Ways forward for the CD and space security
During the final plenary meeting of the first part of the Conference on Disarmament (CD)’s 2009 session, Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland delivered remarks to mark the Ottawa Convention’s tenth anniversary. Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria delivered his farewell statement to the CD, upon which the current CD president commented. Canada’s Ambassador Marius Grinius introduced aUNIDIR paper on getting the CD back to work and another on preventing an arms race in outer space.
Brief highlights
- Switzerland’s ambassador urged universality of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines.
- Bulgaria’s ambassador argued that the ultimate responsibility for breaking the CD’s stalemate lies with those in government making political decisions.
- Canada’s ambassador introduced one paper reviewing questions facing the CD’s relevance and methods of work and another analyzing the merits of current proposals to enhance outer space security and suggesting a “third” way forward.
Anti-personnel landmines
Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland noted that the Ottawa Convention (Mine Ban Treaty) celebrated its tenth anniversary of entry into force three weeks ago. While praising the Convention’s progress in stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and victim assistance, Ambassador Streuli lamented that 39 states are not yet party to the Convention and noted that mine clearance and destruction still pose challenges to the Convention’s full implementation. However, he also observed that the Convention has helped establish a global norm against the use and production of anti-personnel landmines, even for those states who have not signed or ratified the Convention. Ambassador Streuli also argued that the adoption of the Convention “marked a shift in the international community’s approach to human security and arms control, demonstrating its willingness and ability to work alongside civil society outside of any established forum.
Work of the CD
During his farewell speech to the CD—the second of his career—Ambassador Petko Draganov of Bulgaria optimistically said, the last three years “have been a source of encouragement and a sign of hope for a better future, despite the difficult political context.” However, he argued, “the basic problems we face cannot be resolved here, as they are political by nature ... no matter how inventive or imaginative we get in the exercise of devising the perfectly balanced program of work, at the end of the day we are not the big decision makers in this chamber.”
Military spending and the economic crisis
Describing the “difficult political context,” Ambassador Draganov cited statistics that global military expenditure is growing at a higher rate than global economic growth. He expressed hope, however, that he economic crisis “will be seized as an opportunity to sober up.” In response to Ambassador Draganov’s statistic about military spending, the current president of the CD, Ambassador Ambassador Idriss Jazairy of Algeria, suggested, “perhaps as economic growth is now going in the other direction, military expenditure will be reduced at a rate higher than the reduction in economic growth.”
UNIDIR paper on getting the CD back on track
Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada explained that last month, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) chaired a series of informal meetings with a diverse group of CD delegates and civil society representatives. He introduced a paper called “Getting the Conference on Disarmament Back to Substantive Work: Food for Thought,” which he hopes will “promote understanding and dialogue among CD members, and help the CD find its way progressively and positively through the current impasse and to a resumption of its substantive work.”
Relevance of the CD
The paper notes that while “barren periods of the kind currently being experienced by the CD are not unprecedented in the security arena,” some Permanent Missions in Geneva argue the CD is losing its value and may be “acting as an obstacle to the emergence of alternative efforts toward nuclear disarmament goals.” Many, however, consider the CD’s past successes indicative of its future potential—though the paper notes that since the CD’s establishment, several disarmament treaties have been negotiated outside of it. The paper asks if it would be possible to “remove any of the current crop of issues from the CD for negotiation elsewhere, but assumes that the nuclear weapon states would “almost certainly not participate.” In terms of current membership, the paper argues that while many states call for expansion of the CD, very few accuse the CD of being unbalanced—though if an Arms Trade Treaty is to be negotiated in the Conference, “it could be claimed that this forum does not include among its Members the most affected states.”
Four core issues
The paper also asks if a “less complex question” than the current four core issues should be taken up in the CD to build confidence in its ability to work, though it says “no issue in recent years has been articulated as a CD proposal.” Regarding the issue of a fissile materials cut-off treaty specifically, the paper asserts, “It cannot be taken for granted that a fissile material mandate that includes the negotiation of a verification mechanism will be sufficient on its own to break the deadlock,” as other members “can be expected” to link progress on the fissile materials issue to progress on another issue—which, the paper assesses, could be used to prolong the stalemate.
Programme of work
The paper considers whether or not a “less complicated vehicle” could carry the CD forward and questions the assumption that the programme of work “must contain mandates of the kind found in proposals tabled since the Shannon Mandate.” The paper points to Rule 28 of the CD’s rules of procedure, which requires the programme of work to include only a schedule of its activities based on its agenda. “Deepening those activities” is to be determined by members’ subsequent decisions, not the programme itself. The paper suggests a schedule-focused programme might “help with the management of divergence” on other fronts, such as linkages and mandates, by offering “the opportunity through individual mandates to remove explicit, written linkages.”
Rule of consensus
Visiting the issue of decision-making—blocking consensus—the paper examines the possibility of developing “a new, less restrictive, community of practice or ‘culture’.” It quotes the Blix Commission’s recommendation that the CD adopt its programme of work by two-thirds majority and Jozef Goldblat’s argument—echoed by many civil society and diplomatic representatives—that there is “no risk in adopting veto-free procedures, because no conference or organization can impose treaty obligations on sovereign states through voting.” This view, the paper contends, is countered by states who feel nervous about being subject to pressure by other states and NGOs to go with the flow—making a “relaxation” of the rule on consensus unlikely. However, the paper notes that states could voice reservations rather than objections in order to not block consensus.
