18 May 2006

The United States introduced a draft Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and a draft mandate for negotiating it in this morning's May 18th discussion on existing stocks during the week of the Conference on Disarmament's focused debate on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). US Acting Assistant Secretary of International Security and Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker traveled to the Conference topresent the draft treaty. Following the introduction, the CD paused its speaking list to give delegations an opportunity to react to what Ambassador Landman of the Netherlands called “possibly the most important statement in 3/4/5/6 years.” India, United Kingdom, Iran, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Italy, Japan, Spain, France, Pakistan, Germany, Venezuela, Chile, Belgium, China, Russia, Bulgaria, Algeria, and Canada reacted to the draft treaty, mandate and statement. All welcomed the statement and text as a sign of US engagement with the CD, even if many were not fully satisfied with its content.

The Text
The draft treaty does not include existing stocks or provisions for verification. The draft mandate is “to negotiate a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devises,” leaving out “internationally and effectively verifiable” from the previously agreed-upon Shannon Mandate for an FMCT. The draft treaty requires the ratification of the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) to enter into force and includes a withdrawal provision. Interestingly, Assistant Secretary Rademaker proposed either an ad hoc committee, or this plenary, begin negotiations. He also suggested they aim to approve a text by the end of this 2006 CD session.

As delegations only received the text this morning, most were not able to officially comment on specifics because they must send the draft to their capitols, but were interested in further discussions. Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Russia hoped the negotiating mandate and draft treaty were a flexible starting point for negotiations that “will help us to strike a balance” among differing positions, as Algeria said. Germany was “happy about some elements of flexibility in the mandate and draft proposal.” Pakistan hoped neither the text nor the US statement were “intended to support the notion that it is a take it or leave it document” and Russian said the draft treaty was “not the final word” on such a treaty, hoping it was open for comments and ideas.

Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands were particularly concerned about the lack of verification in the draft treaty, although all agreed with the Netherlands who said “it seems we should, can and will discuss that” in negotiations. Even Pakistan, who has long held that “the agreed upon negotiating mandate [Shannon Mandate] cannot be called preconditions”, today said that “we believe all issues can be raised once negotiations start.” Although Australia holds that an effective FMCT should contain verification measures, it believes the treaty could contain states' commitments, followed by secondary agreements on verification, similar to the process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's initial commitments followed by secondary agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Possibilities for Beginning Negotiations
As discussed yesterday, the CD must agree by consensus on a program of work to establish the Ad Hoc Committees that negotiate treaties, and has been unable to agree for ten years. Many delegations expressed hope today that the draft text and mandate would provide momentum and/or the opportunity to “bring the Conference back to negotiating mode” in the words of Italy. Some, like Spain and the UK, recommended dropping the links among the CD's four core issues in order to begin work, while others, like China, suggested the CD “speedily begin work on an FMCT, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), nuclear disarmament, and Negative Security Assurances.” Belgium, Bulgaria and France were ready to begin negotiations “immediately”, “right away”, and “today”, respectively. Russia said the introduction of a draft FMCT text “cannot serve as an obstacle to our work on other issues”, and Venezuela said that if a program of work is to be adopted it “must address the concerns of all States Parties.”

The compromise Five Ambassadors' proposal for a program of work with Ad Hoc Committees on each of the four core CD issues has been rejected by the US, who only wants to work on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. Although all the other CD members agreed to the Five Ambassadors' compromise, Rademaker said, “a package approach will never work.” He called the linkage among the issues “unconscionable hostage-taking... by proponents of less worthy ideas”. The US saw no need for new agreements on outer space, nuclear disarmament, or security assurances.

Canada and the Netherlands both suggested a more compromising attitude. The Netherlands, reacting to the US characterization of linking issues as hostage-taking, advised that “in practice... insisting on not talking about anything but an FMCT is exactly the same approach as insisting on multiple subjects.” Canada reminded the Conference that the Five Ambassadors' proposal contains a negotiating mandate for an FMCT, but only discussion mandates for the other three subjects. “Americans do not usually shy away from a good debate,” said Canadian Ambassador Meyer. “If the US would signal a willingness to engage, secure in the knowledge they would not advance to negotiations without explicit US approval, it would make an important contribution to bringing this body back to productive channels.”

The text is indeed an opportunity. Although the Conference may not be able to agree by the end of the session, it should be able to use this text, in combination with the timetable of scheduled discussions on all the issues, to find a way to begin working.

The US and Iran
Rademaker's speech also accused Iran of having less than peaceful intentions with its nuclear program, and said “the US expects Security Council to live up to its responsibility to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program. It will be a defeat for effective multilateralism should the Council fail to live up to this responsibility.” Iran responded to Rademaker's list of reasons why Iran's nuclear program is not logically about energy independence by recalling the timeline of US accusations about weapons of mass destruction leading up to its invasion of Iraq, telling the Conference “not to take [the US's] words as real facts, and recalling that the International Atomic Energy Agency had found no diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes in Iran.

New US Ambassador to the CD
Assistant Secretary Rademaker announced the new US Ambassador to the CD as a sign of the US intention to begin negotiations, and followed it with the veiled threat that hopefully the former Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs Christina Rocca would not “be the last US Ambassador to the CD.”

Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Speakers
Following the discussion of the draft treaty and negotiating mandate, South Africa, Brazil and Nigeria spoke. Egypt addressed the Conference at its afternoon session devoted to “any other FMCT matters”.

South Africa offered that its experience destroying its nuclear program and the following International Atomic Energy Agencyinvestigations would give some insights for FMCT verification. Egypt said compliance must be strict and with guarantees, requiring a complete inventory of stockpiles in all states, including Nuclear Weapon States and states that are not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nigeria pointed out that “In other disarmament instruments stockpiles, verification and compliance mechanisms have been incorporated because of their importance in achieving the set of objectives of such instruments. Why should these elements not be considered in our work on fissile material?”

All four supported including existing stockpiles in an FMCT as a step towards nuclear disarmament. South Africa said because stockpiled material could be used for the production of future nuclear weapons, in order for an FMT to be truly credible, in should include stockpiles in its scope: “It is clear that a complete halt in the production of fissile material would leave enough of the material available to further increase – and not decrease – the number of nuclear weapons.” Egypt said not including existing stocks in an FMCT would not reflect the majority of states' wish to reach complete nuclear disarmament. “The fact that certain countries insist on excluding stockpiles from the scope of the treaty is not in conformity with the spirit of the NPT,” they added.

Brazil stated that the scope of an FMCT must clearly be defined in order to preserve the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Next Meeting
The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow morning, with a focused debate on compliance. The afternoon session will address verification.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom