19 May 2006

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) held a plenary discussion on compliance and verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) on the 19th of May, followed by two informals on the same subject. The Democratic Peoples’s Republic of Korea, Mexico, theUnited States, Japan, Iran, Australia and South Africa made plenary statements, primarily on verification and compliance.

Following their introduction of a draft treaty on fissile materials on Thursday, the United States introduced a white paper outlining their policy on the FMCT on Friday. US Charge d'Affairs Thomas Cynkin made it clear that the US is ready to start negotiations with an ”aim to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as soon as possible.”

Unfortunately, the US is still at odds with nearly the entire Conference on verification and compliance, reiterating that ”so-called effective verification of an FMCT cannot be achieved.” Reportedly during the informal sessions, experts from around the world tried to convince the US otherwise. However, in its public statement, the US held that ”Even with extensive verification mechanisms and provisions – so extensive that they could compromise the core national security interests of key signatories, and so costly that many countries would be hesitant to implement them—, we still would not have high confidence in our ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT.” Later in the white paper, the US said that not only would negotiating verification provisions prolong ”a difficult enough task”, it would actually be ”dangerous” by providing ”a false sense of security”.

In the plenary session South Africa asserted verification of a treaty on fissile materials would be realistic and effective, and identified three elements of a potential verification system. These three elements would deal with 1) facilities previously used for production of fissile materials, 2) weapons grade materials that have been declared as excess, and 3) non-weapons materials, including down-blended materials and materials for non-weapons purposes.

South Africa also promoted the Internatioanl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the most logical entity to be entrusted with the Treaty's verification because it has expertise and experience in dealing with safeguards and verification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would also probably be more costly to create a new verification entity than to utilize the IAEA. Because the effectiveness of a treaty on fissile materials would depend on sufficient funds for verification, ”One could therefore argue that the willingness of State Parties to provide funding for the verification of an FMT will be a real test of its practical effect,” said South Africa's Mr Johann Kellerman.

Japan offered two approaches to dealing with verification, looking first at what type of verification is required, dependent on the type of fissile materials ban, and second at whether such verification is feasible. Japan also mentioned that many CD members, including Japan, would have more questions for the US experts that explained the US position on verification in the CD two years ago.

Iran's Mr Hamid Eslamizad quoted their Minister of Foreign Affairs, HE Mr. Mottaki, from his March 30 statement to the CD: ”A treaty on fissile materials should be verifiable in order to be capable of creating confidence. By the term verifiable we mean that the treaty needs to have sufficiently elaborated provisions on its verification mechanism.”

Mexico pointed out that verification is essentional in any treaty, but most important in a disarmament treaty. The sole outcome of an instrument without an effective verification mechanism is a norm that may or may not be observed. Ambassador Pablo Macedo also recalled the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference's call for the CD to initiate negotiations on this matter, meaning ”This mandate is not an option, it is an obligation.”

Australia suggested a step by step approach to the issue as a compromise. Mr. Russel Leslie said the first step is to secure the acceptance of the norm against the new production of Fissile Material for use of weapons by the recognized Nuclear Weapon States and the non members of NPT. The next step would be in the context of verification discussions.

Some of the states also commented on exsisting stocks. The US firmely stated what they made clear in their draft treaty, that ”stocks of already existing fissile material would be unaffected by the FMCT”. Mexico shared South Africa's May 18 concern that ”Even banning future production of fissile material, one could use exsisting ones to build new weapons.” Mexican Ambassador Pablo Macedo said a treaty not covering existing stocks would only be an arms control measure, not a disarmament one. Iran had ”serious doubts on how a treaty on fissile materials could serve the nuclear disarmament cause without covering the vast stocks which could easily be used for development of new and new types of nuclear weapons.”

Iran also stated that a program of work should include all four core issues (FMCT, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, nuclear disarmament, and Negative Security Assurances) and enjoy consensus.

The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea made a statement primarily focused on their nuclear situation, not the FMCT. ”It is not that we put our fate at all on the Six-Party Talks. We defend our security ourselves. We have possesed the nuclear deterrence commensurate with the character of the threat against us.” However, the DPRK stated that if the US demonstrates the political will to abide by the Joint Statement (9.19 Joint Statement by the Six-party Talks) and puts it into action, they will rejoin the NPT. ”We withdrew from the NPT, not because there is any problem with the NPT itself, but because the US misused it as a tool to infringe upon our supreme interests.”

On the FMCT, the DPRK appropriated the May 18 US terminology accussing some CD members of taking the FMCT hostage to other issues, when it responded, ”The CD is not the forum serving unilateral interests of one country. The CD can’t be a hostage to one country.”

The conference will hold its next plenary meeting on Monday 22 May at 3 pm.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom