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What is progress?

Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) met on Thursday, 27 January to hear statements from Ms. Rose Gottemoeller of the United States as well as representatives of the Russian Federation, Algeria, the European Union, the Eastern European Group, Japan, New Zealand, Bangladesh, and Australia.

Highlights

  • Ms. Gottemoeller of United States said that if member states cannot find a way to begin negotiations in the CD, then her delegation would need to consider other options.
  • Several delegations agreed with the US position and warned that continued stalemate would lead to other initiatives.
  • Ms. Gottemoeller informed the CD that in accordance with a request from the US Senate, work is underway in Washington to prepare for a dialogue on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons with Russia.
  • The Russian delegation highlighted that the Russian Duma wanted to continue efforts to reduce offensive weapons and anti-missile defense.

New START
Ms. Gottemoeller welcomed the news from the Russian State Duma, which approved the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Once the Treaty is officially in force, she explained that the US intends to pursue with Russia further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including non-deployed nuclear weapons. She highlighted the strong interest from the US Senate in addressing the numerical disparity in non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons and noted that the resolution taken in connection with the Senate approval of the Treaty calls for the US to initiate negotiations with Russia to limit and reduce tactical nuclear weapons within a year of entry into force of New START. She informed the CD that work is already underway in Washington to prepare for such dialogue with Russia.

Ambassador Loshichin of Russia, on the other hand, noted that given the reservations that were entered by the US Senate in the ratification resolution, the Russian parliament and its ratification law has also established conditions on which approval of the treaty must be based. The Russian ambassador did not refer to tactical nuclear weapons at all, and instead quoted President Medvedev’s speech in Davos on 26 January 2011, when he stated, “We need to continue our efforts to reduce offensive weapons and on one other subject too, which is related to it, and that is anti-missile defense.” Ambassador Loshichin argued that implementation of New START will only be possible by bearing in mind all principles of the Treaty, in particular those that explicitly highlight the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive nuclear weapons. He also drew attention to the fact that Russia may leave the Treaty “if the US would unilaterally to deploy anti-missile defense systems which would infringe the national security and defendability of the Russian Federation, or if it would weaponize non-nuclear systems without corresponding decisions by the bilateral consultative commission established in accordance with the treaty.”

Getting to work?
Once again, delegations engaged in a debate on a programme of work and the future of the CD. Ms. Gottemoeller of the United States,Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand, Ambassador Suda of Japan, Mr. Wilson of Australia, and the European Union representative all noted that efforts outside the CD might take place soon if substantive work did not commence.

Ms. Gottemoeller of the US argued that waiting “ad infinitum” for the CD to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) was not a viable option. She emphasized that no country needs to fear the outcome of FMCT negotiations and no country should feel it necessary to abuse the consensus principle and frustrate everyone else’s desire to resume serious disarmament efforts on negotiations. She argued that if member states cannot find a way to begin these negotiations in the CD, then her delegation would need to consider other options. She also stated if the CD should not be able to agree on beginning negotiations now, the US would strongly support the idea of robust plenary discussion on broad FMCT issues, reinforced by expert-level technical discussions. Ms. Gottemoelleralso noted that US experts will come to Geneva and “be available to contribute to discussions in the CD, and hold meetings on the margins with interested delegations” and highlighted that the US looks forward to contributing to these FMCT discussions “in CD plenary and, informally, elsewhere in the Palais.”

The representative of the EU argued that if the CD’s stand-still continues, there would be no doubt that the international community will increasingly reflect on options and, if necessary, identify other ways to ensure progress in multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament. The EU noted that the UNGA First Committee urged the CD to agree on a programme of work, and argued that the CD has an obligation to serious follow-up on the high-level meeting before it reports back in the autumn. Ambassador Jazaïry of Algeria, on the other hand, repeated his delegation’s position from the high-level meeting, arguing that the stalemate was not a failure of the Conference, but is rather caused by lack of political will by some members to support all topics on the Decalogue.

