First Committee Monitor, Vol. 23, No. 4
Editorial: We Can Build Bunkers for the "Balance of Terror" or We Can Build Peace Through Disarmament
25 October 2025
By Ray Acheson
The First Committee’s third week featured debates on nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional weapons, and outer space. Throughout each, most delegations lamented the waste of money spent on weapons at the expense of human wellbeing. As Cameroon asked, “What message are we sending to populations lacking food, medicine, and schools when we invest more in the instruments of death rather than in the tools of life?”
These concerns about wasted resources were accompanied by expressions of alarm from many states about the deliberate deconstruction of international law and the promotion of the illusion that more weapons equal more security. From the withdrawals by European states from the landmark humanitarian disarmament treaties banning landmines and cluster munitions, to the automaton-like defence of nuclear deterrence by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, to the doctrines indicating possible space weaponisation, disarmament is under attack and militarism is on the rise. And as several delegations pointed out, delusions about deterrence—that less law and more weapons will make a country safer—are putting the entire world at risk.
The insecurity of the atomic bomb and artificial intelligence
“We must resist assertions that nuclear weapons can be responsibly possessed and judiciously wielded,” said Malaysia, while Mozambique described as reckless the “misplaced confidence in the idea of a ‘limited’ nuclear exchange,” which could force humanity to “stumble into nuclear war.” It pointed out that while some governments regard nuclear weapons as the ultimate security guarantee, others are forced to contend with the fragility of the arms control regime and “arbitrary unilteral coercive enforcement” of non-proliferation.
The nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-supportive allies, in contrast, reiterated their belief that nuclear weapons are essential to their security (but also that no other states are allowed to have them) and that their policies and practices of nuclear deterrence are compatible with international law. The historical inaccuracies, hypocrisy, and other fallacies of these arguments have been repeatedly refuted by other states and civil society, in particular in the context of the ongoing Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review cycle, where the issues of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing have come to the fore.
The harms of deterrence have also been addressed by states parties and signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which recently engaged in a study of the security implications of nuclear weapons for non-nuclear-armed states. As TPNW members said in a joint statement this past week, the inherent risks and catastrophic, transboundary consequences of nuclear weapons “make clear that all States’ security is jeopardized and that all States therefore have an urgent security interest in their total elimination.” Nuclear weapons are “a threat to the security and ultimately the existence, of all States, irrespective of whether they possess nuclear weapons, subscribe to nuclear deterrence or firmly oppose it.” South Africa, which will preside over the TPNW Review Conference next year, likewise said, “It is unjustifiable that the majority of States that have bound themselves not to acquire nor aspire to possess nuclear weapons would have to bare the catastrophic consequences of the use and testing of nuclear weapons.”
The integration of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithms, into weapon systems further exacerbates these risks and consequences. In addition to grave concerns about autonomous weapon systems, more delegations than ever are worried about the possible inclusion of AI in nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems. “Most of today’s safeguards predate the age of algorithmic warfare,” cautioned Mozambique. “The acceleration of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems in defense presents an unprecedented challenge to nuclear stability. Decision-support algorithms now permeate early-warning and command systems, compressing decision timelines and eroding human judgment at moments of potential crisis.” Mozambique, and many other delegations, emphasised that until their total elimination, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems must remain under meaningful human control in order “to keep the nuclear taboo intact in the algorithmic age.” As Cameroon affirmed, “No algorithm should ever decide the fate of humanity.”
One only needs to watch the new film A House of Dynamite, which shows how precarious the “system” of nuclear deterrence really is, to be alarmed at what it would mean to introduce AI into this system. While problematic, the film exposes the failure of the missile defence boondoggle, the absurdity of nuclear war planning, and the bankruptcy of deterrence theory. If AI hallucinations, black box decision-making, and speed are introduced to these systems, the results will be catastrophic.
In an effort to help prevent such a scenario, Mexico has introduced a new resolution in the First Committee that focuses on ensuring human control over NC3 systems. The text raises concerns that AI would reduce human control and oversight, induce distortions in decision-making, and heighten the risk of accidental, unintended, and unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. Importantly, the resolution highlights the inherent technical limitations of AI, including the potential for malfunction, exploitation, and intrusion; cognitive and automation biases; and hallucinations or other flawed and inaccurate outputs. Because of these risks and dangers, the resolution demands that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, human control and oversight is maintained over NC3 systems. It also urges nuclear-armed states to adopt policies and doctrines ensuring that NC3 systems will not autonomously initiate decisions on the use of nuclear weapons.
