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17 May 2006

The Conference of Disarmament (CD) continued its general debate on a Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), followed by brief focus on definitions, at its May 17 plenary session. The Conference is meeting every day, twice a day, this week, during its week of focused discussion on an FMCT. President Doru Costea of Romania also announced the Conference will invite an expert from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to speak in plenary next Monday, May 22, on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

India, Algeria, Belgium, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, China and Syria made general debate statements, and Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan made definitions-related statements in the morning plenary session before the Conference moved to informal mode. South Africa, Algeria, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Japan and Germany made statements in the afternoon plenary session devoted to scope before the Conference broke into an informal meeting.

While only about one quarter of the yesterday's general statements discussed the FMCT in the context of the Conference's program of work, seven of today's eight statements did. As CD Report readers know, the Conference needs consensus on its program of work in order to establish the ad hoc committees in which Member States negotiate treaties like the FMCT, and there has been no consensus on the topics or mandates for these committees for the past ten years. The 2001 Five Ambassadors' (A5) proposal to establish ad hoc committees on “four core issues” (FMCT, Nuclear Disarmament, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and Negative Security Assurances) simultaneously, is the most popular compromise, but does not enjoy consensus. Therefore, all the discussions about an FMCT are taking place in a forum which is unable to agree on a program which would allow it to negotiate an FMCT.

Today, Syria pointedly said it only supports establishing an ad hoc committee on an FMCT when the CD adopts a programme of work on all four issues. Yesterday, Spain said it is necessary to abandon such linkages among the issues given the impossibility of moving forward with them. Today, Algeria called the Five Ambassadors' proposal the only means to find agreement on a programme of work, while China reminded the Conference of its flexibility in finally agreeing to the Five Ambassadors' proposal in 2003. New Zealand expressed hope that the FMCT discussions this week could break the deadlock.

Today's general statements again addressed scope, stocks and verification. Member States continue to differ over including existing stocks in an FMCT, as they have since Ambassador Shannon first conducted his consultations in 1994, as South Africa noted. China is “of the view that future FMCT negotiations should not involve the issue of stockpile.” South Africa, who like Pakistan yesterday chose to use the term Fissile Material Treaty, said that “Although cognizant of the difficulties associated with the past production of fissile material, we believe that stocks should be included in the Treaty.” Australia said an FMCT should deal with the status of pre-existing fissile material stocks and be a “forward-looking” treaty. India said the Treaty should deal with future production only.

Different points of view were also made concerning verification. Although China said the Shannon Mandate was a delicate balance to be maintained, it also said all draft provisions for verification, including no verification, should be “carefully explored and prudently considered.” Algeria recommended a verification mechanism with a comprehensive safeguard regime similar to that of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's safeguards for Non-Nuclear Weapon States, thereby ending the discrimination between Nuclear Weapon States and Non Nuclear Weapon States. Belgium said that appropriate verification must be guaranteed in the outcome of the Treaty, though negotiations should begin without preconditions. India was concerned that “Absence of a verification mechanism may engender lack of confidence in compliance with the Treaty, encourage willful non-compliance, and lead to allegations and counter-allegations of non-compliance.”

Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan had experts with working papers who gave statements at this morning's thematic discussion of definitions. Australia considered definitions of four relevant terms: fissile material, productions, stocks and non proscribed activities. “Fissile material should be only those relevant to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. The material regarded for IAEA safeguards purposes as unirradiated direct use materials could serve as a useful template,” said Australia's Mr. Russel Leslie. The Republic of Korea shared definitions of fissile material from UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents, and said that “direct use materials can be used as a reference for the considerations to define fissile material for FMCT negotiations.” Japan, who suggested the Conference use the International Atomic Energy Agency's definition of fissile material, said the inclusion of other material should be studied in detail by experts and possibly discussed in the International Atomic Energy Agency.

South Africa began the afternoon's thematic discussion on scope by emphasizing the Conference does not need consensus on the scope of an FMCT before beginning negotiations. Australia outlined the framework for the Treaty: the principle article would be the prohibition of fissile material production for nuclear weapons. It would also include definitions, entry into force provisions, mechanisms for revisions and amendments, provisions for the status of stocks and verification, and a mechanism for the declaration of non-proscribed military use of fissile materials (ie naval propulsion).

Algeria said the objective of an FMCT is to ensure fissile materials are not produced for nuclear weapons, which is therefore the same objective as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards regime, contrary to Japan's earlier assertion they were different. Therefore, fissile materials production in Nuclear Weapons States will either cease or be under safeguards. Japan said there was “no doubt” that civilian use of fissile materials should not be subject to an FMCT. The Republic of Korea said the FMCT and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should complement each other in scope and safeguards, and that it is dangerous to make distinctions between them.

The conference will hold its next plenary meeting tomorrow, Thursday 18th May at 10 am, with a thematic debate on existing stocks.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom