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Colombia takes over CD presidency

Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) met on 1 June under the new president, Ambassador Alicia Arango of Colombia. The delegations of Brazil, Italy, Pakistan, Ecuador, China, Algeria, Mexico, the United States, Iran, Cuba, Germany, Japan, India, Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) delivered statements on the state of the CD and a fissile materials treaty.

Highlights

  • In her introductory statement, CD President Ambassador Arango noted that the international community is watching the CD and sending a clear message that patience is running out.
  • Ambassador Akram of Pakistan reiterated his delegation’s position on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and made some comments in light of the recent op-ed by the UN Secretary-General on the deadlock in the CD.
  • Ambassador Manfredi of Italy delivered an oral report on the informal thematic debate on FMCT that took place during the Chinese presidency.
  • The delegations of Brazil, Pakistan, and Iran reiterated the importance they place on including existing stocks in the negotiations of a future treaty on fissile material.
  • The delegations of Pakistan, Algeria, Cuba, Ecuador, and Iran argued that the rules of procedure are not the cause of the deadlock in the CD.
  • The Mexican and Dutch delegations said it is necessary to modify working methods that no longer function.
  • Due to scheduling problems, the two remaining presidents of the CD, Cuba and the DPRK, swapped order. Therefore, the ambassador of the DPRK will take over the presidency after Colombia and Cuba will assume the final presidency of the 2011 session.

Result of the informal FMCT discussions
Ambassador Manfredi of Italy chaired the two informal meetings devoted to the issue of fissile materials during the Chinese Presidency. He noted that the discussions had focused on the structure of a future treaty and its definitions. Various possible solutions were examined, for example:

  • a single text treaty including verification, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention;
  • a single text treaty excluding verification, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;
  • a main text with attachments like a single entry into force mechanism, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);
  • a main text accompanied by attached protocols or annexes, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; or
  • a concise main text with a system of verification subsequently agreed upon based on the IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocol, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The advantages and disadvantages were identified and discussed, with different states preferring different options. However, Ambassador Manfredi concluded that no objections had been made during the discussions to the proposal that an FMCT should have no date of expiry. The discussions had also touched upon entry into force provisions, where the CTBT precedent was considered flawed by most speakers, who advocated for solutions.

The Italian ambassador noted that considerable attention was also been devoted to the topic of definitions and verification. The usefulness of basing definitions on IAEA criteria and verification on its comprehensive safeguards system was recognized by many delegations, but several urged caution concerning the extra burdens to the Agency’s budget that this would entail. Ambassador Manfredi concluded that there is a clear need to provide an FMCT with financial assessment clauses if a feasible and credible treaty can be concluded.

The question of stockpiles was addressed in depth on various occasions during the informal meetings, confirming the opinion that it would constitute one of the most contentious issues during negotiations. Some delegations insisted that the FMCT should limit itself to banning future production of fissile materials, while others reiterated the need to add at least a minimum of provisions regarding present stocks. Aside from this difference, most delegations believed that the question would inevitably surface during negotiations, and that the Shannon mandate allowed for this.

Negotiations on fissile materials 
The Pakistani ambassador reiterated his argument that only a treaty that would adequately deal with the asymmetry in fissile material stockpiles would be acceptable, as “the international non-proliferation regime has been sacrificed at the alter of power and profit” since the exception made by members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group for trade with India. He argued that this exception “only makes a mockery of the NPT, the IAEA and the NSG itself.” Ambassador Akram is therefore in favour of a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) rather than a FMCT, “which will be a genuine disarmament instrument and not just a quasi-non-proliferation measure”. Mr. Daryaei of Iran noted argued that a treaty on fissile materials should be a clear and meaningful step towards disarmament, with both future production and existing stockpiles covered. A treaty that did not cover existing stocks would be “fruitless”.

Ambassador Suda of Japan believed that the Shannon mandate is a good basis and that it would not be helpful to reopen that compromise. Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany argued that all delegations had different views and starting points but asked the Pakistani ambassador to what extent did details of a future treaty needed to be clarified before the commencement of negotiations.Ambassador Macedo Soares of Brazil pointed out that it cannot be denied that “the fierce resistance by some member states to even a broad mention of pre-existing fissile material could be assumed as announcing a denial to treat that question in the negotiations.”

The dysfunctional state of the CD
Ambassador Akram of Pakistan commented on the recent op-ed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which points out that the CD has failed to make any substantive progress for 15 years. The Pakistani ambassador highlighted the “critical facts” that he believes are the reasons for the “dysfunctional” state of the CD: that it does not function in a vacuum; that it needs to meet and address security concerns of all CD members; that it has nothing to do with the rules of procedure; and that previous successful treaties have only been negotiated once they are “cost-free” for states and do not affect their capabilities. Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany disagreed that previous arms control and disarmament treaties had been “cost-free”, pointing out that such arguments devalue the importance of existing agreements.

