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In this edition:

1. Editorial: Force of Logic
2. Nuclear Disarmament
3. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
4. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
5. Outer Space
6. Biological and Chemical Weapons
7. Missiles
8. Depleted Uranium
9. Conventional Weapons
10. Small Arms and Light Weapons
11. Cluster Munitions
12. Landmines
13. Arms Trade Treaty
14. Disarmament and Development
15. Disarmament Machinery
16. Regional Disarmament
17. Transparency
18. In Brief: Nuclear Proliferation
19. In Brief: Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons
20. In Brief: Negative Security Assurances
21. In Brief: Terrorism
22. Report: Space Security Side Events
23. Report: “Getting to Zero—What will it take and from whom?”
24. Report: “Middle East and Nuclear Challenges”

Editorial: Force of Logic
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

During a panel discussion on disarmament machinery on 23 October, Christiane Johnson, Deputy Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), spoke of vicious and virtuous circles of the disarmament and security paradigm. Suggesting that the transition from a unipolar global system with clear geostrategic positions to a multipolar system with often divergent regional/national security concerns has contributed to the paralysis of disarmament machinery, she argued the world is now entrenched in a vicious circle characterized by loss of confidence in multilateralism, armament and non-proliferation problems, and stymied negotiations—all of which stop humankind from thriving in a peaceful, secure environment.

Speaking about the paralyzed disarmament machinery, during informal discussions on Thursday Ambassador Mackay of New Zealand noted that traditionally, negotiations on disarmament issues have been treated as “win-win” situations, from which all participants can benefit. Ambassador Salander from Sweden also cited the “win-win” philosophy as the basis for past negotiations during his address to the EastWest Institute’s “Seizing the Moment” event on 24 October. Ambassador Mackay argued, however, that increasingly for some governments, especially those “that possess some categories of weapons,” disarmament negotiations are seen as zero-sum games, wherein if they give up their weapons they lose while “others” win from these weapons being given up. He suggested that to break the vicious circle Ms. Johnson described, the international community needs to get back to the traditional approach of disarmament negotiations as win-win situations.

Win-win strategies are also known as “cooperative games,” which emphasize the importance of cooperation and over-all group success in contrast to domination and personal gain. The vast majority of delegations to the UNGA and First Committee repeatedly call for collective or cooperative security. On 20 October, Gillian Frost of the Canadian delegation urged, “The international community cannot allow divergences among our national security interests blind us to our shared collective interest.” In his comments as President of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Adam Daniel Rotfeld suggested that if the international community needs to establish a “new grand bargain” in order to achieve consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation, it should be less political, more pragmatic, and more closely linked to broader security arrangements.

The call for pragmatism in disarmament is not new, but it is seemingly ignored. Many of the nuclear weapon states still cling to the concept of deterrence to rationalize their continued possession of nuclear weapons, despite overwhelming evidence that deterrence is no longer relevant in today’s world. Some of these states also argue that the “international security environment” is not “ripe” for disarmament—an argument that has persisted since 1956, when then-UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld argued, “On the one hand ... disarmament is not likely to come about in an efficient, effective way short of further improvement in the international situation. On the other hand, I do not think any single policy move will contribute more to an improvement in the international atmosphere than an agreement on even the most modest step in the direction of disarmament.”

In a statement on 21 October, Tanzania’s permanent representative declared, “The force of logic must be made to prevail over the logic of force.” We need to not just develop an alternative, de-weaponized concept of security, but also an alternative, logical concept of process and achievement, in order to overcome the illogic of force, security through military superiority, and deterrence.

Ms. Johnson of UNIDIR outlined logical ways to turn the vicious circle into a virtuous one of dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, confidence, and a degree of predictability—first and foremost by getting out of the “process dynamic” and focusing more on results. She argued, those working on disarmament should not just note that they took certain actions but should be able to point to the real impact of those actions, by setting objectives and indicators of success. This, she insisted, would allow governments to make better the use of the machinery and to honour their commitments to their citizens for both defence and human security. The objectives and indicators of success have been identified time again. They are laid out in the thirteen practical steps, the Blix Commission report, and UNGA resolutions, and have been promoted by a number of groups and initiatives, both governmental and non-governmental. For the international community to ensure peace and security, the logic of cooperative strategies with results-based objectives must overcome the current logic of force and domination.

Nuclear Disarmament
Jim Wurst | Middle Powers Initiative

The thematic debates moved on from nuclear disarmament this week, so the only new developments on this issue were the issuance of the anticipated draft resolutions. The three key omnibus drafts—the New Agenda Coalition’s, the Non-Aligned Movement’s (NAM), and Japan’s “total elimination”—reflected the language of previous years, although all of them added phrases, mostly focusing on the nuclear weapons states’ responsibility to eliminate their arsenals.

The New Agenda Coalition’s draft (A/C.1/63/L.30), “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” had the most changes. The draft, which focuses tightly on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review processes and the 13 practical steps from the 2000 Review Conference decision, added both preambular and operative paragraphs elaborating on the responsibilities of states parties to the NPT and the preferred outcome for the remainder of the NPT review process. For example, one addition calls on the nuclear weapon states to “accelerate the implementation of the practical steps towards nuclear disarmament” agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Another called on the 2009 Preparatory Committee meeting to “identify and address specific aspects where urgent progress is required” to reach a nuclear weapon free world. One omission from 2007 was the operative paragraph on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While there is a preambular paragraph recognizing the “continued vital importance” of the CTBT and its early entry into force, there is no operative paragraph on the subject, as was the case in 2007.

“Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/63/L.58), the resolution spearheaded by Japan, also contains a few new elements that highlight the responsibilities of the nuclear powers, in particular the United States and Russia. While one preambular addition notes “the concrete proposals and initiatives on nuclear disarmament,” two additions in the operative paragraphs specify what the co-sponsors want to see from the nuclear weapon states. One calls on the nuclear powers to “undertake reductions … in a transparent manner” and to increase transparency and confidence-building measures. Another addition calls on the US and Russia to pursue “the conclusion of a legally binding successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,” which expires at the end of 2009. As usual, the bulk of the resolution focuses on the range of treaty-based commitments of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states required for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is less explicit than the New Agenda draft in calling for a nuclear weapon free world, which is one reason the Japanese text traditionally gains greater support in the voting.

NAM’s annual draft “Nuclear Disarmament” (A/C.1/63/L.14) reflects the Movement’s past declarations and resolutions—meaning it contains every nuclear disarmament initiative endorsed by the Movement, including no first use, de-alerting, a Conference on Disarmament ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, the CTBT, a “non-discriminatory, multilateral … and verifiable” fissile materials treaty and a halt to qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons. The draft changes little over the years. This year’s version has a couple of additions, both designed to sharpen the focus on elimination of nuclear weapons. In calling on the nuclear weapon states to “take effective disarmament measures,” the paragraph now includes the phrase “at the earliest possible time.” The paragraph calling for de-alerting and other measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems now includes the caveat “while stressing that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the elimination of, nuclear weapons.”

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Ildikó Bors | Middle Powers Initiative

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55 on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) this year is so far co-sponsored by 46 states. The most noteworthy change to the text is that whereas last year’s resolution “calls for a peaceful solution of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula” L.55 “calls for the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” It also welcomes the Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT, adopted at the Ministerial Meeting held in New York on 24 September 2008, and adds a new paragraph welcoming the ratification of the Treaty in 2008 by Colombia, Barbados, Malaysia, and Burundi, as well as the signature in 2008 by Iraq and Timor-Leste, as significant steps towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Among draft resolutions to be presented for voting, a few others, especially those on general and complete disarmament, point to the CTBT. A/C.1/63/L.19 on “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” expresses its satisfaction at the increasing number of states that have signed and ratified the Treaty; A/C.1/63/L.14 on “Nuclear disarmament” calls for the early entry into force and strict observance of the CTBT; and A/C.1/63/L.58, entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” urges all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify it at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry into force. Moreover, the latter “stresses the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions pending entry into force of the Treaty,” and reaffirms the importance of the continued development of the CTBT verification regime, including the international monitoring system, which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with the Treaty.

Three other draft resolutions comment on the Treaty. “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” A/C.1/63/L.30, welcomes recent ratifications and recognizes the continued vital importance of the CTBT to the advancement of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. A/C.1/63/L.49 entitled “United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services” expresses its appreciation to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization for having organized specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in its respective area of competence, thereby contributing to the objectives of the programme. A/C.1/63/L.2 on “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” notes that a number of States in the region have signed the CTBT.

