The First Committee Monitor

Week One: October 6-10

In this Issue:

1. Introduction
2. Missiles
3. Proliferation
4. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
5. Nuclear Disarmament
6. Fissile Materials
7. Verification and Transparency
8. Disarmament Machinery
9. Nuclear Testing
10. First Committee Reform
11. The New Agenda
12. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
13. Conventional Weapons
14. Negative Security Assurances
15. Chemical Weapons
16. Biological Weapons

Introduction

The 2003 session of the General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security comes at the end of a year in which counter-proliferation has begun to take the place of nonproliferation. States have gone to war over the suspicion of weapons of mass destruction. The withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has led many states to urge for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and for the strengthening of the multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
Malaysia defined the tone of the 2003 First Committee meeting well when it stated on the opening day of the Committee:

The year 2003 is a significant as well as a dismal year for disarmament. On 23 May 2003, we commemorated the 25th anniversary of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I). It is worth recapitulating here that the Final Document of the SSOD-I underscores that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the ultimate goal of multilateral disarmament efforts. Yet after 25 years the goal is far from being achieved. Hence there was nothing to celebrate in May.

Despite this disheartening environment, many States have come to the Committee with a slew of ideas for strengthening the international disarmament and nonproliferation regime.

Japan will once again submit a draft resolution entitled "Path to the Total-Elimination of Nuclear Weapons". The New Agenda Coalition will again submit two resolutions entitled "Towards a nuclear weapons free world: a new agenda" and "Reductions of non- strategic nuclear weapons", with notable changes to the text. (See "New Agenda" report)

Many States highlighted the need for the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a program of work. Noting the progress made toward adopting the A5 proposal in that body, many are hopeful that negotiations can begin on a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) early next year (see "Fissile Material" report).

The First Committee Chair has called again for a special meeting to discuss the strengthening and perhaps modifying multilateral disarmament negotiating bodies- including the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. (See "Disarmament Machinery" report)

In both the General Assembly General Debate, as well as this past week of statements in the First Committee, many states emphasized the need for multilateralism and UN reform, in order to preserve and strengthen international security.

At the opening of the meeting, Chairman Ambassador Jarmo Sareva of Finland said: "You may recall the conundrum about whether if a tree falls in the forest and no one is there, does it make a sound. I think we should ask ourselves whether if a statement is made, however valuable, in the General Assembly, and no one in the outside listens or cares, does the statement make a sound. If the answer is negative, we all together- big and small alike- have a problem." (See "First Committee Reform" report)

In the current debate between nonproliferation and counter-proliferation, many States raised concerns about both vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (See "Proliferation" report). The shift from nonproliferation to counter-proliferation- and away from general and complete disarmament- should be remedied through multilateral confidence building measures and strengthening of existent treaties. As the Honourable Godfrey Smith, Attorney-General of Belize said "Multilateralism or Chaos!"

The problems facing this 58th General Assembly are indeed numerous. The NGO community hopes that this year, all states will renew their commitment to multilateralism and international law, and that the recommendations that come from this committee are implemented throughout the course of the next year.

-Susi Snyder and Rhianna Tyson
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Missiles

The First Committee on Disarmament convenes only a week after the Second Regular Meeting of Subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles adjourned. In this context, over twenty States recognized the enormous problem of missile proliferation in their statements to the Committee, and almost a dozen acknowledged the Code, although with varying degrees of approval.

The Chairman recognized missiles as an issue "requiring urgent attention," and noted the "importance of deliberating initiatives to forge new norms."

Ambassador Lavrov noted Russia’s "positive assessment" of the work of the group of governmental experts on missiles that began work in 2001. "It is high time that this group should proceed with in-depth consideration of the problems on its agenda."

Most States, like Chile, welcomed the adoption of The Hague Code while concluding that it is but a first step in a solution to the problem of missile proliferation, such as Romania. Others, such as China, acknowledged the problem but highlighted only their national initiatives that address it.

Italian Ambassador Carlo Trezza, speaking on behalf of the European Union, noted that "The E.U. considers HCOC an initial, though essential step" that must not "preclud(e) other initiatives or, in the longer term, more comprehensive approaches." In addition, he called for the establishment of "a relationship between the Code and the United Nations. Belarus also supported such a relationship "to explore more comprehensive approaches to address this problem."

Stating that the Code "provides only a partial solution to the problem of delivery systems," Switzerland called for a legally binding agreement to compliment the HCOC, and invited "all countries who have not already done so to subscribe" to it.

Both Canada and Japan viewed the Code as "significant" and, along with Australia, promoted its universalization. South Korea referred to it as a “confidence building measure," while Mongolia "considered (the HCOC) as an important initial step towards creation of a legal norm in this field." In 2004, the South Korean government will host the next Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Meeting.

Pakistan, a non-signatory, indicated that it was willing to cooperate in establishing "multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory measures to avert missile proliferation."

Uruguay regarded the HCOC, which "lies outside the UN," as an "important demonstration of political will." The signature of "more than one hundred countries" to the Code has "created…a space dedicated to an issue of which its relevance needs not to be recalled."

South Africa, however, failed to acknowledge the HCOC at all, and discussed missiles as a problem in which "we have not managed to collectively address."

For more information on missiles, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/missiles/missilesindex.html.

Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

Proliferation

Since the last conference of the General Assembly First Committee, the world has borne witness to a war waged under the pretext of combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to an announcement of withdrawal from the NPT. Thus, the issue of WMD proliferation remains at the forefront of international security concerns.

Many states also discussed WMD proliferation as contributing to the terrorist threat, as exemplified in Romania’s statement that the problem lies in “the prospect of trans-national groups seeking to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. There is an increasing concern that radicals or terrorist groups might obtain weapons of mass destruction from unstable or hostile regimes.”

Canada addressed terrorism in the context of the existence of nuclear weapons, not only their spread: “There is no escaping the reality that premising security on the existence of nuclear weapons is a dangerous approach, fraught with the risk of annihilation. The sooner we add nuclear arms to the WMD scrap heap the better. In addition to the dangers of state use of WMD, we must also now confront the risk of use by terrorists or other non-state actors. The only sure solution to this problem is ensuring the elimination of WMD according to international law."

China criticized war as an alleged solution to proliferation, stating that, “If non-peaceful means is used to counter proliferation, that would not only be logically self-defeating but counter-productive.”

Unsurprisingly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea received enormous criticism for its announcement of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its failure to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguard standards. States including Brazil, Canada, the European Union, South Korea, Japan, and the United States, condemned the DPRK’s actions. Norway referred to the DPRK's announcement as a "serious challenge to the authority and integrity of the Treaty." Concern was also expressed about Iran's compliance with safeguard obligations.

Other statements, including that of the Chairman, acknowledged that proliferation is not a problem solely relegated to the realm of acquisition of WMD by states perceived to be unstable or unreliable or having links to terrorist groups. As Chairman of the First Committee, Finnish Ambassador Jarmo Sarevo declared that some states “are even alleged to be helping others to acquire weapons of mass destruction, while others may be seeking to acquire such weapons, or are failing to eliminate their own stockpile. And some are developing new weapons that are not yet concerned by any treaty regime or that fall into the gaps of existing legal constraints.”

Brazil's statement on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) highlighted the “disturbing trend to erase the distribution between conventional weapons and non-strategic weapons. This trend is among the many horizontal and vertical pressures, which are extending the range of nuclear weapons and the related threats we face.” In its separate national statement, Brazil also said, “The concept of proliferation has been somewhat blurred by efforts to confine it to the horizontal dimension, losing sight of the ever-growing threat posed by the technological upgrading or improvement of weaponry – the vertical dimension of proliferation.”

-Marisa Tugultschinow, Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will
and
John Burroughs,
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

In his opening speech, Ambassador Jarmo Sareva, Chairman of the First Committee, stressed the need for “additional efforts to promote universal membership in multilateral treaty regimes, along with further consolidation of regional arrangements, including nuclear-weapon-free-zones.”

Mexico and Mongolia’s stances on NWFZ mirrored each other, almost to the point of verbatim. Both stated that “the creation of agreements freely arrived at among interested states constitutes an important disarmament measure.” The Mexican delegation said that they “will promote a resolution to convene a Conference of States Parties and Signatures of Treaties establishing such zones before 2005. Mexico supported the consolidation of Mongolia as a nuclear weapons free state and encouraged efforts of the five Central Asian States to finalize the establishment of NWFZ in their region.

Mongolia upheld its stance promoting expansion. It mentioned to the delegates that the number of states covered by NWFZs has now exceeded over 100 states. Mongolia warmly welcomed the five Central Asian States on reaching an agreement to conclude a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central Asia.

Kazakhstan, an involved member of the Central Asian zone, also spoke in support of Mongolia’s efforts.

Ghana had comments on establishing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in Africa. Qatar and Algeria discussed a NWFZ in the Middle East.

Brazil and Italy were two other advocates pressing the expansion of NWFZ. Brazil expressed a desire for the entire globe to become a NWFZ: “a nuclear-free world.”

Russia pointed out that it consistently supports the establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. Security assurances by the Russian Federation now extend to over 100 states “who have acceded to the relevant NWFZ agreements.”

Russia’s neighbor, Belarus, followed suit with their comments. Fellow Security Council members, China and the United States, however, had no statement on the issue of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.

China did comment that “globalization should be a process of different countries and cultures to learn and benefit from each other. It should not be a process of imposing one standard upon all others.”

- Wyatt Matthews
Franciscans International

Nuclear Disarmament

Article VI of the NPT requires states "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ... nuclear disarmament." In light of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 NPT conferences and of the 1996 opinion of the International Court of Justice, it is now generally accepted that the obligation requires achievement of the total elimination of nuclear arsenals in accordance with principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification.

According to the First Committee statements this week of Russia and the United States, they are fulfilling their Article VI obligation with the recently entered into force Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty). The treaty requires each state to have no more than 2200 deployed strategic warheads by 2012, but contains no provisions requiring transparency or verification, or destruction of delivery systems or dismantlement of warheads. It is express U.S. policy to retain on the order of 2000 warheads in a "responsive force" capable of redeployment in weeks or months. While some states simply welcomed the agreement (e.g., Switzerland, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea), others noted its deficiencies. Thus Indonesia stated: "While we welcome the contribution of the Moscow Treaty to international peace and security, we could not but recognize that it lacks most of the standard provisions of a bilateral nuclear arms control treaty or any reference to an exchange of data or any verification mechanism. In this condition we call upon the U.S. and Russia to continue taking further steps to improve the treaty so that it would adhere to the principles of irreversibility, transparency, and verifiability which will have far-reaching ramifications for the future of genuine nuclear arms reduction and elimination." The New Agenda ministers made a similar comment on September 22 (see (www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/dis/nuclear/ministersdeclaration.html).