Ambassador Akram further raised concerns about “a concerted campaign through a patently pliable and biased western media to present exaggerated claims of Pakistan’s strategic capacity and capability, which are totally unrealistic and unfounded.” He also argued that any attempts of using pressure on Pakistan to agree to FMCT negotiations would be unsuccessful, as “no price is too great for ensuring our security.” The Brazilian ambassador argued that a member state that freely joined the CD, the purpose of which is to negotiate legal instruments on disarmament and arms control, “cannot invoke its security situation in order to prevent a negotiation that is deemed appropriate by a great majority of member states.” This view was supported by the German delegation.

Ambassador Mauricio Montalvo of Ecuador argued that the rules of procedure should not be used as an excuse; there were other reasons for the deadlock in the CD. He argued that each day the deadlock turns into something that is more and more unsustainable and unjustifiable. Ambassador Reyes Rodriguez of Cuba noted that in other organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, powerful states attempt to impose their views and positions on smaller ones. The Cuban ambassador argued that similar attempts are made in the CD, but that the consensus rule allows for a more democratic decision-making process.

The Mexican delegation, on the other hand, argued that the rules of procedure are part of the problem. Ambassador Gomez Camacho argued that while the global political context for achieving nuclear disarmament might be difficult, complex situations exist in all fields of international relations. He believed that the existing mechanisms can either facilitate or inhibit negotiations of agreements and decisions. Ambassador Gomez Camacho stated that the CD has clearly turned into one of those that inhibit negotiations. Ambassador van der IJssel of the Netherlands reiterated the importance his delegation places on the CD but argued that it is necessary to remain critical of it. He stated that while the rules of procedure and working methods have worked before, it does not mean that they are sacred and automatically applicable to the situation today. 

Ambassador Reyes Rodriguez of Cuba also spoke out against any attempts of cutting the funding of the CD. However, he did argue that it should only meet when there is a clear objective of the meetings, rather than for repeating old positions.

What if discussions were taken outside? 
The delegation of Brazil noted that it is “indispensable that all nuclear weapons possessors are included in the negotiation” and that the proper venue for this would be the Conference on Disarmament. “A parallel expeditious process cannot ensure the participation of all States necessary for an instrument on nuclear disarmament,” he argued. Ambassador Akram noted that it was absolutely clear that Pakistan will not be a party to any FMCT negotiations outside the CD and believed that “even in the unlikely event that such negotiations provide a result, that outcome will be still-born and we shall not be bound by it.” The Iranian delegation argued that any negotiation that will not involve the key players would be fruitless.

The Mexican ambassador disagreed that there would be no point to negotiate a treaty if “key players” are not involved. He argued that there are no key and non-key players, as nuclear weapons affect all countries in the world. He also noted that if this assumption were true, there would be neither international law nor an NPT today.

Ambassador Jazaïry of Algeria believed that if delegations wanted the CD to remain the “sole multilateral negotiating forum” for disarmament, they had to intensify efforts to protect it. As it is not the rules of procedure that is the problem, but rather the absence of political will, Ambassador Jazaïry did not believe that using mechanisms outside the CD would make matters better. “In fact, it could make matters worse as any instrument negotiated in such a body might not include the participation of all the relevant parties and would not be as strong as an instrument negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament,” he argued.

However, other delegations seemed more open to moving outside the CD if the deadlock continued. Ambassador Suda of Japan reiterated that disarmament is more important than the CD itself, and if it remained dysfunctional, states will understandably lose interest and continue work on nuclear disarmament and fissile materials in other places.

Ambassador Gomez Camacho of Mexico called the 15 years of deadlock a “crude, clear, and sad reality” that is difficult to rationalize or justify. He argued that either the CD must be reformed or work would need to be done elsewhere. 

Notes from the gallery
While it appears that all delegations are at least are willing to admit there is a problem with the CD, views on what to do about it continue to differ. After 15 years of deadlock, it is not enough to simply continue to discuss what exactly causes the problem; concrete proposals for solutions are needed. If the rules of procedure and the current working methods are fine as they are, what should delegations do to get the CD back to work? Should the international community simply sit back and wait for states with nuclear arsenals to change position? Or should the international community signal that their time has run out and demand implementation of the commitments to nuclear disarmament that have been made by all nuclear weapon states? Abandoning the CD for work elsewhere might not be a perfect solution, but perhaps it is better than wasting another decade on unproductive sessions with unchanging positions.

Next plenary
The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 9 June at 10:00 am.