The First Committee Monitor

Week Four: October 27-31

In this Issue:

1. Introduction
2. Missiles
3. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
4. Nuclear Disarmament
5. Fissile Materials
6. Transparency
7. Disarmament Machinery
8. Nuclear Testing
9. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
10. Negative Security Assurances
11. Proliferation
12. Chemical and Biological Weapons
13. Conventional Weapons
14. New Agenda

1. Introduction

The articles contained in this week’s First Committee Monitor are decidedly briefer and fewer, in a direct reflection of the past week’s events. Other reports, such as the First Committee Reform report, will not be found in this edition, as the resolutions on some issues have yet to make their way onto the schedule of voting.

The brevity of this week’s Monitor should not suggest that the past week has been devoid of interesting developments, however. With all impassioned, surprising, and often entertaining interventions aside (and here we must thank Chairman Sareva for his skill at handling outbursts and logistical confusion), monitoring NGOs have been privy to a debate as yet witnessed in this year’s First Committee. While dozens of resolutions have been adopted quickly and without a vote, the votes taken on many others have been accompanied by several frank and lucid explanations of votes (EoVs), which often express reservations States may have with issues that had not yet been raised in this forum.

Whether their previous quiet was due to a desire to maintain a level of secrecy on orders from respective capitals, or whether these qualms were developed only after careful analysis and intense informal consultations between Member States, most NGOs do not know. What is apparent, however, is that these disagreements are a sign of a healthy and vibrant democratic debate, and should be aired in the open in order for progress on these critical issues to ensue.

This week’s reports on Transparency and Conventional Weapons, for example, discuss the vote on the UN Register of Arms and the abundance of EoVs that erupted after the resolution was adopted. In all of the discussion on the Register during the first three weeks, not once was it publicly suggested that draft resolution L.45 should include a recommendation to broaden its scope to include weapons of mass destruction, the most popular reason for abstaining or voting against the draft resolution.

The report on Nuclear Testing discusses Syria’s reservations about the CTBT. While voting in favor of the draft resolution L.52, Syria used its EoV to discuss worries about on-site inspections, negative security assurances, and trends of vertical proliferation that are not controlled by the Test Ban Treaty.

The HTML edition of this week’s Monitor includes hyperlinks to all EoVs, which can also be found at: www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/res/resindex.html.

Allow us to reiterate, once more, the NGO mantra by which we live our days and find purpose to our work: non-governmental organizations are here to help and assist Member States in their pursuits of disarmament and nonproliferation. Our raison d’être is to foster a debate among peoples and their governments, to provide an enriched analysis of the issues not always possible for Permanent Missions, who often do not have the resources and staff to focus solely on disarmament. We have the ability to supplement the valid arguments of States with briefing papers to governments, or public and media education on the issues and the various positions. We encourage the frank and open discussion of resolutions provided this week in various EoVs, yet the ideas and hesitancies voiced this week must be more thoroughly and publicly discussed prior to the votes, in order to promote a more equitable and productive session of the GA and all of its committees.

-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

2. Missiles

The Iranian-sponsored draft resolution L.4 on missiles was adopted this week at the First Committee with 98 votes in favor and no votes cast against. 59 States abstained from voting.

Among those that abstained, some that explained their votes, including the European Union, the Republic of Korea, Australia and Japan, noted their disappointment with the resolution’s failure to reference the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC). There was also noted concern that the Panel of Governmental Experts- which the resolution would establish- would not be “an efficient next step,” as the Italian representative stated on behalf of the European Union. The resolution, he said, should more clearly outline the “value added” by another panel. Australia echoed this view, believing that a new panel must be “constructive.”

The first resolution on missiles, also sponsored by Iran in 2000, established a Panel of Governmental Experts, which concluded its findings in 2002 (see GA Resolution 57/71).

Many of those that abstained, including Japan and Australia, insisted that they are nonetheless in support of missile nonproliferation measures in the United Nations.

