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20 March 2007

On March 20, Conference on Disarmament (CD) heard statements from Canada, the Ukraine, Switzerland and Nigeria as well as an opening statement from Sri Lanka at the beginning of its presidency. Ambassador Fernando conveyed a message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, Rohitha Bogollagama, urging governments to "work with renewed commitment and a sense of urgency." In that connection, the CD's Six Presidents will present a proposal for work for the rest of the year informally at 3pm on March 23, and formally following the informal session (probably around 5pm). The CD will likely take a formal decision on this proposal, which means governments that wish to block progress in the CD this year will have to publicly object and identify themselves and their reasoning. Canada also introduced its new working paper on possible verification measures for a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). 

FMCT
Premised on the position that verification builds confidence and encourages compliance, the new Canadian working paper examines the connection between verification and scope in a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The paper suggests an FMCT use the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) system of verifying compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for non-nuclear weapon states. The paper proposed that a comprehensive safeguards agreement plus an Additional Protocol be the verification standard for an FMCT, at least for non-nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon states and non-parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would have the same verification goal, but "while the application of relevant IAEA safeguards measures in such states would be preferred, alternative verification measures could be considered". The working paper also suggests that governments use the IAEA's definition of "unirradiated direct use material" for materials that will be covered under an FMCT, which will also enable an FMCT to use IAEA safeguards for verification. If an FMCT is truly going to equally serve both non-proliferation and disarmament concerns, then the application of anAdditional Protocol, an important verification of non-proliferation, should be balanced by applying the same strict international verification standards to the nuclear weapon states and non-NPT states.

While the working paper presumes stockpiles of fissile materials "may not" be subject to the provisions of an FMCT, it posits that they should be addressed because they represent a diversion risk for both non-proliferation and disarmament. It therefore suggests that nuclear weapon states and non-NPT states "undertake a process that would complement a ban on production" by declaring their materials, accepting verification, subjecting excess material to international control, and reducing overall stockpiles, all to the greatest degree possible.

The working paper would not ban the production of fissile materials for non-explosive military purposes (ie, naval propulsion) or specific civilian uses (radioactive isotopes). It suggests using a mechanism similar to that used in the comprehensive safeguards agreements, which would allow states to make special verification arrangements for these types of production (see the IAEA's INFCIRC/153).

Nigeria affirmed that "a negotiation on FMCT that addresses the issues of existing stocks and future productions is not only necessary for confidence building, but also for erecting the building-blocks to drive our collective efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament." 

Nuclear Disarmament
Nigeria and Sri Lanka both highlighted the urgency of nuclear disarmament. Sri Lanka reminded the CD that "while progress has been made on important reduction in the nuclear arms stockpiles following the end of the Cold War, we cannot forget that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons still remain in arsenals around the world." Nigeria called on states to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, "which would have put a stop to the quantitative and qualitative research and development of nuclear weapons", into force. It also noted that "non-proliferation will remain a mirage unless there is total commitment towards nuclear disarmament."

Conventional Weapons: ATT, SALW, and Cluster Munitions
The Ukraine, Switzerland and Nigeria discussed small arms and light weapons, supporting an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Nigeria invited the CD to "recognize the grave danger posed by SALWs, and to drive the on-going UN process to negotiate a Global Arms Trade Treaty." The Ukraine also believes the CD should "move without further delay to commence negotiation on ATT." Switzerland invited states to respond to the UN Secretary-General's inquiries about an ATT, in accord with the UN General Assembly's resolution (61/89) on the subject.

Switzerland supported the recent 42-state Oslo declaration on a new international legally-binding treaty on cluster munitions, and said that in order for such a treaty to be effective, it should be as universally recognized as possible.

The next formal plenary meeting will be held on 23 March at 5pm, after the 3pm informal meeting.