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The First Committee Monitor
Week Two: October 9-13, 2006
In this issue:
- Introduction
- The Fallout from North Korea's Test
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- Disarmament Machinery
- Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
- Nuclear Disarmament
- International Court of Justice
- Negative Security Assurances
- Conventional Weapons
- Arms Trade Treaty
- Terrorism
- Biological and Chemical Weapons
- Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
- Landmines
Introduction
On October 9, the Chair of the First Committee
opened the Monday morning session with a short,
terse condemnation of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear test. Ironically,
the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty Organization, Ambassador Tibor Toth,
also made a presentation to the First Committee that
morning. There has not been a nuclear test in nearly
a decade, and a non-nuclear weapon state party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty has never left the treaty and
tested nuclear weapons. Many were still in shock,
and although some governments made statements on
Monday deploring the test that could fundamentally
change the disarmament and non-proliferation regime,
the responses really came pouring in on Tuesday,
both from governments at the First Committee
and from civil society around the world.
Because of the focus on the test, there was much less
new discussion of other non-proliferation concerns.
Accordingly, while we have in-depth coverage of
North Korea in this issue of the Monitor, the proliferation,
nuclear weapon free zones and Iran reports
will be published again in next week's issue.
In its October 9 statement, the DPRK explained that
its nuclear test was a result of its perception that the
law of the jungle prevails, and it needs the threat of
excessive force to deter a powerful enemy. Moreover,
as the Netherlands reminded us in its October 10
statement, threat perceptions are about economies as
well as militaries.
There are 192 states in this increasingly globalized
and technically advanced world, and if we want to
avoid similar threat analyses and results in the future,
we must create an international system based on the
rule of law, not the rule of force. The rule of law states
that nuclear disarmament is an obligation on at least
five nations of the world. The rule of law states that
nuclear weapons are illegal, and a requirement exists
to negotiate an end to their destructive power over
the planet. That law must apply equally to everyone
in order to be perceived as legitimate, and therefore
work. Creating and obeying law is not blind faith, but
is rather the process of building a just international
system with fair rules and effective verification to ensure
they are being followed.
As civil society, it is our job to find hope in tragedy,
and to point towards creative solutions. There is some
possibility here: the nuclear test is another guide post,
a warning sign at the crossroads about which Secretary-
General Kofi Annan warned us. We can either
work to build a collective security system in the interests
of all, or this can be one of many tragic and
destructive instances of people and states taking security
into their own hands. If we are to choose the
former- as we must- the First Committee, as the only
global body charged with deliberating and adopting
resolutions pertaining to international security, must
take the lead. A collective security requires negotiation
and compromise, as the political will to implement
all decisions reached.
Over the next three weeks, the Committee will adopt
a variety of resolutions that aim towards strengthening
our collective security. More than just perfunctorily
fulfilling its mandate, member states should view
the upcoming weeks as a prime opportunity to assert
the rule of law, the primacy of cooperation and the
necessity for enlightened rationality. If it fails to do
so, the DPRK will be proven correct: the law of the
jungle will prevail. The the Committee must prove
them wrong.
-Jennifer Nordstrom, Reaching
Critical Will
The Fallout from North Korea's Test
While the nature and quality of the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea's (DPRK) test is still under
investigation, the impact on the nonproliferation regime
was immediate. Governments at the First Committee
condemned the test while urging restraint and
diplomacy. Malaysia saw the test as a blow to a nuclear-
free world. The Russian Federation, China and
Pakistan denounced the tests and called for a return to
the Six-Party Talks. The Republic of Korea declared,“[S]uch a provocative act will not be condoned or tolerated.”
Japan introduced a draft resolution entitled
Renewed determination towards the total elimination
of nuclear weapons, which includes language expressing
deep concern over DPRK's announcement
of a nuclear test.
In response, the DPRK stated that it does not want a
nuclear Korean Peninsula but was forced into testing
by the United States and its threat of nuclear weapons.
An indigenous nuclear weapons program is perceived
by the DPRK regime as a means of deterrence and
a way to maintain its sovereignty. Ambassador Kim
Kwang II said, “The US extreme threat of a nuclear
war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK to
conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering
nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure
for defense.”
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which
DPRK is a member, called for restraint and a return
to the Six-Party Talks. In its statement, the NAM “expressed
its concern while recognizing the complexities
arising from nuclear test in the Korean Peninsula
which underlined the need to work even harder to
achieve the Movement's disarmament objectives, including
elimination of nuclear weapons.”
Japan bemoaned the test as, “a serious challenge to
the (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) NPT regime,”
and argued that such an act “is not only in violation
of Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration and the Joint
Statement by the Six Party Talks, but also disregarding
the spirit of UN Security Council (SC) resolution
1695 and the Presidential Statement of the Security Council dated October 7th this year.” The European
Union also affirmed that the test violated SC 1695 as
well as the December 1991 North-South De-nuclearization
Declaration. While the DPRK did acknowledge
its commitments under the Joint Statement, it
did not mention SC1695, the 1991 Declaration or the
Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.
The Security Council unanimously approved resolution
1718 on Saturday, 14 October, which imposes
weapons and financial sanctions. The resolution forbids
the export or import of materials that could be
used for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.
It calls for the restriction of funds and travel
of anyone judged by a newly constituted SC committee
to be related to the DPRK weapons or missile
programs. The resolution also reinforces the importance
of the NPT by underlining “the need for all
States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their
Treaty obligations”.
The DPRK representative, Pak Gil Yon, stated that
the DPRK rejected the Security Council resolution,
calling it “gangster-like” and “coercive” and would
consider any further US pressure an act of war. Russia
and China both emphasized that the resolution
does not authorize use of force.