Cuba voted in favor of draft resolution L.4, while advising the soon-to-be established Panel to be cognizant of the peaceful uses of missiles, such as space exploration. Cuba also urged Member States that vertical proliferation of missiles should remain at the forefront of considerations on the issue. The focus, the Cuban delegate insisted, should remain on preventing the proliferation of WMD-capable missiles and high precision cruise missiles.

Unlike South Korea, which viewed the Panel’s mandate to address missiles “in all its aspects” as unfocused, Cuba was pleased at the broad scope outlined in the resolution.

For one of the most comprehensive analyses of the current missile nonproliferation regime to date, see “Missiles of Empire,” by Andrew Lichterman of the Western States’ Legal Foundation: http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/missiles03.pdf.

-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

3. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Four resolutions on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and one on a zone of peace were voted upon this week. Two additional NWFZ resolutions are scheduled to be voted upon on Monday. However, it is expected that one of these, resolution A/C.158/L.19, may be withdrawn.

The three following resolutions were all adopted without a vote.

A/C.1/58/L.14, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central Asia," put forth by Uzbekistan, passed without opposition, as did A/C.1/58/L.6, "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)," which was presented by Brazil as its lead sponsor.

Though resolution L.6 was passed without a vote, the United States took the floor to explain that it considers each resolution on a case-by-case basis and that the U.S. government has not yet reviewed its position on the protocols that they have signed but not yet ratified. The U.S. also commented that it sees NWFZs as "a way of promoting nonproliferation and regional security interests." The preambles of the NWFZ treaties on the other hand include the objective of disarmament as well as non-proliferation.

A/C.1/58/L.22, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East," sponsored by Egypt, was the third of the three resolutions adopted without vote.

Israel stated that it was joining the consensus on the NWFZ but that the nuclear issue should be dealt with in the context of the peace process and suggested that there is a need for a practical step-by-step approach and the final step of this process will be a NWFZ. Israel explained that the zone can only be established through direct negotiations between states in the region and if Israel's right to exist is recognized.

A/C.1/58/L.24, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace," sponsored by Malaysia, passed with 110 yes votes, 42 abstaining, and three no votes: the U.S., U.K., and France. The resolution, unlike draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.38, does not affirm the freedom of navigation through high seas and rights of innocent passage through maritime space, an omission which likely contributes to the high number of abstentions.

A/C.1/58/L.38, "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas," sponsored by Brazil, passed with 145 votes in favor, 11 abstaining, and 1 no vote from India.

Despite the resolution affirming rights of navigation and innocent passage and other rights included in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the United Kingdom, on behalf of the U.K., U.S., and France, stated that the three countries had concern about the rights of passage on the high seas. The U.K. spokesman state the following: "We remain uncertain what value over and above existing zones would be added by a Southern Hemisphere nuclear weapon free area…In essence, it seems contradictory to simultaneously propose an area that is compared largely of high seas and effectively say it does not apply to the high seas."

Resolutions A/C.1/58/L.11, "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)," and its Amendment 58 sponsored by Nigeria will be voted upon on Monday.

A/C.1/58/L.19, "Conference of States parties and signatories to treaties by which nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established," is scheduled to be voted upon on Monday. However, it is possible that the resolution may be withdrawn due to difficulties in securing the funding necessary for the conference.

-Wyatt Matthews,
Franciscans International
and
Alyn Ware,
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

