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CD discusses negative security assurances again

Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) met on Thursday, 10 March to further discuss negative security assurances. The delegations ofBrazil, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), New Zealand, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico,Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Italy participated in the discussion.

Highlights

  • The delegations of Brazil, DPRK, New Zealand, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran, Mexico, and Japan called for a legally-binding instrument on negative security assurances (NSAs).
  • The CD President and the delegations of New Zealand and Algeria reminded the Conference about the proposal made by the Irish ambassador on a legally-binding treaty on NSAs on 10 February.
  • The Israeli delegation argued that a WMD free zone in the Middle East cannot happen before peace and security exists in the region.
  • The delegations of Algeria, Syria, Iran, Egypt, and Italy believed that such a zone would contribute to enhancing peace and security.

The legitimate concerns of non-nuclear weapon states
All delegations that discussed NSAs supported the conclusion of a legally-binding agreement on this topic. Ambassador Macedo Soares of Brazil elaborated the security issues underpinning the issue of NSAs. He argued that states possessing nuclear weapons “do not wish any change in the present situation of international security except in the sense of increasing their own security.” He explained that this doctrine, often explained as the “principle of undiminished security for all” is often invoked by nuclear weapon states or states belonging to nuclear alliances but not by states which neither possess nuclear weapons nor belong to alliances based on them. Ambassador Macedo Soares stated that in fact, “the security of the other non-nuclear weapon states cannot be diminished since it is simply non-existent.”

Ambassador Macedo Soares reminded delegations that some nuclear weapon states resist the idea of negotiating and signing a legally-binding treaty for NSAs and argued that their refusal to work on such a treaty indicates the intention of keeping the possibility of employing nuclear weapons against any perceived enemy. While understanding the difficulties ahead, the Brazilian ambassador stated that his delegation did not accept the existence of obstacles or arguments of any nature to block progress on any item of the CD’s agenda.  

The delegation of the DPRK noted that the provision of NSAs is essential to the existence of non-nuclear weapon states and for the promotion of the process of nuclear disarmament around the globe. Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand noted that entering into legally-binding security assurances is a comparatively quick and effective way by which nuclear weapon states can bring about a significant improvement in the international security environment. Mr. Saiyadi of Iran noted that already at the time of the adoption of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the UN General Assembly in a subsequent resolution requested the negotiation body to urgently consider NSAs. He also argued that the existing unilateral declarations are partial, declarative, and limited.

The representative of Pakistan quoted US Ambassador Laura Kennedy’s statement from last month, when she said that the US “will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.” Mr. Ali Khan of Pakistan believed that this statement implied that NSAs would only be extended “when the powerful countries have perhaps developed conventional weapons with enormous destructive potential on a scale comparable to nuclear weapons.” He stressed that this is unacceptable and that it reveals an approach focusing on multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation as “a cost-free exercise”.

Ambassador Macedo Soares of Brazil also pointed out that non-nuclear weapon states that received so-called “positive security assurances” by placing themselves under nuclear umbrellas “are not ipso facto beneficiary of negative security assurances.”

Nuclear weapons in security and military doctrines
Several delegations noted the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in security and military doctrines. The Algerian delegation believed that the military doctrines based on nuclear deterrence adopted by some nuclear weapon states allow for use of nuclear weapons even against the non-nuclear states. He argued that this makes the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on the NSAs all the more urgent.The delegation of DPRK called for nuclear weapon states to give up their nuclear doctrines based on pre-emptive use and commit themselves unconditionally to non-use of nuclear weapons pre-emptively. Mr, Daryaei of Iran argued that dangerous doctrines of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states have officially been proclaimed, putting such states under more threats than ever.

