assembly to address the issue and consider ways to proceed with the aim of beginning FMCT negotiations.”

The European Union indicated it would prefer to work within the CD but said that if the stalemate continues “the international community needs to reflect on options and, if necessary, identify other ways to ensure progress.” The Italian and Moroccan delegations separately echoed this position.

Both the UN Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the CD suggested this as a possibility. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon suggested that states “could conduct negotiations in an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly or a United Nations conference.” He emphasized, “If the CD remains deadlocked, the General Assembly has a responsibility to step in. As I have said before, the CD should not be held perpetually hostage by one or two members. Concerns should be addressed through negotiations.”

Meanwhile, CD Secretary-General Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that while the CD is working on reforming is procedures and rules, the General Assembly should “assume the responsibility entrusted to it by the United Nations Charter.” He said, “I fully support the Secretary-General’s idea of exploring the possibility of conducting negotiations in an Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly or a United Nations Conference.”

Must not “circumvent” the CD

• Non-Aligned Movement
• Brazil
• Cuba
• China
• France
• India
• Iran
• Israel
• Pakistan
• Romania
• United Kingdom
• UN General Assembly President

In a joint statement delivered by France, the P5 said, “We are convinced that, as the sole standing multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the CD should maintain the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament.” While four of the P5 were adamant in their statements that FMCT negotiations must be conducted within the CD, the US delegation merely said it would prefer to negotiate the FMCT within the CD. The Russian delegation, on the other hand, called proposals to circumvent the CD “shock therapy,” arguing that such measures would “paralyze forever and ultimately destroy existing machinery.” The UK delegation argued that the CD is the “best option” for negotiations while the Chinese ambassador described the CD as “irreplaceable”. The Brazilian ambassador said, “despite its shortcomings, there really is no alternative to the CD.”

US representative Rose Gottemoeller indicated that the P5 agreed in Paris “to take steps prior to the next UNGA to renew efforts with other relevant partners to promote FMCT negotiations, and we are planning these activities now.” The UK delegation confirmed this commitment.

Cuba’s delegation unequivocally opposed “the replacement of the Conference with elective, improvised ad hoc arrangements, outside the framework of the United Nations, exposed by certain countries. If such criterion is imposed,” it argued, “we would be taking a dangerous step back.” Israel’s delegation argued that “independent processes have not been able to-date to attract into their fold the most relevant countries, those countries whose participation in the new legal arrangement will make the most significant changes to the situation on the ground.” (However, as the Philippines’ delegation noted, in many cases countries have joined the treaties later even if they did not participate in negotiations.)

The UN General Assembly President argued that member states “must not circumvent CD or deprive of it of its legitimacy,” but should instead “renew its efficiency”.

Working methods/rules of procedures

Should review/reform CD’s rules of procedure

• European Union
• Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
• Bulgaria
• Chile
• Colombia
• Finland
• Ireland
• Italy
• Japan
• Kazakhstan
• Luxembourg
• Mexico
• New Zealand
• Romania
• Spain
• Switzerland
• Secretary-General of the CD

The Swiss representative noted that while political will is necessary to overcome the deadlock, his delegation “is struck by the inherent weakness of existing mechanisms to provide ways and means to catalyze the necessary political will and to capitalize on it where it is developing.” To this end, Mr. Bavaud suggested the General Assembly should “take forward the revitalization process, by introducing fresh thinking, new ideas, and pragmatic approaches. Such a groundwork is essential to pave the way for the broader support needed to launch a deeper reform process.”

The Mexican delegation argued that the CD’s working methods are “designed for different times,” and that the rule of consensus is the “greatest obstacle” to progress, because it is “construed as a need for unanimity.” Ambassador Heller stressed that this interpretation has turned the rule into a veto, which, when exercised as such, robs the majority of the opportunity to achieve a higher goal. The Irish delegation likewise emphasized that the consensus rule was not envisaged to allow one state to frustrate the desire of the vast majority. Ambassador Anderson argued that the consensus rule is conducive deadlock, as is the interpretation that the programme of work has to be adopted annually. NPDI pointed out that the “use of rule of consensus to prevent negotiations on FMCT prevents action on other core issues, too.” The Kazakh delegation called for reconsideration of the consensus principle.

