Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Other Provisions of the Treaty
At the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New York, 7 May 2019

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful.

Mr. Chairman,

Achieving full universality of the NPT is an important factor in realizing its objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Accordingly, the Review Conference should accord required attention to this critical issue.

All States parties have commitment to make every effort to achieve Treaty’s universality and to refrain from any action that can negatively affect prospects for realizing this objective.

However, it appears from the actions and policies of certain nuclear-weapon States that, in practice, they have put aside this commitment and no longer honor it, either for geopolitical interests or alliance considerations or because of viewing the goal of Treaty’s universality as unrealistic. Unfortunately, they reward the nuclear armed non-parties with nuclear cooperation and trade in nuclear power reactors.

For instance, they continue to provide a great deal of economic and military aid to the only non-party to the NPT in the Middle East. With this kind of assistance, the Israeli regime has afforded to run its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities at which it produces plutonium for its underground nuclear weapons program. Such irresponsible policies and actions indeed have significantly undermined the prospects for the achievement of Treaty’s universality in the Middle East.

In this regard, this Committee should recommend the following to the 2020 Review Conference:

To recognize that lack of progress in achieving the full universality of the NPT would undermine realizing its objectives, erode its credibility and effectiveness and thus pose a threat to international peace and security;

To urge the non-parties to accede, promptly, unconditionally and as non-nuclear-weapon parties to the NPT and to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards;
To recognize that unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the non-parties to the Treaty and providing nuclear cooperation and assistance to them by certain nuclear-weapon States threaten the peace and security in particular in the Middle East;

To reaffirm the commitment of all States parties to cease and prohibit completely the transfer or sharing of any nuclear related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, or the extension of scientific and technical assistance in the nuclear field to non-parties to the treaty without exception.

Mr. Chairman,

On the right to withdrawal, I would like to stress that Iran would never agree to any proposal that would challenge, constrain or condition the sovereign right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty. This inherent right has been integral part of the compromise that led to the conclusion of the NPT.

While the U.S. is withdrawing from international instruments and institutions one after another, it is paradoxically attempting to set strict conditions for non-nuclear-weapon States for exercising their right to withdraw from the NPT.

Article X is completely clear and void of any ambiguity. It recognizes the existence of the unconditional right of any State party to withdraw from the Treaty in exercising its national sovereignty.

It also creates a lawful mechanism for a State party to terminate its treaty obligations and withdraw therefrom if it decides that its “supreme interests” have been “jeopardized” by “extraordinary events” related to the subject matter of the Treaty. Determination of the existence of the extraordinary events is left completely to the discretion of the withdrawing State.

Extraordinary events related to subject matter of the Treaty may include, inter alia, non-compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations, violation of obligation to facilitate exchange in nuclear technology and civil nuclear cooperation, military attack against safeguarded nuclear facilities of a non-nuclear-weapon States and application of unilateral sanctions against a non-nuclear-weapon State in a manner which impedes the exercise of the right of that party to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In our view, should the letter and spirit of the Treaty are not observed in all its aspects, the benefits and incentives for the non-nuclear-weapon States to stay in the Treaty will be reduced. Therefore, the most effective way to prevent future withdrawal from NPT is to ensure full implementation of all its provisions, without selectivity, double standards or discriminatory approaches.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.