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On nuclear disarmament and Security Assurances
At the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
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In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful.

Mr. Chairman,

I associate my delegation with the NAM statement.

The mere existence of nuclear weapons is the greatest threat to humanity, and as reaffirmed by the 
2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat 
of use is the total elimination of these inhumane weapons.

Unless entirely are eliminated, they will almost certainly be used again, either intentionally or by 
accident, and in both cases the consequences will be catastrophic.

That is why that the UNGA has declared that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would 
be contrary to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, general principles of international law and rules and 
regulations of the international humanitarian law, and would constitute a crime against humanity.

Similarly, in its 1996 advisory opinion, the ICJ has also decided that the threat or use of force by 
means of nuclear weapons would be contrary to UN Charter’s Article 2 (4).

Given the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament and pending the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons, credible assurances, of course as an interim measure, must be granted to all non-
nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of these weapons under 
all circumstances.

Both 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences have recognized the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-
weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances and reaffirmed 
that such assurances would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Non-nuclear-weapon States that have renounced the nuclear-weapons option have the right to 
receive assurances of not being subjected in any way to a nuclear threat. Nevertheless, regrettably, 
no substantial progress has been made towards providing such security assurances.
The Conference on Disarmament remains in deadlock due to unilateral, obstructionist and anti-nuclear disarmament policy of the U.S.. As a result, there is no prospect that it could agree on a comprehensive and balanced program of work in the near future, thus enabling also the elaboration of a universal legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

Existing legally binding security assurances within protocols additional to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones do not apply to all NPT States parties and do not meet the concerns of the many other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT which are not covered by such zones.

The unilateral assurances provided for in Security Council resolutions and unilateral declarations do not constitute firm and legally binding assurances. They have not been negotiated and contain unacceptable reservations which raise serious questions about the security benefits of such unilateral assurances. For example, some unilateral declarations cite circumstances that in their judgment warrants the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT. Moreover, the 1995 Security Council resolution, which was part of NPT’s indefinite extension and is obligatory for NWSs needs to be converted to an unconditional legally binding treaty.

Therefore, the argument that unilateral declarations made by nuclear-weapon States were sufficient or that those assurances should be granted only in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones are not valid.

In view of the U.S. provocative nuclear strategies and policies, which, in total contradiction with the NPT obligations, envisage also the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the NPT, granting such assurances is urgent and related efforts should be intensified.

This can be realized through the conclusion of a treaty on providing universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

Given the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, one practical possibility is to negotiate such a treaty within the context of the NPT. To this end, the Preparatory Committee should recommend the following to the 2020 Review Conference:

Recognizing that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

Reaffirming the urgency of providing negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT;

Establishing an ad hoc committee within the 2020 Review Conference to immediately begin substantive work on concluding an internationally legally binding instrument to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.