CCW Report, Vol. 10, No. 8

Mitigating risk means prohibiting autonomous weapon systems
27 July 2022

Ray Acheson | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

During Wednesday’s meeting, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on autonomous weapon systems (AWS) ran through the rest of the paragraphs in Section III of the draft report, which contain the “conclusions” about the Group’s work this year. Details about those discussions are contained within the reports on the morning and afternoon meetings, but one key theme arising from the conversations today is the recurring tension between those who want to develop AWS and see the GGE process as a way to legalise and normalise these weapons, and those who do not want these weapons to exist and see the goal to be to prohibit and regulate them.

This tension is the main reason that after nine years of discussion and massive convergence around core principles and approaches, there are still a handful of hold-out states that only want the GGE to rubber stamp their development and use of increasingly autonomous weapons.

But this tension isn’t just between those states who refuse to accept any restrictions on AWS and those who do want limits and commitments. This division also pops up even among those participants who support a “two-tiered approach,” in which some weapon systems would be prohibited and others regulated. In this context, the tension between legalising and prohibiting AWS has a bearing on what weapon systems these states consider to be “automatically prohibited” and which they think need to be regulated.

For example, some states supporting the two-tiered approach, such as Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden in their joint working paper, call for a complete prohibition on “fully autonomous lethal weapons systems operating completely outside human control and a responsible chain of command.”

But as Ireland pointed out, while prohibitions on certain systems that are “beyond the pale” are a very useful starting point, the GGE shouldn’t imply that this is the entire story. “Weapons that are illegal are illegal” does not satisfy the GGE’s mandate or public expectations, said Ireland. Likewise, Stop Killer Robots agreed that it is not enough to prohibit systems that are already de facto prohibited.

This distinction in how participants see the two-tiered approach also has a bearing on what measures they see as necessary to ensure compliance with international law or respect for ethical principles—and whether they think these restrictions need to be made binding through an international treaty or can be developed nationally based on individual state interests and capacities. This has major implications for the utility of any agreement that might come out of this GGE process.

Chile and Mexico raised concerns about some of the language on risk mitigation measures today. While some of the states supporting a two-tiered approach seem to view such measures as a regulatory framework to be considered while developing AWS, many others see the core risk mitigation measure to be legal prohibitions and regulations of AWS altogether. Chile and Mexico explained that they do not see risk mitigation as a separate category but rather as the foundation of prohibitions and regulations.

Similarly, Pakistan argued that the GGE’s objective is not risk mitigation but addressing the inherent challenges of AWS. This Group is not intended to legalise AWS, it pointed out, but to prohibit or regulate them, or both. Undertaking measures to reduce the risk that these weapon systems will violate international humanitarian law (IHL) is not sufficient to address the inherent legal, moral, ethical, and security challenges that AWS pose. Furthermore, as Pakistan noted, complying with IHL may not preclude the idea that a wrongful act has been committed. Such an approach gives the impression that AWS can be used lawfully, Pakistan warned, but this is a question that has not yet been answered.

As states move to finalise the conclusions and discuss the recommendations contained in the draft report, this tension will persist. Some states see AWS as generally acceptable and either in need of no limitations, or perhaps some non-binding regulations related to their design and operation. Others—the majority—understand that the risks posed by automated killing machines are far too great and that their design, development, and deployment must be prevented. If the GGE continues to fail to address the concerns of the majority of states, not to mention the global public, then it will fail to protect humanity from a future of increasingly automated violence, exacerbated injustice and inequality, and global instability.

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