The resolution does suggest AI could potentially be useful for nuclear disarmament and risk reduction, overlooking all of the catastrophic environmental, economic, political, and social harms AI is generating in the military domain and elsewhere. And the text’s language doesn’t necessarily preclude the possibility of integrating AI into NC3 systems altogether. However, the resolution is an important step in recognising and addressing this problem before it’s too late. Tech companies are already starting to shoulder their way into nuclear systems, with tech workers and reporters warning that this is “an unbelievably precarious moment to be handing over any amount of control over nuclear weapons to a busted AI system.” All states should support this resolution in the First Committee, and all have a role to play in operationalising its request for states to develop common understandings, confidence building measures, and more.
War profiteering and ruptures in law
Of course, nuclear weapons aren’t the only threat to humanity. Delegations also raised many concerns about the harms wrought by conventional weapons, including the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, explosive remants of war like landmines and cluster munitions, and the rampant proliferation of small arms and ammunition.
Some delegations warned that the profits of the arms companies are being prioritised over international law and human security. Mexico argued, “It is unsustainable that producer and exporter countries continue to prioritize economic interests and protect the profits of their arms industries when conventional weapons are the leading cause of deaths and casualties worldwide.” Looking at the carnage wrought by weapons across the African continent, Equatorial Guinea asked, “Where do these weapons come from? Who pays for them? Why do armed groups, lacking an economic structure, gain access to sophisticated weapons? The answer is clear: there are international networks and bloodthirsty lobbies that enrich themselves by keeping Africa eternally at war, to prevent the continent from rising and achieving development.”
To address this problem, Equatorial Guinea called on the states “that shelter these traffickers or the industries that manufacture and sell illicit weapons” to assume their responsibility. “The United Nations cannot continue to be a passive observer,” it warned. “There must be real sanctions against countries that, by action or inaction, allow their citizens or companies to finance chaos and destabilize sovereign governments.”
Raging militarism is also leading some states to dismantle long-fought for commitments against specific weapon systems. Several delegations regretted the recent withdrawals from the landmine and cluster munition treaties, with Mexico expressing grave concern “about the recent resurgence of narratives seeking to justify the military use of these weapons with indiscriminate effects, as well as the interest in employing explosive and incendiary weapons.” Mexico pointed out that the “alleged military utility” of such weapons “is vastly outweighed by the prolonged suffering they inflict on civilian populations, including the creation of new cases of disability.” In this context, the Netherlands urged for the protection of civilians to remain at the centre of arms control efforts, while Switzerland called on states to reconsider their decisions about withdrawing from or suspending their implementation of related instruments. As Norway said, “In times of growing insecurity, we must reaffirm—not retreat from—our collective obligations.”
Preventing an arms race in outer space
Fulfilling collective obligations is cruical in outer space, too—but certain governments and their tech billionaire backers seem to be turning to space as a new theatre of war and dominance. During the outer space debate, which has not yet concluded, most delegations warned against militarising and weaponising space, pointing out that is critical for people all over the world that space remain free from weapons, violence, and debris. “Space is not a frontier of exploration, but a domain of our shared aspirations: to advance knowledge, to cooperate in peace, and to ensure that progress benefits all humankind,” said Sri Lanka, expressing deep concern with “any attempt to change outer space into a ‘war fighting domain’ or the ‘next battlefield’.”
Last year saw competing resolutions and charged exchanges on this topic, primarily between Russia and the United States. Most of the rest of the world appealed to them to not engage in an arms race, deploy nuclear weapons in space, or destroy each other’s satellites. The risks have continued since then. Zambia warned that the “testing and development of space-based weapons and anti-satellite capabilities, along with incidents of interference, jamming, and destructive ASAT tests, increases the risk of misunderstanding and escalation, threatening global peace and security.” Switzerland likewise observed “a number of concerning developments, including issuing of military doctrines and other policy documents designating outer space as a warfighting domain or aiming for supremacy in outer space.” It cautioned, “Such developments fuel tension, where restraint is needed.”