At a one-day consultation outside First Committee hosted by the the EastWest Institute and designed to begin the process of a new East-West consensus on weapons of mass destruction and disarmament, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged the international community to pursue institutionalization of nuclear treaties, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The event also included Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and leaders from the European Union, China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and the United States. In his keynote address, when outlining a five point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament, Mr. Ban called for new efforts to bring the CTBT into force. According to NewsDaily/Reuters a US official who requested anonymity said in response, “We appreciate the secretary-general’s comments, but our policy remains clear. The U.S. does not support the CTBT and will not become a party to it. The U.S. continues to maintain a moratorium on nuclear tests, and urges other states to do likewise.”

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Sandra Fong | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

During thematic discussions, twenty-nine interventions mentioned the need for nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) as an efficient measure of strengthening the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation and enhancing the level of regional and international security. Delegations to First Committee reintroduced draft resolutions on NWFZs in the Middle East, the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas, and Central Asia as well as a draft resolution on Mongolia’s nuclear weapon free status.

Introduced by Egypt, A/C.1/63/L.1, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” proposes the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, calling on all states in the region to: adhere to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place all nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; declare their support for establishing a NWFZ; and not develop, test, produce, acquire, or station nuclear weapons on their territories. The text remains unchanged from last year’s resolution, which was adopted without a vote.

Controversial draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” in the past has been repeatedly rejected by Israel and the United States as it exclusively calls on Israel to accede to the NPT and place all nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Last year’s resolution, the text of which mirrors this year’s draft, was rejected by the United States and Israel, with abstentions from Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and India. While voting in favour, the European Union noted that the resolution did not reflect the international community’s concern over Iran’s nuclear programme.

Focusing on a region that has previously tested and stationed nuclear weapons, draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.37, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,” emphasizes the role of a NWFZ in Central Asia “in promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the environmental rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive contamination and the importance of stepping up efforts to ensure the safe and reliable storage of radioactive waste.” The draft resolution also welcomes the ratification of the NWFZ Treaty in Central Asia by Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and states the “readiness of the Central Asian countries to continue consultations with the nuclear weapons States on a number of provisions of the Treaty.” This resolution was last introduced in 2006 and was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 61/88. The only change to the text is the addition of an operative paragraph that “Welcomes the convening of an international conference on the problem of uranium tailings, to be held in Bishkek in 2009, and calls upon the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other stakeholders to participate in that conference.”

As last year, A/C.1/63/L.40, “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas,” calls upon states parties and signatories to existing NWFZs “to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.” The resolution usually receives strong support, though France, the United Kingdom, and the United States vote against it, questioning the effect the resolution would have on the Law of the Sea, despite assurances from the resolutions sponsors that it does not contravene any international laws.

Kazakhstan, Morocco, and Mongolia tabled A/C.1/63/L.28, “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status,” last introduced in 2006, when it was adopted as resolution 61/87 without a vote. The text, which remains unchanged, welcomes the efforts made by member states to cooperate with Mongolia in implementing resolution 61/87 and invites them to continue to do so. It also appeals to states of the Asia and Pacific region “to support Mongolia’s efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic arrangements.”

Outer Space
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

First Committee held its thematic discussion on outer space security on 20 October, which revealed once again the starkly opposing views between the United States and the rest of the international community.

Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
On behalf of Egypt and Sri Lanka, the Egyptian introduced draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.4, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” which has been adopted each year in the General Assembly for decades by an overwhelming majority of votes in favour. Since 2005, the US delegation has been the lone “no” vote against the resolution. This year’s text contains only technical updates. The Egyptian delegate indicated that over 40 states so far have agreed to sponsor it. The resolution reaffirms that the existing legal regime does not guarantee PAROS. It calls on space faring nations to refrain from activities contrary to the objective of PAROS and to keep the Conference on Disarmament (CD) informed of any progress on bilateral or multilateral negotiations on space security. It also reiterates that the CD “has the primary role in the negotiation of multilateral agreement” on PAROS and invites the CD to establish an ad hoc committee on PAROS in 2009.

Warning against “new military and combat concepts and theories like ‘control of space’ and ‘occupation of space’,” Sri Lanka’s delegate emphasized the need to establish an ad hoc committee in the CD to prevent a “race to the bottom.” China’s delegation argued that the legal regime for outer space has not kept up with modern developments in space technology. Recognizing that the existing space regime has played an important role in maintaining space security, the Chinese, Cuban, and Sri Lankan delegations argued it cannot keep non-weapons of mass destruction out of space or prevent the use or threat of force against space objects. The US delegation, however, argued that the Outer Space Treaty “continues to provide the legal foundation to respond to the emerging challenges of the Twenty-First Century.”

Reiterating its rejection of “arms control concepts, proposals, and legally-binding regimes that seek or impose prohibitions on the use of space for military or intelligence purposes,” the US delegation also argued that it is impossible to define the nature of a space-based weapon or to develop an effectively verifiable agreement banning either space-based weapons or terrestrial-based anti-satellite systems. This preclusion of negotiations of a possible agreement, on the assessment that it is “impossible,” is in contrast to its position expressed the following day. The US representative, regarding the ongoing negotiations in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to develop a new protocol on cluster munitions, said, “We can’t be certain of success, but what we know for sure is that if we don’t try, we cannot succeed.”

Transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs)
The Russian delegation introduced a slightly revised draft resolution on “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities,” A/C.1/63/L.44. As in previous years, the draft resolution invites all member states to submit concrete proposals on outer space TBCMs “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and [PAROS].” It has a new preambular paragraph noting Russia and China’s introduction of the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT) in the CD.

The Russian ambassador also noted the European Union’s proposed draft code of conduct, explaining that while such a code could help create an atmosphere of transparency and confidence, “it should embrace also peaceful outer space activities and act in the interests of preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.” He suggested that TCBMs could also become part of a PPWT. China and Cuba’s delegations argued that TCBMs are only meaningful in the framework of a legal instrument and cannot substitute a new legal instrument on space.

The US delegation again took the opposite approach, noting that while it opposes legally-binding space arms control proposals, it “enthusiastically supports voluntary and concrete measures that address practical problems.” The delegation welcomed France’s initiative to establish an informal working group to explore measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of space activities and the European Union’s proposals for a set of “pragmatic and incremental” TCBMs. However, it rejected Russia and China’s resolution on TCBMs because it links TCBMs to “pointless negotiations on an unneeded and unverifiable space arms control agreement.”

Space debris
Expressing concern about increasing space debris, the Cuban delegation lamented that objects launched for military or espionage purposes will increase space debris. The Sri Lankan delegate noted, “Orbital paths are further cluttered by deserted spacecrafts, discarded rockets debris, and outer space junk shed from hardware.... Implementation of global action plans must start now before the loss of critical space systems occur, but more importantly, before the loss of human life results from this debris.” Canada’s delegate called on states to adopt and abide by the COPUOS debris mitigation guidelines.

Other
The Republic of Korea’s ambassador emphasized the importance of securing ground-based space systems, which often provide command and control support for space objects. He argued, “any disruptions or infringement on space systems on the ground may cause grave damages to the daily lives of innocent citizens worldwide.” Ambassador Im also called for increased cooperation between COPUOS, the First and Fourth Committees, and the International Telecommunications Union.

Cuba’s delegation called for the use of nuclear energy sources in outer space to be “restricted to the extent possible, until there is a clearly defined security framework and more concrete agreements have been initiated.” Cuba’s delegate also called for states using nuclear energy sources to provide transparent information on their activities.

The delegation of Belarus expressed support for the Russian moratorium on placing weapons in space and urged all states to join it, arguing it would contribute to advancing and creating legally-binding instruments.

Biological and Chemical Weapons
Ann Lakhdhir | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Chemical Weapons
Ambassador Zdzislaw Rapacki of Poland introduced A/C.1/63/L.17, “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction on Monday,” on 20 October. He stressed that the resolution is of special importance this year because of the results of the Second Review Conference held in April 2008, which approved a consensus Final Report.

There are few small changes in the draft, compared with last year’s resolution. Operative paragraph 2 now underlines that the implement of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) also “provides for assistance and protection in the event of use, or threat of use, of chemical weapons and for international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities.” The resolution also places more emphasis on the continuing relevance and importance of Article X and on the activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in relation to assistance and protection against chemical weapons. Emphasis on Article X and economic and technological development and international cooperation reflect the debate and outcomes of the Review Conference. Ambassador Rapacki expressed the hope that the resolution will be adopted without a vote as it has in the past.