Many states underlined the essential role of multilateralism. Referring to the CTBT and the proposed FMCT, South Korea stated that the "objectives of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament cannot be achieved without strengthening the multilateral instruments that complement the NPT regime as a whole." Nigeria stated that "the existence of broad structure of disarmament and arms control agreements is a direct result of non-discriminatory multilateral negotiations.... [T]he Nigerian delegation wishes to reaffirm its absolute commitment to the promotion of multilateralism in the field of disarmament as an essential way to strengthen international peace and security ..." Illustrating why such formerly unexceptionable statements have now become emotionally charged, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker stated provocatively that the United States "does not believe in multilateralism for its own sake.... Rather, the United States is committed to an effective multilateralism, properly targeted at today's security threats, contributing in real ways to enhancing international security, and free of political linkages or outmoded Cold War icons."

- Carlos Gonzales and John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

Fissile Materials

References to fissile or radiological materials this week focused on two aspects: the technical and physical security of materials and the long-awaited Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), for which the Conference on Disarmament is charged to negotiate. (See "Disarmament Machinery")

Peru, speaking on behalf of the Rio Group, noted the two international conferences on the protection against nuclear terrorism, held in October 2002 in Germany and in March 2003 in Vienna, both of which “acknowledged the necessity to reinforce the technical and physical security of nuclear material and radioactive sources.”

To the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the “transshipment of nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea” remains an “issue of overriding concern,” as declared by the Bahamas, which spoke on behalf of the 15 member group. “While recognizing the right of states to the peaceful uses of nuclear material, CARICOM countries maintain that these shipments, and the concurrent potential for accidents, represent a serious threat to the economic development of our region.” Therefore, “CARICOM States would support the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory framework to promote state responsibility with respect to disclosure, liability and compensation in the event of accidents.”

Iceland invoked General Assembly resolution 56/24 L of 29 November, 2001, on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, noting that “this item is in fact again included in this year’s agenda of the First Committee.”

Many states, such as Zambia, are relying upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. South Africa deplored the “inactivity” of the CD which “has prevented the negotiation of a nuclear fissile materials treaty, despite agreement by this Committee for the negotiations to proceed, and has prevented work on other priorities” as well.

Echoing South Africa, Australian Ambassador Peter Tesch also blamed the CD for the lack of progress on an FMCT, stating that, “It defies credibility that the widely-held aspiration for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty continues to be frustrated by the Conference on Disarmament’s failure to agree on a work program.”

The European Union was joined by Mongolia, Switzerland and Belarus in attaching “special importance” of an FMCT and in urging work on the matter in the CD. The E.U. stated that the banning of fissile materials for nuclear weapons “would strengthen both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and thus international security,” an opinion voiced also by China and Romania.

Russia and Norway called the start of FMCT negotiations “another logical step” in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, while the Republic of Korea agreed, adding that it will also be “an effective means of combating nuclear terrorism by reducing the risk of loose nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.” While Norway “welcome(s) the existing moratoria” on fissile material production for weapon purposes, moratoria still do not provide the guarantee that only “a legally binding prohibition” would.

Ukraine concluded that an FMCT “comes to the fore” in light of the current security challenges, and they “hope that this positive trend” of this issue in the CD and with the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction “will result in practical measures.”

Japan, who continues to hold the Presidency of the CD throughout the inter-sessional period, noted that it submitted a working paper on the FMCT which is available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches03/FMCTwp.pdf

To learn more on the background of an FMCT, see the “Reaching Critical Will Guide to the Conference on Disarmament” at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdbook2004.pdf

For a summary of the positions of each Member State to the CD on the issue of an FMCT, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/alerts.html#Topic

-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

Verification and Transparency

In the opening statement, the Chairman of the First Committee, Amb. Jarmo Sareva, called for “the development or wider acceptance of transparency and accountability measures, to build confidence that reassuring words are in fact finding expression in security-enhancing deeds”. This was a common thread amongst nations mentioning the importance of transparency in the process of general disarmament, non-proliferation and export control, including the Rio Group, Malaysia, Canada, Switzerland, Jordan, the Bahamas, Iceland, the Republic of Korea, Kazakhstan, Jamaica, Burkina Faso, and Romania.

An important existing transparency measure is the UN Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1992 at the joint initiative of the EU and Japan pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/36 L of December 9, 1991, "Transparency in Armaments". It calls on member states to report data on imports and exports of conventional arms in seven categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems. In 2001, 117 States reported to the Register. Italy, on behalf of the EU, called on all states to submit information about their imports and exports to the Register, including information on military holdings and national production, and Canada, Ghana, and Belarus similarly called for its expansion. Namibia and Jordan called for the extending the Register to include weapons of mass destruction. Japan reported that "in an effort to enhance [the Registry's] universality" it co-organized a series of regional workshops with Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the UN in Africa, South America, and Asia. Generally, Italy for the EU described the UN Register as an important “global transparency and confidence-building measure to support stability and security,” a sentiment echoed by South Africa, Jordan, and Romania.

While transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of their reduction and elimination is called for by the 2000 NPT 13 steps and by subsequent New Agenda and other resolutions, the record in this regard is poor. Nor did the topic receive much attention this week in the First Committee. Here NGOs have been leading the way, as illustrated by Reaching Critical Will's "NGO Shadow Report: Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security," April 2003.

Regarding verification, a key point made this week is that it is lacking with respect to the U.S.-Russian "reductions" under the recently entered into force Moscow Treaty (see New Agenda and Nuclear Disarmament topics). Generally, governments, including Sierra Leone, the Rio Group, Mexico, and the EU, noted its high importance in building confidence among nations in the disarmament process. Malaysia emphasized that the “provisions of … treaties and conventions must be implemented in a verifiable, irreversible, equitable and balanced manner. There is no room for selectivity and double standards...” Otherwise states cannot “trust other states”, and no progress will be made.

-Nya Fleron and John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy
Jennifer Nordstrom, Global Action to Prevent

Disarmament Machinery

Many countries deplored the paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament, the one multilateral negotiating body, over the last seven years. The most recent effort to end the stalemate was the effort of five Ambassadors, from Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia and Sweden. They proposed the creation of four ad hoc committees, on Negative Security Assurances, on Nuclear Arms, on Banning the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons and on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The mandate for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space would not include negotiation of a new treaty. Banning the Production of Fissionable Materials would.

In the Chinese statement on October 7th in the First Committee Ambassador Hu Xiaodi said "FMCT (Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty) will hopefully contribute to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. China supports the early negotiation and conclusion of the treaty. On August 7th this year China once again demonstrated its constructive attitude towards the work of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) by accepting the initiative of five ambassadors. We hope that other parties concerned could respond positively, so as to facilitate reaching an agreement on a comprehensive and balanced work programme at the CD, which will reinvigorate the CD as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body."

Stephen Rademaker, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, in a statement said: "It has become nearly impossible to deal with a given arms control or disarmament issue without facing demands that other, unrelated subjects be dealt with on an equal basis and at the same time. Recently, the Conference on Disarmament showed signs that its work program stalemate could be lifted. We consider this an encouraging sign, and are considering its ramifications. Obviously, seven years of inactivity there have wrought damage to the reputation of the Conference." He did not indicate whether the U.S. would accept the proposal of the five ambassadors.

Governments expressed different expectations of what will happen when the Conference on Disarmament reconvenes in January, 2004 as to whether the deadlock will be broken. Canada was optimistic: "There are even fresh signs of responsible compromise on an emerging consensus that would permit the Conference on Disarmament to resume productive work." The European Union statement said that "The EU regrets the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and is convinced that the new threats to peace and security require that this standstill be overcome as soon as possible. The EU is committed to reaching a consensus on a program of work in the CD and welcomes the fact that new ideas have been put forward over the last year. We appreciate these efforts aimed at the outset of the first session in 2004. In this
respect we support efforts by the current and incoming Presidency during the intercessional period."

Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi of Japan said "It is truly regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament (CD), being the sole body negotiation on multilateral disarmament, has been unable to enter into negotiations since the formulation of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) in
2996. This stalemate must be resolved promptly....During the intercessional period, in my capacity as president of the CD, I will continue to hold consultations with member States of the CD, in close coordination with the incoming President, on ways to resolve the current stalemate, in accordance with the mandate provided by the annual report."

Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg of Brazil said on October 8 "The continued paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament is an example of lack of interest and absence of the political will needed to move forward. A deadlocked CD is to no one's benefit. Brazil regards as imperative the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD." Ambassador Gustavo Albin of Mexico said "As for the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation regrets that we have once again spent a year in stagnation. It is essential that those countries which have a particular responsibility allow the conference to resume substantive work." Others expressed the same sentiments.

-Ann Lakhidir
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security

Nuclear Testing and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in 1996. Seven years later, of the 44 Annex II States whose ratification is required for the entry-into-force of the Treaty, all but 12 have ratified. In the statement of Ambassador Hoffman, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Committee, he said that the International Monitoring System is more than half completed, and that the majority of States Parties are cooperating with the processes. He also mentioned the recent Article XIV conference on facilitating the entry-into-force of the CTBT, and the outcome Final Declaration (available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/ctbt/ctbtindex.html#whca) of that conference which contained concrete recommendations to facilitate the ratification of the 12 holdout States.

The ratification of the CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria and Kyrgyzstan were noted by many States as positive steps forward on the path to nuclear disarmament. India and Pakistan were urged to maintain their testing moratoria, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was also urged to not escalate tension in the region by testing. Many States, especially in Asia, welcomed the news of China's intention to continue the ratification process, and of Indonesia's intent to ratify soon.

The Bahamas, on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), noted appreciation for an agreement that was established between the CTBTO and Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the first of its kind for the CTBTO.

-Susi Snyder
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

First Committee Reform

About half of the States that delivered a statement this week specifically mentioned the need for reform of the First Committee. This call for reform is similar to the General Debate that took place September 23- October 3 of this year, regarding the rethinking of the structure and function of the United Nations as a whole.

