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Thematic discussion on a fissile materials cut-off treaty

Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) met on 3 February to discuss a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Delegates from Australia, European Union, United Kingdom, Brazil, Turkey, United States, Japan, Argentina, Syria, Netherlands, Canada, Algeria, Colombia, Peru,Germany, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Austria, Iran, South Africa, Pakistan, Italy, India, China, Switzerland, Russian Federation, and Chile participated in the discussion.

Highlights

  • All speakers except one expressed support for negotiations of an FMCT.
  • Pakistan’s delegation reiterated its opposition to an FMCT based on the Shannon mandate.
  • Delegations discussed issues such as definitions, verification, and stockpiles and many speakers made concrete proposals on how to move forward on these topics.
  • As an answer to the UN Secretary-General’s call for an informal process in preparation for negotiations, Australia’s delegation announced that it would arrange three side events on the topic of definitions.

Importance of a FMCT
Australia, the European Union (EU), the Netherlands, Canada, Peru, Germany, and Russia called for FMCT negotiations to be based on the Shannon mandate, as set out in CD/1299. The EU emphasized that an FMCT would contribute to disarmament efforts under article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while the Swiss delegation noted that the treaty should strengthen the non-proliferation regime by bringing closer together state parties and non-state parties of the NPT.

Delegates from the EU, Turkey, Australia, and Austria called for a moratorium on production of fissile materials in the absence of negotiations on a legally-binding treaty and the US, the UK and Russia reminded delegations of their voluntary moratorium. The Dutch delegation drew attention to previous groundwork for an FMCT, such as the work done by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), and CD/1878, in which the Netherlands, Japan, and Canada transmitted a draft FMCT.

The Algerian, Syrian, and Iranian delegations suggested that an FMCT process should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the Algerian ambassador argued that the conclusion of such an instrument should give effect to article VI of the NPT. Ambassador Marschek of Austria agreed that an FMCT was more than a stepping-stone and believed that the continued production of fissile materials is counteractive to the outspoken goal of nuclear disarmament, action 1 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan, as well as to article VI of the NPT. Iran’s delegation firmly stated that an FMCT must not be turned into an instrument solely devoted to non-proliferation, but rather should be a clear and meaningful step to nuclear disarmament. Ambassador Matilja of South Africa noted that as the first country to develop and then completely eliminate its nuclear weapons, South Africa is fully aware of the complexities associated with a future treaty, but argued that such an experience has shown that technical difficulties on topics like definitions, verification, and stockpiles can be overcome if the necessary political will exists.

Definitions
The Australian ambassador focused his statement on definitions, noting that there are two key terms that need to be decided in future negotiations: “fissile materials” and “production”. On “fissile materials,” he highlighted the official definitions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for “direct-use materials,” which are highly enriched uranium (U-235 and U-233) and plutonium (p-238). While noting that these definitions would seem like an appropriate basis for an FMCT, he argued that plutonium and uranium-233 in irradiated fuel should not be regarded as “fissile materials” since they cannot be used for nuclear explosive devices without being separated from the irradiated fuel rods, fission products and other materials by reprocessing. Ambassador Woolcott also drew attention to other fissionable materials which could potentially be used to produce nuclear weapons, such as neptunium and americium. He argued that like plutonium and uranium-233, neptunium and americium are produced through irradiation of uranium and should only become subject to FMCT consideration after separation by reprocessing.

Delegates from Japan, the US, Canada, Algeria, Germany, Chile, and Argentina highlighted the definition of “fissile materials” from the IAEA as appropriate basis for a future FMCT. The Canadian delegation also argued that material such as separated americium and neptunium might also be made subject to a FMCT, “but this would require additional measures and further considerations.” Ambassador Akram of Pakistan stated that aside from highly enriched uranium and plutonium, new kinds of material should be taken into account, such as neptunium and americium.  Ambassador Manifredi of Italy drew attention to previous proposals for definitions submitted by the United States, Switzerland, and Russia and argued that the different submissions required further discussion.

