Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Brazil attaches utmost importance to the full and strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations under Articles I and II of the NPT, as well as to the implementation of verification measures called for by its Article III.

As regards current proliferation challenges, we are particularly concerned with the situation in the DPRK. Brazil has strongly condemned the nuclear and missile tests carried out by the DPRK in violation of its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We have been following with great interest recent diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We hope that those efforts can be resumed and sustained until their objectives are met, and that the DPRK will return to the NPT as a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State.

Mr. Chairman,

Brazil's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation is underpinned by multiple layers of legally-binding commitments. In the domestic legal system, Article 21, subsection XXIII of the Federal Constitution strictly and unequivocally prohibits nuclear weapons.

At the international level, Brazil is a State Party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, which established the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is a Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and was among the first States to sign and ratify the CTBT.

We have also signed and are in the process of ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which sets the highest legally-binding standards for nuclear non-proliferation, applicable to all its Member States on an equal footing.
Brazil fully supports the IAEA’s role as the only internationally recognized authority responsible for the verification of compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations.

The application of comprehensive safeguards in Brazil is based on the Four-Party Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), and the IAEA. This arrangement ensures that Brazil's nuclear programme is subject to a double layer of safeguards, implemented both by ABACC and by the IAEA. ABACC's institutional design has long been recognized as an innovative and effective approach for the application of nuclear safeguards, as well as for confidence-building and fostering nuclear cooperation.

Brazil also maintains an effective and stringent system of national export controls on nuclear materials, fully aligned with our international obligations and commitments, as well as with UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Mr Chairman,

Over the past review cycles of the NPT, Brazil has expressed its utmost concern with attempts to impose additional non-proliferation obligations on Non-Nuclear Weapon States, while the implementation of disarmament obligations lags far behind. We are opposed, in particular, to any attempts to establish the Additional Protocol as the standard for non-proliferation verification under the NPT, which would accentuate the imbalance among the pillars of the Treaty beyond its breaking point.

We recall that, in approving the Model Additional Protocol contained in INFCIRC/540, the IAEA Board of Governors did so on the understanding that it is a voluntary instrument. This understanding has been consistently recognized in IAEA General Conference resolutions ever since. In addition, the outcome document of the 2010 Review Conference clearly and unequivocally stated that the conclusion of an Additional Protocol is a sovereign decision of any State, and that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Brazil believes that the universalization of safeguards would require bringing all existing nuclear weapon programmes under legally-binding and time-bound obligations establishing their complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination, including the destruction of existing stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

Mr. Chairman,

Although verification of compliance is an essential element of the NPT, it should not be forgotten that the only way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to address the reasons for which countries might seek to obtain such weapons in the first place. In this regard, the continued existence of nuclear arsenals in countries both within and outside the NPT are the most powerful driving forces for nuclear proliferation worldwide.
Nuclear weapons are not only indiscriminate and inhumane. They also foster mistrust and foment insecurity among States. In clinging to their arsenals, NWS drive others to seek to acquire such weapons as an insurance policy against attack or threat of attack from nuclear-armed adversaries, however flawed that insurance policy might be. Above all, this dynamic is underpinned by the mistaken belief that nuclear weapons are essential to maintaining security and stability.

Nuclear disarmament is - and will continue to be - the best antidote for nuclear non-proliferation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.