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The First Committee Monitor
Week Three: October 18- 22, 2004
In this issue:
- Introduction
- A New Agenda
- Disarmament Machinery
- Conventional Weapons
- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
- Fissile Materials
- Nuclear Disarmament
- Terrorism
- Regional Efforts
- Disarmament Education
- Negative Security Assurances
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Missiles
- Disarmament and Development
- Panel: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
- Chemical and Biological Weapons
Introduction
Its hard to determine whose jobs are more demanding, more time-consuming,
or more frustrating: those of the NGOs that spend all weekend chasing
down and pulling together the statements, resolutions and notes
from the past week in order to produce another edition of the Monitor,
or the governmental representatives, who stay in their Missions
until midnight and beyond all week long, corresponding with capitol
on the latest offer of revised text, sending word on a shifted position
of a key delegation on their own sponsored resolution.
It’s a tough call, and unless somebody has had the opportunity
to fill both shoes at some point, there’s no way to know for
sure. But what is certain is that both roles are necessary if we
are to make true progress in achieving a sustainable framework of
global security.
That is, after all, the purpose of the General Assembly First Committee,
as we have been reminded by some over these past weeks: to express
the will of the international community, to advance the cause of
international peace through the adoption of resolutions, which impel
such progress through the morally binding mandate with which they
are endowed.
Yet, like most other international political machinery, the First
Committee seems lost in inefficacy, caught up in its own identity
crisis. As last week’s First
Committee Reform report testified, many States seem nervous
that the Committee’s mandate may be lost amidst all of the
hoopla surrounding the debate on its reform. Others warn their colleagues
against investing too much in ideas on reform, maintaining that
no amount of revitalized working methods can supplant the need for
implementation of resolutions already adopted. As Dr. Patricia Lewis
of UNIDIR asserted in her remarks to the Committee on Monday, “We
need to keep the deliberations of the First Committee rooted in
reality and make sure that the words- so hard fought over- lead
to practical action.”
It doesn’t seem, however, that “practical action”
is the goal of many delegations, whose representatives, burning
the midnight oil, are working ceaselessly to establish a tactical
strategy for this next crucial year. States argue how best to refer
to a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty so ripe it may be rotten by
the time it is harvested, debate over the dates for the United Nations
Disarmament Commission, (see Disarmament Machinery
report), and struggle to find logistical and financial support for
a southern-hemisphere-wide nuclear-weapon-free zone conference (see
Regional report). These arguments imply that
the First Committee is wrestling with tactics, rather than substance,
all for the purposes of locating the best position from which to
negotiate at the seventh Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, only a few months away.
States- and NGOs- fret over the specifics of language pertaining
to regional stability, the length of the New Agenda resolution or
the strength of references to the IAEA or the Comprehensive Test-Ban
Treaty. We perceive major victories or devastating defeats from
the votes cast by a particular country or two, especially if their
vote differs from that of the years past. Yet, as Dr. Lewis reminded
us all on Monday, “(s)light shifts in positions may cause
all sorts of excitement in the room, but this means absolutely nothing
in the outside world to the people you are representing.”
But even if more people did fully grasp the significance of nuanced
diplomatic language- one of the aims of this publication- there
still remains significant work to be done in enhancing the efficacy
of all of our efforts. All of these sleep-deprived nights, weekends
spent in front of a laptop and hours spent poring over dozens of
draft resolutions searching for meaning in the slightest change
of text, will remain worthless in the shadows of nuclear weapons
that continue to threaten our existence.
As the distinguished Director of UNIDIR told us, “(t)he only
way the work of the First Committee could have meaning is for it
once again to produce results that have an impact in the real world.
It has been done in the past; it needs to do it again, and now.”
- Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org
A New Agenda
The draft resolution put forward
by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Mexico, South Africa, Sweden) entitled, “Accelerating the
implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” is drastically
cut down from last year’s comprehensive resolution and mostly
uses consensus language from the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It
is designed to obtain the widest possible support - including from
NATO states - heading into the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
In its preambular paragraphs, the draft expresses concern over
the lack of implementation of binding disarmament obligations, reaffirms
that non-proliferation and disarmament processes are mutually reinforcing,
and recalls the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals.
In its operative paragraphs, the resolution calls for full compliance
with disarmament and non-proliferation commitments; universal adherence
to the NPT and early entry into force of the CTBT; accelerated implementation
of the practical disarmament steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference; further steps to reduce non-strategic arsenals and non-development
of new types of nuclear weapons; and establishment of subsidiary
body within the CD to address nuclear disarmament. It also agrees
to resumption of negotiations in the CD on an effectively verifiable
FMCT and to completion of arrangements for nuclear weapon states
to place excess military fissile material under international verification,
and underlines the principles of irreversibility and transparency
and the development of verification capabilities.
The intent in selecting these measures and topics from the much
wider range addressed in previous years' resolutions reportedly
was to identify areas in which the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) could
begin action prior to the Conference. Such action in turn could
at least reengage those States in the nuclear arms control process
and make a successful Conference possible. Thus the resolution is
not necessarily purporting to identify what is most important for
achievement of a nuclear weapon free world. For example, an obviously
important step not mentioned by the resolution is further - and
verified - deep cuts in U.S./Russian arsenals. Rather, the resolution
highlights existing commitments on which short-term action can be
reasonably expected. Even given these criteria, it is regrettable
that there is no mention of the 2000 commitment to "concrete
agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear
weapons systems". Standing down nuclear forces - removing warheads
from missiles, withdrawing submarines from deployment, etc. - has
the most potential of quickly transforming the nuclear landscape
for the better, and would also greatly reduce ongoing risks. As
it is now, the U.S. and Russia remain locked in Cold War style postures
allowing nuclear launches that could annihilate nations in a matter
of minutes.
The decision to offer a short, concise resolution means that details
in past resolutions are absent this year. Last year's resolution
set forth a comprehensive set of steps for reduction of non-strategic
nuclear arms, while this year's simply calls for reduction; also,
unlike last year, there is no separate New Agenda resolution on
non-strategic reductions. There is no reference at all this year
to such matters as negative security assurances, nuclear weapon
free zones, the IAEA additional protocol, or establishment of an
ad hoc committee at the CD on PAROS.
Given that the resolution mostly employs language and commitments
which NPT NWS have approved in the past, and which most countries
continue to actively support, arguments against the resolution focus
not so much on what is in the resolution, as on what is not: the
resolution does not discuss specific cases of potential or actual
proliferation; it does not acknowledge the reductions in numbers
that the U.S. and Russia have accomplished.
However, the resolution frequently refers to the need for non-proliferation
as well as disarmament, and focuses on the lack of progress in meeting
the 2000 commitments, rather than in quantitative reduction.
Given the document’s moderate tone and its strict adherence
to existing commitments, what is really at stake is that NATO countries,
Japan, and Australia must choose between endorsing widely recognized
commitments or bowing to U.S. demands. The U.S. is waging an intense
campaign for "no" votes or abstentions, motivated in part
by the desire to prevent the New Agenda group from playing the central
role in negotiations at the 2005 NPT Review Conference that they
had in 2000. While much can change before the vote is taken and
decisions are made at the ministerial level, indications to date
are that some U.S. allies will support the resolution, as Canada
alone did in last year's vote.
- Michael Spies and John Burroughs,
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy
mjspies@gmail.com
johnburroughs@lcnp.org
Disarmament Machinery
Last year, the Non-Aligned Movement withdrew their draft decision
on the “Convening of the fourth special session of the General
Assembly devoted to disarmament” before a vote could be taken.
Now, with both the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as well as the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) trapped in a deadlock, the Non-Aligned
are renewing their calls for another special session of the GA,
the first of which created the machinery now locked into stalemate.
The draft resolution calling for an SSOD IV (59/L.14)
contains only minor revisions to some of the preambular paragraphs
contained in its
2003 predecessor. The resolution would re-establish substantive
sessions of the open-ended working group which would submit a report
on its work, including possible substantive recommendations.
Mexico tabled a draft decision (59/L.15)
on a “United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating
nuclear dangers in the context of disarmament.” Draft resolution
59/L.30 also supports the convening
of this conference, originally called for in the Secretary-General’s
Millennium Report as a way to address the challenges of disarmament,
nonproliferation and other hazards wrought by the nuclear age. The
2001 report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (A/56/418),
as cited by India, also supported the SG’s call. Measures
for reducing nuclear dangers are, said India, “sine qua non”
to achieving international peace and security.
Four years since the Millennium Report, States such as Philippines,
Tunisia, Syria and Viet Nam (see Disarmament
Machinery report, Week 2) continue to urge the convening of
such a conference.
Without specific reference to draft resolution L.15, Nigeria
voiced support for a conference to identify ways and means to achieve
the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
The United States, which does not support the convening of a fourth
special session of the GA, remains intent on reaching consensus
on its proposal to revitalize the First Committee. By the end of
the close of the thematic debate this week, two draft resolutions
on First Committee reform remain on the table: L.1,
the United States’ contribution, and L.13,
the draft resolution tabled by the Non-Aligned Movement.
The US and NAM, along with recommendations from the EU, will be
continuing consultations in the hopes of merging the two draft resolutions
and offering up a revised, joint compromise next week.
The President and Chairman of the CD and the UNDC, respectively,
also tabled their draft resolutions reporting on the work of the
bodies.
Georgia, which held the chairmanship of the UNDC this year, introduced
draft resolution L.42 on the
“Report of the Disarmament Commission.” Georgia noted
that, without substantive work upon which to base this report, the
draft resolution was contrived largely from the informal consultations
regarding the deliberative body’s agenda. Operative paragraph
5, which contains the recommendations for the UNDC’s 2005
agenda, remains blank.
It is also likely that the dates of the Commission, noted in OP
6 as 11-28 April, will be changed to July, 2005, so as not to risk
jeopardizing negotiations at the 2005 NPT Review Conference by calcifying
divergent positions.
The UNDC report, as well as the CD report, (L.27)
are likely to be adopted without a vote.
- Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will
rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org
Conventional Weapons
This week, Member States presented eight draft resolutions regarding
conventional weapons to the First Committee.
Colombia, Japan and South Africa, along with 27 other states, have
sponsored a resolution (59/L.43)
on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) in all
its aspects. L.43 differs from last
year’s (adopted by consensus in the General Assembly)
by setting specific dates for the PoA Review Conference (June 26-July
7, 2006), the Preparatory Committee (January 9-20, 2006), as well
as the second biennial meeting of States (July 11-15, 2205). This
resolution also expresses appreciation for the work of the open-ended
working group to negotiate an international instrument to enable
States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit
small arms and light weapons (OEWG), which was established through
last year’s resolution. Furthermore, the draft resolution
requests the Secretary-General to hold broad-based consultations
on international cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit
brokering in small arms and light weapons. Informal consultations
on brokering will continue.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) nations
have sponsored a resolution (59/L.21)
regarding the assistance of States for curbing the illicit traffic
in small arms and collecting them. The resolution, extremely similar
to last year’s version which was adopted without a vote, calls
on the international community to give support to States seeking
to curb illicit SALW trafficking. Moreover, the resolution supports
the ECOWAS moratorium on SALW, and “encourages the involvement
of organizations and associations of civil society in the efforts
of the national commissions to combat the illicit traffic in small
arms”.