4. Nuclear Disarmament

By a vote of 146 to 2 (India, United States), with 16 abstentions, the First Committee adopted draft resolution L. 53 Rev. 1, “Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” whose lead sponsor is Japan. Among the abstainers were the New Agenda countries, whose resolution will be voted on next week. On behalf of that group, Brazil explained that the placement of the “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate nuclear arsenals in the resolution’s operative paragraphs concerning steps to be taken is mistaken, because that undertaking has already been given in the 2000 NPT Final Document. While there is logic to the New Agenda position, their abstentions likely reflect the fact that while the 13 steps set forth in the 2000 document largely resulted from the New Agenda initiative, Japan since 2000 has insisted upon offering its own resolution centering on the steps and has refused to vote for the New Agenda resolutions. NATO countries voted for the resolution, including nuclear weapon states France and Britain. Russia voted yes, while China abstained. In explanation of its negative vote, India said that while it is committed to global elimination of nuclear weapons, achievement of that objective has to go beyond the discriminatory framework of the NPT. Pakistan’s explanation of its abstention was similar. The United States explained its negative vote on the ground that while it supports the moratorium on testing, it “does not support the CTBT and will not become a party.” The phrase “will not become a party” appears new and has an ominous sound. As a signatory to the CTBT, the United States would seem to have an obligation to deliberate in good faith concerning whether to become a party. All efforts must be exerted to ensure that the United States, perhaps in a second Bush administration, does not make a formal notification, as it did in the case of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, that it does not intend to ratify the treaty. Such a development if coupled with a resumption of testing could lead to the complete unraveling of the de facto test ban regime now in place. (See "Nuclear Testing" report.)

Draft resolution L.31 on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was adopted by a vote of 104 to 29 with 29 abstentions. Importantly, operative paragraph one underlining the ICJ’s unanimous holding that there exists an obligation to bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament was adopted by a vote of 140 to 4 (United States, Russia, Israel, Congo) with five abstentions (Belarus, France, United Kingdom, Georgia, Portugal). By similarly very large margins, the paragraph has been endorsed in votes on the resolution over the last few years. Especially in light of the 2000 NPT “unequivocal undertaking,” the case becomes increasingly strong that the the ICJ’s 1996 interpretation of Article VI and international law regarding the disarmament obligation is authoritative and indeed has achieved the status of a general obligation of international law, applicable, as ICJ President Bedjaoui said in his 1996 declaration accompanying the opinion, “erga omnes,” that is universally. (See www.lcnp.org/wcourt/bedjaoui.htm) The dissenting nuclear weapons states may object that their objections forestall this outcome, but South Africa’s objections to international condemnation were not considered to negate an international norm against apartheid. So far as the divided voting on the resolution as a whole is concerned, its sources are reflected in Japan’s explanation of its abstention. Japan said that it supports the ICJ’s unanimous conclusion, but believes that what is needed are “concrete measures to achieve step-by-step progress.” Therefore, according to Japan, it is “premature” to call upon states, as the resolution does, to commence multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

The Mexico-sponsored draft decision to place on next year’s agenda a resolution on a UN “conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament” was adopted by a vote of 105 to 7 (France, Germany, Israel, Monaco, Poland, UK, USA) with 40 abstentions. Explaining its negative vote, Germany said that with a “view not to undermine the NPT-process and the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum, we do not consider it appropriate, at this juncture,” to convene a conference.

The draft resolution “Reducing nuclear danger” (L.34) was adopted by a vote of 99 to 46 with 14 abstentions. Similar to earlier versions going back to 1998, this resolution, sponsored by India, calls in operative paragraph one for immediate steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It mirrors the emphasis some NGO experts, like Bruce Blair of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, have placed on standing down nuclear forces from the ongoing posture of hair-trigger alert, essentially unchanged, especially for the United States and Russia, from the Cold War era. Operative paragraph two “requests the five nuclear-weapon States” to take such measures. The large number of negative votes probably reflects unwillingness to indirectly grant legitimacy to India’s nuclear arsenal as well as concern about the resolution’s focus on the NPT nuclear weapon states. In general, there is an ongoing difficulty as to how to address nuclear-armed India, Pakistan, and Israel other than issuing rote calls for them to join the NPT.

Draft resolution L.36, sponsored by India for many years and calling for negotiations on a convention prohibiting threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance, was approved by a vote of 102 to 46, with 10 abstentions.

- John Burroughs,
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

5. Fissile Materials

Over two months have passed since China announced a new flexibility concerning the PAROS mandate contained within Five Ambassadors’ proposal (A5), and until this 58th session of the First Committee, the United States had not yet publicly reacted to the Chinese announcement. (See PAROS report week 3)

Yet throughout these past weeks in New York, the U.S. delegation has disclosed that they are indeed mulling over these new developments, and the world waits with baited breath to see if the stalemated negotiating body will indeed commence work on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) next year.