The European Union said the CD, as well as the UN Disarmament Commission and First Committee, should review its working methods and report back to the UN General Assembly. The Italian delegation suggested changing from six to two presidents per year, with clearer mandates, and maintaining a programme of work over multiple years. The Chilean delegation said revitalization requires revision of central aspects of the CD’s working methods, including composition, procedures, regional groups, and rule of consensus, the last of which should be preserved but cannot be abused to the point of where even procedural matters are compromised.

The Secretary-General of the CD agreed that states should “review and overhaul” the Conference, including its working methods, composition, and agenda. He suggested that the rule of consensus should be limited to substantive decisions only and that the four-week rotating presidency should be reconsidered. He suggested that a high-level panel as suggested by the UN Secretary-General could conduct this review.

Must not reform the CD’s rules of procedure

• Non-Aligned Movement
• Algeria
• Brazil
• Cuba
• China
• Ecuador
• India
• Iran
• Israel
• Pakistan
• Russian Federation
• United Kingdom

Russia’s representative argued that revitalizing the CD is not a matter of “radically reorganizing” it but of marshalling political will to kick-start its work. He argued that the “current situation is not the result of systemic breakdown in the machinery but a reflection of differing priorities of states and visions of legitimate national interests.”

The Non-Aligned Movement argued that revitalizing the UN disarmament machinery “hinges on creating a suitable political environment, taking into account the security interests of all States rather than changing ‘rules of procedure’.” It insisted that the real problem is lack of political will by some states “to achieve actual progress, including in particular on nuclear disarmament,” and that ascribing the lack of progress to the CD’s rules of procedure conceals the “true obstacle” faced by the Conference.

Iran’s delegation argued that “the only choice to give a boost to [the CD’s] activity is to inject political will into this important and irreplaceable forum.” (Though as Austria’s delegation noted, political will “cannot be forced upon Member States.”)

Brazil’s delegation questioned whether “the countries denouncing the abuse of the rule of consensus in negotiations on an FMCT would be ready to accept majority decisions in other issues that are under consideration by the Conference.”

Could reform the CD’s rules of procedure, but that’s not the real problem

• Austria
• Costa Rica
• United States
• UN Secretary-General

The Austrian delegation argued that the CD’s “procedural architecture has proven to be insufficient to adequately address security concerns of the 21st century. Its working methods, in particular its consensus rule, stand at odds with those of most other international fora.” However, Ambassador Kmentt also acknowledged that the CD “is and has been in paralysis for such a long time due to political issues and insufficient political will to overcome them.” He argued that the responsibility for this paralysis does not lie with one state alone, as others have suggested, since it is “not only the FMCT which does not seem to muster consensus. Nuclear disarmament, PAROS, and NSAs are also divisive issues. The ultimate problem,” he suggested, “appears to be the lack of real political commitment to address disarmament and non-proliferation through multilateralism leading to multilateral treaties.”

The Costa Rican delegation noted that while the CD does repeat “year after year the same routines and the same mistakes,” the reasons for the stalemate “do not lie exclusively within its current working methods.” Rather, Ambassador … suggested, the more important reason is that the international community holds a militaristic, rather than a humanistic, approach to disarmament. He argued, “It is about time to approach disarmament as a value to human security, and arms control through the lens of international humanitarian law and human rights. If we do so, it will allow us to relocate the conceptual axis of the debate, in a more positive, and we believe effective manner.”

UN Secretary-General Ban said, “I see no fundamental flaw in the United Nations disarmament machinery that may be blamed for this deadlock, certainly none that cannot be overcome by changes in State policies. The problem lies not with the vehicle, but with the driver. What is needed most of all is a closer alignment between policy priorities and multilateral disarmament goals.”

Should expand the membership of the CD

• Non-Aligned Movement
• European Union
• Informal Group of Observer States
• Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
• Brazil
• Bulgaria
• Colombia
• Costa Rica
• Finland
• Ireland
• Malaysia
• Philippines
• Russian Federation
• Serbia
• Slovenia
• Thailand
• Uruguay
• Secretary-General of the CD

The Costa Rican delegation noted that it is paradoxical that in the CD, “there is not even one of the 27 countries in the world which does not possess armed forces, and thus, have turned military disarmament into national realities.”

The Informal Group of Observer States noted simply that “the current membership of the CD does reflect anymore the world as it is.” Pointing out that a membership review has not been conducted since 1999, the IGOS argued that to reconnect with the international community, the CD must make itself “more representative of the world we live in.”