Ambassador Suda of Japan reminded delegation of action 5 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, which calls upon nuclear weapon states to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies. He emphasized that NSAs would play a significant part in reducing reduction the role of nuclear weapons. He also highlighted action 8 of the same action plan, which states the responsibilities of nuclear weapon states to fully respect existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Ambassador Suda called upon the nuclear weapon states to build on to this action by providing stronger NSAs to non-nuclear weapon states that comply with the NPT.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)
The representative from Pakistan noted that while NWFZ are highly important, such zones cannot obviate the need for negotiations on NSAs in the CD. Ambassador Macedo Soares of Brazil suggested that the CD should devote a separate meeting of the CD to a debate on different aspects of NWFZs. The delegation of Mexico agreed with this proposal and argued that NSAs should be considered separately from NWFZ.

Mr. Hatem El-Atawy of Egypt reminded the UN Secretary General and the NPT depositor states that his delegation is basically waiting for them to start the preparation towards holding a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. He called upon relevant actors to start the preparations for the 2012 conference and highlighted that time is running out. Ms. Tamar Rahamimoff-Honig of Israel attached importance to “the eventual establishment” of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, including means of delivery. However, she argued that the zone cannot be detached from the circumstances in the Middle East, since it can only be achieved and sustained in a region where war, armed conflict, terrorism, political hostility, incitement, and cause of annihilation of other states stops being a feature of every day life.  The Israeli representative argued that peace and security must first exist in order to foster necessary conditions needed for a WMD free zone, as such arrangements “cannot be super imposed from the outside nor can they advance security for one state at the experience of another.”

The Egyptian delegation responded by noting that any disarmament arrangements, such as NWFZs, are tools for stability and security.Mr. Hatem El-Atawy argued that the international community should not wait until there is total peace in the Middle East before thinking about establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in the area. On the contrary, he argued that it would be an attempt to help the peace process in that area by establishing undiminished and increased security for all countries in the area.  Mr. Al Nuqari of Syria reminded all delegations that the creation of a NWFZ in this region was within the package of the indefinite extension of the NPT. He noted that certain guarantees were given by the depository states and that Arab countries joined this agreement based on this understanding, so this is part of the security concept of these states. The Iranian delegation believed that the comment of Ms. Rahamimoff-Honig was “another example of the systematic efforts to play the victim aimed at distorting the facts and diverting attention form the sole source of concern and danger in the Middle East which is the existence of nuclear weapon of Israeli regime in this region.”

Concrete proposals
Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand took note of the proposal made by the Irish delegation on 10 February 2011, which suggested a treaty on NSAs negotiated in the CD whose terms did not condone the possession of nuclear arsenals by states who have not adhered to the NPT. It could take the form of a general prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT and would be opened for universal adherence. Ambassador Higgie believed that this was a thoughtful suggestion, which offers the prospects of stepping around the complicated issue of NSAs in the CD or in the NPT, and she welcomed views from others on this topic. Mr. Hamza Khelif of Algeria agreed that the proposal of the Irish delegation represents a good basis for continued discussions and noted that it also represents a point of departure that could be complimented with other proposals. Mr. Kahn of Pakistan noted some views that NSAs should be treated in the context of the NPT. He argued that the two tracks could be pursued and should be mutually reinforcing.

Notes from the gallery
The decision by the 2010 NPT Review Conference on a promise of a 2012 conference on the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East was one of the more progressive parts of the outcome document. However, without effective implementation, the final outcome document of 2010 is just a piece of paper. No special coordinator has been appointed and with only one year left before the conference is to take place, time is becoming scarce. With the next NPT preparatory committee coming up in just a little over a year, it is essential that the depositary states—the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian Federation—show concrete progress on this issue. A future zone free of WMDs in the Middle East is a central issue for the continued trust and confidence in the NPT. Linkages between a NWFZ in the Middle East and an effective peace agreement in the region are often used to block genuine debate. It is therefore necessary for a special coordinator to be able to start contributing to a mutually reinforcing strategy, where both issues are dealt with in parallel.

Next plenary meeting
The next meeting will take place on Tuesday, 15 March at 10:00 am, when delegations will focus on agenda items 5, 6, and 7.