This small disclosure from the United States was again reiterated this week, in its explanation of vote on draft resolution L.49, when U.S. representative Sherwood McGinnis stated that: “the United States is reviewing specific elements of our policy regarding an FMCT, and our joining consensus on this resolution is without prejudice to the outcome of that review.”

The United States, with over a thousand tonnes of weapons-grade and civilian fissile material already stockpiled, (see Reaching Critical Will Shadow Report: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/shadowreport/USA.pdf) warns the FMCT-hopefuls that it will only “support an FMCT that advances U.S. security interests.”

Most States hoping to create a fissban in the upcoming months are in vast agreement that it is indeed in the interests of all peoples and States to “shut off the water tap” of production, as described by the British ambassador to the CD, David Broucher. (See the Ambassador’s metaphor in his statement to the CD on March 27 at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches03/Mar27UK.pdf). Is it helpful, then, that the seemingly sole hold-out on this long-awaited treaty is situating it in the increasingly archaic notion of national security, as if its security interests are divorced from those of others?

The draft resolution L.49 was adopted without a vote this week, implying that the world is indeed one step closer to a legally-binding production cut-off. While the U.S. administration continues to discuss their stance behind closed doors in Washington, we await the General Assembly vote on this resolution in the upcoming weeks.

-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

6. Transparency

In stark contrast to last week’s statements regarding the UN Register on Conventional Arms, following this week’s vote adopting the resolution (L. 45, “Transparency in Armaments”) a number of states voiced dissatisfaction.

The resolution calls for continued implementation of the Register, endorses experts’ recommendations to expand its scope by adding shoulder-fired missiles and small-caliber artillery, and generally supports enhanced transparency. It was adopted by a vote of 140 to zero with 23 abstentions. Abstaining states included Middle Eastern states and China. Explanations of abstention provided by Syria (on behalf of the Arab League), Iran, Algeria, Myanmar, Cuba and Egypt generally acknowledged the importance of transparency in the process of non-proliferation and disarmament but objected that the Register lacks comprehensiveness and balance because it does not cover nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Iran stated that the Register was supposed to be the first step of a larger initiative dating back to 1991, but it still only includes seven categories of weapons and does not include nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. According to Iran, the lack of comprehensiveness is particularly significant in the Middle East, where Israel remains the only non-party to the NPT and possesses nuclear weapons and other WMD. Iran added that the “pattern of lack of participation of the countries in West Asia and North Africa” demonstrates that it “is not a popular confidence building mechanism”. Israel defended the Register as a confidence-building measure which does not pretend to be a solution for every issue. Only when relations in the region warm, Israel added, could the instrument be further developed. China explained its abstention by stating that “a certain country” had been registering sales to Taiwan as a footnote, which China regards as its province. China therefore has not participated in the Register since 1998.

As these statements partly reflect, while the Register aims only at transparency, it nonetheless raises profound issues: When does a country go beyond the bounds of self-defense in acquiring or transferring weapons? And how can confidence be developed when the Register is only partial, when information is provided on a voluntary basis, and control of weapons of all types lacks universality or, for some categories, does not exist at all? These and other issues, which are ultimately leading to the regulation of armaments of all kinds (a responsibility of both the Security Council and General Assembly under the Charter), demand the attention of civil society and governments on an ongoing basis. For an outline of the form that could be taken by a system of limitation or elimination of both conventional and non-conventional arms, see the program statement of Global Action to Prevent War at www.globalactionpw.org.

- Nya Gregor Fleron
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

7. Disarmament Machinery

Five of seven Disarmament Machinery Resolutions were voted on this week, and all five, Japan’s Report on the Conference on Disarmament (L.5), the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace, Disarmament, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (L.7), Africa (L.13), Asia and Pacific (L.21) and the Report of the Disarmament Conference (L.20) were all adopted without a vote. A second resolution on a UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (L.55), one on United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament (L.28), and the resolution about SSOD IV (L.25) have not been voted on yet.