Engagement with civil society
Regarding the involvement of civil society, the paper describes the annual reading by the CD president of a statement composed by theWomen’s International League for Peace and Freedom as “patronizing and demeaning to women and to the Conference itself.” It argues, “the issue has become symbolic of the need for a broad change in policy toward greater civil society participation.” The paper also questions if the 2004 decision, that NGOs be allowed to deliver presentations once a year after a programme of work has been adopted, is still tenable given that a programme has still not been adopted, and questions the rationale for the CD being more exclusive than the NPT, BTWC, and CCW meetings. The paper recommends the six presidents or appointed “friend” determine the formality of the level of engagement with civil society; determine the regularity of engagement; decide whether the International Women’s Day address is to be treated separately from the practice of broader engagement with NGOs; and settling on a formula for receiving statements from NGOs.
Regional groups
The paper notes many states feel regional groups weaken or even circumscribe presidential authority, as presidents “filter any potentially contentious issue through the regional groups,” while dynamics within and among the groups themselves have “compounded” the difficulties of reaching consensus. The paper suggested informal or cross-regional groups to develop cooperative approaches and broker compromises among the key players.
Overall recommendations
In order to move the work of the CD forward, the paper suggests that the Conference:
Hold a discussion about the “ripeness” of the four core issues to identify elements of each issue that would be central to any negotiation or “substantive discussion,” and identify potential sources for helping to deepen understanding of these elements.
Determine whether a basis for future work can be laid through means other than a programme of work or depart from the current practice of developing a programme of work that seeks to include mandates.
Preventing an arms race in outer space
Ambassador Grinius of Canada also delivered a statement on preventing an arms race in outer space, in which he introduced a working paper on “The Merits of Certain Draft Transparency and Confidence Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for Space Security.” The paper questions whether states should, as they did when developing the Outer Space Treaty, start with a code of conduct to build transparency and confidence or launch directly into negotiations of a new treaty. It notes:
Canada’s goals for space security can be found in the juxtaposition of the right of safe passage of space objects for peaceful purposes with the right of self-defence in the Outer Space Treaty and the UN Charter, informed by the technological prowess that now permits conventional weapons to successfully engage objects in outer space.
The paper argues that in the new rules, “security guarantees should presage safe passage guarantees for space objects,” encouraging readers to consider, “Should the world’s first space-based weapon be granted safe passage or freedom from harmful interference in outer space?”
Russian-Chinese draft treaty
Specifically referencing the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space, Canada’s paper notes that the draft treaty’s prohibition of force against outer space objects and its ban on weapons in outer space would not necessarily have prohibited the anti-satellite weapon test by China against its own satellite in 2007. Another reason the anti-satellite weapon tests would not be prohibited under this text is because the draft treaty does not ban development or testing of space weapons, only their use.
EU draft Code of Conduct
Canada’s paper notes that the European Union drafted this Code “within the context of the prior US Administration’s reluctance to enter into any legally-binding instrument that would constrain America’s freedom of action in outer space,” and also accommodates the US anti-satellite test in 2008 that the US government and this Canadian working paper argue was “undertaken for the protection of public safety.”
The paper highlights two issues with the draft Code’s exemption for safety considerations and for activities which are undertaken to “minimise outer space debris”. One issue is that “a national security prerogative is not an expressly authorised reason for the production of space debris,” and some states “might not accept this restriction on their national security” if another state deploys space weapons. The second issue is “that it allows for a proliferation path for anti-satellite weapons that ought to be closed when judged against other possible or viable proposals for a more robust security guarantee.”
Another way forward
The paper argues, “a better security guarantee than both the EU’s draft Code of Conduct and the Chinese-Russian draft PPWT, would be for the international community to agree or accede to a ban or a pledge such as:
State [Parties]/[Signatories] to the [Treaty]/[Code of Conduct] [shall]/[should] not test or use a weapon against any satellite so as to damage or destroy it.
The paper notes that such an undertaking “would again need to be done in conjunction with a prohibition on the placement of weapons in outer space, lest we inadvertently provide a sanctuary for space-based weapons,” and argues that a prohibition “on the test or use of any satellite itself as a weapon capable of inflicting damage or destruction on any other object, would address the residual threat of a benign dual-use satellite serving as a weapon. Taken together, these three rules would prohibit armed conflict in outer space based on the application of physical force.”
The paper argues that this alternative approach would avoid the struggle to define a space weapon, a satellite, or outer space, “since the effects of the weapon are included within the proposed prohibitions, a satellite is a object that orbits round the Earth or other celestial body, and the prohibition on the placement of any weapon in outer space can be modelled on the language of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.” It also suggests, “the definition of test could also be modelled on the following: where ‘test’ means ‘to flight or field test in a manner observable to the national or multinational technical means of [verification]/[compliance monitoring] available to a State [Party]/[Signatory]’.”
This proposal, according to the Canadian paper, “would also obtain a concomitant safety guarantee preventing the production of space debris, ” while both limiting the possibilities for testing devices as anti-satellite weapons and keeping open the door to develop “self-defence measures against the future prospect of space-based weapons.”
CD business
This was the last plenary meeting of the CD before the Disarmament Commission in April and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in May. The CD’s 2009 session will resume on 19 May 2009 at 10:00 AM in Geneva.
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