In a side event hosted by the Middle Powers Initiative,
Chilean Ambassador Alfredo Labbé observed
that while the quality and character of the North Korean
test was still in doubt, it is clear that the DPRK
wanted the international community to believe it was
a nuclear device. Therefore, he reasoned, it is imperative
to prevent the political fallout from destroying
the NPT and non-proliferation regime.
The test indeed reinforces the importance of the upcoming
Preparatory Conference for the NPT and the
need to have the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) brought into force, as noted by several states.
(See CTBT report) Switzerland argued that the CTBT
was needed to counter a potential arms race. Israel called for a moratorium on nuclear tests, and Norway called for states to bring the CTBT into force.
Canada's representative said that the DPRK test necessitated
a permanent international ban on nuclear
test explosions. Australia introduced a draft resolution,
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, with
language condemning the DPRK test.
- Neal Sandin, Middle Powers Initiative
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
In light of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
's (DPRK) proclamation late Sunday night that it
successfully conducted a nuclear test, preventing nuclear
testing was a major issue this week in the First
Committee. This test was carried out despite the international
community's urging for the DPRK to halt
its nuclear program. The incident has highlighted the
necessity for the entry into force of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The EU urged the DPRK to “announce immediately
that it will refrain from any further tests of a nuclear
device…(and) sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.” New Zealand called the nuclear test a“travesty of the spirit” of the CTBT. The multilateral
response denouncing the DPRK test included statements
from the Republic of Korea, the United States,
the Russian Federation, Japan, Bangladesh, Mexico,
Norway, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Brazil, Australia
and Canada.
India, Pakistan and Israel, three Annex II states that
have not yet ratified the CTBT, also condemned the
actions of the DPRK. India expressed “deep concern”
over the DPRK test. Pakistan stated it “deplores the
announcement” of the DPRK and called it “regrettable
that the DPRK chose to ignore the advice of the
international community.” Israel declared the test “an
irresponsible and provocative act” and added, “Israel
not only remains formally committed to the CTBT,
but also actively supports and participates in the work
of the (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization)”
or CTBTO, the Organization that supports the
Treaty and works to verify its adherence. All three
delegations confirmed they continue to observe the
moratorium on nuclear testing.
In its own statement, the CTBTO also expressed
its “deep concern and strong condemnation” of the
DPRK test and hoped the DPRK would sign and ratify
the CTBT. It noted the “significant progress” the
CTBT has made over the last year by attaining 10
new signatories. The CTBTO stated that it is proud of
this progress, but stressed there is more to be done. It
explained the CTBT must still enter into force to enable
proper verification and called on the ten Annex
II states that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so.
The CTBTO asserted, the “current situation (with the
DPRK) highlights the importance” of the entry into
force of the CTBT. The DPRK is one of the ten Annex
II states that has not yet ratified the CTBT.
Many states agree the test by the DPRK is evidence
of the necessity for the entry into force of the CTBT.
Canada asserted, the “announcement by the DPRK
underlines the necessity of a universal, legally-binding
and permanent international ban on all nuclear
test explosions.” The Canadian delegation said the
moratorium on nuclear testing is good, but “[t]here
are no substitutes for a legally binding compact.”
Australia, a staunch supporter of the CTBT, also feels
that “North Korea's actions underscore the urgent
need for entry into force of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.” Australia proudly introduced a draft resolution this week that stresses the “vital importance
and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay
and without conditions” for the early entry into
force of the CTBT. This draft resolution differs from
A/RES/60/95 in that it: specifically condemns the
DPRK announcement of a test; suggest “coordinated
ratification” to achieve universality of the treaty, and;
stresses that self-imposed test moratoria “do not have
the same permanent and legally-binding effect as entry
into force of the Treaty”.
The DPRK's claim that it conducted a nuclear test
also highlights the need for a fully operational verification system. At a side event on the CTBT, Dr.
Haak, Chairman of the CTBTO working group on
verification, stated that the International Monitoring
System (IMS) of the CTBTO was the first to detect
the sub-kiloton explosion in the DPRK. He mused,
“Did the system perform right? Yes it did.” However,
it is still unclear whether the explosion was nuclear or
conventional. This is where the entry into force of the
CTBT becomes crucial. Because the DPRK test was
conducted underground, it may or may not be possible to detect radiation in the air. Therefore, on-site
inspections, which would involve digging into the
earth, are needed to verify the DPRK claim. Unfortunately,
until the Treaty enters into force, this critical
step in verification cannot take place.
The IMS searches for a nuclear explosion by reading
seismic waves, infrasound waves, hydro-acoustic
waves and measuring radionuclides. It is currently
comprised of 189 of the intended 321 IMS stations.
All the data from the stations is collected at the International
Data Centre (IDC) and made available to
member states via the internet. The IMS is also beneficial for its civil and scientific applications, such as
predicting earthquake and volcanic eruptions, locating
underwater events or tsunamis and monitoring the
temperature of the sea and possible global warming.
However, Dr. Haak stressed that this system is not yet
fully operational and will not be until the entry into
force of the CTBT.
- Jennifer Leigh Schwerer, NGO Committee on Disarmament,
Peace and Security
Disarmament Machinery
Although disarmament machinery is scheduled to be
discussed on Oct 18, the First Committee debated
the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
when Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, the Secretary General
of the CD, made a presentation to the First Committee
on October 9. Mr. Ordzhonikidze said there
obviously had not been enough imagination to solve
the deadlock and that he doubted that the CD could
survive another year without substantive work. He
also doubted whether the Five Ambassador's proposal (A5), although widely supported, would ever accrue
consensus.
Pakistan said the A5 proposal, which would create ad
hoc committees on the four core issues -fissile materials,
arms in outer space, nuclear disarmament, and
negative security assurances- would be the minimum
threshold for Pakistan. “When negotiations start,”
Pakistan said, “it is conceivable that each issue will
have a varying pace and progress, but none of the
items on the table can be removed from the CD agenda
at will.”
