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Thematic discussion on negative security assurances

Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) met on Thursday, 10 February to discuss negative security assurances (NSAs). The delegations of Switzerland, Pakistan, Philippines, Ukraine, Canada, Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Brazil, Belarus, Hungary on behalf of the European Union, Algeria, Italy, Argentina, Japan, China, South Africa, Turkey, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Chile, Cuba, Malaysia, India, Australia, the United States, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Austria, Serbia, and New Zealand participated in the discussion.

Highlights

  • All speakers from non-nuclear weapons states, as well as Pakistan and India, supported work on a multilateral and legally-binding agreement on negative security assurances (NSAs).
  • Russia and China signaled that they are willing to work on such an agreement, while the United Kingdom and United Statesfocused on nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) and unilateral declarations as more “appropriate” ways to deal with this issue.
  • Delegations also discussed whether the proper forum for negotiations of NSAs is the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the CD.

Importance of NSAs
An overwhelming majority of speakers called for legally-binding assurances and argued that existing ones through unilateral statements or NWFZs are not adequate. Ambassador Lauber of Switzerland argued that an instrument for negative security assurances (NSAs) would improving the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime as a whole, by strengthening the attractive nature of non-nuclear weapon state status and increasing their interest in being party to the NPT. He also argued that legally-binding NSAs could build bridges with states outside the NPT and that they could constitute a movement towards the general prohibition to the use of nuclear weapons, an additional step towards making them illegitimate, and perhaps help forge a way towards negotiations of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The delegation of Ukraine also argued that NSAs would limit the scope of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and thereby contribute to further delegitimization of such weapons. The Brazilian delegation noted that a universal and legally binding NSA instrument would reinforce the notion that international security must be based on the rule of law, rather than in the use of force.

The Pakistani delegation argued that the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states is not only strategically untenable, “but also morally reprehensible”. Ambassador Akram compared such use to “the most hideous form of genocide”.  The delegation of Ukraine argued that since it was not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or any other military alliance, it was forced to seek NSAs as a priority.

Ambassador Manifredi of Italy argued that a treaty on fissile materials and on NSAs are both necessary to make nuclear arsenals less important. He stated that while an FMCT would choke the supply of material for weapons, NSAs would reduce the amount of targets available for nuclear weapon states. Ambassador Corr of Ireland noted that the outcomes of the NPT Review Conferences of 1995, 2000, and 2010 all referred to the need for legally-binding security assurances. He argued that the absence of even any sign of negotiations of such a treaty is difficult to understand.

However, Ambassador Kennedy of the US argued that she was not persuaded that a global convention on NSAs “is practical or achievable,” but noted that her delegation is willing to engage in a substantive exchange of views regarding different national perspectives on NSAs.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)
Ambassador Kennedy stated that the US believes that the most appropriate way of dealing with NSAs is through adherence to the protocols establishing NWFZs. However, Ambassador Corr of Ireland said he did not agree with any such arguments and argued that in several cases, the signature or ratification of such protocols has been accompanied by unilateral declarations or reservations aimed at retaining the possibility of using nuclear weapons in certain circumstances.

The delegations of Switzerland, Chile, and Argentina pointed out that many states cannot enjoy the security assurances connected to NWFZs because of geographical limits. The ambassador of Bangladesh pointed out that potential use of nuclear weapons is a global challenge, not a regional one. He and the ambassador of Algeria both agreed that NWFZs are useful, but emphasized that such zones are not applicable to all regions. Many speakers also noted that the security assurances by nuclear weapon states under additional protocols to many of these zones are subject to conditions and that not all nuclear weapon states have signed the additional protocols.

The European Union (EU) stated that it attached great importance to NWFZs “as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the UNDC” and called upon all nuclear weapon states to sign and ratify the relevant protocols. China’s delegation noted that it has signed and ratified all the relevant NWFZ treaties and protocols. The UK delegation highlighted that it had signed and ratified the protocols for Tlateloco, Raratonga, and Pelindaba and “as a part of the P5,” the UK remains ready to discuss outstanding difficulties with certain NWFZ treaties.

The Russian delegation stated that in additional to the legally-binding obligations through appropriate additional protocols of NWFZs, which cover over 120 states, it has provided assurances for Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan when they acceded to the NPT and stated that it also had started discussions with Mongolia regarding its nuclear-free status. Mr. Vasiliev noted that Russia supports the treaty of Semipalatisk and announced it was ready to work the remaining issues in the NWFZ in South East Asia. Ambassador Kennedy stated that the US was prepared to consult with parties in these two zones “in an effort to each agreement that would allow us to sign the treaties’ protocol.”