There will be an organizational meeting next month regarding the 2004-2007 period of the Disarmament Commission. In its statement before the vote, Italy expressed the wish that the DC will adopt a more realistic and constructive approach to its next phase of work.

-Jennifer Nordstrom,
Global Action to Prevent War

8. Nuclear Testing

After the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (A/C.1/58/L.52) was adopted by a tremendous majority this week, at least half of a dozen States felt compelled to deliver an explanation of their vote (EoV), and to demonstrate what has been called in this publication a “near universally-accepted sense of urgency” for the CTBT’s entry-into-force. (See "Nuclear Testing" report, week 3.)

The European Union declared its unwavering support for the resolution, affirming that the conglomerate “spares no efforts” to promote the Treaty’s entry-into-force (EIF) and universalization. All E.U. Member States co-sponsored the resolution.

Israel, a non-ratifying Annex II State, reminded the Committee that it had signed the CTBT in 1996 and “attaches importance to the objectives” of the Treaty. Its vote in favor of L.52 is “notwithstanding” its dispute over language in operative paragraph 1 which: “Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the earliest entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.”

Colombia, which abstained from voting, cited “constitutional impediments” to the ratification process, and justified its abstention vote with the need for more national discussion. The Annex II State, they maintained, remains committed to the principles.

According to Syria, the CTBT requires the “utmost attention” of the international community, despite its shortcomings. Disappointed with the Treaty’s failure to halt “qualitative improvements” to existing stockpiles, Syria discussed its apprehensiveness to on-site inspections, which, they fear, may open the door to “abuse” of this provision by other States. Syria also noted concern with the Treaty’s lack of security assurances for non-Nuclear Weapon States, which “does not help in adding a global aspect to the Treaty and hinders its ratification.” (See “Negative Security Assurances” report.)

Pakistan, another crucial Annex II State which has neither signed nor ratified, voted affirmatively on the resolution, and declared that it will not stand in the way of the Treaty’s EIF.

The United States, too, offered an explanation of its unsurprising and solitary vote against the resolution, affirming that: “the United States will not become a party to that treaty.” The U.S. will, assured Mr. McGinnis, maintain their moratorium on testing and urged others to do the same.

The current U.S. administration’s hostility toward the CTBT is symbolized both by its solitary negative vote against resolution L.52 and its outright rejection of any other draft resolution that refers to the CTBT and its critical implementation, including resolution L.53, “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.” (See “Nuclear Disarmament” report.) While they are mindful to declare the continuation of their testing moratorium, it is perhaps imperative for those who recognize the urgency of this Treaty’s EIF to explore some desperate measures.

Once again, we call your attention to an article in this month’s Disarmament Diplomacy, “Beyond Article XIV: Strategies to save the CTBT,” by Rebecca Johnson, available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd73/73ctbt.htm.

-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

9. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

The First Committee voted this week on draft resolution L.44 as introduced by Sri Lanka on October 21. The resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority, with only 3 States abstaining and no State opposed.

The Italian delegation delivered an explanation of vote (EoV) on behalf of the European Union and the Acceding Countries of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia, which aligned themselves with the E.U. explanation. This was the only EoV offered on this draft resolution.

The E.U. reiterated that any decision taken regarding work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be done so within the confines of the Conference on Disarmament. The Italian delegate reiterated the E.U.’s support of the establishment of a subsidiary body at the CD to deal with this matter, on the basis of a mandate, and subject on an agreement by all. He also reiterated, once again, the E.U.’s preference to begin work in that body on an FMCT first, as that issue is perceived to have more support and thus riper for negotiation.