Japan asserted that while further deliberations are required
within the CD on all of 4 major agenda items,
only a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has
reached the stage of establishing an ad hoc committee
for negotiations.
The United States made it clear that the CD should
only negotiate an FMCT and reiterated its opposition
to negotiations on the “so-called Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space [PAROS].” Russia again
called it counter-productive to say PAROS is not ripe
for negotiations, and called on the CD to resume its
work on the issue as soon as possible. (See PAROS
report)
Russia, China and India also support, or at least do
not oppose, a programme of work based on the A5
proposal. France and United Kingdom said only that
the A5 proposal does not have consensus. The Netherlands urged states to “acknowledge that a number of
issues on its agenda are to be further prioritized, recognizing
their relative weight as was confirmed in the focused, structured debates held this year in the CD.”
Mr. Ordzhonikidze also questioned the consensus rule
of the CD, and said that consensus should not be used
as a veto. Currently, the CD must take all decisions
by consensus, including procedural ones. The Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr.
Hans Blix, recommended that the CD be able to adopt
its programme of work by a qualified majority of two thirds
of the members.
Pakistan disagreed. While recognizing that the long
impasse makes changing the consensus rule “quite
tempting,” Pakistan remains convinced that “on issues
related to collective security, consensus is a good
device for decision making.” Pakistan further argued
that consensus “provides a sound basis for universal
adherence and compliance. If we tinker with the
principle of consensus in the CD, we will have an interminable
and unproductive discussion even on this
subject.”
Other states suggested that the CD be able to vote and
decide by majority on procedural issues but leave the
consensus rule in place when dealing with matters of
substance.
Various pieces of the disarmament machinery, including
the CD, were created by the first Special Session
on Disarmament (SSODI), and some states are calling
for a fourth SSOD to review the disarmament machinery.
Indonesia, on behalf on the Non-Aligned Movement,
submitted a draft resolution entitled Convening
of the fourth special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament (A/C.1/61/L.4). The draft resolution
suggests that a SSOD IV could set the future
course of action in the fields of disarmament, arms
control, non-proliferation and related international security
matters. The resolution includes the decision to
establish another open ended working group to consider
the objectives and agenda, including the possible
establishment of a preparatory committee.
-Beatrice Fihn, Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
It has been more than ten years since the UN General
Assembly agreed by consensus on a negotiating mandate
(GA/48/75L) for a treaty banning the production
of fissile materials for use in weapons. The prospect
that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) might take
up this task has never seemed closer, yet it stubbornly
remains just beyond reach. The thematic debate on
nuclear weapons in the First Committee highlighted
once again the long-standing disagreements preventing
the commencement of such negotiations.
In May, the United States introduced a draft Fissile
Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and negotiating
mandate to the CD. In their draft, the reference
to an “effective verifiable” treaty is dropped from
the agreed 1995 Shannon mandate. Likewise, the
US treaty draft contains no verification provisions.
Representative Robert Luaces restated the US position,
first announced in 2005, that “so-called 'effective
verification' of an FMCT cannot be achieved” as
such measures and provisions would be “so extensive
that they could compromise the core national security
interests of key signatories.” The US mandate also
breaks with the Five Ambassadors' Proposal (A5) by
dealing only with the topic of the FMCT, although
Australia noted the draft mandate does not preclude
the CD from taking up its other agenda items.
At an NGO event sponsored by the International
Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the International Panel on
Fissile Materials (IPFM), Princeton physicist Frank
von Hippel expressed skepticism about the US position
on verification. In his presentation, Professor von
Hippel described how such a treaty could be verified,
regardless of the scope of the final treaty and whether
it covers existing stocks. In response to government
acclaim and interest in the project, Professor von
Hippel said his group would undertake to develop a
draft verification protocol by early 2007. A full discussion
on the verification measures envisaged by the
IPFM can be found in its 2006 Fissile Material Report,
available at www.fissilematerials.org.
Japan solidly backed the US position. Ambassador
Mine voiced support for the formation of an ad hoc
committee to begin negotiations in the CD, noting
that “while further deliberations are required within
the CD on all of 4 major agenda items, only an
FMCT has reached the stage of establishing an ad hoc
committee for negotiations.”
Pakistan disagreed with Japan, asserting that all four
issues on the CD's agenda were ripe and contemporary.
However, if the CD were to commence the
programme of work as proposed by the A5, progress
on all four items could happen at different paces. Expanding
beyond the provisions called for in the US
draft treaty, the Pakistani representative also called
for the FMCT to address the issue of existing stocks,
mandating the transfer of all military fissile material
to civilian use and to be placed under safeguards.
Other states provided a supportive, but more nuanced
take on the mandate and draft proposed by the US.
Echoing sentiments expressed by the EU, Australia,
and others, the Republic of Korea described the US
proposal as a “solid basis for starting negotiations in
the Conference on Disarmament (CD).” However,
despite general approval of the US negotiating mandate,
Australia added a caveat by stating support for “an FMCT that provides for appropriate measures to
verify compliance.” The EU noted that while “the
FMCT negotiation mandate proposed by the US is
broadly in line” with the EU position, “nothing can
be precluded from the FMCT negotiations.”
Ambassador Paul Meyer announced that Canada “will be tabling a resolution in this Committee calling
for the immediate commencement of negotiations on
an FMCT.” Ambassador Meyer further stated, “there
is broad support and the timing is right. The time to
act is now.”