The Turkish delegation argued that expanding the CD’s membership now is a distraction from substantive issues. Thailand’s delegationdirectly dismissed this claim, arguing that membership expansion would enhance the effectiveness of the CD’s work.

Should increase role of and interaction with civil society

• European Union
• Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
• Austria
• Brazil
• Bulgaria
• Colombia
• Chile
• Finland
• Ireland
• Luxembourg
• Malaysia
• Russian Federation
• UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board

Ireland’s delegation emphasized that greater involvement of civil society would enhance representation in the CD of global public opinion and strengthen its standing and credibility.

How to address the challenges of the UN disarmament machinery

Should convene a fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV)

• Non-Aligned Movement
• Algeria
• Canada
• Brazil
• Ecuador
• Indonesia
• Iran
• Ireland
• Malaysia
• Pakistan
• Philippines

Brazil’s delegation specified that the “any reform effort should consider the UN disarmament machinery as a whole” and not only the CD, and discouraged “initiatives that try to partially amend the operation of the machinery based on a limited goal and restricted to only one subject, such as, for example, fissile material.”

Ireland’s delegation said it is open to the idea of establishing SSOD IV and all other suggestions. Canada’s delegation said it is “not opposed” to convening SSOD IV, but emphasized that the start of FMCT negotiations “should not await

Recommended the establishment of a high-level panel/eminent persons group to consider ways to revitalize the CD and/or other aspects of the UN disarmament machinery

• Malaysia
• Republic of Korea
• UN General Assembly President
• UN Secretary-General
• Secretary-General of the CD
• UNSG’s Advisory Board

Is the FMCT the only topic “ripe for negotiation”?

FMCT is the preferable “next step”

• European Union
• Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
• P5
• Canada
• Finland
• France
• Italy
• Japan
• Luxembourg
• Republic of Korea
• Russian Federation
• Slovakia
• Slovenia
• Spain
• United Kingdom
• United States

In the P5 joint statement, the French delegation described the FMCT as “one key element in the effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT.” The UK delegation argued, “Starting Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament would constitute a significant achievement and necessary building block for our ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

The Italian delegation indicated that it is also open to proposals for work on negative security assurances with a view to the possible start of negotiations.

The European Union and the French delegation called for nuclear weapon-possessors to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

FMCT does not have to be the next step

• Non-Aligned Movement
• Brazil
• China
• Colombia
• Cuba
• Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
• Ecuador
• Indonesia
• Iran
• Ireland
• Kazakhstan
• Pakistan
• South Africa
• Uruguay
• Viet Nam

Brazil’s delegation emphasized that it does “not endorse the view that only the issue of a treaty on fissile material is "ripe" for negotiations. Nor do we support the thesis that only one country should be held responsible for the stalemate in the work of the CD. If this is true with respect to the subject of a treaty on fissile material,” Ambassador Viotti argued, “other countries have blocked the negotiation of instruments related to the other agenda items.” She further noted that even with regard to a fissile material treaty, “there exists a clear difference of views.”

Similarly, Colombia’s delegation noted that while the “logical” next step might be an FMCT that includes existing stocks, other items have “matured” at the same time and it would make more sense to pursue more than one treaty at a time. China and Cuba argued that the CD does not have to work on one thing at a time. While the Chinese delegation urged that FMCT negotiations begin as soon as possible, it also said the CD should engage in “substantive work” on the other three core issues, which will “produce a positive effect on promoting negotiations on an FMCT.” Cuba’s delegation suggested engaging in simultaneous negotiations on all four core issues and emphasized that an FMCT is “insufficient by itself if the subsequent steps to achieve nuclear disarmament are not defined.” Ecuador’s delegation called for action on all four core issues.

The Non-Aligned Movement unequivocally called for the immediate commencement of negotiations on “comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament with a specified timeframe.” It called on the CD to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament “as soon as possible and as the highest priority.” The DPRK delegation likewise called for immediate negotiations of a treaty abolishing nuclear weapons. Indonesia’s delegation suggested that undertaking “time-bound actions” on nuclear disarmament would be “the best way to build confidence and assure that the CD can be reincarnated.” The Iranian and Pakistani delegations suggested negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, NSAs, and PAROS, while the Kazakh ambassador indicated support for negotiations on all four topics. Uruguay’s ambassador suggested negotiations on FMCT, NSAs, and PAROS.