Biological Weapons
A discussion on “Biological Incidents” took place on 23 October in a programme sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Two members of UNODA, Franz Kolar and Karin Hjalmarsson, presented the development in UNODA of a Biological Incident Database. The development of the database is dependent upon the reportage of states. At least four members of UNODA, who previously worked for UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and/or UN Special Commission, are working with the mandate created by a General Assembly resolution requesting the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. The resolution calls for the “development, together with Member States, of a Biological Incident Database complementary with the database contemplated by the Interpol on bio-crimes.” Franz talked about the database, and Karin talked about some of the incidents, in three categories, that have occurred: natural, accidental, and deliberate. There will be a transcript fairly soon on the NGO Committee web site.

In Geneva there are also several people working under the Implementation Support Unit that was created by member states of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to serve as a Secretariat for the Treaty. Neither group has any investigatory powers. If there is a charge of biological weapons use the issue can be brought to the Security Council. That procedure was used more than twenty years ago. What exists is better than nothing, but eventually a verification protocol with an investigatory mandate for the BTWC needs to be created.

Missiles
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

Iran, on behalf of co-sponsors Egypt and Indonesia, introduced draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27 entitled “Missiles,” which follows on the conclusion of the Third Panel of Government Experts on Missiles and its July 2008 report. The brief and moderate resolution follows the basic approach of past resolutions introduced by Iran on the subject, calling for a comprehensive, balanced, and non-discriminatory approach to the issue of missiles. It welcomes the report of the Secretary-General, submitted pursuant to resolution 59/67 (2004), and directs the Secretary-General to seek the views of states and to submit them to the 65th session of the General Assembly.

With this resolution, Iran continues to incrementally push for a more comprehensive approach to missiles through the UN system. Despite its moderate and incremental approach, it remains to be seen whether this will translate into more votes in favour, as support for this initiative has come nearly exclusively from the Non-Aligned Movement with most NATO and European states abstaining.

While many delegations undoubtedly believe the issue deserves greater attention, in the past the role of Iran in shepherding this process has led many key Western states to write off this effort in favour of other initiatives. These efforts, which deal with missiles only in the context of working to prevent the further proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, include promoting the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

After a three-year hiatus, the sponsors of resolution 60/62 (2005) entitled “Hague Conduct of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” introduced draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, which includes only technical updates to the 2005 text. The resolution, which focuses exclusively on preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, invites all state to subscribe to the Code of Conduct and encourages exploration of other ways and means to deal with ballistic missile proliferation.

In 2005, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia had introduced amendments to this resolution that, inter alia, would have expanded its scope to also endorse constraining development of ballistic missiles as well as proliferation. The First Committee voted overwhelmingly to reject these amendments, however. This effort followed an equally unsuccessful attempt of Iran to propose the same amendments orally in 2004. No formal amendments had been circulated by the end of the third week of the current First Committee session.

Depleted Uranium
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

On behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the delegation of Indonesia introduced A/C.1/63/L.26, “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.” L.26 follows the first NAM resolution on depleted uranium weapons adopted last year at the General Assembly as resolution 62/30 by a vote of 136 in favour, 5 against, and 36 abstentions.

Last year, some delegations, including the United States, voted against the resolution arguing these effects have been investigated by a variety of organizations that have not “been able to document environmental or health effects attributable to use of these munitions.” However, NAM and the Cuban delegations argue the International Atomic Energy Agency, World Health Organization, and the United Nations Environment Programme have all stated that more research is needed on the immediate and long-term health and environmental effects of depleted uranium munitions. Cuba’s representative argued that many countries and organizations have expressed concerns at use of munitions with depleted uranium. She pointed to the European Parliament, which adopted a resolution calling for a “Global treaty to ban uranium weapons,” in May 2008.

The current resolution has two additional preambular paragraphs and four additional operative paragraphs. It takes note of the opinions expressed by member states and relevant international organizations on the issue, as reflected in the Secretary-General’s report and invites those who have not yet done so to communicate their views to the Secretary-General. The resolution also asks the Secretary-General to “request relevant international organizations to update and complete their studies on research on the effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium on human health and the environment.” It encourages member states to facilitate these studies and asks the Secretary-General to submit an updated report at the 65th (2010) session of the General Assembly.

Conventional Arms
Mariah Quinn | Global Action to Prevent War

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Several delegations, including Jordan, Switzerland, and the European Union, asserted that the CCW is a pivotal component of international humanitarian law and expressed their hope that the Convention will achieve universal support. The US delegation reported that the Senate has consented to US ratification of all outstanding protocols and amendments relating to the CCW; namely, Protocol III on incendiary weapons, Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons, and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. Jordan’s delegate praised the CCW for its “credibility and capacity to respond in an adequate and responsible manner to the humanitarian challenge posed by certain advancements in weapons technology.”

Jordan joined Sweden, Greece, and the Netherlands as a sponsor of the draft resolution on the CCW, A/C.1/63/L.31, and expressed its hope that the resolution will again be adopted without a vote. The draft adds preambular paragraphs noting Protocol V, welcoming the results of the Third Review Conference, the 2007 Meeting of High Contracting Parties, the results of the Ninth Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, and the First Conference on Protocol V. Changes to its operative paragraphs include those emphasizing the importance of Protocol V; welcoming the adoption of the Plan of Action; welcomes continued action on minimizing the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, including the work conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts; welcomes the decision to establish a framework for exchanging information and cooperation on Protocol V; and notes that 2008 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the CCW.

Explosive remnants of war
Ambassador Borisovas, in his capacity as the President-designate of the Second Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, reported on the Meeting of Experts held in July 2008. The Meeting generated a framework for international cooperation on issues of clearance, cooperation and assistance, national reporting, preventative measures, and victim assistance. The modalities for implementation will be discussed at length in early November 2008 at the Second Conference. The Non-Aligned Movement encouraged states to become party to the CCW and its additional Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War and Switzerland called for the full implementation of the Protocol.

Ammunition
Germany and France introduced draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.35 to address the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles. The aim of the resolution, first tabled in 2005, is to ensure that conventional ammunition is not neglected in discussions of international arms control. The 2008 version of the resolution endorses the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) report in paragraphs 6 and 7, and remains otherwise unchanged.

Michael Hansenau, Chair of the GGE, provided an overview of the group’s recommendations, one of which was to develop global guidelines on stockpile management and security. He expressed particular concern regarding the prevalence of inappropriately located and poorly stored and managed stockpiles. Such stockpiles not only pose a threat to the community in which they are located and the peacekeeping personnel operating in the vicinity, but also allow for the illicit use of ammunition by non-state actors. The Group outlined the components of effective stockpile management, including: categorization and accounting systems; safe handling and storage; identification of surplus; security systems; and test procedures to assess the reliability of ammunition and its suitability for use.

UN Register of Conventional Arms
Noting the imperative nature of ensuring transparency in the field of conventional weapons, the EU delegation expressed its support for the Register. It indicated its preference for an expansion of the Register to include data on purchases, production, and national allocations and to designate small arms and light weapons (SALW) as a separate category within the Register. India’s delegation maintained that the Register is an effective and transparent instrument and that legitimate conventional arms trade is not a major concern. Attention and resources ought to instead be devoted to addressing the illicit proliferation of SALW.

MANPADS
The European Union representative expressed concern over the threat posed by man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), and in particular over the use of MANPADS by terrorists or non-state actors to threaten civil aviation. In order to address this threat the EU delegation called for multilateral action aimed at preventing the illicit transfer of MANPADS.

Other resolutions
A/C.1/63/L.29, “Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms,” unchanged from its 2006 version, welcomes all relevant measures, encourages their continued development and adoption, welcomes the establishment of the electronic database containing related information, and requests the Secretary-General keep it up to date.

Ray Acheson of Reaching Critical Will contributed to this article.

Small Arms and Light Weapons
Eleanor Andrews | Quaker United Nations Office

The final two days of general debate yielded some attention to small arms and light weapons (SALW). Many delegations continued to welcome the substantive outcome of the 2008 Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) on Small Arms. The Ambassador of Papua New Guinea devoted the majority of his statement to the problem of illicit SALW, which could “bring the country to its knees.” Some delegations highlighted regional progress on tackling illicit SALW, in particular, the Central American Program on Small Arms Control, a joint initiative between the UN Development Programme and the Central American Integration System (SICA); the politically-binding 2006 SICA Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers; and the new binding sub-regional ECOWAS Convention on SALW, formerly a moratorium. Benin’s ambassador referred to the ECOWAS Convention as a possible model for global standards, especially in prohibiting arms transfers to non-state actors.