-Michael Spies, Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear
Policy
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
The annual draft resolution on PAROS (A/C.1/61/
L.10), introduced on October 12 by Egypt, is virtually
identical to last year's resolution. It reaffirms existing
legal machinery and calls upon all states to “contribute
actively to the objective of the peaceful use of
outer space and of PAROS and to refrain from actions
contrary to that objective.” While overwhelming
agreement on PAROS is evident, major divergences
remain regarding a treaty's potential scope.
In its introduction of the draft, Egypt emphasized the
need for a prohibition of military purposes in outer
space. Some, however, argue against such a broad
prohibition, which might limit or restrict dual-use
technology. These states call instead for a more specific ban on space-based or ground-based space capable
weapons.
The European Union (EU) declared PAROS “ an essential
condition for strengthening strategic stability
and for . . . the free exploration and use of outer space
for peaceful purposes by all states.” Belarus, Canada,
New Zealand, the Russian Federation, the Sudan, and
Venezuela called for space-capable states to guarantee
transparency in their outer space activities and
to engage in confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia, and Sri Lanka
called for further substantive debate in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) and the reestablishment
of an Ad-Hoc Committee for PAROS. China, Sri
Lanka, and Venezuela called for the strengthening
and universalization of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
(OST), while Canada and Japan called for enhanced
dialogue within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS). All of these states called
for the proactive development of a comprehensive,
legally-binding PAROS treaty.
The United States,
the only member state to vote against last year's PAROS resolution,
opposes “the development of new legal regimes or other
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or
use of space,” and will continue to “dissuade or
deter others from impeding [its right to operate in space] .
. . and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities
hostile to US national interests,” according to its new
National
Space Policy, released on October
6, 2006.
Furthermore, the US considers “space capabilities to
be vital to national interests, whether these capabilities
are in ground or space segments,” and the National
Space Policy “is designed to re-energize efforts
to develop and maintain robust and effective space
capabilities for civil, commercial, and national security
purposes.”
Regardless, the US
insisted in the First Committee that, “One: there is no
arms race in space. Two: there is no prospect of an arms race
in space. Three: the United States will continue to protect
its access to, and use of, space.”
In response to the US's assertion, Russia insisted a
multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such
an arms race, arguing, “if all states observe this prohibition,
there is no arms race.” Furthermore, with
increasing reliance on peaceful uses of outer space,
Russia further supports an additional obligation of no
use or threat of use of force against space objects.
Russia encouraged all delegations to consider the
scope of such a treaty, to determine its practicality,
implementability, and verifiability. Above all, Russia
emphasized that this treaty would not limit space access,
but would prevent such limitations.
Russia also introduced its new draft resolution Transparency
and Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
in Outer Space Activities (A/C.1/61/L.36) which it
described as the next step following its 2005 resolution
on CBMs in outer space. Building on last year's
resolution (A/RES/60/66), the new draft invites all
states to submit concrete proposals on outer space
transparency and CBMs regardless of their space capabilities,
and requests the Secretary-General submit
a report to the General Assembly in which member
states' concrete proposals would be annexed. Russia
emphasized the draft resolution does not limit the legal
right of states to self-defense or their use of outer
space, and said it hopes the resolution will garner
consensus. The US voted against a similar Russian
resolution last year.
Preventing the weaponization of space and protecting
all states' right to the peaceful use of space, are inextricably
linked and require preventative diplomacy.
-Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
Nuclear Disarmament
None of the anticipated nuclear disarmament draft
resolutions- including those annually sponsored
by Japan, the New Agenda Coalition and the Non-
Aligned Movement- were introduced as expected this
week, though some states presented their views on
nuclear disarmament during the thematic debate.
Ambassador Yoshiki Mine of Japan detailed some of
the changes that will be in this year's draft on Renewed
Determination towards the Total Elimination
of Nuclear Weapons. He said the new text will emphasis
the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) review process beginning next year,
and will include language “calling for the immediate
commencement of substantive work to its fullest” in
the Conference on Disarmament. The draft resolution
will also note member states' “deep concern” over the
alleged North Korean nuclear test. Ambassador Mine
said the success of the resolution last year showed
that, despite the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference
to reach a substantive consensus, “there exists
a common ground in the international community
on specific guidance in promoting nuclear disarmament.”
With the clock ticking on the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
(START)—the
treaty, along with its verification provisions, expires in 2009—delegates
focused on the need for firmer commitments from the United States
and Russia on eliminating their strategic and non-strategic
stockpiles. These weapons account for more that 90 percent of
all the world's nuclear weapons. Delegates called for Russia
and the United States to press further on both START and the
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT).
Referring to SORT, Finland,
speaking for the European Union, said the EU “stresses
the need for more progress in structurally reducing these nuclear
arsenals through appropriate follow-on processes.”
He said that while the EU welcomed the reduction
in stocks of the two great powers, he also emphasized “the need for an overall reduction of the global
stockpile of nuclear weapons . We recognize the application
of the principles of irreversibility to guide
all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control.” SORT, unlike START, has no provisions
for verification and no commitment to irreversibility
once the treaty expires in 2012. Pointing to the
same weakness, Norway said, “It is our hope that the
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty should be renewed
and strengthened based on the principles of
irreversibility and verification.”
Russia said
it has exceeded its obligations under the two treaties and was
ready to go further. Sergey Koshelev
said Russia had reduced its stockpiles “much faster than
envisaged by START” and said SORT is “a tangible
contribution to implementation by Russia of the NPT's Article
VI.” Koshelev said Moscow has “proposed to our US
partners to launch a negotiating process” in light of
START's impending expiration and said, “Russia is prepared
to reduce on a reciprocal basis its nuclear arsenal to the level
of 1500 warheads or less.”
On non-strategic weapons, he said Russia had reduced
those arms four-fold and had moved all of them “within the national boundaries at central storage depots.”
