4 March 2008
The foreign ministers of the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Romania, Iran, Slovakia, Norway, Turkey, Japan, and the Ukraine, and the vice president of Colombia, addressed the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The participation of high-level representatives demonstrates the international community's continued interest in the CD, though Minister Kubis of Slovakia suggested, “as the impasse over priorities goes on, there may be a noticeable reduction of high-level engagement by governments in the CD.” He indicated that the longer the stalemate continues, public and government interest alike will decline—and with it, “the sense of pressure.”
One theme that resonated throughout most of the statements at this plenary was a sense of pressure. Delegates recognize that action is needed now to overcome the impasse in the CD, and further, to understand and overcome the sources of instability in the world. However, the same divergences in opinion and priority that have caused the stalemate in the CD and that have halted progress in disarmament in general were present in these statements, highlighting the true challenges to disarmament and security—trust and compromise.
Divergence: Threats to security
One particularly large divergence in governmental opinion is what constitutes a threat to security. Some representatives, such as the Mr. Gahr Store, Foreign Minister of Norway, spoke of “the threat of proliferation, and the scenario of nuclear technology and material falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists,” while others indicated that nuclear weapons in any hand are a threat to peace and security. Mr. Mottaki, Foreign Minister of Iran, highlighted unilateralism, the resort to military rather than peaceful means to settle disputes, and military doctrines based on pre-emptive strike as threats to security.
Divergence: Compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation obligations
The foreign ministers' statements also offered widely varying perspectives of the current state of international compliance with thenuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While Mr. Verhagen, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, noted the “bold steps” nuclear weapon states have so far taken to “embrace their responsibility” of nuclear disarmament, Mr. Mottaki of Iran argued, “attempts to reinterpret the commitments of nuclear weapon states under the Article VI of the NPT in order to attach conditions in fulfilling those obligations ... deliberately ignore the letter and spirit of Article VI of the treaty.” Mr. Tazhin, Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, further lamented the destructive attitude that permeates the NPT and hinders its work, particularly the inequality that “is set in the core” of the NPT, meaning “nuclear powers see no point in observing disarmament obligations.”
Related divergence: Iran's nuclear programme
In terms of nuclear non-proliferation, Iran's alleged nuclear weapon programme is currently the main focus. On 3 March, the UN Security Council voted 14-0 (with one abstention, Indonesia) in favour of Resolution 1803 (2008), a new sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear programme. Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council affirmed its earlier decision that Iran should suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as previously stipulated in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and1747 (2007). The thrust of the resolution is to widen the scope of existing sanctions on imports of materials listed on Nuclear Supplier Group and Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines and to add to list of sanctioned individuals and entities. As in past resolutions on Iran's nuclear programme, the Council again declined to make a determination that Iran's efforts constitute a threat to international peace and security, a requisite for the Council to impose either sanctions or authorize military force under Article 39 of the UN Charter. The Associated Press noted that for the first time, the resolution bans trade with Iran in goods which have both civilian and military uses. It also extends the freezing of the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. The Council also decided that if Iran should fail to comply with its decisions, it would adopt additional measures under Article 41 (sanctions).
In the CD, Mr. Verhagen of the Netherlands argued that the statements delivered at the Council session by the five veto-wielding nuclear weapon states and Germany (P5+1) “underlines their sincere intentions to offer everything reasonable to reestablish a respectful relationship between Iran and the international community.” However, as Ambassador Kumalo of South Africa pointed out at the Council session, the sponsors of the resolution persisted with the same text they had tabled before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's report was released. He noted that the resolution did not adequately take into account the progress that has been made between Iran and the IAEA, and that the vote on the new resolution was not even postponed until the IAEA Board had a full opportunity to review the report and consider the matter, leaving the impression that the progress made was virtually irrelevant to the co-sponsors.
The IAEA's latest report demonstrated, according to South African Ambassador to the IAEA Abdul Minty, “increasing confidence” that Iran does not intend to use its nuclear programme for military purposes and that Iran is cooperating with the IAEA. In explaining his country's abstention, Ambassador Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia said that “more sanctions are not the best course,” arguing that sanctions “would only give a potential negative impact at a time when progress is being made.” However, the P5+1 argued that recently declassified Western intelligence suggesting Iran conducted high-explosives tests and design work on a missile warhead as part of a covert nuclear arms programme was a serious concern that needed to be addressed by Iran immediately. Mike Veiluva ofDisarmamentActivist.org pointed out on 26 February,
The “one remaining issue” relevant to the programme is “the alleged studies (by Iran) on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle.” (”Green salt” is an alleged uranium conversion process.) The report references discussions in late January; however, Iran was only given access to US information pertinent to these matters in February. The timing is not explained; Iran was given literally days to address this purported new evidence. The UK is now contending that this evidence indicates Iran was conducting weapons work after 2003, but the larger question is why we are only hearing of this now—perhaps the proximity of a new UN Security Council meeting has something to do about it.
