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7 August 2007

In the CD plenary meeting of 7 August, discussion focused on two weapons of mass destruction—chemical and biological weapons. Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), delivered a detailed statement on the successes and challenges of the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC) and the OPCW. Likewise, Ambassador Masood Khan, President of the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chairman of the 2007 Meetings of the BWC, addressed the CD on the achievements and obstacles of the BWC regime. Ambassador Pfirter and Khan's insightful analyses of two markedly different disarmament treaty regimes highlighted multiple pathways to achieving successful and concrete results in multilateral disarmament initiatives.

During the plenary, the Netherlands, in a joint statement with Poland, announced the two countries will hold a High Level Meeting commemorating the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC alongside the UNGA Session in New York, on 27 September. The Meeting will focus on the importance of multilateralism and the purpose and objectives of the CWC, while supporting its universalization and implementation. Kazakhstan informed the Conference of its accession to the BWC on 28 June 2007, and of its intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Iran made a brief intervention announcing that it will organize a conference in Tehran commemorating the tenth anniversary of the CWC on 22 and 23 October, wherein participants will visit Sardasht, a city whose population still suffers from the effects of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq under Saddam Hussein's government.

Ambassador Pfirter's statement on the CWC and OPCW framed the successes and challenges of the Convention against its unique status in the field of disarmament. The CWC is a "disarmament and non-proliferation instrument that is unprecedented in the history of arms control. Never before had the international community banned so comprehensively an entire category of weapons of mass destruction together with creating the verification tools necessary to assure compliance with these prohibitions," he said.

He argued that the success of the CWC has been clearly demonstrated, despite skepticism that a "Treaty containing such sweeping provisions affecting both militaries and the industry; governments as well as the private sector may be difficult to implement." Despite containing what has been perceived as intrusive verification provisions, the CWC has one of the highest memberships and the fastest rate of accession of any disarmament treaty. Ambassador Pfirter credited the CWC and OPCW's "exemplary spirit of dialogue and a continuous search for balance," and inclusion of every party concerned as the cornerstones of the Convention's achievements.

The CWC currently has 182 members, which represent over 95% of the world's population. 24,000 metric tons of chemical materials—or 33% of the world's known stockpiles—have been certifiably destroyed in 11 destruction facilities, operating in 5 countries. 94% of the chemical weapons production facilities in 12 States Parties have been destroyed; OPCW inspection teams have made over 3,000 inspections in over 1,080 military and industrial sites in 80 countries; and 5,600 participants have been involved in OPCW led activities on international cooperation and peaceful uses of chemistry, Ambassador Pfirter declared.

A key factor of these stunning figures is the commitment of two of the world's largest possessor states to fulfilling their stockpile destruction obligations. The US and Russia have both made significant reductions in their stockpiles. Russia has destroyed 22% of its chemical weapons—a figure that is rapidly increasing, as it had only destroyed less than 10% as of last year. The US has destroyed 46% of its total stockpile, and continues to provide assistance to other possessor states attempting to destroy their own stocks. India, Libya, and others have also made significant reductions in their stockpiles.

Flexibility and balance by the OPCW in dealing with stockpile destruction obligations and deadlines has been another important component of the CWC's success. Albania became the first country to completely destroy its chemical weapons on 11 July 2007. It achieved its goal with the assistance of a number of other States Parties, despite narrowly missing its deadline requirement.

Another element contributing to the success of the CWC regime has been the emphasis placed on establishing a comprehensive regime, not only for disarmament but also for non-proliferation, Ambassador Pfirter stated. The CWC's provisions requiring national measures such as "systematic declarations, industry monitoring, controls on transfers of chemicals, and regulatory measures to identify and track chemicals of concern," along with penal legislation allowing for the detection, pursuit, and prosecution of persons committing breaches of the Convention, have been vital for the CWC's implementation and concrete results.

Lastly, the partnership that the CWC has fostered with the chemical industry and private sector has been an essential part of its development. The OPCW has designed a number of programs and courses to provide chemists and industry-related persons with training dedicated to enhancing understanding of the CWC, national implementation, and safe and peaceful uses of chemistry. As Ambassador Pfirter explained, "We are committed to seeking the continued engagement and support of industry, which, by and large understands that our intrusiveness is well justified by the benefits that the CWC brings in terms of peace, security and better conditions for a prosperous commercial activity." He also announced that the OPCW will hold a meeting in November to foster dialogue between States Parties and global chemical industry representatives on the issue of protecting critical infrastructure and facilities related to the chemical industry and States' security needs, such as protection against terrorism.

These elements—a high rate of universalization, participation by key players, emphasis on national implementation, strong verification, balance, flexibility, assistance, and a partnership and compromise between all relevant players—have been the foundations of the CWC's success. However, as Ambassador Pfirter pointed out, many challenges still threaten the CWC today.

As chemical weapons are some of the "most toxic and dangerous substances ever invented and produced," it is imperative that accession to the Treaty must be universal. Even one absence is a threat to global peace and security. Today, only 13 states are not party to the Convention. While some states, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Congo, Angola, and Guinea Bissau, have indicated their willingness to join in the near future, other states show continuing reluctance. Ambassador Pfirter highlighted two areas which represent "a serious void on our map." In the Middle East, Egypt, Israel, and Syria still refuse to join the CWC regime, while in Asia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Myanmar are not States Parties. Meanwhile, the US and Russia still have a significant portion of their stockpiles to destroy. They have already extended their deadlines until the maximum time allowed, April 2012.

Today's CD plenary also commemorated the success of an entirely different disarmament treaty model. While it was once thought that chemical and biological weapons could be treated together in one instrument, Ambassador Khan described the divergent approach to regulating biological weapons and the dissimilar shape that the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) finally took.

"The BWC is a simple instrument, only a few pages long. Its prohibitions are clear, succinct, categorical and definitive, but it is an instrument of principle rather than procedure," Ambassador Khan stated. Unlike the CWC, the BWC "contains no provision for monitoring or verification of compliance, no provision for an implementing organization, no details of how alleged breaches should be investigated, no organized means of helping States Parties meet their obligations. Many considered this a serious shortcoming. For much of the history of the BWC, States Parties and others have fretted about the effectiveness of the treaty as a practical barrier against the development of biological weapons," Ambassador Khan said.

Discussions during the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC on a verification mechanism nearly brought about a complete halt to future efforts to regulate biological weapons, Ambassador Khan related. Yet the BWC was able to overcome its difficulties by pursuing a different course of action. Unlike the CWC, the BWC did not try to negotiate binding measures, or even recommendations. Instead, experts and officials from the scientific, medical, and political communities came together to cooperate in the face of the increasing threat of bio-terrorism, which after the events of September 11th seemed increasingly dangerous and urgent to address. Their concerted efforts resulted in the successful outcomes of the Sixth Review Conference of 2006, which Ambassador Khan listed as: an intersessional work program, specific measures on universal adherence, updated confidence-building measures, the creation of a national point of contact, improvement of national implementation and coordination, and the creation of an Implementation Support Unit.

Today, with membership increasing and a new system for the electronic distribution of confidence-building measures, Ambassador Khan said, "I am pleased to report that, thanks to the creative and constructive efforts of the States Parties, the BWC is in good shape and ready to confront the challenges it faces."

Thus, the CWC and BWC provide two very different examples of legal disarmament regimes, each producing significant results. Both stem from past efforts in the Conference on Disarmament and serve as important reminders of the work the Conference is capable of, and intended, to do. Ambassador Trezza of Italy, in a brief intervention, referred to an analogy made by Ambassador Pfirter about the CWC being a baby coming back to its mother, the CD. Ambassador Trezza asked if, in view of the results of recent years, who was the mother and who the baby? The BWC and the CWC stand as examples of the successful record of the CD, but the Conference should be mindful that it has not achieved the same results in dealing with nuclear weapons. The CD should draw lessons from the successful implementation of both the BWC and CWC, but should always look to the future and continue its essential work.

The next formal plenary will not take place on the usual Tuesday, but will be held on Thursday, 16 August at 10am, in order to give the President more time for consultations.

- Katherine Harrison, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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