During the thematic debate on conventional weapons, most delegations welcomed the outcome of this July’s BMS—although a few, notably the European Union, regretted the lack of consensus. The Iranian delegation reiterated its concern that the BMS’ procedure was neither transparent nor inclusive, and stressed that what has already been agreed upon should be implemented before new non-consensual measures are negotiated. Ambassador Dalius Cekuolis, Chair of the BMS, outlined his views on the way forward for the UN SALW process. Process-wise, he stressed regional implementation, converting assistance needs into concrete measurable projects, improving analysis of national reporting under the UN Programme of Action (PoA) on the illicit trade in SALW, and the important role of civil society. Substantively, he suggested that states should consider developing a legally-binding instrument on arms brokering, practical guidelines for stockpile management and surplus disposal, and a standard international format for authenticating end-user certificates.

During thematic debate, several delegations stressed the importance of including ammunition in the UN SALW process, including Fiji, Jamaica, and United Kingdom. Many delegations focused on international cooperation and assistance—CARICOM called for more responsibility from arms producers and a need for assistance without conditions; ECOWAS called for appropriate mechanisms at the international level, citing the globalized nature of the problem. Other delegations were more concerned with regional approaches. The Nigerian representative suggested standardized end-user certification. Several delegations welcomed the creation of the PoA Implementation Support System and the UNIDIR database for matching needs with resources. Some also called for a global ban on international SALW transfers to non-state actors. Others drew linkages between SALW and transnational crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

The Japanese delegation introduced the annual omnibus SALW resolution, A/C.1/63/L.57, “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,” which it co-authored with Colombia and South Africa. As noted in the first edition of the Monitor, the draft text affirms that the next BMS will be held in 2010 and the next Review Conference in 2012. Additionally, it endorses the report adopted by the 2008 BMS and calls for the convening of an “open-ended meeting of governmental experts” no later than 2011 to address “key implementation challenges and opportunities relating to particular issues including international cooperation and assistance.”

Mali’s delegation summarized the key points of the annual ECOWAS resolution, “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them,” A/C.1/63/L.41. The representative stressed the critical role of civil society in collaboration with National Commissions on Small Arms. The resolution remains unchanged from last year.

For the first time, Australia and the Republic of Korea tabled a draft resolution on “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities,” A/C.1/63/L.43. Concerned about the impacts of “illicit brokering of arms in all its aspects” on international peace and security, economic and social development, and conflict situations, the draft text recognizes the need to combat illicit brokering of both conventional weapons and “materials, equipment and technology that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” The draft takes note of the PoA, the 2005 Firearms Protocol, the GGE report on illicit brokering, and the third BMS report as international efforts to prevent and combat illicit arms brokering. It encourages member states to fully implement relevant international treaties, instruments, and resolutions and to establish appropriate national laws and measures, acknowledging that national efforts “can be reinforced” by efforts made at the regional and subregional levels.

The Canadian delegation welcomed the resolution on illicit brokering, supporting its approach of addressing both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, “as there is a clear overlap in many of the measures to address each.”

Staff from the International Action Network on Small Arms and Reaching Critical Will contributed to this article.

Cluster Munitions
Allison Pytlak | Religions for Peace on behalf of the Cluster Munition Coalition

Cluster munitions were a prominent topic during the thematic debate on conventional weapons. Statements followed the two tracks that governments have taken to address the problems caused by these weapons. A majority of delegations spoke positively about the recently negotiated Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and others showed varying levels of support for the parallel process occurring in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which is seeking development of a protocol addressing cluster munitions.

The CCM was adopted by 107 nations in Dublin last May and constitutes a categorical and comprehensive ban on all cluster munitions. It will open for signature in Oslo this December 2008. The CCW will meet in November. Any agreement made there will benefit from the inclusion of the world’s major users and producers of clusters, but is likely to be a regulation, not a ban, of the weapon’s use and will give consideration to military and defence needs.

Irish Ambassador Daithi O’Ceallaigh, President of the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, provided the First Committee with a thorough report of the Dublin conference and the Convention. The CCM defines cluster munitions by the effects of the weapon in question and not just its components. This enables application to a wider expanse of weapons in this category. It also addresses problems of joint military operations between member and non-member states. The CCM’s central provision is the ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. Additionally, the CCM contains very strong provisions and obligations relating to survivor assistance and clearance.

During thematic debate, the delegations of Australia and Uruguay announced officially that they will sign the CCM. Over 50 governments have already made this commitment. From those who have not yet done so came statements indicative of progress. Japan’s ambassador referred again to the “concrete steps” being undertaken to ensure signature in Oslo. Indonesia’s representative welcomed the regional conference on cluster munitions that took place in Laos last week and encouraged all states to sign the Convention. Ecuador, set to host the next regional conference on cluster munitions on 6-7 November, reiterated that the CCM should receive the full support of all UN member states.

Nearly all delegations spoke with great optimism about the outcome of Oslo Process. Chile’s delegate called it a “substantial step forward” while Senegal’s representative stated that the CCM ought to remain a priority for the international community. The delegations of Norway, Austria, Mexico, and others of the Oslo Process Core Group encouraged all UN member states to be present for the Oslo signing. Paraguay’s delegate acknowledged the role that civil society played in the Oslo Process.

The delegations of Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland could have perhaps been stronger in their support of the CCM. Despite applauding the ban, these delegations were also careful to stress the importance of the CCW solution and indicate their commitment to that process too. The European Union, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom delegations mentioned both processes as well, but their position emphasized that the CCW outcome should be complementary to the ban, not a substitute for it.

China, India, Israel, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States articulated their preference for a solution to cluster munitions in the framework of the CCW. China and the Republic of Korea—both members of the group of experts in the CCW process—spoke of the need for balancing humanitarian concerns with military realities. Pakistan expressed concern that the Dublin treaty would supplant rather supplement the CCW process. Focusing exclusively on the CCW, the American statement expressed hope for the completion this year of a sixth CCW protocol that addresses cluster munitions. Finland, who presently seems unlikely to sign the CCM, called the treaty a “remarkable milestone” but regards it as “important now that the CCW will also achieve results that will further contribute to the humanitarian cause on the ground.”

On behalf of the Core Group of the Oslo Process, Ireland presented draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.56, an administrative and procedural resolution on cluster munitions that provides the mandate under which the Secretary-General of the UN can act as the depository of the CCM.

A lunch event on 22 October illustrated how partnership and multilateralism drove the Oslo Process. The panel consisted of speakers from the Norwegian government, the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, the UN Development Programme, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the civil society network the Cluster Munitions Coalition. Each panelist was able to reflect on their unique contributions to the creation of a ban on cluster munitions.

Landmines
Allison Pytlak | Religions for Peace on behalf of the Cluster Munition Coalition

Jordan’s representative presented draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.6 on the “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.” This resolution was tabled on behalf of the Troika of presidents of states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT; also known as the Ottawa Convention)—Australia, Jordan, and Switzerland. It reaffirms the determination to put to an end the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines (APMs) and the need to ensure victim assistance. The changes made to the resolution from last year are procedural and technical in nature, in line with progress made in the treaty’s implementation. Jordan’s delegation asked all UN member states to support the resolution regardless of their participation in the MBT.

Thailand, a states party to the MBT since it opened for signature in 1997, expressed its concern over a recent landmine incident that occurred near one of their borders when two Thai army rangers stepped on PMN2 mines. Their statement explained that the Thai Mine Action Centre concluded that these mines were recently, and intentionally, laid and were not from a past conflict. Thailand has “reasonable doubt” that the mines come from a foreign source and find it “regrettable” that these weapons are still in use. They are seeking clarification on this issue under the provisions of the MBT and reiterated that they are a “strong believer and advocate of the spirit and principles of the Ottawa Convention.” New Zealand’s delegation may have alluded to the Thai incident in an expression of concern over recent reports of new use.

Many delegations touched on the issue of extension requests from states parties who are unable to meet their mine clearance deadlines under article V of the MBT. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway indicated that this will be a major theme at next month’s Meeting of States Parties to the MBT and a growing challenge in the coming decade. South Africa’s representative expressed disappointment with affected states that have waited a long time to begin demining.

Building on this concern, New Zealand’s delegation made a strong statement about the importance of collaboration between states parties and with international organizations, in the future. Switzerland’s representative referred to this year’s theme of “Honour your Commitment”—applicable to both donor and affected states. The delegation of Mozambique spoke at length about the substantial challenges they have faced in demining and victim assistance, and also highlighted the need for greater financial and technical aid.

The statements of Belarus and Turkey reviewed their respective difficulties in meeting stockpile destruction deadlines under the MBT. Turkey’s representative described the recent visits from the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and the Implementation Support Unit to their disposal facilities. He confirmed that as of 30 September 2008, just under 2 million mines remain to be destroyed and that the fuses of all stockpiled mines have been destroyed, rendering them useless. Belarus faces a unique problem as it has large stockpiles of PFM mines, anti-infantry cluster landmines that contain a toxic chemical that complicate their destruction. Despite making progress, the Belarus representative stated that the government signed the MBT with the expectation of support and they call on all donor states to remain committed.

States not party to the MBT also articulated their positions on landmines. Pakistan and India view APMs as necessary for their defence. Cuba does as well but fully supports the humanitarian and economic impact of the MBT. China’s delegation discussed demining activities undertaken in Sudan.

Libya’s representative articulated several points that the MBT should re-consider to be more effective, arguing that it is not a balanced document taking into account the interests of all countries. He suggested the draft resolution on the MBT would garner more support if it considered these changes.

Arms Trade Treaty
Virág Kaufer | Oxfam GB

The third week of the First Committee saw increasing support for the continuation work on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Statements from delegations were mostly supportive, urging the international community to agree a legally-binding instrument that is in line with states’ international obligations.

A number of regional initiatives were presented on this matter, including the Nairobi meeting on the ATT and sustainable development, hosted by the government of Kenya and attended by 22 African states. The statement of the European Union also welcomed the proposal of an open-ended working group to set out the scope and parameters of a future ATT. Even sceptical governments like China and Pakistan urged the international community to address the problem of illicit trade of conventional weapons. China’s delegation welcomed the report of the Group of Government Experts and the efforts of strengthening international controls on arms. It expressed interest in joining future discussions as long as they are based on consensus. Pakistan’s delegation emphasized the need to maintain the right of states to manufacture, import, export, transfer, and retain conventional weapons. The United States, the only country that voted against the ATT in 2006, did not comment on the process in their statement.

The conventional weapons debate closed on Wednesday lunchtime and by Thursday evening the number of co-sponsors to the draft resolution, “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms,” A/C.1/63/L.39, had reached a hundred states. The growing support was demonstrated by the fact that 7 countries that did not co-sponsor the resolution in 2006 added their names to the list this time. The resolution has three new preambular paragraphs noting the views expressed by member states on the feasibility, scope, and draft parameters of an ATT, welcoming the report of the Secretary-General prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), and expressing determination to prevent the diversion of conventional arms from the legal to illicit trade.

In its operative paragraphs, the resolution endorses the Secretary-General’s report; encourages states to implement the relevant recommendations from paragraphs 28 and 29 of the report; decides to establish an open-ended working group starting in 2009 to “consider those elements in the report of the [GGE] where consensus could be developed for their inclusion in an eventual legally binding treaty on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms,” and transmit an initial report to the General Assembly next year; and requests the Secretary-General transmit the replies from member states and the GGE report to the open-ended working group.

Civil society efforts continued to be strongly visible in and outside of the UN during the week. The members of the Control Arms campaign organised a number of events and generated media interest around the debate. On 20 October, three parliamentarians handed over the Control Arms Parliamentarians Declaration, supported by 2000 signatures from 124 countries, to the Chair of the First Committee. On 21 October, the Control Arms team spread out through Manhattan aboard rickshaws, visiting 192 mission in 192 minutes to deliver a video message from Archbishop Desmond Tutu calling on all states to vote in favour of the ATT resolution next week. On 23 October, Amnesty International hosted an event titled “UN Arms Embargoes and the Arms Trade Treaty—why both?” Senior military officers who have worked in some of the world’s most dangerous conflict zones and witnessed the resulting catastrophic humanitarian consequences highlighted their support for an ATT and spoke about the need for an ATT to enforce arms embargoes.

Disarmament and Development
Mariah Quinn | Global Action to Prevent War

In the final two days of general debate, delegations again highlighted the linkages between disarmament and development. The Caribbean Community representative stressed that it will be necessary for the international community to acknowledge the relationship between disarmament and development in order for development targets to be achieved, noting that military expenditures “divert necessary resources from the development agenda.” Delegates from Benin and Nicaragua called on member states to uphold their obligation, under the UN Charter, to commit the minimal human and economic resources possible to ensure international security. Nicaragua lamented that, with the money currently spent to produce new arms and perfect existing weapons, it would be possible to eradicate the majority of curable diseases, achieve poverty reduction goals, and address hunger and illiteracy.

Papua New Guinea’s delegation echoed statements made by several delegates during the first week of general debate, which elucidated the connection between small arms and light weapons and development. It stated that SALW will have serious repercussions for the economic, social, and political sectors and, in so doing, pose a formidable impediment to national development. Eritrea’s representative similarly observed, “the proliferation and easy access to Small Arms and Light Weapons exacerbates conflicts, facilitates violent crime and terrorism, impedes post-conflict reconstruction and undermines long-term sustainable development.” The Eritrean delegation joined Colombia and Nicaragua in endorsing the UN Programme of Action as a critical instrument in furthering both disarmament and development initiatives.

Palestine’s representative noted that underdevelopment and poverty render a population more susceptible to radicalism and hopelessness and warned that conflict zones represent a lucrative market for illicit arms sales. He stressed, “We must confront the undeniable fact that deadly conflicts and illicit arms trade will continue unless we treat the root causes of conflicts.”

During the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, Myanmar’s delegation asserted that the billions of dollars currently devoted to nuclear weapon arsenals ought to be allocated to alleviating world poverty. The Cuban delegation likewise deemed such an expense a “useless diversion of resources that could be used in valuable programs, like development assistance, the implementation of which would allow real contribution to international peace and security.”

In statements made during the thematic debate on conventional weapons, states continued to empahsize the topic of disarmament and development. Recognizing the link between security and development, the European Union representative stated that the elimination of illicit SALW ought to be incorporated into development and poverty reduction strategies.

Switzerland’s ambassador provided an update on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, initially launched in 2006. He urged those states that have not already subscribed to the Geneva Declaration to do so and called on all states to promote its principles. The Geneva Declaration now boasts the support of 96 states, suggesting a growing awareness of the negative impact of armed violence on development. In the Review Summit on the Declaration, held in September of this year, armed violence was explicitly cited as an obstacle for the realization of the Millennium Development Goals. Representatives of Benin, the European Union, Morocco, and Papau New Guinea expressed support for the Geneva Declaration. Kenya’s delegation expressed hope that states will partner with civil society and international organizations to ensure that armed violence is reduced and development targets are achieved.

Cuba’s delegation restated its support for the Plan of Action, adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987, which called on states to reallocate military spending toward the realization of socio-economic development. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), similarly recalling the Plan of Action, invited member states to provide the Secretary-General with an update on their individual efforts to redirect resources from arms to development. NAM also tabled resolution A/C.1/63/L.23, “Relationship between disarmament and development,” which remains unchanged from last year.

Kenya’s delegate introduced an outcome document for the event “Arms Trade Treaty, International Transfers and Development.” Representatives from 20 African governments, actors from civil society, and regional organizations were in attendance. The aim of the event was to discuss the relationship between armed violence and development, with a particular emphasis on the role that illicit arms transfers play in fueling conflict. The participants then sought to examine how an Arms Trade Treaty might help to address irresponsible transfers and thus contribute to socio-economic development in Africa.

Disarmament Machinery
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

First Committee held its thematic debate on disarmament machinery on 23 and 24 October, during which representatives of the CD, UNDC, UNSG Advisory Board, and UNIDIR exchanged informal perspectives with delegations on the current paralysis and possible ways forward.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Ambassador Hernández of Venezuela, current president of the CD, pointed to three issues that member states have highlighted as possible areas of improvement in the functioning of the CD, including the agenda—which some think is outdated—the presidency—which some feel is too short, though coordination among the six presidents has largely solved this issue—and the rule of consensus, which some feel should be changed.

New Zealand’s ambassador reiterated his arguments from 19 August in the CD regarding the safeguards for consensus built into the negotiating process, which should allow for states to be more flexible on the procedural stage of the process—agreeing on a programme of work. Chile’s delegate said that while the rule of consensus is an appropriate tool for sensitive topics, it is sometimes used inappropriately. He described it as being closer to a veto than a tool for finding solutions. However, Egypt’s delegate argued that in the current situation, the “veto” on the proposed programme of work is not against the start of negotiations but against specific items being included in the negotiating mandate—that is, verification has been vetoed from the negotiating mandate on a fissile materials treaty, even though states previously agreed to a mandate with verification. Refuting the oft-heard argument that insisting on the inclusion of verification in the negotiating mandate acts as a precondition to negotiations, the Egyptian delegate argued that the veto on its inclusion is the real precondition—and an incomprehensible one, given how important verification is to states in all other situations.