Ninety-eight states have co-sponsored draft resolution (59/L.38)
on consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures,
a 2003 draft decision on which, sponsored by Germany, was adopted
without a vote. L.38 recognizes that “a comprehensive and
integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures
often is a prerequisite to maintaining and consolidating peace and
security and thus provides a basis for effective post-conflict peace-building”.
The resolution encourages efforts to better integrate programs combating
the illicit trade in SALW with those aimed at the prevention of
armed conflict as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) programs for former combatants. (See DDR report.)
Fifty-six nations co-sponsored draft resolution (59/L.54)
on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). Comparable to
the resolution presented last year; L.54 calls on States to become
parties to the CCW, supports the decisions of the Meeting of the
States Parties and sets the dates for the Second Review Conference.
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, India, Romania, the Republic of Korea,
and the EU also voiced support for the CCW.
Sixty-six nations have co-sponsored a new resolution on “Information
on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms.”
The resolution (59/L.52) encourages
Member States to “engage in a dialogue on confidence-building
measures,” and calls for the establishment, by the Secretary-General,
of “an electronic database containing information provided
by Member States” and to assist with the organization of seminars,
courses and workshops on new developments in the field.
Argentina, Australia, Kenya, Thailand and Turkey sponsored the
first resolution (59/L.49) dealing
with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). While recognizing
the right of Governments to possess MANPADS in order to protect
their national security, the resolution notes that “effective
control” over MANPADS is crucial “in the context of
the intensified international fight against global terrorism.”
The draft resolution urges States to support current efforts to
combat the illicit trade of MANPADS as well as strengthen or enact
legislation to better control access to MANPADS and ban their transfer
to non-state actors. Furthermore, the resolution “(e)ncourages
initiatives to mobilize resources and technical expertise to assist
States . . . in enhancing national control and stockpile management
practices to prevent unauthorized access to, use and transfer of
MANPADS and to destroy excess or obsolete stockpiles of such weapons.”
Bulgaria, France and Netherlands co-sponsored a draft decision
(59/L.48) to include the issue
of “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional
ammunition stockpiles in surplus” in the agenda of the sixtieth
session of the General Assembly.
This week, the First Committee undertook informal consultations
with Ambassador Thalmann, Chair of the OEWG. Various States gave
oral replies to the fifteen questions distributed in advance by
Amb. Thalmann, with more detailed written replies forthcoming. The
questions were organized by topic: scope and definition, record-keeping,
cooperation in tracing, implementation of the instrument, and final
provisions.
While many States supported including ammunition in the work of
the OEWG, several States raised concerns, noting that ammunitions
were not included in the mandate of the OEWG and that discussions
on the issue were not yet “ripe.”
While disagreement persisted over the role of Interpol in the handling
of SALW issues, most States supported an administrative role of
the UN in the implementation of the international instrument. States
also discussed practical issues of marking, such as where on the
weapon they should be placed, and the nature of various national
practices which could possibly form the basis of the international
instrument for keeping records.
The Chair of the OEWG did not include a question on whether or
not the international instrument should be legally binding. Several
States, however, took up this issue during Thursday’s thematic
debate on conventional weapons; Brazil
(on behalf of the MERCOSUR nations), France,
Senegal,
Nigeria,
and the European
Union were among those who requested that the international
instrument be legally binding.
Illicit brokering of SALW promises to be a divisive issue in the
coming weeks. During the thematic debates, Norway,
Austria,
Canada, the Republic of Korea and the EU all stated that further
steps need to be taken in order to determine whether an international
instrument combating illicit brokering needs to be established.
The EU declared that they are, “convinced that the establishment
of a national legislation and regionally accepted rules and practices
on brokering activities is essential and urgent.”
- Anna Morgan,
Quaker UN Office
amorgan@afsc.org
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space
This week, Egypt introduced draft resolution L.36
on the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", an
identical text to that of resolution 58/36
of last year. Although L.36 has decidedly fewer co-sponsors than
earlier versions, they are still hoping for the broadest possible
support.