For more on the PAROS campaign, see:
http://www.space4peace.org
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html
http://www.abolition2000.org/groups/gnanwps/

-Emma McGregor-Mento,
Abolition 2000/GRACE
and
Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

10. Negative Security Assurances

By a vote of 98 to zero, with 59 abstentions, the First Committee adopted draft resolution L.8 calling for the conclusion of effective international arrangements, in particular an international convention, to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In explaining its abstention, South Korea stated that all non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT “who are in full compliance with the NPT provisions, have a legitimate claim to credible and effective negative security assurances. [However, what] has transpired in recent years shows that in reality there exist States who sign non-proliferation treaties and then choose not to fully comply with them. Under the circumstances, the argument for establishing a legally binding arrangement is premature.” The large number of abstentions may in part reflect concern that it is only NPT non-nuclear weapon parties who merit security assurances, as stated by South Korea. The resolution is not limited in this manner. (See "Negative Security Assurances" report, week three.) The United States stated regarding its abstention that “that the United States continues to oppose any proposal for an NSA treaty, or other global, legally binding security assurances regime.”

- John Burroughs,
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

11. Proliferation

A resolution intended to curb one aspect of proliferation surfaced on the voting agenda on Thursday, October 29. Draft resolution L.35, introduced by India, on “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” was adopted without a vote by the Committee.

In its explanation of vote (EoV) to the committee, Russia once again recalled President Putin’s statement to the General Assembly in September, in which he “emphasized that the spread of WMD … remains an important challenge” and that “their acquisition by terrorists (is) the most dangerous” of proliferation issues.

Israel pointed to the “double danger” of terrorism and WMD, and, like New Zealand, welcomed the UNIDIR workshop to be held in Geneva next season.

Last year’s GA resolution on the subject (57/83) was adopted without a vote. 57/83 called for the Secretary General to compile a report, based on the views of Member States, on ways to tackle the threat of terrorists’ acquisition of WMD. The United States, in its explanation of vote on draft resolution L.35, expressed its satisfaction with the responses to the SG’s inquiries, and is pleased that L.35 will request a similar report from the SG on the “nexus” of terrorism and WMD.

Other states utilized their right to an EoV to express cautious support for the measure. Pakistan urged, as they did last year, for the “need to address underlying causes of terrorism, which lie in suppression, injustice and deprivation.” (It could be argued, however, that the United States disagrees with the latter of the identified root causes, as it was the sole State to vote against draft resolution L.29 this week, on “Relationship between disarmament and development.”)

Consensus on this draft, as Brazil underscored, “shows the importance” that the international community attaches to this issue. Yet, maintained Ambassador Sardenberg, “the total elimination” of these weapons has and always will be the only way to stop the threat of this danger. This unshakable truth, as articulated by Brazil, is just one more reason why this New Agenda country will continue to advocate for general and complete disarmament in this forum and others.

-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

12. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.41, “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” was the only resolution presented that directly concerned Chemical Weapons. Put forth by Poland on 15 October 2003, L.41 was adopted without a vote. In previous years, it has been co-sponsored by Canada, and it has regularly been the case for this resolution to be adopted without a vote.

Within the statements and debates leading up to the voting this week, there was discussion about ensuring the effectiveness of the OPCW. The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention has generally been given praise.

In 2002, Israel explained that the major consideration for Israel regarding the issue of its ratification was Israel’s hope to see positive changes in the security climate in the Middle East. There were no explanations of vote given this year on L.41.

“The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction,” L.37, was also adopted without a vote and there was
no explanation before or after the vote.

The fate of UNMOVIC was not under discussion in the First Committee. The
UN handling of the oil for food program, which also provided the funding
for UNMOVIC's investigation of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons
and its missile capabilities, is to be phased out by November 21.
Presumably it will require action by the Security Council to either give
UNMOVIC a new mandate or phase it out eventually. As there is no
verification or monitoring capability for the Biological Weapons
Convention - or for missiles - it would seem worthwhile to continue, at
least in embryo, the capabilities UNMOVIC has.

Resolution A/C.1/58/L.37 was introduced by Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary who has been Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee that spent seven years negotiating the protocol that would have given the treaty a monitoring capability, and the Ad Hoc Committee working to list the resolution as A/C.1/58/ L.37.

UNMOVIC may be able to exist for another period of time without Security Council action to give it a new mandate but sooner or later this will have to happen for it to continue in existence.

-Wyatt Matthews
Franciscans International
and
Ann Lakhdhir
NGO Committee on Disarmament

13. Conventional Weapons

Five resolutions dealing with conventional weapons were voted on this week, leaving only L.1, Voluntary reports on the implementation of the Program of Action, and L.46/Rev.1, on OSCE promotion on the Program of Action, for next week.