He added that other countries should relocate
non-strategic weapons “to the territory of states that
possess them.” With nuclear weapons stored in some
European NATO countries, the United States is the
only country that fits this description.
The United States did not discuss START or SORT in
its presentations last week.
-Jim Wurst, Middle Powers Initiative
International Court of Justice
On October 10, Malaysia introduced a draft resolution
on Follow-up to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The draft resolution is
similar to what Malaysia has introduced annually
since 1996, the year the ICJ rendered its opinion on
this matter affirming that “the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict” and
that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith
and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control.”
Malaysian Ambassador Hamidon Ali noted that it
was important to keep introducing this resolution
because “the global disarmament and non-proliferation
framework remains in a flux. Nuclear-weapon
states continue to modernize existing nuclear weapons,
and large stockpiles of nuclear weapons remain
in their arsenals.” Ambassador Hamidon also noted
there is a regression away from multilateral norms
and towards unilateral approaches (i.e. counter-proliferation
aimed at specific states instead of universal
non-proliferation and disarmament) that “could destabilize
international peace and security and increase
the risk of new instances of unilateral or pre-emptive
use of force.”
The draft resolution calls for negotiations that would
conclude in a nuclear weapons convention (NWC)
- a universal treaty that would both prohibit nuclear
weapons and provide for their elimination under international
verification and compliance mechanisms.
Costa Rica submitted a Model NWC to the UN in
1997 to assist in the implementation of the ICJ follow-
up resolution by “setting forth the legal, technical
and political issues that should be considered to
achieve an actual nuclear weapons convention.” The
Model NWC demonstrates that nuclear abolition,
while difficult to achieve, is indeed feasible.
Ambassador Hamidon noted that the obligation to
pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations applies to all states, not only members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Malaysia thus criticized both
the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and also those states
outside the NPT pursuing nuclear weapons programs,
particularly North Korea which last week announced
it had tested a nuclear device for the first time.
The resolution traditionally finds support from a mix
of countries including some non-aligned, western,
and nuclear possessing, such as China, India and
Pakistan. NATO countries either abstain or oppose.
France, the UK and US also oppose.
In a discussion on the ICJ advisory opinion at the
New York Bar Association on October 10, Ronald
Bettauer, Deputy Legal Adviser for the US State Department,
noted that the US did not agree with the
ICJ's opinion that there exists an obligation to conclude
nuclear disarmament obligations. Rather, he
emphasized that Article VI of the NPT only obliges
States to negotiate, and that competing national interests
could prevent such negotiations from reaching a
conclusion. In addition, Bettauer noted that Article VI
of the NPT linked nuclear disarmament negotiations
with progress on general and complete disarmament.
Thus States should not be expected to achieve nuclear
disarmament when there is insufficient progress on
general disarmament.
In response, Peter Weiss, Vice President of the International
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms,
cited from the authoritative Black's Law Dictionary
that “Good faith consists of an honest intention to
abstain from taking any un-conscientious advantage
of another, even through the forms or technicalities
of law.” John Burroughs, Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, in a paper released in February this year, argues that “International
law in general with respect to good faith negotiation
clearly requires that you enter into the negotiations,
that you consider proposals of the other
side, and that you re-examine your own position, all
in order to reach the objective of the negotiations.”
Malaysia usually refers to the compatibility between
negotiations leading to a NWC and a step-by-step
process for nuclear disarmament. However, this year,
in an indication of frustration at the failures of the
step-by-step process to prevent nuclear proliferation
and to prevent the NWS from modernizing and expanding
the roles of their nuclear weapons, Malaysia
noted instead that, “We must address the issues
and challenges confronting nuclear disarmament in a
comprehensive, constructive and balanced manner.”
-Alyn Ware, International Association of Lawyers
Against Nuclear Arms
Negative Security Assurances
In the second week of the First Committee, nonnuclear weapon states
continued to call for a legally binding treaty on negative security
assurances (NSA). In the thematic debate on nuclear disarmament,
Pakistan
stated “no issue is riper for negotiations than the NSAs.
It has been on the front burner of the (nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty) NPT regime since 1968 and on the (Conference on Disarmament)
CD agenda since its inception.”
India presented
a working
paper on nuclear disarmament where they mentioned that the
existing security assurances, such as Security Council resolution
984,
are inadequate, conditional and non-binding. “An agreement
among the States possessing nuclear weapons on a global 'no-first-use'
posture will engender strategic stability and reduce the danger
of the accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons,”
India stated.
China, a nuclear weapon state, reiterated its support
for concluding a NSA treaty as soon as possible,
though Russia, the US and Israel did not mention
NSAs at all. The US made it clear that FMCT was the
only thing ripe for negotiations in the CD and that it
would not negotiate on the other issues. (See FMCT
report)
The United Kingdom (UK) stated in 2004 that a general
assurance to non nuclear weapon states party to
the NPT has already been given, and there is no need
to repeat or elaborate it. The way forward on NSAs,
according to the UK, would be through Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ).
Unfortunately, three nuclear weapon states refused
to sign the newest NWFZ. The UK, France and the
United States (US) declared in the CD in September
that they would not sign the new Central Asian
NWFZ.
The European Union
(EU), which includes two nuclear weapon states, the UK and France,
supported “pursuing consideration of the issue of security
assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT.”
The EU also called upon nuclear weapon states to reaffirm existing security assurances that were noted by
resolution 984, and encouraged them to sign and ratify
the relevant protocols on NWFZs. The EU stated, “positive and negative security assurances can play
an important role: they can serve both as an incentive
to forego the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
and as deterrent.”
During the 2005 General Assembly, the only recognized
nuclear weapons states that did not vote
against the Reducing Nuclear Dangers resolution (A/
RES/60/79) were China and Russia. Introduced again this year, this resolution states that “it is imperative on
the part of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt measures
that assure non-nuclear-weapon States against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,”were
China and the Russian Federation.
