7 March 2006

Continuing the Conference on Disarmament (CD) debate on agenda items one and two, Member States discussed nuclear disarmament, indicating their positions on the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; ways to strengthen transparency; the principle of irreversibility; and a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). These four issues, which Ambassador Park of the Republic of Korea extrapolated from last week's debate, are in the context of verification and compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the NPT 2000 Review Conference's 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament, and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty). There was some discussion of the CD's procedures.

The debate was also relatively interactive, with almost twice as many government responses to their colleagues' statements as statements themselves. Germany, the Republic of Korea, Venezuela and the Netherlands made statements, and Japan, Italy, Canada,Ireland, the Republic of Korea and the Secretary-General of the CD participated in interactive debate.

Delegations noted last week's interventions by the Russian Federation and the United States and acknowledged reductions under the Moscow Treaty, but also called these reductions insufficient. The Netherlands and Canada found the US and Russian statements helpful for transparency. Germany, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Italy, Canada and Ireland expressed support for increased transparency in nuclear disarmament. Building on Ireland's in-depth statement on transparency from March 2, Canada and the Republic of Korea both supported specific nuclear disarmament transparency measures.

The Republic of Korea suggested the nuclear weapon states "jointly work out a practical formula to be implemented in a systematic way and on a regular basis." Canada went further and asked the US and Russia if they could give an annual indication of the reductions achieved since the SORT (Moscow Treaty) came into effect and an indicative timetable projecting further reductions over the next five years. Ambassador Meyer also suggested the two states go beyond transparency and build confidence by agreeing on a final, preferably lower number, which is now set between 1700-2200 strategic systems. Ireland offered to work with other delegations interested in increasing transparency.

The Republic of Korea and Venezuela expressed concern over the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and their effect on trust and confidence between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Venezuela expressed deep concerns over military doctrines that increase the possibility for nuclear weapons' use, the development of more and better nuclear weapons, and security policies that allow the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. The Republic of Korea suggested that some nuclear weapon state transparency on their military doctrines would "contribute towards dispelling unnecessary misgivings about their intentions." Submitting their positions as official documents to the CD would be appreciated.

Germany said the principle of irreversibility (Step 5 of the 13 steps) "should guide all matters in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control." The Republic of Korea said it expected the "full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative and its expansion to other NW states". The 1996 Trilateral Initiative is an agreement among the Russian Federation, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor fissile materials released from military programs, and is the eighth step of the 13 steps. Although all the technical and legal details have been hammered out, the Initiative has never been implemented.

The Netherlands was "pleased to note that a cross regional understanding emerged about negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty being the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament". An FMCT is Step Three of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, and one of the four core issues of the CD. Germany and the Republic of Korea also prioritized beginning negotiations "without preconditions". Japan asked the Republic of Korea's Dr. Kang Kyung-wha, visiting from capital, what she thought of the "unfortunate package" of the Five Ambassadors' proposal for a programme of work, seemingly in reference to linking an FMCT to the other three core issues.

The Republic of Korea suggested the focused debates on an FMCT in May "be organized along the normal structure of arms control treaties, so that they may serve as a springboard for progress in the future."

States also supported other steps from the 13 practical steps, which Germany called "the performance benchmark for the disarmament process." Germany and Venezuela reiterated the importance of the earliest possible entry-into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Step 1), Venezuela supported establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD (Step 4), and Germany and Canada discussed reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons (Step 9). Germany recalled the step-by-step approach from its 2005 NPT Review Conference working paper endorsed by the European Union. This approach begins with confidence building measures that Canada noted should not give rise to security concerns when the information exchange is only on total numbers and is not site specific.

Although the Republic of Korea again acknowledged the right of any delegation to raise any issue at any time, we hope the CD will focus on agenda items one and two for the rest of the Republic of Korea's presidency. Ambassador Mary Whelan of Ireland "would like to pusue the question of how we can give more depth to our deliberations [on nuclear disarmament items 1 and 2] over the next few weeks." We join her in looking forward to the President's compilation document of proposals from these discussions.

Canada proposed a further measure to increase the efficiency and efficacy of the CD's work, and suggested the President assign each of the major emergent themes from the nuclear disarmament discussion (the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; ways to strengthen transparency; the principle of irreversibility; and an FMCT) to a Friend of the President. The Friends could then work informally to identify practical measures relating to those themes. CD Secretary General Sergei Ordzhonikidze advised governments to seriously consider this proposal and that of Ireland, as they might change the CD's atmosphere.

Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching Critical Will 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom