We use Google Analytics to learn more about who is reading the resources on our website. Please read Google Analytics privacy policy for further information. Close

logo_reaching-critical-will

The CD debates definitions of fissile materials

Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) met on Thursday morning 3 March to discuss items relevant to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Statements were made by the delegations of Australia, Ukraine, China, Japan, United States, Republic of Korea, Pakistan,Italy, Canada, Switzerland, India, Germany, United Kingdom, Algeria, and Iran.

Highlights

- Ambassador Woolcott of Australia reported comprehensively on the recent side events on FMCT definitions.
- The delegations of the US, Canada, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, the UK, and Mexico expressed support for the side events and were interested in future ones.
- The representatives of China, Pakistan, India, and Iran cautioned against pursuing substantive discussions outside the CD and preferred to pursue further discussions inside the CD.
- The delegations of Italy, Japan, Germany and Canada, supported the definition of “fissile materials” as laid out in Article XX of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute.
- The Pakistani delegation argued for the inclusion of Americium and Neptunium in the definition of “fissile materials.”
- The US delegation advocated for the "direct use material" definition.
- The Swiss delegation want to discuss a concrete proposal for a simplified programme of work, including its advantages and disadvantages in order to move the substantive discussion of the CD forward.

Report from the side events
Ambassador Woolcott of Australia gave a comprehensive report on the recent side events on FMCT definitions, arranged by the delegations of Australia and Japan. He re-emphasized that the events were intended to build confidence about a FMCT and its negotiations, and did not represent negotiations nor pre-negotiations. The Australian delegation circulated a table, which summarises the four broad options for the definitions of “fissile materials” and “production” raised by participants at the side events. Ambassador Woolcott stressed that this was a non-exhaustive list of options, and other options may feature in coming discussions. Ambassador Woolcott reported from the discussions on the detailed definitions of fissile material, production, production facility, nuclear explosive devices, and how possible stockpiles could be defined. Both Ambassador Woolcott and Ambassador Suda of Japan emphasized that Australia and Japan will co-host another side event on FMCT verification and an opportunity to follow-up and further reflection on FMCT definitions in the near future. The delegations of the US, Canada, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, the UK, and Mexico expressed its support for the side events and looked forward to future events on verification.

Ambassador Lauber of Switzerland noted that the side events showed that with political will, the Geneva disarmament community can make progress on the CD agenda, and that his delegation is open to attend and to contribute to similar events on the other core issues.Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany stated that while the side events are welcome, he was at the same time very interested in a substantive exchange of views on such questions in the CD itself, both in formal or informal meetings.

Ambassador Qun from China, who has previously declared that the Chinese delegation would not participate in such side events, noted that from Australia’s report, it was clear that the discussions had been substantive. He pointed out that since it did not take place in the CD, the discussions would not enjoy any formal status. He suggested that if the discussions could take place in the CD, they would be more significant and meaningful, and encouraged all delegations to consider this. Dr. Daryaei of Iran noted that “many delegations did not participate” in these side events and that many of the participants were not engaged in these substantive discussions. He argued that that the report presented by Ambassador Woolcott had no formal status in the work of the CD and “any effort to blow this issue out of its proportionality is not acceptable by us.” The Iranian representative urged all delegations to “stop any activity that undermine the credibility of the CD.” Mr. Singh Gill of India also noted that all relevant countries were not represented at the side events and that many of those who participated did not engage substantively. He therefore believed that the summary of the discussions can only be what it has been stated to be – the Chair’s  personal assessment.

Ambassador Akram of Pakistan argued that the CD was the only forum for such discussions and expressed concern about “efforts that can only undermine the CD” and “efforts to question the very basis of the rules that have always governed over work”. He continued by raising objections to the “hollow threats of isolation” and “a disinformation campaign through a transparently pliant media,” and stated that Pakistan had already demonstrated its “determination and capability not to succumb to pressure or intimidation.”

General aspects of Fissile Material
The Ukrainian delegation highlighted the recent initiative of its President, Mr. Victor Yanukovych to convene the “Kiev Summit on Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy” and argued that it was another step on the path of implementation of the Nuclear Security Summit commitments. Ambassador Maimeskul noted that another commitment was to promote the idea of conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel nuclear reactors to low enriched ones as well as to secure rights of non-nuclear states to nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with the requirements of the NPT. Ambassador Qun from China believed that before starting with specific issues in the FMCT, it was essential to sort out its general structure. He asked what key elements should be included, should it be one treaty or include relevant protocols, would it be of a general nature and consist of principles or would it be comprehensive with a detailed scope including such features as an executive body. Ambassador Qun argued that if consensus could be reach on these questions, it would help all parties to gain a better view of which direction a future FMCT would take.  Ambassador Akram of Pakistantook the opportunity to highlight that “the major powers were ready to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) only after sufficient number of nuclear tests had already been carried out by them and further testing became unnecessary,” and argued that the same case now applies to the FMCT. Ambassador Akram noted that major powers, after having developed huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons as well as stocks of fissile material that can quickly be converted into nuclear warheads, are now ready to conclude a treaty that will only ban future production of fissile material. He further argued that the proposed FMCT, would not be a “real disarmament measure” since he believed that only a treaty that bans future production and involves the reduction of existing stocks would constitute a true disarmament measure.

Definitions of “fissile material” 
US Ambassador Laura Kennedy noted that the challenge was to not be so narrow in the definitions of, for example, “fissile material” that it leaves open opportunities to circumvent the fundamental objective of an FMCT. However, she also highlighted that at the same time, it was important not to be so expansive that the treaty constrain activities that have no relation to such objectives. Ambassador Kennedy stated that the US delegation preferred a definition of fissile material aimed at capturing material that could be used to make such weapons, which would correspond to the standard IAEA definition of "direct use material". The Japanese, the German, the Canadian, and the Italian delegations advocated for the use of the definition in Article XX of the IAEA Statute. Ambassador Hoffmann argued that it was not only because of“purely pragmatic reasons”, but also because if an FMCT were to use a fundamentally different set of definitions than the IAEA safeguards system, it could be a danger of this doing damage to the IAEA safeguards system itself.

Ambassador Akram of Pakistan argued for the inclusion of Americium 241, 242 and 243, as well as Neptunium 237 in the definition of “fissile materials,” as these are potential material for nuclear weapons. He noted that many technically advanced countries have accumulated sizeable amounts of separated Americium and Neptunium, and argued that if these two materials remain outside a verification domain, such major powers may have alternate proliferation routes available to them.

Ambassador Manfredi of Italy argued that definitions of fissile materials should include materials with current or near-term predictable technology, such as the relevant isotopes of uranium and plutonium in order to keep definitions as close as possible to real-life conditions and avoid theoretical scenarios. While suggesting the definition in Article XX of the IAEA Statute, Ambassador Manfredi noted that such definitions are nearly fifty years old and would need to be brought in line with present-day scientific and technical knowledge, while remaining compatible with current IAEA verification procedures.

Ambassador Grinius of Canada believed that while there was a compelling case to incorporate neptunium and possibly americium, negotiators would however need to recognize that these two elements do not pose equal proliferation risks, either between them or in relation to uranium or separated plutonium. Ambassador Grinius pointed out that delegations should begin with the "do-able" and an approach consistent with the existing safeguards system under the IAEA.

Stocks
The report of Ambassador Woolcott highlighted that if existing stocks were included in the treaty, these would also need to be defined.He explained that the Vice-Chair of the side events, Mr. Bruno Pellaud, had suggested three possible aggregations of fissile material, which could serve as a basis for discussion on the associated aspects of verification; stored weapon components at weapon stores; stocks stored in bulk form at fabrication plants or weapon stores; and materials in bulk form separately stored in other less sensitive facilities. Ambassador Grinius of Canada believed that negotiations of stockpiles would not be simply a choice of including or excluding, as stocks have a range of forms and a variety of possible verification and disposition scenarios. He believed that it was necessary to transform position statements into actionable, concrete proposals that could be taken up in negotiations. Dr. Daryaei of Iran noted that the main criteria for his delegation were that an FMCT should be a meaningful step towards nuclear disarmament, and thereby cover all stockpiles. “Without covering the stocks of fissile material, the FMCT would be futile,” he added and believed that this should be clear in a programme of work.

Verification
US Ambassador Kennedy suggested a verification approach that would be based on monitoring facilities capable of producing fissile material and any newly produced fissile material. She argued that such an approach would aim at keeping implementation costs low while achieving these aims and pointed out that such a structure for an FMCT should be aimed at complementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Ambassador Kennedy argued that she did not foresee additional verification obligations under an FMCT for non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT which have a comprehensive safeguards agreement, supplemented by an Additional Protocol in place.

Ambassador Manfredi of Italy believed it was preferable that the agency tasked with verifications should be the IAEA, since it has the necessary operational experience, trained personnel, and technical knowledge to achieve this end. He noted that any other solution, such as the creation of a new verifications body within the FMCT, would require greater human and financial resources, not to mention the time wasted in bringing it up to speed.

While noting the IAEA’s “incomparable amount of knowledge,” Ambassador Grinius of Canada argued that the relationship of the IAEA with a future FMCT cannot be assumed. He noted that the IAEA is already a complex international organization pressed to the limits of its existing resources.

Notes from the gallery
It is encouraging to see delegations move beyond generic national positions and explore and counter each other’s arguments. As the German Ambassador noted, “are we not currently engaging in negotiations?” However, in order for this exercise to be more useful than previous thematic debates, suggested language and proposals will need to be put down on paper and circulated for comments. The circulated table that summarises four options for definitions of “fissile materials” by Australia and Japan is a good start and hopefully similar documents can be tabled on other aspects of an FMCT, such as stockpiles.

Reaching Critical Will believes that stockpiles will be the most crucial part of a future FMCT, as such future treaty must lay the groundwork for complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament. Already during negotiations, pre-negotiations, or in the process of “building confidence and understanding”, an FMCT must be explicitly embedded in a disarmament framework. The Shannon mandate, without a specific reference to stocks, was agreed upon in 1998. Today, the international community has higher expectations than a simple cut-off that will do little more than keep the status quo. People all over the world are expecting the nuclear weapon states to deliver concrete disarmament measures in line with commitments. If the FMCT is to be a credible step in an approach to a world free of nuclear weapons, it will have to include provisions for the next steps on that road.

Next plenary meeting
The next public plenary of the Conference will be held at 10:00 on Tuesday, 8 March 2011 when it will hold a discussion on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.