States called for a reform in three different circumstances: (1) for a First Committee reform irrespective of the reform developments in the General Assembly (GA); (2) for a rethinking of the First Committee in the context of a general GA reform; and (3) for a reform that does not significantly change the present structure and role of the Committee.

(1) First Committee Reform per se

The majority of countries pleaded for the First Committee reform regardless of the general GA reform debate. South Africa urged “…to get back to the basics and ensure that the bulk of our time and deliberation in this Committee is spent on issues that could move international security forward.”

Mongolia, Australia, and Italy (on behalf of the European Union) called for the “streamlining” of the working methods of the First Committee. While Mongolia noted that a “balanced agenda” is needed, Australia stressed that the committee should concentrate on “the most pressing and widely-held concerns”.
Zambia, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and Argentina also called for the revitalization of the Committee’s agenda and processes.

Some countries put forward specific proposals on how to streamline the work of the First Committee. Norway issued a non-paper, "Enhancing the role of the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 9, 2003 (see www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/nonpapernorway.pdf) on the reform and argued that “the number of resolutions should be reduced” and that “more integrated thematic discussions” should be held. Iceland applauded the Norwegian initiative and supported their proposal.

Along similar lines, Canada and Senegal called for the reduction and rationalization of the workload, Brazil supports the “reorganizing” of the “agenda in a coherent, methodical way”, and Belarus notes that the Committee should “elaborate a clear-cut list of top priorities”. Finally, the United States stressed the need to “examine carefully the resolutions that the Committee takes up each year” to avoid “drowning our message in a sea of unnecessary repetition.”

(2) First Committee Reform in the Context of a GA Reform

A smaller number of countries noted that the First Committee reform should go hand in hand with the reform of the General Assembly.

Kenya held that “a review should not be addressed to the First Committee in isolation“, but to the General Assembly as a whole. Along similar lines, Malaysia, Uganda, the Philippines, and Nicaragua argued that as a body of the GA, the First Committee should be included in any general reform process.

Egypt moreover highlights that “any actual steps that may be agreed upon should fully respect the role of the General Assembly” and emphasizes the “utmost importance of maintaining a substantive balance” between the Committee and the GA relating to disarmament issues.

More hesitant to outline the possible nature and scope of a Committee reform, the Russian Federation and Indonesia noted the necessity to rethink the agenda and function of the First Committee within the GA reform debate. Indonesia notes that “the First Committee should be accorded renewed attention regarding its role and functioning”, whereas the Russian Federation stresses the importance of “taking into account the specific nature of the activities of the First Committee” in the reform process.

(3) Cautious Reform

Taking a more hesitant approach, China argued that while reform is necessary the First Committee per se should not be transformed. China’s Ambassador Hu Xiaodi stressed that “the First Committee does need to keep pace with the times, and [that] there is room for improving its efficiency and working methodology”. However, the nature of the First Committee “should not be changed”.

Julika Erfurt
Reaching Critical Will

New Agenda

In his October 6, 2003 statement on behalf of the New Agenda governments (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden), Amb. Duarte of Brazil announced that the group will, as in 2002, put forward two resolutions, "Towards a nuclear weapon free world: a new agenda," and "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons." The latter resolution aims to give non-strategic reductions "a higher priority, as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons."

Amb. Duarte noted that the program of action, the 13 steps, "provides the blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament." The adoption of the 13 steps was in no small measure the result of the New Agenda initiative, and they form the basis for the 2000 and 2002 omnibus New Agenda resolutions and no doubt the resolution to be offered this year. Amb. Duarte also stated that the "New Agenda Coalition is deeply concerned at the lack of progress in the implementation" of those steps. The Declaration of the Ministers of the New Agenda Coalition made September 22 (www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/dis/nuclear/ministersdeclaration.html) referred prominently if politely to one major aspect of the lack of progress, namely the lack of provision in the Moscow Treaty for making U.S.-Russian "reductions irreversible. The ministers called upon the two states to make the treaty "irreversible and verifiable and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it a nuclear disarmament measure."

Amb. Duarte described other "horizontal and vertical pressures" on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He stated the coalition's deep concern about North Korea's announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and "ambiguities regarding the implementation of ... safeguards obligations", thus referring diplomatically to Iran. He also identified as "particularly disturbing" the "emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use and the development of new types of nuclear weapons."

The 2000 New Agenda resolution (http://disarmament.un.org:8080/vote.nsf) mostly consisted of the 13 steps and was adopted overwhelmingly, by a vote of 154 to 3 (India, Israel, Pakistan) with 8 abstentions (including France and Russia). No resolution was offered in 2001. The 2002 resolution (www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com02/res/L3rev1.html) went beyond the 13 steps in certain respects (e.g., elaborating regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons, calling for agreement on a mandate in the CD regarding PAROS). Reflecting that and more importantly that a new administration was in place in Washington, the 2002 vote adopting the resolution was more divided: 125 to 6 (France, India, Israel, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States) with 36 abstentions (U.S. allies and friends).

