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CCW Report, Vol. 12, No. 3

Editorial: The Minority Wins Again at the CCW
5 September 2024


Laura Varella | Reaching Critical Will, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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On 26–30 August, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) met in Geneva for its second session of the year. The Group is almost halfway through its three-year mandate, which must produce “a set of elements of an instrument” to address LAWS. However, discussions this week showed that the Group couldn’t be further away from agreeing to a meaningful outcome that will protect the world from autonomous weapons.

The minority rule

As in the previous session of the Group, this week states continued to discuss specific text proposed by the Chair, Ambassador Robert in den Bosch of the Netherlands. The main focus of debate was the topic of characterisations, which some delegations, including China, Russia, Türkiye, and the United States (US), identified as essential to move forward. In total, the Group discussed four different versions of the text on characterisations throughout the week. The problem, however, was that each version presented by the Chair was significantly weaker than the previous one—a view that most states in the room seemed to share.

 On Friday afternoon, when the Chair presented the fourth version, the frustration in the room was evident. The paragraph presented was long, confusing, and significantly different from the previous versions. Panama noted that the revised text included language never before discussed in plenary, which made it difficult to understand the rationale behind it. This point was echoed by Costa Rica, with both countries saying they were not part of consultations held by the Chair, despite actively engaging in the GGE. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made a similar point about the draft including language from closed door consultations, lamenting that most delegations “did not get to see exactly how this sausage was made.”

Panama also pointed out that the fourth draft not only introduced new elements, but also retained wording that had been objected to by several delegations the previous day (see the “Report on Formulating and Working Characterisation of LAWS” for examples). Panama also pointed out that references to concepts such as “nominal human input” and “human intervention” were deleted, despite most of the room supporting those references. “I know it is important to find a middle ground, but we cannot just give preference to one very small group of states over the rest,” argued Panama.

Once again, this process made it abundantly clear that in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), where consensus is interpreted as a veto power, no matter how much agreement there is among most states, it will always be a small minority that will dictate the rules. The heavily militarised states will only allow an outcome that is aligned with their national interests, to the detriment of the well-being of the rest of the world.

Red lines

The debate around prohibitions and regulations made it clear where delegations stand when it comes to banning autonomous weapons. Despite more than ten years of discussions, and despite overall support for an approach based on prohibitions and regulations, Russia insisted that this framing was premature. It also weirdly said that it did not believe “that achieving the goals of so-called prohibition or restrictions on some type of activity connected with these weapons systems requires clear use of the word prohibit or restrict.”

Russia strongly opposed paragraph 6 of the rolling text, which specified, “To ensure that LAWS can be used in compliance with IHL, their effects must be adequately predictable, reliable, traceable and explainable.” Russia noted a clear division between two groups of states: those that believe there is a need to ensure these factors, and those that believe these factors should not even be discussed, as they are lot legal categories. “From our point of view, it is unlikely that we can reach consensus on these categories and in that connection, we would propose deleting the last paragraph entirely.” Or, in other words, if Russia does not agree, it can never be adopted.

But it was not just Russia that opposed the paragraph. The United States (US) also strongly opposed the text, arguing that these concepts do not enjoy consensus, that they are not required under existing IHL, that their addition would not be appropriate for a legal instrument, and that they are not helpful at this point.

Both US and Russia proposed several changes to the section on prohibitions and regulations of the rolling text that significantly weakened the draft proposed by the Chair. Both countries, along with India, Israel, and a few others, insisted that the Group should stick to previously agreed language. “We perfectly remember the amount of work and effort that was required to adopt that wording and we see no need to restart that discussion,” said Russia, while the US said that it would like “to avoid wherever we can rehashing old debates where we have again in the past spent a lot of time resolving the substantive issues in ways that have found consensus.” However, as Pakistan reminded in the discussion of another section:

If our ambition was just to readopt the previous conclusions that we have made in the past, we would not have needed the three-year mandate. We would have just come on the first day and readopt our previous conclusions and would have gone home. However, the task that is in front of us is very clear, that we have to build on the previous understandings and the work that we have done. And I recall that many delegations in this room have referred to the painstaking negotiations that were made, especially last year to arrive at a text at times during late evening hours of Friday. A lot of compromises were made and now we have the opportunity to look at the text and see if we can offer more clarity in those understandings and conclusions that were reached back then. Now we have the benefit of hindsight. We have the benefit of comments from organizations, such as the ICRC. And if we can improve on the text, I think that should remain our primary task and goal as we conduct our work during this three-year period in our GGE.

Austria also recalled that compromises were made “in a room deprived of oxygen, very late, under time pressure,” and that now GGE participants have the chance to continue this discussion and improve the text.

Overall, the opposition by India, Israel, Russia, and the US to central aspects of the debate demonstrates that it does not matter that the vast majority of states support a legally binding instrument with prohibitions and regulations. If not everyone is on board, it won’t get adopted. At least not in the CCW.