The delegations of Japan and New Zealand looked back to previous practices in the CD and argued that a programme of work was not such a contentious issue then. Ambassador Suda of Japan noted that the rules of procedure do not obligate a programme of work to include the establishment of any working group or its mandate; the rules only indicate that a programme of work will include a schedule of activities. He noted that in 1996, the CD continued its negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without agreeing to a programme of work at all, and did so by reestablishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the CTBT negotiations independently. Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand argued that the content of a programme of work needs to be de-mystified along the lines set out a decision adopted by the CD on 21 August 1990. She explained,

That decision—on the so-called “Improved and Effective Functioning” of the Conference—envisaged a streamlined and sensible process whereby the programme of work would be no more than just that which its literal interpretation suggests, that is, a mere programme or timetable—but certainly not an overarching mandate. CD/1036 led to the current rule on the work programme, rule 28, with its emphasis on organisation of business rather than on mandates. Mandates are matters for subsidiary bodies, should the Conference decide to establish such mechanisms.

For those interested in the history of the CD previous programmes of work and decisions, Reaching Critical Will is currently working onan online archive of CD documents from 1979 to 2000. It will be updated continuously during the spring.  

Comments on the UN Secretary-General’s speech
All delegations that took the floor welcomed the Secretary-General’s speech from the day before and showed appreciation for his efforts and commitments to the CD, in particular his initiative of the high-level meeting in September 2010. Representatives of Japan, the Eastern European Group, and the European Union all supported and endorsed the Secretary-General’s call to the CD to commence substantive work without further delay and adopt a programme of work at the earliest possible date. Ambassador Higgie of New Zealandalso supported the suggestion from the Secretary-General on an informal process on a fissile material treaty, and highlighted that the continuing failure of the CD is not just a wasteful use of resource, but also compromise the interests and security of small countries.

Notes from the gallery
The discussions around the future of the CD, working methods, and progress on nuclear disarmament are useful and necessary at this point. The frustration amongst certain delegations might have grown larger after the failure to implement the programme of work in 2009, but many delegations and civil society have expressed concerns and disappointment about the CD’s ability to deal with the issues far longer—over a decade. When discussing ways out of this deadlock, it is necessary to reflect on how we envision multilateral disarmament negotiations to be pursued in the future.  Many delegations believe consensus is the best and perhaps only way to achieve sustainable progress in multilateral disarmament, while others argue that consensus is preventing progress.

As Reaching Critical Will suggested in the final editorial of the First Committee Monitor in 2010, one of the main problems is that some of those states that demand consensus-based processes do not seem to respect consensus themselves or have no interest in progress at all. Consensus-based processes should be a positive aspect of negotiations, employed in order to maximize the participation of as many actors as possible and to ensure that all participants are given equal voice. However, such processes have proven to also be used to ensure no progress at all. When discussing whether to revitalize the existing disarmament machinery or launching parallel processes, we must look into other successful negotiations. Not only do we need to look at successful multilateral disarmament negotiations like the Oslo and Ottawa processes, but also towards other areas such as climate change talks, trade agreements, and human rights treaties. Such negotiations cover topics that affect human and therefore national security just as much as weapons do. Lessons learned from how these disciplines have managed to progress in the twenty-first century should be considered when discussing how the international community can move forward.

It is possible that the CD, or a new and revitalized but still consensus-based disarmament machinery can achieve progress. In such a case, however, it is a condition that all parties want to make progress on the disarmament agenda as whole—and not just selective parts of it. As civil society and governments are trying to move forwards with our work in 2011, billions of dollars will be spent on modernization of nuclear weapons—the same weapons leaders of these countries have agreed to eliminate. The conditions and investments attached to the ratification of New START in resolutions from both the US senate and the Russian parliament will be a formidable obstacle for disarmament efforts in the future. It is therefore important that any effort to revitalize the CD and move forward isn’t just an attempt to launch negotiations on some country’s main priority, an FMCT, but rather should consist of measures that will lead to sustainable progress of nuclear disarmament.

Next plenary meeting
The next plenary meeting will take place on Tuesday, 2 February at 10:00am in the Council Chamber. CD President Ambassador Grinius suggested that delegations concentrate on the issue of nuclear disarmament in this meeting.