Matching rhetoric and reality
When it comes to other WMD, all states participating in the debate were adament that they are in compliance with their collective obligations, yet are also fueling tensions. Accusations of alleged development and use of these weapons, and vigorous denial of these accusations, continued to fly throughout the rights of reply during this cluster debate. This suggests that international law and humanitarian ethics still have some sway: states would rather spread disinformation or deny allegations than admit they are using these horrific weapons.
In its other WMD statement, Cameroon called for “a future where science is synonymous with progress and not terror, where security is built on trust and not threats.” And Mexico pointed out that the prohibition and total elimination of WMD constitutes both a moral and legal obligation. Unfortunately, the power of law and morality seems to be more abstract than functional right now, as reality is not matching rhetoric. In its nuclear statement, Cameroon criticised this “blatant gap between proclaimed principles and actual practices, a paradox that undermines trust and undermines the very foundations of collective security.” It warned, “This erosion of trust is not only diplomatic; it has tangible strategic consequences. It weakens international norms, encourages unilateral behavior, and ultimately risks causing a dangerous rupture in the global collective security architecture.”
Concrete action for real change
Healing this rupture requires a recommitment to intenational law, through the pursuit of new obligations and full implementation of existing ones. On the nuclear front, this includes the urgent renewal of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between Russia and the United States, set to expire in February 2026. In a joint statement delivered by Austria, 35 delegations stressed that it is in the interest of all states’ security that New START “is fully implemented and that further reductions and limitations of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals are achieved.”
But as urgent as arms control limitations on nuclear weapon deployment is, it’s even more important for nuclear-armed states to fulfil their obligations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals altogether. Most delegations proposed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as the best instrument for the job. “The TPNW represents today the most coherent, comprehensive, and universal instrument for achieving this supreme objective,” said Equatorial Guinea. It explained that the TPNW “restores multilateralism's credibility by placing human dignity and the sovereign equality of States at the center of the debate.”
Equatorial Guinea also warned that the NPT, in contrast, “has become an obsolete and elitist framework that allows nuclear-weapon states to perpetuate their nuclear dominance, weakening the disarmament commitments assumed under Article VI.” To this end, it said, “The NPT can no longer remain the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime. The world has changed, and the TPNW has assumed this central role as a new normative, ethical, and humanitarian pillar of the international system, in consisten[ce] with international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”
These assertions led to some right of replies from nuclear-armed and allied states, which claimed the NPT is the only relevant instrument for nuclear disarmament. But the question for many delegations has become, relevant for whom? The nuclear-armed states refuse to comply with their disarmament obligations and impose sanctions or violence on those they deem to be out of compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. The failure to disarm, coupled with renewed arms racing, threats of use, sharing with allies, and other reckless behaviour means that most states have looked elsewhere to bolster their security, most notably the TPNW. As the Philippines said, with 99 countries now supporting the TPNW, the majority of states have shown that they reject the legitimacy of these weapons. This approach doesn’t compromise the NPT, it fulfills it. While TPNW states parties remain bound to the NPT, they are also working to build a more just framework for the abolition of nuclear weapons, remediation and reparation for past nuclear harm, and the prevention of more nuclear violence.
Some current initiatives through the UN General Assembly seek to fulfil these goals and objectives of both the NPT and TPNW. The UN scientific panel on the effects of nuclear war, which was established through a First Committee resolution last year and commenced its work this year, is an important venue for understanding and amplifying the catatrophic humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons and inspiring nuclear disarmament. This year, Brazil and Norway are proposing the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which Brazil explained “has the potential to foster trust and to provide the basis for the development, in a multilateral setting, of technical tools that could underpin future verification regimes.”
Other initiatives and proposals across a range of issues will be tabled during this First Committee, which states will start to take action on toward the end of next week. As we move from deliberation to operation, it’s time, as Cameroon urged, “to align actions with rhetoric, budgets with commitments, and strategic priorities with humanitarian imperatives,” because “lasting peace and security cannot be built on a balance of terror.”
In its conventional weapon statement, Equatorial Guinea asked, “Why do we hold these sessions every year if everything remains the same?” Calling on states to move from words to action, it argued, “True security is not built with weapons, but with justice, development, and mutual respect. Africa does not demand compassion, but coherence. If the international community desires peace, it must stop financing war.”
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