On the definition of “production,” Australia’s delegation sees two processes as being particularly relevant: uranium enrichment and separation from irradiated fuel by reprocessing, for both plutonium and uranum-233. Consistent with its view on definitions of “fissile material,” Australia does not believe the irradiation of uranium or thorium fuel to form plutonium or uranium-233 to be “production,” and only the process of separation by reprocessing for these two materials would be defined as such. The US delegation noted that a definition too broad, such as covering spent fuel, would “add considerably to cost of verifying a treaty without adding significantly to its effectiveness.”

Verification
The Japanese delegation set out a detailed list of how core obligations could be verified in four ways: confirmation that the stocks have not increased from the date an FMCT enters into force; confirmation that reactors and facilities for production are closed down, decommissioned, or converted to non-nuclear weapon use; confirmation that material declared as excess as a result of disarmament measures are not reverted back to nuclear weapons purposes; and confirmation that materials for non-weapons purposes are not diverted into weapons purposes. The Canadian representative noted that the general parameters for a verification and compliance framework should include five elements: an initial declaration; an assessment of the declaration; a continuous monitoring and evaluation process; a conclusion based on the results of this verification process; and finally, a means to address non-compliance.

The ambassador of Argentina argued in favor of a verification mechanism that can achieve a good balance between national security issues and international trust and confidence, but emphasized that such a mechanism should not create any new obligations for non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT.  Ambassador Jazaïry of Algeria noted that verification should not be just for military facilities, but also for civilian ones.

Delegates from the Netherlands, Algeria, Austria, Russia, and Canada highlighted the expertise of the IAEA and its safeguards system under the NPT as a potential contributor to the verification of a FMCT. The Canadian delegation also cited bilateral verification models between the US and Russia and the on-site inspections of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. On the other hand, Ambassador Akram of Pakistan argued for an independent verification mechanism, which would include on-site and challenge inspection. He stated that reliance of IAEA would be not sufficient in order to verify a fissile materials treaty.

Stockpiles
The delegations of Brazil, Argentina, Syria, Algeria, Iran, South Africa, and Pakistan clearly stated that an FMCT should not just be a ban on future production, but also should include existing stockpiles. While acknowledging that the issue of stockpiles is sensitive, the ambassador of Argentina noted that unknown existing quantities introduce an element of uncertainty to the treaty and its verifiability. Algeria’s ambassador argued that including stockpiles would fulfill the requirement of transparency. Ambassador Jazaïry argued that effective verification would require appropriate transparency of production of fissile materials and stockpiles and suggested that the treaty should have inventories and should cover bilateral and unilateral measures of nuclear disarmament, which will ensure irreversibility of the actions.

Since the issue of stockpiles is one of the main sources of its opposition to an FMCT based on the Shannon mandate, the Pakistani delegation argued that a future treaty must address the issue of asymmetry of stocks and not just halt production. Ambassador Akram highlighted new numbers from the 2010 IPFM report and noted that the continued existence of huge stockpiles means that even in the case of a cut-off treaty, sufficient material will be available both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Indian delegation did not agree with the issue of asymmetry of stocks, arguing, “asymmetries in size and development do not and should not prevent us from working together in multilateral forums.” Ambassador Rao of India further argued that India’s membership in international export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group strengthens international non-proliferation efforts and noted, “we have to be careful about who seeks to be the conscience keeper of the international non-proliferation regime.” The Indian delegation stated that an FMCT “must be a Treaty for banning the future production of fissile material” and sees this as the main characteristic in defining the scope of the treaty.

Some delegations tried to find a middle ground between the two polarizing positions on stockpiles.

Ambassador Suda of Japan discussed different implications and views of three different categories of stocks: stocks for nuclear weapons purposes; stocks for non-explosive purposes (conventional military); and stocks declared excess to military requirements. For the most crucial category, stockpiles for nuclear weapons purposes, he argued, “we must wait until discussions converge on whether to include a future reduction/elimination obligation.” Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany argued that the issue of stockpiles could be worked out in negotiations, as the “Shannon mandate explicitly does not preclude and delegation from raising this very issue.” He believed that there will be a need to “strike a balance between opposing approaches” but noted that a minimum transparency will be an issue high on the German agenda in order to make an FMCT meaningful. The Swiss delegation argued that in order to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation, an FMCT should institute a ceiling and reductions of stockpiles. Mr. Wollenmann argued that stocks need to be at least partially covered in order for the treaty to make a contribution to both non-proliferation and disarmament.

Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand argued that a treaty “which banned the future production of fissile materials, and at the same time imposed obligations on disclosing, reducing and eliminating existing military stocks in a verifiable manner, would certainly be the optimal outcome of our negotiations,” but admitted that a range of other solutions could also be proposed. She argued that a fissile materials treaty might only be feasible in the context of a framework approach—with the treaty being supplemented by protocols negotiated on a multilateral basis, or by unilateral declarations given by the relevant states. These other instruments could be negotiated in parallel to the treaty negotiations or following the conclusion of the treaty—and they would ideally be of a legally-binding nature. Such a framework approach was also mentioned by Ambassador Soares of Brazil, who drew attention to his proposal last year for a framework treaty and two additional protocols which would deal with production and existing stocks, in order to have a phased approach to the controversial topics.

The delegation of Canada emphasized its previous proposals in CD/1578 and CD/1770, in which Canada sought to outline steps to address existing stockpiles through transparency measures, declarations, and disposition. Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand highlighted the importance of declarations, which “would at least serve to specify the total quantities of HEU and plutonium in the possession of the declaring state,” but also suggested a number of other approaches in case mandatory declarations for particular categories of stocks would not be possible, in order for the verification regime to be able to differentiate between stocks held at the date of entry into force of the production ban and stocks produced illegally after that date.

Ways forward
As with all topics on the CD agenda, views on how to move forward with the FMCT differed. Ambassador Duncan of the United Kingdomwarned that if the CD fails to make progress on FMCT, it may encourage other states to seek alternatives to the CD in order to further their “disarmament ambitions”. He argued, “this would not be conducive to concluding the sort of comprehensive and meaningful treaty to which the international community aspires.” Delegates from Algeria, Pakistan, China, and the Russian Federation argued that parallel discussions elsewhere than the CD on this topic would be counter productive.

Brazil’s delegation highlighted its proposed programme of work from its presidency in 2010, arguing that it was an attempted compromise that provides a clearer opening to the issue of stocks and other problematic issues of an FMCT. However, as Ambassador Soares noted, this proposal did not enjoy the support of the same countries that supported CD/1864. Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany expressed belief that “states should consider very carefully whether they want to take it upon themselves to prevent the entire international community in its effort of starting a process of exploring mutually acceptable solutions in negotiations” and referred to Pakistan’s statement on the 25 January. In his reply, Ambassador Akram stated that it was not the intention of Pakistan to prevent the entire international community, but referred to the countries that had created the circumstances that forced his delegation to take this position.

Last week, the UN Secretary-General called for informal processes on an FMCT in the CD, in preparations for negotiations. The European Union, Peru, the Republic of Korea, and Austria supported this proposal. The US also said it was ready to engage in formal CD plenary or meetings on the sidelines on these issues. In order to follow-up on this call by the Secretary-General, the Australian and Japanese delegations announced a series of side events on FMCT definitions. These side events are aimed to support the CD and to support future FMCT negotiations in the CD. The invitation triggered a lengthy discussion on side events, “past practices of side events,” informal meetings, and “informal informal” meetings in the CD. The delegations of Iran, Pakistan, China, Algeria, and Syria raised questions of possible linkages between side events and the CD and any potential reflections of this in the annual report. In the end, most delegations seemed clear that the side events announced were indeed a national initiative and not formally connected to the work schedule of the CD.

Notes from the gallery
It is clear that many delegations are eager to engage in technical and focused discussions around fissile materials. The informal discussions on these topics that the Secretary-General called for will most certainly be useful. However, CD delegations have had focused discussions on stockpiles, definitions, and verification each year since 2006. If any new initiatives are going to be useful, states must go further than once again stating their national positions and must put forward concrete proposals for a future treaty.

Next plenary meeting
The next plenary meeting will be held in the Council Chamber at 10:00am on Tuesday, 8 February. The topic will be prevention of an arms race in outer space.