Pakistan’s resolution on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, co-sponsored by Netherlands and Spain (L.10), was passed this week, with only India voting against it. Using the right to an explanation of vote, Mr. Varma asserted that India is not convinced of the productive value of calling upon the CD to deal with conventional weapons in their region. He stated that, “the need to consider (a) framework” is “not persuasive” in the resolution tabled by its neighboring rival. In addition, India feels that the “narrow definition” contained within the resolution does not reflect their security situation, and is far too restrictive.

Other resolutions on conventional weapons, such as the Netherlands’ L.16, “National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology,” L.50 on CCW, and L.51 on assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them all passed easily and without vote.

Draft resolution L.45 on transparency in armaments, underwent a bit of dissection, resulting in four separate votes: first, on OP 4 (yes-137; no-0; abstain-22), second on OPs 3, 4, and 8 (yes-138, no-0, 22-abstain), third on OP 2 (yes-138; no-0; abstain-22) and then finally as a whole: (yes-140; no-0; 23-abstain). With such a prolonged vote, many states felt the need to explain their votes. (See “Transparency” report.)

The landmines resolution, sponsored by Thailand, (L.43) also passed with 143 votes in favor, 19 abstentions, and no votes cast against. Iran explained that, while they share the values of the Ottawa Convention, the Landmines Convention is not a conclusive and comprehensive response to landmines. A real campaign to combat irresponsible uses of landmines needs to be “far reaching and should involve different and multifaceted related aspects of the issue.”Iran broached the concerns of countries with long land borders, stating that landmines continue to be the sole effective means to ensure the minimum security requirement for land-territorial countries.

-Eliza Kretzmann,
Quakers International
and
Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will

14. New Agenda

The New Agenda Resolutions have been the subject of considerable parliamentary action in Western Group countries, with the adoption of a resolution by the Australian Senate in support, parliamentary questions asked in the Norwegian and Dutch parliaments, and parliamentary delegations contacting foreign ministers in Belgium and Germany.

NGOs in Western Group countries have also been active contacting their foreign ministries to request support for the resolutions.

On 29 October the New Agenda Coalition submitted revised draft resolutions A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda (often referred to as the 'NAC omnibus resolution').

The revisions were made as a result of consultations with other States - particularly NATO and Western Group members, with the aim of making it easier for Western Group members to support. They include:

a) NAC Omnibus resolution:

Pre-ambular paragraph 15: NAC clarified that their criticism of the nuclear-weapon States was for not engaging in the 'multilateral' process leading to complete nuclear disarmament, and they were thus not critical of bilateral and pluri-lateral steps being taken by the nuclear-weapon States.

Operative paragraph 4: NAC formally described the 2000 NPT Review Conference agreements as a 'blueprint' to achieve nuclear disarmament. This was replaced with the term 'plan'. This was done in order to not appear too prescriptive and inflexible.

Operative paragraph 10 (d): NAC had called for the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (under which the USA and Russia made unilateral reductions of tactical nuclear weapons) to be formalized into 'legally-binding' instruments (agreements or treaties). This was replaced with 'legal' instruments. The effect of this is to soften the resolution. The removal of the word 'binding' reinforces the reality that agreements are entered into freely and that States have the right to withdraw from agreements. Retaining the word 'binding' could infer that the provisions of the instruments would remain binding even if States wished to withdraw, i.e. that the instruments had developed a customary legal basis binding on all States regardless of whether or not they are parties to the agreement. (Note: This change was also made in the tactical weapons draft resolution)

b) Non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons

NAC removed pre-ambular paragraph 11: "Concerned about the increased risk of non-strategic nuclear weapons being used." This softens the tone of the resolution. NATO States in particular had expressed the perspective that the resolution was too alarmist and did not acknowledge that progress had been made - particularly in Western Europe, on reducing both the numbers and risks of tactical weapons being used.

- Alyn Ware,
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

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