-Beatrice Fihn, Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom
Conventional Weapons
During the two-day thematic debate on Conventional
Weapons, states used the opportunity to acknowledge
advances and urge continued movement. A number of
review processes commence before the end of 2006.
The Netherlands took the floor to introduce the draft
resolution on Transparency in Armaments, which acknowledges
the success of the United Nations Register
of Conventional Arms as an international security
and confidence-building measure. New in the draft
resolution is reference to the optional standardized reporting
form adopted by the 2006 Group of Governmental
Experts on the UN Register of Conventional
Arms (GGE) and a request “to ensure that sufficient
resources are made available for a group of governmental
experts to be convened in 2009 to review the
continuing operation of the Register”.
The Chairperson of the GGE recognized the relatively high level
of participation by member states, noting that 170 countries
have participated in the arms register since its inception.
The Republic of
Korea and Indonesia
noted satisfaction with the GGE's reduction of the minimum size
of warships from 750 to 500 metric tons, which will increase
the number of warships reported, and Israel
and Japan
applauded the 2003 GGE's inclusion of Man-Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS) as a sub-category of Missiles
within the Register. Canada applauded the work of
Australia, Israel and the United States on their hard
work on MANPADS.
Japan recognized
that the issue of transparency in armaments is addressed in
both this resolution and in the omnibus resolution “the
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,”
though with different scopes. The Netherlands noted that this
resolution was co-sponsored by 106 states in last year's First
Committee, and invites all states to co-sponsor the Transparency
in Armaments resolution again this year.
The draft resolution Convention On Prohibitions Or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects was tabled this
week. It was sponsored by 48 countries last year and
was adopted without a vote. Ambassador Rivasseau
of France, the President-designate of the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Review
Conference, was the guest speaker during the second
thematic debate on conventional weapons. He felt
that the CCW has been a relatively successful regime
which, because of its flexibility of mandate and the
proximity of the humanitarian effects of conventional
weapons on civilians, has somewhat escaped the
disarmament crisis that other machinery has experienced.
He noted that the flaw of the convention is that
it entails a great deal of legal complexity; member
states may become party to the convention by joining
2 protocols, and states therefore have different levels
of commitment and obligation. Ambassador Rivasseau
will be working to universalize the regime and
to ensure a successful Review Conference.
Most of the focus with regard to the CCW remained on its upcoming
2006 Review Conference. The
Republic of Korea, Israel,
Canada, Switzerland,
China and others welcomed the entry into force of Protocol V
on Explosive Remnants of War. In the statement read by Finland,
the European Union
wished to see the universalization of Protocol V, its implementation,
and continued work in this area regarding sub-munitions. New
Zealand and Norway
also urged negotiation on a legally binding instrument on cluster
munitions, with New Zealand proposing 5 key elements to address:
the persistent nature of failed cluster munitions; the use of
cluster munitions in areas populated by civilians;
indiscriminate use that attack both combatants
and civilians; the way these weapons kill civilians
and destroy civilian objects; and the proliferation and
retention of “outmoded” cluster munitions.
-Waverly de Bruijn, Global Action to Prevent War
Arms Trade Treaty
In a strong show of support for efforts to work on an
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 77 governments co-sponsored
a resolution tabled on Wednesday, October 11,
2006 to examine the feasibility of an ATT. The resolution,
authored by the governments of Argentina,
Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the
United Kingdom, seeks to establish a Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE) to examine the feasibility
of establishing common standards for export, import,
and transfer of conventional arms.
Speaking on behalf of the European
Union (EU) during the thematic debates last week, Finland
said, “everyday, everywhere, people are affected by the
side effects of irresponsible arms transfers.” As there
is currently no comprehensive internationally binding instrument
available to provide an agreed regulator framework for this
activity, the EU welcomes the growing support, in all parts
of the world, for an ATT.
The resolution enjoyed widespread support across
Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Among the cosponsors
are a few major or emerging exporters of
weapons, including France, Germany, Italy, Serbia,
Romania, and Bulgaria, and countries that have been
devastated by armed violence such as Colombia, Haiti,
Liberia, and Rwanda.
According to the Control Arms Campaign, however,
a few major arms exporters remained skeptical of the
resolution, preferring only a call for the UN Secretary
General to collect state's views on the feasibility of
an ATT. Governments would decide on a GGE in the
future. The campaign, run by Amnesty International,
Oxfam International, and the International Action
Network on Small Arms (IANSA), has been encouraging
governments to support an ATT since October
2003.
During the thematic debates on conventional arms, Russia also
said they would rather “squeeze out” all the potential
from the existing instruments on conventional arms rather than
start a new legal framework to address conventional arms proliferation.
A few governments that are not yet co-sponsoring the resolution
expressed support for an ATT or efforts to better regulate the
international transfer of arms. Republic
of Korea, for example, said, “we share the concern
that legal transfers of conventional arms are sometimes used
as cover for illegal transactions, especially small arms and
light weapons. To address this problem, an effective, transparent
system of controls over international arms transfers is a prerequisite.”
On Tuesday, October 10, the authors of the resolution
introduced a new draft text that incorporated
several of the suggestions from governments. Maintaining
most of the key elements of earlier drafts, the
new resolution does not include a reference to “unrestrained”
arms transfers, which several governments
thought could be misinterpreted. It also includes a
rewording of a preambular paragraph that addressed
the need for an ATT.
The Control Arms Campaign indicated that they expected
more governments to co-sponsor the resolution.
They said many governments from North Africa
and Asia have been expressing support for the resolution.
A vote on the resolution is expected on Monday,
October 23 or Wednesday, October 25.