Pakistan’s delegate also briefly took the floor to argue that the rule of consensus conforms with the principle of equal security and to argue that the programme of work is a substantive not a procedural issue. He also said that abuse of consensus occurs when there are attempts by some to “shift goalposts.”

In response to this debate, Amb. Hernández said the CD should retain the rule of consensus, as it is a “useful tool for enabling debate and debate is the path toward truth.” He argued the problem is abuse of the rule to prevent debate from taking place, in which case states should consider how to ensure it does not prevent the inclusion of new topics and that it is only applied to substantive issues.

The six presidents of the 2008 CD—Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela—submitted draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.47, “Report on the Conference on Disarmament.” The text contains only technical updates from last year’s resolution, which was adopted without a vote by the General Assembly. Reaffirming the role of the CD as the “sole multilateral negotiating forum of the international community,” the draft calls on the CD to intensify consultations to reach consensus on a programme of work and welcomes the decision of the Conference to request the current president (Venezuela) and incoming president (Viet Nam) to conduct consultations during the intersessional period.

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
Piet de Klerk, Chair of the 2008 session of the UNDC, recognized that the UNDC is “not in very good shape” but argued it should not be discontinued because it has a “respectable track record of unanimously adopted principles, guidelines and recommendations on disarmament,” which contributes to the totality of disarmament efforts in a modest way. However, he, and the German ambassador in an informal response to his presentation, noted that Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) have taken over the role of the UNDC—focusing on specific issues, making recommendations to the First Committee or the CD. The German ambassador also noted that the CD has unwittingly become a deliberative body, rendering the UNDC even more redundant. Amb. de Klerk argued the UNDC needs to return to considering limited agenda items and reclaim its role, as it is more inclusive than a GGE. He added that inviting experts from international and non-governmental organizations to participate in the UNDC would increase its importance.

In its formal statement, the representative of MERCOSUR and Associated States noted that nine years have passed without consensus in the UNDC. He suggested that now is “the right moment to reflect on the possibility of identifying other ways of carrying out our work,” pointing out that the rules of the UNDC state that decisions should be adopted by consensus “in so far as possible.” Norway’s ambassador suggested the UNDC hold shorter sessions and focus on one or two clearly defined topics and said its report could just be a summary rather than a negotiated document.

Since the UNDC completed its three year-cycle without consensus on either of its agenda items, it is unclear what it will consider in 2009. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emphasized that, pursuant to UNGA decision 52/492 and resolution 61/67, the agenda items for the next cycle should be “recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”—which one of the items from its 2006–2008 cycle—and “elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade.” The ambassador of Qatar, on behalf of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, supported NAM’s position.

The Netherlands’ delegation introduced draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.48, “Report of the Disarmament Commission.” It recommends the 2009 cycle include an item entitled “Elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade” in its agenda and suggests the Commission meet from 13 April–1 May.

UNSG Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, president of the Board, outlined the Board’s recent considerations and recommendations. Noting that the Board held discussions on energy security, the “Hoover Plan” on reducing nuclear danger, and emerging weapon technologies including outer space aspects, Prof. Rotfeld said the Board encouraged a broader dialogue on nuclear energy and fuel supply arrangements; recommended the UNSG strengthen his role in generating political will, seizing the momentum created by the Plan and encouraging wider discussions regarding its objectives; and suggested the UNSG continue raising awareness of the risks related to emerging weapon technologies and initiating a dialogue between governments and the scientific community. Details are available in document A/63/279.

Fourth special session on disarmament (SSOD IV)
The delegations of MERCOSUR and NAM called for the establishment of SSOD IV. NAM tabled draft decision A/C.1/63/L.22, “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,” which includes the item on the General Assembly’s agenda for next year.

Regional Disarmament
Ray Acheson and Sandra Fong | Reaching Critical Will

On 24 October, delegations to the First Committee heard from the Director of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs Regional Disarmament Branch and the Directors of the three United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament. Delegations also tabled several resolutions on regional disarmament and security matters.

Ms. Anges Marcaillou, Director of the Regional Disarmament Branch, gave an overview of the structure of the Branch and the work of the New York office in overseeing the three Centres. She explained that the office essentially works on promoting better coordination with regional and other organizations in field of disarmament and non-proliferation by strengthening relationships with regional organizations and civil society.

Regional Director for the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Ms. Jacqueline Seck Diouf, highlighted efforts to make the Centre a continental resource, consolidating existing partnerships and establishing new ones to ensure that Centre activities are in line with priorities of the region and the continent. Most of the Centre’s work has been focused on small arms, with capacity-building programs receiving support from the Economic Community of West Africa and collaboration with the International Action Network on Small Arms and the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons. She also highlighted some activities undertaken by the Centre in the area of a possible Arms Trade Treaty, code of conduct for security and armed forces, and training of parliamentarians in Togo. Although nothing has yet been initiated for Southern Africa, Ms. Diouf envisions programmes beginning by 2009. She emphasized that the Centre belonged to Africans and members need to take full ownership. After her presentation, the representative from Angola reaffirmed the importance of the Centre and emphasized the need to invest in it.

The newly appointed director for the Asia and the Pacific Centre stressed the need to increase the Centre’s capacity. The Centre covers 43 countries and hopes to establish a network of governmental experts and regional non-governmental organizations to support its work. The director also briefly discussed some activities that would be undertaken by the Centre, such as cultivating the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms. Australia and New Zealand’s delegations raised the question of how the newly-relocated Centre will maintain focus on the Pacific countries and implement these activities in the Pacific region, given that 16 of the 43 countries are part of the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS). New Zealand’s delegate also asked how the Centre would engage PIFS and how governments can best interact with the Centre. Ms. Marcaillou answered that the needs of the Pacific have not always been addressed as they should be, due to lack of funding, and that this is particularly difficult to coordinate from New York. She affirmed that serving the Pacific was very high on the list of priorities, along with improving dialogue with states and coordination with regional organizations.

The Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean is currently reviewing its programme of work in public security, promotion of disarmament instruments, and confidence-building, to address the realities of the region. Much of the work of the Centre has been in the assistance of the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on small arms, training law enforcement, the destruction of firearms, ensuring universality and ratification of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and promoting the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The representative of MERCOSUR and Associated States said that despite being under resourced, the Centre assists all states of region in promoting security, disarmament, and development on regional and sub-regional levels.

For implementation of activities, funding is crucial to the Centres. All the directors stated the need for increased contributions for the implementation of work programs and fulfilment of mandates. The Centres function on voluntary contributions and have stressed the need to attract new funding. A draft resolution introduced by Peru, A/C.1/63/L.13, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean,” added a new preambular paragraph expressing deep concern that the lack of voluntary financial contributions could “seriously hinder” the Centre’s functions and another “taking note with interest of the suggestion of the Secretary-General that Member States may wish to consider salternative means of ensuring stable core funding for the Centre.” It therefore adds a new operative paragraph requesting the Secretary-General to provide funding from the biennial regular budget starting in 2010–2011.

A/C.1/63/L.42, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific,” adds preambular and operative paragraphs welcoming the relocation of the Regional Centre from New York to Kathmandu. It also adds a new paragraph expressing concern with the Secretary-General’s assessment that the Centre “urgently needs more core funding” and requests the Secretary-General to provide funding from the biennial regular budget starting in 2010–2011.

A/C.1/63/L.50, “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa,” removes from preambular paragraph four a phrase linking arms control to development. In addition, whereas in 2007 the resolution said the Secretary-General stated that the Centre’s capacity was “hampered by the lack of funding, in particular core funding,” the 2008 version quotes from his new report that “an increase in the Regional Centre’s human and operational capacity would enable it to discharge its mandate in full and to respond more effectively to requests for assistance from African States.” While in 2007 the resolution recommended that the operating costs of the Centre be funded from the UN regular budget, the 2008 version urges voluntary contributions.

A/C.1/63/L.24, “United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament,” also “appeals to member states in each region and those that are able to do so, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives.” The resolution is unchanged from last year.

A/C.1/63/L.8, “Regional disarmament,” remains unchanged from last year, when it was adopted without a vote. It affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complimentary and should be pursued simultaneously. It also encourages the promotion of confidence-building measures to ease regional tensions.

A/C.1/63/L.9, “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels,” is also unchanged from last year’s resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 177-1-1 in the General Assembly. It requests the Conference on Disarmament (CD) “to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control.” Last year, India voted against the resolution because it believes the CD should only negotiate global instruments; that the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) has already adopted recommendations for regional disarmament; and “the idea of preservation of a balance in defence capabilities in the regional or sub-regional context is both unrealistic and unacceptable to our delegation.”

