The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Languishes Amidst Geopolitical Standoffs

By Emma Bjertén
1 October 2025

The Fourteenth Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) took place on 26 September 2025 in New York. The conference was chaired by the Philippines and Sweden. A recurring theme of deliberations at the conference was the “complex“ global security environment. Only two years had passed since the last meeting in 2023, and states took note of progress made. However, they also underlined how the last two years have been characterised by new major challenges that put the prospects of the CTBT’s entry into force in jeopardy at the same time as they revitalize the urgent need for the CTBT to enter into force.

One step forward…

Many states highlighted that the CTBT has near universal support, with 187 signatures and 178 ratifications. Most delegates welcomed the recent ratification by Papa New Guinea and many described the Treaty, which today has a global network of over 300 monitoring stations, as a success.

Several states, including Malta and Germany, highlighted that the international community has already witnessed the benefits of the CTBT through international monitoring system (IMS), which provides capacity building for scientific communities and offers a verification system. Germany described the IMS as “the smoke detector” that keeps the world safe. By providing early warning of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis, Germany argued, the IMS benefits both signatories and non-signatories of the Treaty.

Dr. Robert Floyd, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) explained that there were around 2000 nuclear explosions in the fifty years leading up to the CTBT’s adoption in 1996. Since then, there have been less then a dozen tests, with only one state conducting tests in the current century. He asked if any other Treaty brought about “such a dramatic, drastic and unambiguous change for the better?” He described the success of the treaty as “a happy marriage between diplomacy and science.”

While many delegations highlighted how the CTBT has contributed to strengthening the stigma around nuclear testing, many also stressed that moratoria cannot replace a permanent legally binding ban, for which the Treaty must enter into force.

Two steps backwards…

While there is close to a universal support for the CTBT, it cannot enter into force until all 44 states that had nuclear research or power reactors at the time of negotiation (the so-called Annex 2 states) have ratified the Treaty. The remaining Annex 2 states are China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States, which have signed; and India, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan, which have not yet signed the Treaty.  Since the last Article XIV Conference in 2023, there are now nine states instead of eight states on the remining list, after Russia revoked its ratification in 2023. The Arms Control Association, speaking on behalf of civil society, also warned that there are dangerous signs that one or more nuclear-armed states may resume nuclear testing in the near future, and “this would likely set off a chain-reaction of nuclear testing, the likes of which we have not seen in decades.”

Many delegations, including Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, the European Union, and the Netherlands on behalf of the friends of CTBT group, expressed concerns and/or regretted Russia’s de-ratification. Some states also expressed concern over Russia’s “irresponsible” nuclear rhetoric. Sweden emphasised that Russia remains a signature of the Treaty and is still to respect the Treaty.

Many delegates also urged the DPRK to refrain from further nuclear tastings and/or to undertake steps to sign and ratify the Treaty. The civil society statement delivered by Arms Control Association noted that the DPRK has refused to engage in talks about measures to limit or reduce its nuclear activities and its nuclear arsenal. It also pointed out that Chinese and Russian officials do not appear to have encouraged the DPRK to join the CTBT, indicating there is more to be done.

Some states also specifically addressed the security situation in the Middle East. Türkiye addressed how the war in Gaza has increased tensions and insecurity in the region while Algeria. Egypt, and others called for a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (MENWFZ).  

This year, three states that are on the Annex 2 list and that have not yet ratified the CTBT delivered statements at the conference: China, Egypt, and Israel. Egypt said that while much attention is rightly given to the environmental and humanitarian impact of nuclear testing, one must not overlook the Treaty’s role in preventing proliferation and in advancing nuclear disarmament. While it has not yet ratified the Treaty, Egypt stressed that it has supported the CTBT and its verification regime, consistently taking part in Article XIV Conferences and championing the strengthening of the CTBT at Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) meetings, recognising that the two instruments are inextricable linked. Egypt said it is unviable to call for the entry into force of the CTBT without simultaneously addressing the universality of the NPT and without nuclear-armed states fulfilling their obligations under Article VI. Egypt argued that the call for CTBT ratification must take into account the “diverse realities of states” saying “placing all states required to ratify the Treaty on equal footing is not only illogical but counterproductive.”

Israel, another state that has not yet ratified the Treaty, argued that other countries in the Middle East are lacking progress regarding construction of IMS stations and some stations don’t offer available data. Israel called on all states to “complete the CTBT verification regime to the level necessary for entering to force” and stressed that a robust verification system in the Middle East is one of Israel’s main considerations before ratifying the Treaty. Israel accused Iran for blocking inspections of the preparatory commission. Israel said its ratification of the CTBT will be based on the overall regional situation.

Iran delivered a right of reply condemning the allegations made by Israel and arguing that Israel’s possession of nearly 200 warheads remains the single greatest threat and impediment of the establishment of a MENWFZ. It argued that a state that has weaponised the most necessities against defenseless civilians in Gaza is in no position to preach to others.

Humanitarian impacts and links to TPNW

A number of states explicitly addressed the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon testing. Uruguay described how health problems continue to impact communities, especially women and girls. Similarly, Malta highlighted how nuclear testing has had disproportionate effects on women and girls and Indigenous people, as is highlighted in the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Other states, including Egypt, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan, also highlighted the relevance of the TPNW in relation to the CTBT.

Several states marked the 80th’s anniversary of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The civil society statement delivered by Arms Control Association called on “all governments, particularly those responsible for conducting nuclear explosions in the past, to provide the necessary financial and technical support for long term environmental remediation programs, to expand access to health care especially as it relates to treatment of illnesses associated with radiation exposure, and to build independent capacity to monitor, assess, and address the environmental and health needs of the affected communities in the years to come.”

The need for political will and courage  

The Article XIV conference took place during a busy week at the UN. It was obvious that delegations were struggling with covering parallel meetings ,including two parallel high-level meetings related to nuclear weapons. This was noted by El Salvador, which urged states to take these opportunities more seriously. It asked what states are signaling to the international community when speakers are delivering statements to a practically empty room.

By the end of the conference, states adopted a final declaration that reaffirmed “the vital importance and urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT and urge all states to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level.” Referring to the current geopolitical reality, Slovakia said the entry into force of the CTBT is even less realistic. Similarly, Egypt problematised how nuclear-armed states have announced nuclear weapon modernisation plans and pointed at the worrying situation with the two failed NPT review conferences in a row. It called for attention to a “the bigger picture” that needs to be confronted.

The next time states meet for the Article XIV Conference, three decades will have passed since the Treaty opened for signature. The civil society statement stressed that “governments must do more than issue rhetorical support. We cannot take the treaty, the IMS, or the de facto global nuclear test moratorium for granted. The CTBT remains within reach. What is needed is political will and courage, and civil society stands ready to support and amplify these efforts.”

As many delegations highlighted, in this bleak security environment, the relevance of the CTBT and the need for it to enter into force becomes even more urgent. As co-chair of the meeting Theresa Lazaro, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines said, there is an urgent need for states to “silence the bombs before they speak again.”