-Colby Goodman, Amnesty International
Terrorism
During the thematic debates, many states expressed
serious concern over the possibility of terrorists acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear
weapons, fissile materials, and delivery devices.
Some addressed terrorist possession of small arms
and light weapons and conventional weapons. Although
there is still no agreed definition of terrorism,
there have been fewer references to “state-sponsored
terrorism” this year than in years past.
Many states saw the possibility of terrorists acquiring
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as one more
powerful reason to abolish nuclear weapons. In line
with the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission's
report, Weapons of Terror, Mexico called WMD the“true instruments of terror,” and expressed its concern
over WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Indonesia
asserted that WMD are dangerous in anyone's
hands, both state and non-state actors.
States also continued to express support for various
international anti-terrorism tools, including Security
Council (SC) Resolution 1540, which requires states
to take measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring
WMD, and the Convention on the Prevention of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism. Morocco called for the frightening
prospect of nuclear terrorism to be studied,
and characterized SC 1540 as demonstrating the international
community's commitment and resolve to
combating nuclear terrorism. Russia
agreed, calling attention to its own ratification of the Convention
on the Prevention of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which it termed
the basis of international cooperation in preventing terrorism.
Norway urged
states to ratify this Convention.
Many member states urged the international community to increase
their commitments to protecting fissile materials from being
illegally trafficked into the hands of non-state actors. Finland,
on behalf of the European
Union, asserted that the EU “strongly supports all
measures that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and related materials,
radiological materials, and their means of delivery”.
He cited various instruments for providing the preventative
measures for illegal diversions of fissile materials, including:
the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism; the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material ; a potential Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty;
and International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreements.
Other member states agreed that the best course of action for
combating nuclear terrorism is through the control of fissile
materials and nuclear technology. Norway
noted that it is working to convert civilian nuclear reactors
to run on low-enriched uranium rather than highly-enriched uranium
because the latter is weapons-usable. In an obvious reference
to Iran, Israel
argued that, “states who threaten others, support terrorism
or deny the right of other states to exist cannot be trusted
with this sensitive [nuclear] technology,” and therefore
should not have the right to possess it.
Two draft resolutions this week, both presented by
India, addressed the issue of terrorism and WMD. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction calls upon member states to
actively prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD. This
resolution also requests the compilation of a report
on measures taken by international organizations on
issues relating to the linkage between combating terrorism
and the proliferation of WMD. It also notes
the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted
8 September 2006 and “appeals” to States to join the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism instead of only “inviting” them
to do so.
The draft resolution Reducing Nuclear Danger calls
for the review of nuclear doctrines as well as a reassessment
of the hair-trigger alert status of nuclear
weapons, which risks their accidental use. With
regards to terrorism, the draft resolution states, “the
threat posed by the increased risk of nuclear weapons
or its components falling into the hands of non-State
actors, including terrorists, has further aggravated
existing dangers”. The draft resolution, while very
similar to last year's A/RES/60/79, does have some
new elements in the draft text including: language related to both de-alerting as well as de-targeting, and;
a more specific reference to “diminishing role for
nuclear weapons in the security policies of nuclear
weapons States”.
Some member states also expressed concerns over
terrorist participation in illegal trafficking, stockpiling,
and proliferation of small arms and light weapons
(SALW) and conventional weapons. The EU said
that as SALW often contribute to the spread of conflict and the collapse of State structures, “the intensified international action against terrorism has made
the fight against the illicit trade in SALW even more
urgent.” (See Conventional Weapons report)
-Courtney Gugliuzza, Reaching Critical Will
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Biological and chemical weapons were both dealt
with in October 11th's thematic session on “Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Outer Space”.
States introduced familiar resolutions, such as the
Implementation of the Convention of the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (A/
C.1/61/L.19), The Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
(A/C.1/61/L27), and Measures to uphold the authority
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/C.1/61/L.5).
Many states lauded the efficacy of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) in destroying existing
stockpiles and in preventing the proliferation of
chemical weapons. Some, such as Canada and the Republic
of Korea, however, warned against becoming
complacent, and urged for universalization and full
implementation of the Convention. As Canada noted,
while the CWC is “a model of a verifiable disarmament
agreement, it still faces important challenges.”
Later this year, states parties will address the possibility
of extending the deadlines for destroying their
chemical weapons stockpiles, presently set for 2012.
Some states, including New Zealand and Canada, oppose
such an extension, since, as South Korea pointed
out, “the Convention clearly stipulates that in no
case shall the deadline for a State Party to complete
its destruction of all chemical weapons be extended
beyond April 2012.” While Canada recognized “the
circumstances that have contributed to the necessity
for some possessor states” to request an extension,
they “do not easily accept this request.” Furthermore,
Canada warned, even a five-year extension “may not
be sufficient to ensure the total destruction of all
existing stockpiles of chemical weapons,” and they“therefore encourage possessor states to redouble
their efforts” to disarm “as quickly as feasible.”
Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan delivered a
presentation as the President-Designate of the upcoming
Sixth Review Conference on the Convention
on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC). Quoting both the UN Secretary-General and
the Report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,
Ambassador Khan insisted that the BTWC
expressed a global norm that the use of disease as
a weapon was repugnant to mankind. He urged all
states parties to work to strengthen the Convention at
the November Review Conference.
States called for further universalization of the
BTWC, to which 155 states are currently party. Finland,
speaking on behalf of the EU, called for full
compliance with all obligations, national implementation
measures and control over pathogenic microorganisms
and toxins. The EU, as well as Australia,
South Korea, India, Japan, New Zealand, and Norway
supported continuing intersessional meetings
between Review Conferences of the BTWC.
Many mentioned the danger connected with the rapid
technological advancements in the field of biotechnology
and genetic sciences. They asked for the reflection of these developments in the Review Conference.