A/C.1/63/L.10, “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context,” remains unchanged from last year, when it was adopted without a vote. Among other things, the resolution reaffirms the UNDC’s recommendations on the issue and emphasizes the need for confidence-building measures to “be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments.”

A/C.1/63/L.18, “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region,” adds a preambular paragraphy welcoming the joint Declaration of the Paris Summit in 2008. Otherwise unchanged, the text calls upon all states of the region to adhere to multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to disarmament and non-proliferation; promote transparency on all military matters; and to cooperate in combating terrorism.

A/C.1/63/L.46, “Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa,” adds an operative paragraph welcoming the progress made by the Standing Advisory Committee “with respect to the drafting of a legal instrument on the control of small arms and light weapons in Central Africa and of a code of conduct for defence and security forces in Central Africa.” This resolution was adopted without a vote last year.

Transparency
Danny Thiemann | Middle Powers Initiative

During thematic debates on a variety of issues throughout the week, delegations raised questions on how transparency contributes to international peace and security.

On 20 October, the European Union’s representative argued that transparency in military expenditure is “a key element for trust between States and conflict prevention.” He said the EU welcomes the increase in participation in the UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditure since its establishment in 1981. However, he argued, the increase in global military spending since 1999 underlines the need for a more effective mechanism, “which is why the EU welcomes and supports last year’s decision to set up a Group of government experts to examine the implementation and development of a standard instrument to account for military expenditure.”

Noting that it is also important to increase transparency and confidence-building in the arms trade, South Africa’s delegation said it will continue to use its National Conventional Arms Control Act to “ensure the implementation of a legitimate, effective and transparent arms control process and to foster national and international confidence in its control procedures.”

Switzerland’s ambassador raised concerns regarding verification and transparency but also highlighted some positive trends. His statement noted that in 2007 only 67 states submitted information to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He urged that the Group of Governmental Experts dealing with the Register in 2009 address these questions as well as the other challenges facing this mechanism in order to ensure that its relevance can be further strengthened. On a more positive note, the number of states that have provided information about exports and imports of small arms and light weapons has increased considerably, which from Switzerland’s perspective was a significant development. See the report on Conventional Weapons for more information.

The delegation of the Russian Federation raised some questions about the efficacy of transparency in and of itself. Russia’s delegation argued that the recent conflict in the Caucuses brings into question the real value of transparency if a 50 fold increase in military budget and weaponry did not cause concerns in other countries and result in preventative action. For Russia, transparency may be alive and well but without coordinated action, this issue means very little for international security.

The Netherlands’ ambassador introduced a draft resolution entitled “Transparency in Armaments,” A/C.1/63/L.51, on behalf of its 74 co-sponsors. Responding to some of the doubts of member states, Ambassador Landman asserted, “transparency in military matters, particularly transparency in transfers of armaments, contributes to confidence and security building.” Noting that the 1991 Transparency in Armaments resolution, 46/36L, established the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Ambassador Landman explained that the 2008 resolution requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report for the 64th session of the General Assembly with the assistance of a Group of Governmental Experts to be convened next year.

In Brief: Nuclear Proliferation
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

• This week, the Secretariat circulated A/C.1/63/L.32 on “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments,“ which includes an expanded list of sponsors from its last version, introduced in 2005. The sponsors made some minor revisions to the 2005 text, which is otherwise a copy of resolution 60/55. The preamble now recalls the 2006 report of the Panel of Government Experts on verification in all its aspects and a new paragraph recognizes “the importance of effective national, regional and international capacities for … verification, compliance and enforcement” consistent with the UN Charter. The operative portions are slightly rearranged, but otherwise unchanged, with the exception of the addition of one paragraph. Paragraph 3 calls upon states to encourage and assist states “in need of assistance to increase their capacity to implement fully their verification and compliance obligations.”

In Brief: Operational Status for Nuclear Disarmament
Michael Spies | Arms Control Reporter

• The six sponsors of A/C.1/63/L.5, on “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems,” released a draft text that is identical to resolution 62/36, which the current draft resolution recalls.

In Brief: Negative Security Assurances
Madeline Woo | Reaching Critical Will

• Delegations introduced two resolutions dealing with negative security assurances to the First Committee.
• Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.7, “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,” remains unchanged from last year.
• It calls for “an early agreement” on negative security assurances (NSAs) and appeals to all member states to work towards that end.
  The resolution also notes that there seem to be no objections in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to the principle of NSAs, and “recommends that the CD actively continue intensive negotiations” on NSAs.
• Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.15, “Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” includes a preambular paragraph arguing, “a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international peace and security.”
• The draft resolution repeats its request to the CD “to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances,” and asked that the CD reported to the General Assembly on the negotiations.

In Brief: Terrorism
Michael Kennedy | Global Security Institute

Draft resolution

• Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.34, “Measures to prevent rerrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,” was tabled this week.
• To date, the resolution has 51 co-sponsors listed in the initial draft, up from last year’s 21.
• Other than taking note of the recently launched Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, this resolution retains the same exact recommendations as last year’s version.
• As with last year, the resolution calls upon member states to take every effort to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and encourages the cooperation of regional and international organizations in achieving this goal.

Arms transfers to terrorists

• Israel argued that not enough attention is being paid to the “uncontrolled” and “irresponsible” proliferation of conventional arms into the hands of terrorists. According to Israel, these arms transfers to terrorists strengthen extremist groups, who then use the weapons to inflict harm on civilians. Israel called on the international community to create a clear and comprehensive norm banning illegal transfers of arms to terrorists and raised concern that the proposed Arms Trade Treaty would not be ineffective in stopping illegal transfers to terrorists.
• Israel additionally claimed that, despite broad and case-specific attempts to regulate arms trade, such as UNSCR 1701, Middle East countries still funnel arms to extremist groups in the region.
• Syria, in a right of reply, denied Israel’s accusations that it has illegally sent arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria also said that Israel has itself brought terrorism into the Middle East.
• Austria named terrorism as one consequence of the availability of and easy access to small arms and light weapons.

Side Event—Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations

• The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research held a side event examining the role of regional organizations in implementing UNSCR 1540 Wednesday in tandem with the release of a two-year study on the issue.
• The speakers emphasized the grave threat that terrorism poses to international security, and called 1540 the world’s recognition of this increasing danger.
• Although significant progress has been made in the implementation of 1540, much work remains, and regional organizations can play a vital role in further advancement, according to the speakers.
• Lawrence Scheinman from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies identified culture, legitimacy, priority, and capacity as the four main challenges and constrains facing regional organizations in their efforts towards disarmament.
• Speakers emphasized outreach and education as crucial in advancing the implementation of 1540 and other resolutions.

Report: Space Security Side Events
Ben Baseley-Walker | Secure World Foundation

Space Security was touched upon in two side events held in the context of the activities of the First Committee: first in a panel co-hosted by the Global Security Institute, the Secure World Foundation, and the United Nations Institute on Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) titled Prospects for a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space; and second in the Space Security Index-Reaching Critical Will co-sponsored event titled, Space Security 2008: New Perspectives on Space Security.

Both events highlighted the pace of change in the space security sector. The international community at large is becoming more and more cognizant of the importance of understanding these topics fully in order to continue to benefit from outer space and all its resources.

The key question that both of these events posed was how space security relates to the work of the First Committee. Many of the panelists raised the point that space activities are truly global in the way that no other sector is. From the security point of view, the fact that the actions of one can have a tremendous effect on the whole space-faring and space resource-utilizing community is significant. Coupled with the increased dependence on space resources for humanitarian, trade, and development purposes as well as military applications, the risk of space becoming a security flashpoint or that global conflict might spill into space is a serious concern.

At Prospects for a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space, Minister Victor Vasiliev, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Office in Geneva, outlined the role of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in space activities. Mr. Vasiliev emphasized that the work toward a treaty preventing the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT) should happen in parallel with the development of TCBMs. Nicolas Gerard of UNIDIR reviewed the input from several UNIDIR conferences discussing space security and Dr. Williamson, Executive Director of Secure World Foundation, outlined some of the other recent initiatives that are currently widening the debate on ways to move forward on space security issues. These other initiatives included the efforts of Mr. Gerard Brachet, the former Chair of United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), and the respective Codes of Conduct of the European Union and the Stimson Center. Dr Williamson also stressed the need for greater liaison between the Conference on Disarmament, the UN General Assembly, and UNCOPUOS. One significant development is an increase in attempts to broaden the scope of space security from more established discussions such as the China-Russia draft PPWT to looking at alternative approaches.