The importance of the proposed WMD free zone in the Middle East was highlighted by most speakers, in particular the Philippines, Ukraine, Brazil, the European Union, Argentina, Turkey, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Cuba, Australia, Egypt, and the United States.

While the EU mentioned that it was preparing to host a seminar on this subject in 2011 with the participation of all relevant countries, the UK stated it would work hard with its US and Russian colleagues towards the conference in 2012, “wanting to ensure it has the widest possible buy-in in the region.” The US noted that the conference must operate by a consensus-based approach and expressed disappointment that certain states pursued the resolution A/RES/65/88 in the General Assembly. The Egyptian delegation stated it was waiting for the Secretary-General of the UN and the depositary states to finish the preparations for this conference.

Unilateral declaration.
Switzerland’s delegation stated that unilateral assurances, such as those contained in UN Security Council resolution 255 and 984, are not adequate responses to the legitimate right of non-nuclear weapon states to enjoy NSAs. This was echoed by most speakers during the plenary. Ambassador Lauber argued that such commitments can be amended unilateral and they only provide very relative assurances. Ambassador Akram of Pakistan called the two resolutions “insufficient, qualified and partial”.  The delegations of Algeria, Argentina, and Egypt all argued that these unilateral declarations are not sufficient, as they are subject to conditions, can be revoked, and do not create the required confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. The delegation of Belarus believed that the assurances in UNSCR 255 and 984 are merely political declarations, which contain a number of reservations. Ambassador Khvostov argued that the resolutions only served to enhance the prestige of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Corr of Ireland argued that these resolutions are just unilateral policy statements, which are in no way legally-binding and are subject to change or abandonment at any moment. He also noted that most of the 1995 declarations “contain caveats which are open to interpretation and therefore unclear.” The Indonesian representative also noted the number of reservations to the two resolutions and argued that the commitments remained incomplete, while the Ambassador of Bangladesh stated that they were inadequate.

The representative of Iran stated that the unilateral declarations and UNSCR 984 were “indivisible parts of the deal” at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, which Ambassdor Soares of Brazil also noted. The Iranian delegation argued that officials in some nuclear weapon states have threatened non-nuclear weapon states and that hundred millions of dollars have been allocated to nuclear weapon development, which puts the nuclear weapon states’ commitment to their unilateral statements and the UN Security Council resolutions “under serious question”.

The European Union reaffirmed the “continuing high value” of the unilateral statements by each of the five nuclear weapon states and called upon those states to reaffirm, in the appropriate fora, the existing security assurances.

Doctrines of nuclear weapon states
While most delegations welcomed the recent reviews of the security doctrines of the US and UK, many still want further commitments. The delegation of Argentina hoped it would lead to an expansion of a no-first use policy amongst all nuclear weapon states and the non-NPT states, and Ambassador Suda of Japan drew attention to the commitments made in Action 5 of the Action Plan at the NPT 2010 Review Conference, where all states possessing nuclear weapons should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies.

Ambassador Qun stated that China’s stance on NSAs has always been clear and it has committed itself not to use nuclear weapons first or against NWFZs or non-nuclear weapons states. He argued that all nuclear weapon states should do the same in order to pursue a legally-binding document on NSAs.  

Ms. Jo Adamson of the UK noted that the UK has long been clear that it would only consider using its nuclear weapons “in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies,” and that it remained deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how, and at what scale it would contemplate their use. She also highlighted the new, stronger assurances to non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, but emphasized the “need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT” and noted that this assurance “would not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.” Ms. Adamson also stated that the UK reserves the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development, and proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological, make it necessary.

US Ambassador Laura Kennedy drew attention to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and highlighted that in it, the US declares not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. She continued by stating that the US would “only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend our vital interests” of the US or its allies and partners.

The Russian delegation stated it unswervingly supported the desire of non-nuclear weapons states to obtain NSAs and declared it is ready to start developing global assurances, taking into account the provisions in the Russian security doctrine.

France was the only P5 state that did not make a national statement during the debate.

India’s delegation expressed belief that non-nuclear weapon states have a legitimate right to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Rao stated that as part of its “credible minimum nuclear deterrent,” India has espoused a no-first use policy against nuclear weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. He argued that India is prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.

Pakistan’s delegation argued that new doctrines that envisage the development of tactical nuclear weapons and their possible use “erode the confidence of the non-nuclear weapon states” and therefore it supports negotiations of a legally-binding agreement on NSAs. Its own strategic doctrine is “based on maintaining credible minimum deterrence” and Ambassador Akram stated that Pakistan has given its unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states not possessing nuclear weapons. “We are ready to translate this pledge into a legally binding international instrument.”

Ambassador Soares of Brazil argued that the resistance of nuclear weapon states to negotiate a legally-binding treaty on NSAs “is an indication that nuclear-weapon States might actually consider using those weapons, even if only in ‘extreme cases’.” He concluded that today’s debate indicated clearly why the CD is not moving forward, and that it is not due to any institutional failure or rules of procedure.

Details of a future treaty on NSAs
Ambassador Lauber of Switzerland argued that there are still many substantive issues that must be clarified in negotiations on NSAs, and topics like as scope, definitions, and structure of a future treaty must be discussed in depth. He drew attention to previous concrete proposals and argued that the process that some members of the CD are currently launching with regards to the definitions of a FMCT could constitute a model for future work on NSAs as well. Mr. Combrink of South Africa listed the issues which he thought needed to be addressed: identification of the states providing the assurances, identification of the beneficiaries of such assurances, the nature and the scope, elements that would needed to be included in a legally-binding instrument, and the format in which such assurances would be provided.

Ambassador Corr of Ireland suggested that an NSA treaty could almost be written in one sentence and suggested it could read, "Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes never under any circumstances to use, or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” The Russian delegation immediately suggested the addition of the words, “which is not a party of an alliance with a nuclear weapon state” to the end of that sentence.

Pakistan’s delegation highlighted two drafts texts of instruments on NSAs submitted by the Group of 21, CD/10 and CD/23. Ambassador Akram argued that the CD could commence negotiations on the basis of these drafts. The representative of Ukraine argued that relevant UN Security Council resolutions and additional protocols of NWFZs could be a basis for further negotiations of NSAs in the CD.

The delegations of South Africa, Ireland, and New Zealand all drew attention to the working paper submitted by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) to the 2003 NPT preparatory committee, which contained elements for a draft treaty. Mr. Combrink of South Africa believed that key concepts of that working paper remained valid still today.

Ambassador Manifredi of Italy countered the arguments that a legally-binding instrument for NSAs would be dismissed because it is not verifiable. He argued that an agreement on NSAs would consist of controlling human intent and is therefore not possible to verify. However, he noted that the unilateral statements are equally unverifiable and therefore not a reason for dismissing any such attempts. He further suggested that while a treaty on NSAs may not contain verification clauses, nothing prevents it from having provisions on sanctions in case of non-compliance.

CD or the NPT?
Most delegations called upon the CD to adopt a programme of work that would contain an ad hoc committee on NSAs. However, Mr. Tan of Canada argued that the discussion of legally-binding NSAs “would most logically take place in the context of the NPT, not in the CD, and that these assurances should be seen as a key benefit of adherence to the Treaty for non-nuclear weapon states.” However, the Canadian representative still supported the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including its proposal for the CD to hold discussions on this matter. This view was echoed by Ambassador Higgie from New Zealand, who expressed some hesitation about the prospect of negotiations on NSAs in the CD. She argued that by their very nature, NSAs are commitments between those countries that had nuclear weapons and those that that did not and cautioned for potential conferring of the status of nuclear weapon states outside of the range of rights and obligations of the NPT. However, just as the Canadian delegation, New Zealand remains open to active participation in the debate on negative security assurances in the CD.

The South African delegation stated it was “unconvinced” about working on NSAs in the CD, but also pointed out that it has never blocked consensus on a programme of work that included consideration of this issue. Turkey’s delegation also noted that NSAs were firmly anchored in the NPT regime, but together with many other speakers, called for implementation of the Action 7 of the 2010 Action Plan. Switzerland’s ambassador argued that Action 7 indicates that all states parties agreed that the CD should immediately being substantive discussions on this topic. Ambassador Lauber argued that this call to the CD to pursue work in this area is clear. Brazil’s ambassador agreed with this. The Irish delegation emphasized that it had an open mind on the forum in which a treaty on NSAs might be negotiated, but was of the firm opinion that the recipients of such assurances should be non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT.

Notes from the gallery
Not only did today’s meeting highlight that most non-nuclear weapon states agree that a legally-binding agreement on NSAs is needed, but also both China and Russia seem willing to pursue such an instrument. While some tend to focus on an FMCT as the only issue in the CD, it is important to remember that the majority of the international community believes that other topics on the agenda are equally ripe for negotiations.  Reaching Critical Will has previously proposed a programme of work that provides for simultaneous negotiations on an FMCT and negative security assurances, together with a discussion mandate on nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space. Such an approach would ensure that the interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states would be addressed more appropriately and would also aid the delegitimization of the use and possession of nuclear weapons.

Next plenary meeting
The next plenary meeting will be held on Tuesday, 15 February at 10:00 am in the Council Chamber.