- John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

In his opening statement to the First Committee, China’s Ambassador Hu Xiaodi referenced “a host” of General Assembly resolutions that call for “further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space” without specifically invoking the Conference on Disarmament, which has been blocked for years in part because of disagreements over PAROS. (See “Disarmament Machinery,")

Russia, China’s co-sponsor in the CD working paper entitled, “Possible Elements of a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (CD/1679) expressed Russia’s support for an Ad Hoc Committee of the CD to take this issue further. Ambassador Lavrov also reaffirmed Russia’s proposed moratorium on the deployment of weapons in outer space, and urged greater information sharing between other “outer space powers … concerning forthcoming launches of outer space objects and their purpose.”

Canada briefly noted that “outer space is one such realm, in which humanity has an increasing stake in maintaining a non-threatening, non-weaponized environment.”

Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Union, addressed the peaceful uses of outer space in the context of the International (Hague) Code of Conduct against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, noting that “the Code also confirms the commitment…on international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all States,” noting that the HCOC is an “essential step” that does not “preclud(e) other initiatives or, in the longer term, more comprehensive approaches.”

Other states expressed the need to prevent an arms race in space. Dr. Aleksandr Baichorov, Head of the International Security and Arms Control Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus stated directly that “The international community has to ban the deployment of offensive weapons in space.”

Zambia, South Africa, and Nigeria also expressed commitment to the preservation of outer space for peaceful purposes.

For more information on PAROS, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html.

For the original text of the PAROS paper in the CD see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches02/chiruswp_062702cd.html

The Chinese and Russian missions compiled a report on international perspectives of the paper which are available here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches03/PAROSwp.htm

Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will

Conventional Weapons

While the First Committee is entangled in a continuing disagreement on nuclear weapons, some progress is being made on so-called conventional weapons. However, some countries feel "conventional weapons" aren’t receiving warranted attention. Norway referred to the description of certain conventional weapons such as anti-personnel mines, Explosive Remnants of War, and small arms, as “weapons of mass destruction in slow-motion.” In the opening session, Finland, as the Chair of the First Committee said, “Some [countries] continue to view deadly conventional weaponry as just another commercial commodity.” South Africa made the bold statement that in addition to being committed to the eradication of weapons of mass destruction, it is also committed to limiting the number of conventional weapons to the minimum required for self-defense.

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), negotiated in 1980, is the primary instrument of international law regulating weapons that ‘may have indiscriminate effects or cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury.’ At the Second Review Conference of the CCW in 2002, States Parties established a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to study the problem of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), not currently fully covered in the Protocol of the CCW. The GGE then asked for and received a mandate to negotiate a new instrument on "post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which would reduce the risks of explosive remnants of war," an area with very little international norms and rules. The next negotiating period is November 17-24, 2003. Mexico is “convinced that only with a legally binding instrument that defines clear responsibilities on removal, clearance, and destruction of ERW, and provides for adequate international assistance in these tasks, will we reach our humanitarian goal of protecting civilians the serious risks and grave threats these remnants represent.” Switzerland hopes that States will be able to accept regulations on sub-munitions including technical measures aiming to reduce failure rates. South Africa was disappointed with the lack of a stronger legally binding instrument on ERW at the Second Review Conference of CCW, particularly regarding victim assistance, but feels the draft instrument should be fine-tuned at final session of the GGE and adopted as additional Protocol to CCW in November negotiations. Russia, Australia, Canada, and Italy on behalf of the EU all expressed support for a new protocol for the CCW on ERW.

     -SALW-
The most common and least regulated of weapons, Small Arms and Light Weapons, cause 90 percent of all casualties in armed conflicts, and around 500,000 casualties per year. Some countries even called the priorities of the First Committee into question. “In Africa, for example,” explained Namibia, “small arms and light weapons are weapons of mass destruction.” Guyana and Uganda only discussed SALW and landmines in their Statements to the First Committee.

The First Biennial Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons was held in July of 2001, where the Programme of Action (PoA) was adopted. The First Biennial Meeting of States to Review Implementation of the PoA was held in New York this past July, and the implementation of the PoA was adopted by consensus. Although many States, including Australia, South Korea, Peru on behalf of the Rio Group, Kenya and Russia, praised the PoA and the implementation meeting, several States, including the Bahamas on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Uganda, Guyana, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Switzerland, France, and Norway believe there is more to be done. “We consider the PoA a small, but important first step that must be augmented by commitments to establish transfer controls in producer countries, to regulate brokering, and to facilitate the reliable and harmonized marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons,” said the Bahamas on behalf of CARICOM. South Africa announced that the progress on the implementation on the PoA has only been "modestly positive", they are submitting a draft resolution with Colombia and Japan on “The Illicit Trade in SALW in all its aspects”, recognizing the First Biennial Conference, acting on the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts, setting the date and venue for the 2006 Review Conference of the PoA, and further guiding work on brokering. Several other countries expressed support for continued work on brokering.

Switzerland announced that it will be submitting a draft resolution with France on an international instrument for tracing and marking of SALW. The most-mentioned specific SALW regulations, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Brazil, Norway, Uganda, Romania, Madagascar, China, South Africa, Kenya, Italy on behalf of the EU, and Jordan all expressed support for a forthcoming international instrument for marking and tracing, and the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the feasibility of such.

Although transfer controls in producer countries such as national end-user certificate programs, and legislation regarding SALW possession of and sale to non-state actors are more controversial measures, several countries, including the Bahamas on behalf of CARICOM, Ghana, Romania, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria expressed support for them. Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States export 88 percent of arms worldwide.

Several countries connected SALW with terrorism. Sierra Leone highlighted the hypocrisy of high levels of attention to terrorist acquisition of WMD when thousands of civilians are killed by terrorist activities with SALW in Africa. The access of non-state actors to SALW remains controversial. The United States made no mention of SALW or the PoA in its statement, only advising that terrorists willing to use "conventional weapons" against civilians would also be willing to use WMD and the UN should therefore strengthen its protocols on WMD.

     -Landmines-
Since the 2002 First Committee an additional 10 States have become acceded to the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines, bringing the total to 139 States Parties and 150 Signatories. Italy, on behalf of the EU, claimed that this “leave[s] no doubt that an international norm has been established that can no longer be ignored.” Many States expressed support for the success of the Ottawa Convention and implored non-States Parties to accede, but highlighted the continued injuries and casualties from landmines and urged increased resources devoted to mine clearance and victim assistance, including Mexico, South Africa, Peru on behalf of the Rio Group, Nigeria, Belarus, Uganda, Romania, Guyana, and Japan. Jamaica and Uganda said they were co-sponsors of a draft resolution to be announced and submitted by Thailand on the implementation of the Land Mine Convention. Norway advised that it has started the Resource Mobilization Contact Group to help mobilize resources on landmines, and Italy on behalf of the EU and China both said they are providing resources for APM destruction and clearance. Romania reminded States Parties to adhere to the deadlines for stockpile destruction and mine clearance set in the Convention, while Algeria, Ukraine and Japan all reported their countries’ stockpile destructions. The Rio Group is committed to changing the Andean region to an APM-free zone, and “condemn[s] decisively the use and indiscriminate manufacture of the mines by non-state actors that hinder the consolidation of a free-hemisphere of APM.”

Russia stated that discussion have begun on restrictions on mines other than APM, and Italy, on behalf of the EU, expressed concern over the “serious humanitarian risks posed by irresponsible use of AVMs [anti-vehicle mines] which cause civilian casualty and hamper economic development.” Norway expressed support for the adoption of an AVM Protocol in the CCW.

-Jennifer Nordstrom, Global Action to Prevent War
Eliza Kretzmann, Quaker UN Office
Sarah Sullivan, Amensty Intl

Negative Security Assurances

The issue of guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against states which have renounced such weapons has wracked the NPT since its inception. Thirty-three years after the NPT entered into force, South Africa pointedly remarked this week that nuclear "horror even continues to threaten States and peoples that have bound themselves not to aspire nuclear weapons, but who are unable to obtain reliable assurances that these weapons will not be used, or be threatened to be used, against them." Indeed, the problem is escalating, at least on a doctrinal level. The Clinton administration gave ambiguous signals that nuclear use would be an option in retaliation against a chemical or biological attack by a non-nuclear weapon state. The Bush administration has now lessened the ambiguity, declaring in the December 2002 presidentially approved National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction that the United States "reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force - including through resort to all of our options - to the use of WMD against the United States" and its "friends and allies." The Strategy also referred to the option of preemptive military action against WMD, and did not rule out nuclear use in this connection. It should be remembered that in circumstances of war, whether a chemical or biological use or threat has occurred may be uncertain.

During negotiations on the NPT, states sought to include non-use guarantees among the treaty obligations. The United States and the Soviet Union refused, but in 1978 they along with Britain declared negative security assurances (NSAs), and all five of the NPT nuclear weapon states declared them just prior to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Not satisfied with these political and only arguably legal commitments, non-nuclear weapon states obtained as part of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted in connection with the extension decision a commitment to "consider" further steps on security assurances.

The A-5 proposal to break the deadlock on several matters in the CD, accepted by China and now squarely in the U.S. lap, essentially takes the NPT approach. On this item, the conference would negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument." CD/1693, 23 January 2003.

The issue also remains on the NPT agenda. Based on the 2000 NPT Final Document (Part I, Art. VII, para. 2), the Declaration of the Ministers of the New Agenda Coalition made September 22 (www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/dis/nuclear/ministersdeclaration.html) "stressed the importance" that the next NPT PrepCom "submits substantive recommendations ... on the matter of security assurances to the [2005] Review Conference."

This week in the First Committee, Ukraine stated its belief "that legally binding security assurances ... will significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear capabilities." In 2002, the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 106 to 0 with 55 abstentions a resolution (A/RES/57/56, at www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com02/res/L40.html) calling for the conclusion of effective international arrangements, in particular an international convention, on security assurances.

For more information on Negative Security Assurances in the CD, see "The Reaching Critical Will Guide to the Conference on Disarmament."

- John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

Chemical Weapons

Several statements in the First Committee this week voiced concern in regards to the effectiveness of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Several spokespeople stressed the importance of monitoring and strengthening the OPCW and/or the Convention on Chemical Weapons. Japan said, “It is important to strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as the functioning of the OPCW.” Japan is continuing its support of both.

Republic of Korea, expressed its hope “that the five-year (CWC) work plan included in the Chairman’s text will provide the organization with a useful roadmap as it carries out its daunting task.”

Brazil stated that, “the CWC must be conducted in strict accordance with the principles so hardly negotiated.” Brazil wishes to ensure that the verification regime of the CWC to remain fair and non-discriminate, and voiced a particular concern that the OPCW will not be able to comply with the Convention deadline for the existing stock of chemical weapons. Brazil urged possessor states to “ensure the destruction of their arsenals, without conditions or parallelisms, in a timely manner.”

Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General, of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons illustrated the OPCW’s successes: “As at 1 September 2003, almost 8,000 metric tones of chemical agents, including Category 1, Category 2, and binary component agents, or about 11.2% of the total stockpile declared, as well as nearly 2 million munitions—nearly 25% of declared stockpiles—have been confirmed destroyed under the OPCW verification regime.” “To be truly successful,” he said, “the Convention has to strive for universality.”

Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer for the Holy See, backed the OPCW, saying, “Multilateral inspection agencies such as the IAEA for nuclear materials and the OPCW are vital to ensuring compliance and verification.”

Russia pledged her support of the Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which she considers “as an effective instrument in preventing the proliferation of those deadly weapons and reducing the risk of toxic chemicals being used as a means of terror.”

There is a common growing concern of non-state actors acquiring chemical weapons.

Switzerland stated that they are satisfied with the progress that has been made since the Convention on Chemical Weapons has come into force. The Swiss promised that they will contribute substantial sums to finance chemical weapons destruction programs in the Russian Federation.

The United States explained that they were taking a “very active role to ensure effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.” They stated that they were also pleased with the convention and the “positive result of the first Review Conference of the Conference this last May.” They too highlighted their significant voluntary financial contributions, specifically those to the OPCW “to carry out important verification and implementation assistance.”

As a reminder of the devastating impact of chemical weapons, China described a recent personal incident: “On August 4th, the leak of Japanese abandoned chemical weapons killed one person and injured forty-three in Qiqihaer City, Heilongjiang Province of China. This tragic event illustrates once again the importance and urgency of early and complete elimination of Japanese abandoned chemical weapons in Chinese territory.”

-Wyatt Matthews
Franciscans International

Biological Weapons

Biological weapons were brought up by many delegates, but so far none have mentioned a possible resolution on the subject. But as underlined by the representative of Australia: "The threat posed by the proliferation of biological weapons is real and increasing". And as
stated by the Norwegian delegation: "No one is safe from biological terrorism".

Ambassador Gustavo Albin from Mexico was the first speaker on Monday, October 6. As last year, he underlined the importance of national implementation of the BWC. But Mexico also pointed out that they "remain convinced of the need to endow the Convention with verifying mechanisms." The Biological Weapons Convention has no Secretariat and no verification or monitoring mechanism. For seven years an Ad Hoc Committee worked on a Protocol to the Treaty that would have given the Treaty some monitoring and verification capability. In July 2001, the U.S.
derailed seven years of negotiation on a protocol that would have established the means to verify the BWC. The meeting of the subsequent Review Conference that November, established annual meetings focused on a more limited agenda until the next Review Conference in 2006. The
annual meeting to be held in November 2003 is focusing on the national implementation of the legal provisions of the treaty which bans the production or use of biological or toxin weapons.

Several other countries also asserted the need for a verification protocol. In addition to Mexico, Peru (on behalf of the Rio Group), the Holy See, Mongolia, the Bahamas (on behalf of the Caribbean Community), Pakistan, South Africa, and Russia indicated they favor a verification protocol for the BWC.

The U.S. on Tuesday, October 7th, listed examples over their "continued commitment to effective multilateralism" and said that they had "led efforts to pursue alternative approaches to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention."

Ambassador Carlo Trezza from Italy, speaking on behalf of the EU, stated that the "EU attaches great importance to the strengthening of the Convention." This was also pointed out by Peru, speaking on behalf of the Rio Group, and by China, Japan, Kenya, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iceland, the Republic of Korea, Uganda, South Africa and Indonesia. Switzerland and many other states called on the countries that had not yet ratified the BWC to do so.

Switzerland also mentioned a World Health Organization project in the area of communicable diseases that are not of natural origin to combat bio-terrorism, and welcomed the ICRC's proposal to launch an international appeal at ministerial level against the abuses of biotechnology. ON Friday the International Red Cross described the project further.

The Holy See brought up the problem that biological agents also are used for legitimate and beneficial purposes but may easily be converted into weapons, and that we need inspection agencies for the BWC similar to those for nuclear (IAEA) and for chemical weapons (OPCW). They also called for "stringent export controls" on the part of states that produce these materials. Many states concurred with this, e.g. Romania.

So far there has been no discussion of UNMOVIC, established to monitor and verify the destruction of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. If it were given a new mandate by the Security Council it could maintain the capability it has to investigate any suspicion of the development of biological weapons that the Security Council considers of concern. The
Security Council has in the past investigated earlier suspicions - as, for instance, Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran and against its own citizens, but it required considerable time to put together a team to do the investigation. Some feel it would be a shame to lose the
expertise already developed by UNMOVIC and think it should continue in existence.

-Arild S. Frick and Ann Lakhdhir of NGO Committee on
Disarmament, Peace and Security

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