Narrowing the scope

The selection of topics for discussion this week left out important issues that have been part of the GGE’s work for many years. In the rolling text put forward by the Chair, there was no mention of international human rights law (IHRL) or ethical considerations. Many delegations objected to this, including Austria, Brazil, the Holy See, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, and the Group of 16 states (G16), composed of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Panama, Palestine, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria.

The G16 called for the incorporation of elements from IHRL, UN Charter obligations, other disarmament conventions, international criminal law, ethical considerations, international arms trade regulations, environmental regulations, and customary international law, among other sources of law. The Group reiterated the ICRC’s point that existing IHL rules do not hold all the answers to the humanitarian, legal, and ethical questions raised by autonomous weapon systems (AWS). “This statement confirms that anything short of a comprehensive approach to address the risks inherent to autonomous weapons systems should be understood as a disservice to our common task of protecting humanity from the unrestricted use of autonomous weapons systems,” emphasised the G16. Austria and Brazil also highlighted that matters of peace, security, and proliferation, as well as the technology related implications of AWS, should be discussed by the GGE.

In addition to the absence of these topics in the Chair’s rolling text, throughout the week some delegations attempted to either keep or change language in the text with the purpose of narrowing even further the scope of AWS to armed conflict. For example, during the debate on characterisations, Israel expressed support for the term “lethal,” arguing that “the inclusion of non-lethal force could lead to broadening the debate to encompass fields which fall outside the purview of the CCW's mandate and expertise, such as law enforcement contexts.” China and India made similar remarks. 

Austria opposed arguments that “lethal” is needed to distinguish from civilian use, law enforcement, or dual-use aspects. “I think this is problematic because in the area where we are currently working on this are systems that will be used very broadly in all kinds of contexts and all kinds of aspects. This is actually one of the biggest problems and one of the reasons why we always advocate to also consider other aspects of law including international human rights law,” noted Austria. Aotearoa New Zealand, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Switzerland, among others, also opposed the qualifier “lethal” for various reasons.

During the debate on characterisations, similar arguments were raised regarding the introduction of the word “military” in the draft, despite concerns expressed by Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Panama. Costa Rica expressed concern that in each new version of the draft, it found language that restricted AWS to “a very militaristic-type sphere.” Costa Rica stressed that the discussion should not be limited to the military sphere and IHL, stressing that any potential development or use of AWS “goes above and beyond the use of these systems in an armed conflict scenario,” which was also echoed by Colombia. 

As Amnesty International stressed, “The path of weapons from the battlefield to the hands of law enforcement, border and security forces is well trodden.” Amnesty noted that if delegations feel unable in their current mandate to consider the full range of situations where AWS might being used, then they must identify a forum where they can more comprehensively address all of these crucial elements. “In this regard, we welcome recent developments in the UN General Assembly and hope that the General Assembly can deepen and extend the valuable work that continues to be carried out in the CCW,” said Amnesty.

No time to wait

Overall, the week was marked by a sense of urgency. Several delegations noted the recent report by the UN Secretary-General, in which he reiterated his call for the conclusion, by 2026, of a legally binding instrument to prohibit and regulate autonomous weapons systems. As Pakistan said, “The UN Secretary-General's report on LAWS reaffirms the urgent need to preserve human control over the use of force and urged us to fulfil the mandate as soonas possible. This urgency is not a mere rhetoric. Each day without a legally binding instrument brings us closer to afuture where LAWS become the norm, a future where machine not human judgment determines the nature ofwarfare.” Similarly, South Africa cautioned “against an indefinite lengthy deliberation process while the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems is gaining momentum.”

Some delegations pondered the effectiveness of the GGE in fulfilling its goal. Brazil noted that while the GGE possesses unequivocal advantages, among them “the participation of all major stakeholders,” it stressed that this advantage is not an absolute value. “It should not be an excuse to defeat the purpose of regulating the issue of AWS through delays or procrastinations. The window of opportunity for it is rapidly closing,” warned Brazil. It underscored that “that all avenues should be explored in order to achieve the best possible instrument, with the largest number of adherents, and that is to be able to be put into force the soonest.” 

In his report, the UN Secretary-General encouraged states to continue discussions in the General Assembly: “With its near universal membership and wide substantive scope, the Assembly is a venue for inclusive discussions and for considering the relationship of lethal autonomous weapons systems to other matters of international peace and security.”

Indeed, the General Assembly allows states to not only address all risks posed by AWS in a comprehensive manner, but also to prevent a small group of states from blocking outcomes that are not aligned with their interests. If anything, this session of the GGE demonstrated that not all views carry the same weight in consensus-based bodies, and that the positions of a small number of states can easily take preference over the rest.

It is time that states adopt a resolution mandating negotiations at UN General Assembly this year. The delay in starting this process benefits only those states developing autonomous weapons and the companies profiting from this. The rest of the humanity is held hostage by lack of action. As highlighted by Stop Killer Robots, “Countries that join these efforts will save lives and draw legal red lines for humanity that we desperately need.”

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