16 May 2006
The Conference of Disarmament (CD) opened its second session of 2006 on May 16 with the first plenary meeting of this week's focused debate on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The President, Ambassador Doru Costea of Romania, presided as twenty delegations took the floor. Canada, Italy, Japan and Switzerland referred to Working Papers they produced on the FMCT. The Conference will meet every day this week: it will discuss definitions on the morning of Wednesday the 17th and scope in the afternoon. On Thursday the 18th it will discuss stocks and any other relevant issues, and on Friday the 19th compliance and verification. Each discussion will begin with a plenary meeting followed by an informal meeting.
France, Germany and Russia said they consider an FMCT the next logical step in nuclear arms control and disarmament. Canada, Italy,Spain, and Poland said it was a priority for their delegation, and Chile, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Sweden and Switzerlandsaid it was particularly important in the light of terrorism.
Many of the states that spoke today referred to the FMCT's long history, including the 1993 consensus General Assembly resolutioncalling for the negotiation of “a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference's commitment to do so, and the 1995 Special Coordinator Report (Shannon Mandate) outlining the mandate for such negotiations.
Ten years later, the Conference on Disarmament, the body responsible for the Treaty's negotiation, is still discussing it. Although four of the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States have declared unilateral moratoria on fissile materials production, and China seems to have informally done so as well, a moratorium is not legally binding or irreversible, and therefore not enough, as Chile, one of six states to welcome the moratoria, noted. Moreover, the three states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have declared no such moratoria and as Pakistan has indicated, may have no intention of doing so. Norway welcomed Pakistan's transparency, and called on the other States without formally declared moratoria to clarify their positions (China, India and Israel).
Technically, an FMCT would only create new obligations for the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States and the three states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All other states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States are already prohibited from producing materials intended for nuclear weapons, which is verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.Germany and the Republic of Korea emphasized the importance of including the three states not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in an FMCT, bringing them under international supervision for the first time.
Definitions, scope, existing stocks and verification, all of which will be discussed in more detail later this week, constituted the specifics of the first plenary's general FMCT discussion. Germany said both the relevant fissile materials and the term “production” need to be defined. Delegations used International Atomic Energy Agency definitions as a common starting point, and both the Japanese and theSwiss Working Papers discuss definitions. The Republic of Korea said “How we define fissile materials is important as it has direct implications for the scope of the treaty. In this regard, my delegation is of the opinion that the criteria of 'direct use material' employed by the IAEA provides a good reference point for further elaboration.”
Member States' approach to the issue of scope varied. There was a broad consensus on banning the of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but there were some differences on how to deal with civilian use, use in naval reactors and existing stocks. Francesaid the point of the treaty is to ban future production, and should not cover existing stocks, peaceful uses or non-explosive military use. The Russian Federation agreed an FMCT should not include existing stocks, nor prohibit fissile materials use for naval propulsion.Japan's Working Paper does not support including fissile materials for civilian use, but, like Germany, does support banning conversion of civilian fissile materials to military use, and transferring fissile materials to another state for military use. Concerns over terrorism ledSweden to reconsider its position on what materials to include in an FMCT and Poland to support the inclusion of fissile materials for peaceful purposes.
Pakistan stated that they would not like to call the treaty a fissile material cut-off treaty, since this would imply only a halt in production. “A cut-off in future production alone would simply finalize and formalize the status quo.” Instead, Pakistan used the term FMT (fissile material treaty). Pakistan ended its statement with “an FMT sans verification, sans stocks, will be sans treaty.” Argentina said the inclusion or exclusion of existing stocks will determine whether the treaty is a non-proliferation or a disarmament measure. Germany listed several advantages to including existing stocks, while Norway suggested including them in future negotiations. Canada updated its 1999 Working Paper on existing stocks, now CD/1770.
Almost every state spoke in favor of verification, while still holding to the line of beginning negotiations “without preconditions”, meaning without the provision from the Shannon mandate for “an effectively verifiable” treaty. However, Canada, an obvious FMCT leader, said that a Treaty that is “merely a vague declaratory statement of good intentions about future production does the international community a disservice and would be an indication that we are not serious about arms control and disarmament.”
Norway stated “At this stage we do not know how much can be achieved as regards verifiability of future FMCT-provisions. Only negotiations and expert studies can enlighten us on this point. Some studies have already been made, and they suggest that a reasonable high degree of verifiability is possible, at a financial price that the international community can afford.” Japan's andSwitzerland's Working Papers both address verification. Japan's Working Paper details four verification methods and also recommends more study.
In that regard, the Netherlands invited the newly formed International Panel on Fissile Materials to a discussion with the Conference the afternoon of May 16. The very well-attended participatory discussion addressed current stocks of fissile materials, which are predominantly Russian and American, the relationship between an FMCT and nuclear disarmament, existing stocks, safeguards, and verification. The panel was of the opinion that an FMCT is verifiable, and that further discussions between technical experts and governments will aid in ironing out problematic technical and national security issues.
The Republic of Korea and Sweden also expressed concern about developing better provisions for the entry-into-force of the treaty, particularly in light of experiences from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Italy developed a Working Paper on the issue. “We should also consider more flexible and evolutionary provisions for the entry into force of the treaty. We should try to avoid encountering the same difficulties we have faced with the CTBT, which unfortunately has yet to be brought into force,” said the Republic of Korea.
The plenary meeting was adjourned at 13.00 by the president Ambassador Doru Costea of Romania before the entire list of speakers was finished, and the remaining four will open the plenary tomorrow. Pakistan, United Kingdom, France, Austria on behalf of the EU,Switzerland, Chile, Spain, Sri Lanka, Norway, Canada, Germany, Poland, Japan, Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, Netherlands, TheRepublic of Korea, Argentina and Italy made statements today. The statements were mostly related to FMCT but some celebrated the entry into force of the Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War of The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons as a result of last Friday's ratifications by Liechtenstein and Switzerland.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will and
Beatrice Fihn, Disarmament and Economic Justice Intern
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom