Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For NNWS committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to never developing nuclear weapons and to non-proliferation, there will be scant reason for celebrating NPT’s 50th anniversary, unless the 2020 Review Conference delivers concrete results on nuclear disarmament.

But such desperately needed outcome still seems improbable, and this is a worrisome prospect not only for the NNWS of the NPT, but for all those who believe that the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapon use or detonation are unacceptable.

We cannot and should not block progress on nuclear disarmament because it puts into question the rationale behind certain security doctrines that rely on the very risk to others implied in the possession and readiness to threat and use nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

In order to maintain the credibility of the NPT as the cornerstone treaty for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the doctrines need to be changed, not the Treaty. Movement in this direction would allow for cross-cutting progress to be made in the implementation of the NPT, but it remains to be seen.

Since the last RevCon in 2015, escalatory announcements have been delivered, in official documents and broadly diffused public statements, regarding the development of expensive nuclear weapon modernization programs, running way into the future.
Programs involve new weapon systems, including low-yield warheads and advanced means of delivery, designed to be impervious to early-warning systems and defensive measures. They contradict the letter the spirit of Article IV and associated commitments under the NPT. Their net result will not be increased security for all, but a substantially elevated risk of accidental, unintended, miscalculated or even deliberate use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapon possessor states, outside the Treaty, frequently peripheral in our considerations, haven't made internationally legally binding commitments towards nuclear disarmament that we can speak to. Their development of nuclear weapons are routinely justified by so-called supreme national interests, but this places everyone; including world peace and humanity, at risk, and puts into question the validity and completeness of the regime of which the NPT is meant to be the cornerstone.

Mr. Chairman,

At the 2020 RevCon, States Parties to the NPT should, at a minimum, reaffirm past disarmament commitments undertaken in the context of the Treaty's review process, in particular the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 and the 2010 Action Plan.

At the same time, we cannot ignore broader and current security challenges. In face of a deteriorating international environment, we recognize the importance of a comprehensive and inclusive dialogue on disarmament, respecting existing obligations and past commitments, but also responsive to present realities. Brazil has been positively inclined and constructive in this regard.

In the meantime, the USA and Russia can make decisive contributions to improving the international security context by extending New START and resuming negotiations to preserve bilateral agreements and advance further reductions in their respective arsenals.

We also recall that the strengthening of NWFZs, in particular through the withdrawal of reservations or interpretations to the additional protocols on negative security assurances, as well the establishment of new zones, also promotes nuclear disarmament objectives.

Mr. Chairman,

In this troubling context, the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a glaring example of how much can be achieved through multilateral action on nuclear disarmament in a relatively short period of time. The Treaty transcends rhetoric and procrastination, and incorporates into the disarmament debate a much-needed focus on the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

The TPNW complements Article VI of the NPT and will henceforth act as a legal and moral compass to guide our efforts in the implementation of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to recall Brazil’s 2010 proposal to the CD on a framework agreement approach to fissile materials, tabled as document CD/1888. We presented and further elaborated this idea in the
High-Level Preparatory Group on an FM(c)T. It seeks a framework for fissile materials that would address non-proliferation aspects, in a protocol prohibiting future production, but also disarmament-related concerns, through a separate protocol on the destruction of existing stocks.

In the GGE created by UNGA resolution 71/67, Brazil proposed the creation of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (GSTE-NDV). Inspired by a similar initiative as a precursor to the CTBT, a GSTE could explore how international agreements on nuclear weapons limitation, reduction or elimination can be supported by verification mechanisms that provide all States, including Non-Nuclear Weapon States, with credible assurances and proliferation-resistant transparency.

We believe that a commitment on the establishment of a GSTE-NDV could be a concrete and positive deliverable of the 2020 Review Conference, opening a new path for the implementation of Article VI obligations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.