Beyond the IAEA report, Michael Spies of the Arms Control Reporter has noted,
there have been various offers by Iran to negotiate directly with the United States on a variety of issues of mutual concern, and that the US government, after years of dismissing such offers out of hand, instead opted to engage in talks as part of the EU3+3 process, where it put nothing more concrete than spare aircraft parts on the table in exchange for verifiable suspension of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program.
This behaviour is not exactly reflective of “sincere intentions to offer everything reasonable to re-establish a respectful relationship between Iran and the international community.” During his statement to the CD plenary, Iran's Mr. Mottaki suggested the P5 are simply “making baseless accusation against others under the pretext of so-called proliferation concerns in order to create smokescreen to cover non-compliance with disarmament obligations and to deceive public opinion.” Overall, the divergence over Iran's nuclear programme and over compliance with the NPT in general demonstrates what Indonesia's Ambassador Marty Natalegawa speculated was the “heart of the matter”: lack of confidence and trust.
Convergence: Disarmament is security
Despite these significant divergences in perspective over threats and non-compliance, most statements in the 4 March plenary reflected the belief that nuclear weapons should be abolished in order to ensure greater security. Mr. Tazhin of Kazakhstan argued that the independent history of his country, which is “inseparably linked with disarmament,” convincingly demonstrates “that it is not the nuclear arsenals, but a peaceful foreign policy, internal stability, sustainable economic and political development that in fact [constitute] the real security.” Mr. Akgünay of Turkey said, “We cannot argue that more arms would bring more security, and there lies the virtue of disarmament,” while Mr. Mottaki of Iran suggested a world free from weapons of mass destruction would better ensure the security, prosperity, and welfare of all nations—it “would be quite different from a world where powers seeking absolute security for them and to that end continue to advance and modernize their nuclear arsenals.” Searching for absolute security through the possession of nuclear weapons “diminishes security, erodes confidence and trust among nations and paves the ground for new arms race and revival of militarism.” Mr. Nakayama, Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, recalled that “disarmament is important to establishing peace,” and argued, “resources can be freed up from spending on armaments and instead be used for economic development, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.”
Visions of a nuclear free world
Many of the ministers, including those from Japan, Kazakhstan, and the Netherlands, called for the United States and Russia to negotiate an extension to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a verification mechanism. Mr. Nakayama of Japan also called for greater transparency, irreversibility, and verifiability of the nuclear weapon states' disarmament measures. Most called for further reductions of nuclear weapon arsenals, reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the establishment of a multilateral, reliable nuclear fuel supply, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and negotiations on a fissile material treaty.
Mr. Mottaki of Iran noted, “Nuclear weapons are as illegal as chemical and biological weapons,” and argued that the illegality of nuclear weapons needs to be recognized through a legally-binding Nuclear Weapon Convention. Many spoke of the value of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ). Mr. Tazhin of Kazakhstan said the creation of a NWFZ in Central Asia “is a significant contribution to stability and security” in the region, and “refers to potential strength of the NPT as well.” Mr. Mottaki of Iran argued a NWFZ in the Middle East “would promote the economic and social life of the people in this region through contributing to strengthening confidence in the region.”
Others still discussed the need for a new and/or strengthened missile control regime. The ministers of the Netherlands and Turkey, for instance, advocated renewed national commitment to implementing the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) as a confidence-building and transparency-enhancing measure. Mr. Verhagen of the Netherlands said he would write a letter to the foreign ministers of the HCOC's other 127 signatories to renew their commitments. Mr. Verhagen indicated he looked forward to discussing the potential multilateralization of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty as suggested by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the CD on 12 February.
Oslo conference
During Norwegian Foreign Minister Gahr Store's report on last week’s Oslo conference that convened to discuss “concrete steps” toward a world free of nuclear weapons, he indicated five key principles and ten policy recommendations that emerged from these discussions. The five principles include committed leadership, concrete and implementable steps, shared responsibility, non-discrimination, and transparency. The ten recommendations include many elements discussed by the other ministers, but also suggest that “non-nuclear weapon states should co-operate with nuclear weapon states to develop the technology needed for verifying disarmament,” and that governments should convene “a broadly-based high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament, analogous to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to advise governments on the core requirements for abolishing nuclear weapons.” Most of these points, along with the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, did not originate with the Oslo conference, but have been persistently discussed, analyzed, and suggested by those who work and act for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Hopefully, the focus on nuclear disarmament can be sustained so that it does not, as Mr. Gahr Store described, glide “down the scale of international attention and resolve” once again.
Outer space
The ministers of Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Romania, and the Ukraine welcomed the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space submitted to the CD by Russia and China on 12 February. Mr. Khandogiy of Ukraine suggested that substantial discussion on outer space in the CD should focus on providing greater transparency of space programmes; expanding the scope of information about space objects in orbit; and developing rules of behaviour while performing activities in space, including establishing a Code of Conduct. Mr. Verhagen of the Netherlands said the European Union is currently in the process of drafting a “code of conduct, or a set of best practices.”
Cluster munitions
The ministers of the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, and Turkey discussed cluster munitions. Norway's minister explained the rationale behind the Oslo Process on cluster munitions is to develop a legally-binding instrument “to take the humanitarian consequences as a starting point, and address the need to prevent new victims and to provide assistance for victims of cluster munitions and their communities.” He argued, “A ban on cluster munitions ... is about fulfilling our humanitarian obligation to put a stop to the use of a weapon that severely harms civilians and impedes development.” The minister of Slovakia said his government is “working diligently within CCW and Oslo processes on the new norm prohibiting” cluster munitions. He argued the instrument (or instruments) would have to “achieve a balance between legitimate defense needs and humanitarian concerns,” and “has to set the conditions for main users and producers of this weapon system, as well as important donors, to come on board.”
On the final day of the Wellington conference, the latest stage of the Oslo Process, 72 countries endorsed the Wellington Declaration, the “ticket” to participate in the negotiation of an international treaty on cluster munitions in Dublin in May. Katherine Harrison of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom noted,
Beyond the overwhelming number of countries that endorsed the Declaration, today’s success is that the Draft Convention will go to Dublin unchanged and undiluted.... States that sought to weaken the treaty with proposals for exemptions for certain cluster munitions, transition periods, and provisions for interoperability were unsuccessful. Instead, all proposals were compiled in a “compendium” separate from the text itself, with lesser status. Even the group of “likeminded” States who do not support a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions endorsed the Declaration, although many included a caveat that they interpreted the Declaration to imply that both the Draft Convention and compendium had equal standing as a basis for negotiations. These States’ voices were overshadowed by the increasing number of States, including many newcomers from the Pacific region, calling for a treaty containing a total prohibition on cluster munitions and strong positive obligations, such as victim assistance.
Arms trade
The ministers of Turkey and the Ukraine indicated their support for the development of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Ukraine's Mr. Khandogiy said his country “welcomes establishing common standards in the international arms trade sphere.” Turkey's Mr. Akgünaysaid his country supports the ATT because it is “[c]ognizant of the damage small arms inflict on peace and security worldwide.” He also mentioned his country's support for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which he described as a “useful mechanism.” The Register is a database to which UN member states submit information on international arms transfers, procurement through national production, holdings, and relevant policies. 172 states have participated in the Register since it was established in 1991. However, the Register does not have an agreed-upon definition of the term transfer, leading to discrepancies in reports. In addition, participation in the Register is voluntary. Three of the top 15 military spenders for 2006—India, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea—have never submitted a report to the Register. In order to use this tool to its maximum potential, more governments need to participate more consistently with the Register and clarify the definition of transfer. Increased transparency on the import and export of arms would provide insight as to whether and/or how such transfers adversely affect international security and give the whole world an indication of who has what—and what they might use it for.
Conclusion
Mr. Kubis of Slovakia concluded his statement by saying, “Slovakia is fully determined to support all initiatives that [aim] at improving the global security environment in the most expeditious and realistic way in the present world full of uncertainties and mistrust.” This conclusion highlights the key problem facing the international community today, which resounded throughout the statements of this plenary—the lack of trust and transparency which impedes people's willingness and ability to compromise. Everyone involved in this work is a human being, subject to suspicions and fears, misunderstandings and miscommunication. There are tools to help us work through our suspicions, however, that enable us to understand the other and figure out how to meet them halfway for the benefit of all. Tools like the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures should be used to increase transparency and build trust; fora like the UNGA First Committee and the UN Disarmament Commission should be used to build understanding and consensus on the most critical questions of security and disarmament; and conferences like the one in Oslo and events hosted by many non-government organizations throughout the year should be used to discuss and analyze issues, perspectives, and strategies with diplomats and members of civil society.
Ultimately, of course, we come back to the CD, “the multilateral forum of choice, where the international community negotiates the issues of disarmament and non-proliferation.” All of the ministers and civil society observers hope that the CD once again fulfils its “primary role.” Soon.
- Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will