The threat of biological terrorism was also
mentioned. Overall, many States seem to have a great
interest in modifying and strengthening the BTWC at
this year's Review Conference.
-Lukas Jeuck, NGO Committee on Disarmament,
Peace and Security
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
During the thematic debate on Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW), states continued to express disappointment
with the lack of outcome in the SALW
Review Conference (RevCon) in July. Opportunities
for reviving the SALW process came with the tabling
of the annual 'omnibus' resolution on SALW and an
informal meeting to discuss Canada's proposal for
SALW inter-sessional meetings.
Co-sponsored by South Africa, Japan and Colombia,
the draft omnibus resolution calls for the UN SALW
process to continue with a biennial meeting of states
(BMS) to be held in New York no later than 2008,“as stipulated in the [UN] Programme of Action” on
SALW (PoA). Emphasizing the importance of the
continued implementation of the PoA, including voluntary
reporting, the resolution further determines
that the BMS will be the framework for reporting on
implementation of the International Tracing Instrument
adopted by the General Assembly in 2005.
Canada hosted an informal meeting with states and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to discuss
the proposed SALW inter-sessional meeting that
would be hosted by Switzerland, June 18-22, 2007 in
Geneva. The objective of the meeting would be “to
identify and/or refine global principles to govern the
transfer of SALW throughout the world.” The Suggested
Global Guidelines for National Control Governing
Transfers of SALW, agreed at the April 2006
Nairobi Conference on Transfer Controls, would be
the departure point. These principles are very close to
those proposed by the Control Arms campaign as the
basis for an Arms Trade Treaty on all conventional
weapons. (See ATT report) All UN member states
would be invited to participate at this inter-sessional
meeting, as well as UN agencies, international and regional
organizations and NGOs, the latter solely in an
advisory manner. This meeting is intended to be complimentary
to any formal process agreed by states, so
there would be no formal statements. Kenya, France,
Switzerland and the UK expressed their support for
the meeting. Italy was supportive but questioned
whether the starting point of the meeting should be
linked so strongly to the Nairobi text.
On Thursday, the thematic debates on conventional weapons opened with a statement by the President of
the RevCon, Ambassador Prasad Kariyawasam of Sri
Lanka. He expressed frustration with some states' inability
to compromise on issues during the RevCon.
He blamed the failure of the conference to agree an
outcome document on states' lack of confidence in the
UN's ability to address disarmament issues; the unresolved
issues of non-state actors and civilian possession;
and an unreasonable interpretation of the consensus
rule. He went on to say that the RevCon result
was not a reason for discouragement and stressed the
need for periodic reviews of PoA implementation, as
envisaged in the PoA. States expressed general agreement
with Ambassador Kariyawasam's assessment.
The floor then opened for general SALW comments
during which Brazil (on behalf of MERCOSUR, or
the Southern Common Market), Canada, Costa Rica,
Finland (on behalf of the EU), Kenya, Mozambique,
New Zealand and the Republic of Korea expressed
disappointment that the RevCon did not agree on an
outcome document and reaffirmed their states' commitment
to implementing the PoA. Additionally, all
but Mozambique made direct references to the need
for BMS follow up meetings. According to the EU,“[t]he review cycle should culminate in a Review
Conference.”
The session continued on Friday with statements by
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Moldova, Norway
and Switzerland, all of which highlighted the negative
ways in which the illicit trade in SALW affects
the world. Indonesia, Japan, Norway and Switzerland
directly expressed support for the omnibus SALW
resolution, with its promise of follow-on after the
RevCon. However, Israel used the RevCon failure to
support its interest in a narrow interpretation of the
PoA, claiming that some states diverted the focus of
the RevCon away from the illicit trade in SALW. In
Israel's view, this put into question the effectiveness
of future follow on process.
The session ran over the allotted time and will continue
on Monday 16 October.
-Mark Marge, The International Action Network on
Small Arms – IANSA
Landmines
Much of the debate on landmines this week focused
on mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM).
As discussed in last week's landmines report,
anti-personnel mines are banned under the Ottawa
Convention, or Mine Ban Treaty. MOTAPM, such as
anti-vehicle landmines, are not banned by the Mine
Ban Treaty. States Parties to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) have been considering
the issue, and it is one of three subjects the
states parties to the CCW will focus on at its Review
Conference next month.
After five years of discussions and preparatory work
by the CCW's Group of Governmental Experts,
progress on MOTAPM continues to gain momentum,
albeit slowly. It remains unclear whether there is
enough political will to reach an agreement to create
a new legally binding instrument banning their use.
The President-Designate of the CCW, Ambassador
Rivasseau of France, called Ambassador Carlos Antonio
da Rocha Paranhos of Brazil's (Coordinator of
the CCW's Working Group on MOTAPM) efforts to
introduce a protocol on MOTAPM a “mission impossible.”
Canada urged states to start negotiations on a new
protocol on MOTAPM immediately following the
upcoming Review Conference, while Israel hoped
to see the CCW adopt a 6th protocol on MOTAPM
during the Review Conference. The European Union
and The International Committee of the Red Cross
also pleaded for action. Switzerland, echoed by New
Zealand, said that a new protocol on MOTAPM has
an added value for the Convention only if it contains
norms that strengthen existing international humanitarian
law. New Zealand added that this requirement
will not be satisfied by optional provisions on mine
detectability and active life.
Australia reintroduced last year's draft resolution on
the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction to
seek further reaffirmation of the Convention by state
parties. The only major change from A/RES/60/80 was the inclusion of an operating paragraph that “Urges all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level and, where in a position to do
so, to promote adherence to the Convention through
bilateral, sub-regional, regional and multilateral contacts,
outreach, seminars and other means”.
-Heikki Hietala, Reaching Critical Will
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