The showcasing of this year’s Space Security Index at the Space Security 2008: New Perspectives on Space Security event emphasized the necessity for a multi-track approach. The need for practical measures and a mixed approach combining both technical and policy aspects was reflected by the presentations of Dr. Ray Williamson and Richard DalBello, Vice-President of Government Affairs at Intelsat. Mr. DalBello touched on some the key underlying governance issues of outer space. From the perspective of space industry, he stressed the necessity of cooperation at the day-to-day level. Spacecraft operators, if they are to continue to carry out and expand their activities, need greater international coordination mechanisms. As the number of international actors grows, the congestion of key orbits will increase and the ways in which those engaged in space activities interact will become more mainstream in the international security dialectic.

The conclusions of both panels clearly sounded a call for greater engagement of international players on space, albeit in different ways. Ms. Ray Acheson, Project Associate at Reaching Critical Will, laid out a variety of NGO positions on the question of space security. There is no unanimous position on the direction in which space governance issues should develop, however, there is a unified concern that these issues need to be dealt with soon.

As part of this engagement, emerging and future space states need to be drawn into the debate on how the international community should proceed. One of the key issues the Space Security Index highlights is the lack of engagement with the less traditional space actors and the need to improve this engagement. From different positions, the panelists at both events agreed with this position.

Key actions points include:

• Increase dialogue;
• Gain greater engagement from players outside of the traditional space-faring states, especially emerging space states;
• Foster effective input from civil society; and
• Push forward a range of measures and methods both technical and political.

Report: “Getting to Zero—What will it take and from whom?”
Paul Ingram | British American Security Information Council

On 24 October, Paul Ingram of BASIC, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Ron Huisken of the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies spoke at a breakout session at the EastWest Institute’s “Seizing the Moment” event.

Mr. Ingram’s main message was that the international community has to be flexible—it can have crucial short-term, achievable, immediate targets, focusing upon the clear anomalies that obviously create danger with no conceivable benefit (such as tactical nuclear weapons). He argued that the future is inherently unpredictable and working with others to establish a pathway requires us to be understanding, responsive, and able to absorb shocks. We need to focus upon establishing universal principles that will underlie the path to disarmament—multilateralism; involvement of all in creating solutions; interdependence; global leadership; and most important, common security. The process we establish is at least as important as the solutions we seek. And it needs to tackle the national identities and domestic drivers underlying the political support for nuclear weapons.

Mr. Krepon suggested that we were in danger of falling into the trap of over-using fear to motivate progress. He expressed the opinion that nuclear weapons are increasingly losing their salience, there are fewer reasons for major powers to fight, the nuclear taboo is stronger, we have more disarmament instruments (many underutilised), and all have an interest in tackling proliferation. His complaint that fear is an inappropriate tool of motivation was widely welcomed within the group. He outlined a suggestion—that we convene (another) eminent persons group to endorse key principles: that all states need to do more; none have any excuse to wait for progress from others; that all must contribute to strengthening the fundamental bargains; that we focus on a 10 year plan—longer is just too unpredictable; that obligations are proportional to the size of arsenals and civil programmes; that we avoid timelines (they are hostages to fortune); and that we abandon extensive efforts to create new treaties, as this can be a distraction from efforts to forge consensus behind other principles and can take too long. This last point in particular was met with contention within the group.

Dr. Huisken agreed that we have a long and difficult process ahead requiring sustained commitment. He proposed that more than anything we need to establish a compelling norm for nuclear disarmament that establishes: the conviction that nuclear weapons are a net liability for nuclear weapon states; that selective possession is not consistent with non-proliferation, as others will seek to challenge the monopoly; that the nuclear weapon states need to regain and then retain their leadership credibility by moving towards serious disarmament; that there is established a universal consensus that new nuclear weapons states are unacceptable and decisive support for action to enforce the norm and measures to restrict access to sensitive technologies; and that global governance and leadership is needed. There is an urgent need to ensure that 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is not a failure.A series of questions arose in the discussion:

• How do we effectively create traction with the public and elites to motivate action? This will vary depending upon constituencies, and between cultures.
• If we reject fear as the primary motivating factor, what can we use in its place? Hope will surely not be sufficient; what about morality, culture, a focus on myths, the creation of norms or commitment to a cause that becomes the primary discourse and are sustainable?
• How do we overcome the fear of the unknown that holds people back? Clearly tackling nuclear weapons has to go hand in hand with building trust, inter-connection, and a greater sense of security (hence, using fear can be counter-productive). In the 1980s, the establishment of arms control went hand-in-hand with the dissolution of the Cold War.

Getting to Zero is like riding a bike. We have to be moving to stay on the bike—if we think we can retain the status quo we’ll fall off. But we have to be moving in a positive direction, towards security and safety, otherwise we’ll be knocked off in any case. Zero will be achieved only if we can be open to the fears and other drivers that lie behind the acquisition and retention of nuclear weapons. We have to instead build confidence and dialogue, establishing principles for a consensual move towards a world free of nuclear danger.

Report: “Middle East and Nuclear Challenges”
Rebecca Johnson | Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Report on the EastWest Institute Consultation break-out group
Given the sensitivities attached to discussions of nuclear programmes and the Middle East, the working group, which had participants from Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, the United States, and Britain, among others, did not come to consensus recommendations on ways forward, apart from recognizing the positive role that civil society could play in providing information and promoting a more open debate. In addition, some civil society organizations could promote confidence-building by convening private, off the record meetings and track 1.5 interactions among key representatives of the major players.

The group considered Israel’s nuclear weapons, Iran’s uranium enrichment and nuclear ambitions, and the implication of more states in the region signing up to develop nuclear energy programmes. The discussion ranged from weaknesses in the NPT regime to the security, proliferation, and safety questions inherent in all nuclear programmes. Participants noted that nuclear threats and challenges are both regional and universal and recognized that they hinge on the perceived value attached to nuclear weapons—whether for deterrence or power projection—as exemplified by the policies and doctrines of the existing nuclear weapon states as well as the fears, practices, and ambitions of certain states in the region.

As illustrated in the group, dialogue on these issues in the region tend to go past each other, as the Arab states want to focus on nuclear weapons, Israel wants to prioritise normalisation and peace agreements, and Iran wants to keep its options open. Initiatives arising from the wider international community, including the EU-3 or P-5 plus 1 are often perceived as discriminatory or missing the point. Some argued that efforts should be directed towards managing rather than trying to resolve problems such as Iran’s uranium enrichment ambitions. The lack of genuine and informed debate about these issues in Israel and Iran, as well as other countries, was discussed, with emphasis on the importance of civil society in raising awareness and laying the groundwork for tackling these issues more effectively.

There was much discussion about energy and resource needs of countries in the region, with some participants forcefully asserting the right of countries to develop nuclear energy as they saw fit, relating this not only important to energy requirements but to desalination projects and water and food security as well. Without denying the right of countries to determine their own requirements and the importance that many NPT members place on Article IV, others in the group argued for there to be more open, informed, and analytical debates at domestic levels as well as internationally on how best to address energy needs and options to enhance security and development.

Participants generally agreed that the regional nuclear challenges could not be resolved in a vacuum and that it will be necessary to devalue nuclear weapons internationally, which will require the other nuclear weapon states not only to reduce their arsenals but, more importantly, to take them out of their doctrines and security equations. One speaker argued that a major qualitative step would be for the international community to start the process towards having the use of nuclear weapons declared a crime against humanity. This, combined with an obligation on all states and people to render all possible assistance to a state that is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons and also to track down and bring to justice those responsible for the threat or use of nuclear weapons, declaring nuclear weapons use a crime against humanity, would greatly reinforce deterrence, denial, and non-proliferation and provide non-discriminatory positive and negative security assurances to all. This would not only strengthen the NPT, but would also enhance regional security.

There was interest in some speakers’ proposals to get around the deadlock arising from preconditions placed on negotiations about a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East or other objectives. These included a kind of Middle East “Helsinki-like process” of negotiating simultaneously on three intersecting “baskets” of problems and issues, to build confidence, and seek mutually reinforcing solutions. As suggested, the parallel negotiations might include: i) principles for peaceful coexistence, justice, and human rights in the region; ii) arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and security; and iii) sharing of resources, mutual confidence-building through education, trade etc. Other proposals debated included a fuel cycle free zone in the Middle East, as proposed by the International WMD Commission. Pending a global declaration stigmatizing the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity, there may be confidence-building mileage in a regional agreement on no-first-use of WMD.

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