Canada
characterized outer space as “simply too precious to leave
unprotected by multilateral action,” and urged that States
which have not ratified in the 1967
Outer Space Treaty (OST)- what they referred to as the “Magna
Carta of Space”- to do so before 2007. Ambassador Meyer also
recalled the statement
by Prime Minister Martin in the General Debate of the General
Assembly, as demonstrative of Canada's commitment to PAROS: “Space
is our final frontier. It has always captured our imagination. What
a tragedy it would be if space became one big weapons arsenal and
the scene of a new arms race. In 1967, the United Nations agreed
that weapons of mass destruction must not be based in space. The
time has come to extend this ban to all weapons.”
China
concurred, maintaining that existing controls, including the OST,
are limited and insufficient. Russia, too, viewed existing international
space law as having “obvious gaps” with a “clear
need for improvement.”
Many called for the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Conference
on Disarmament to deal with PAROS. Sweden,
speaking in a national capacity, suggested that the CD also hold
periodic technical meetings, inviting the participation of international
governmental organizations, space agencies, space law academia and
representatives from the civil and military space sectors, in order
to obtain an “overall perspective” on the issue. Sweden
also suggested inviting the Office for Outer Space Affairs (OOSA)
to brief the First Committee on the work of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COUPOS).
Russia discussed the growing dependence on “space technology”
and challenged their colleagues to imagine the result of attacks
on these space objects. Russia implored the international community
to embark on “cooperation not confrontation” in order
to protect these peaceful uses. Russia also notably declared that,
“as of today and for the near future,” they have no
plans to deploy weapons in outer space, and encouraged others to
adopt a similar moratorium, “a serious step to demonstrate
our responsibility” that would constitute an “indispensable
safety net” in the absence of a legal instrument on PAROS.
China, too, described the various peaceful usages of outer space
as further argument against its militarization, noting that “combat
theories and concepts” increasingly use outer space and threaten
the peaceful benefits. Deploying weapons in space would, China maintained,
“result in great fallout” and damage existing arms control
agreements, especially those pertaining to nuclear weapons and missiles.
China also noted “constructive proposals” from delegations
such as Canada, France, Sri Lanka, Italy and others.
Draft resolution L.50 on the
Hague Code of Conduct (see Missiles report)
also confirms the commitment of the General Assembly to an outer
space reserved for peaceful uses. A broadly accepted HCOC would,
affirmed the European
Union, contribute to the campaign to prevent an arms race in
outer space. The EU also supported a subsidiary body of the Conference
on Disarmament to begin discussions on PAROS, based on a mandate
agreeable to all.
- Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org
Fissile Materials
On October 19, Canada
introduced draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.34,
urging the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a program of work
and immediately commence negotiations on a “non-discriminatory,
multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.” Co-sponsored by 20 countries,
the draft resolution is unchanged from last
year’s version, which was adopted without a vote. Although
L.34 remains the solitary resolution specifically focused on a fissile
materials treaty (FMT), its operative language is included in several
other resolutions, including those put forward by the New Agenda
Coalition (A/C.1/59/L.22), Japan
and others (A/C.1/59/L.23),
and Myanmar and others (A/C.1/59/L.26).
In remarks on October 18, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders reiterated
that an FMT cannot be effectively verified. As paraphrased by the
UN
press release, she explained that “the treaty would ban
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but allow production
for other activities.” Establishing non-compliance would be
problematic, because the “date and purpose of production”
of any material in question would have to be proven. It is unclear
how the present U.S. position affects prospects for agreement on
a program of work in the CD. Its opposition to verification provisions
could be raised in the negotiations. As Canada said in introducing
its resolution, “It remains our view that the existing
mandate permits any CD member to raise any issue or concern
about the envisaged treaty during the course of negotiations.”
Canada reportedly declined a suggestion that the reference to an
“effectively verifiable” treaty be removed from the
title of the resolution. Generally, the U.S. has yet to state its
stance regarding the A-5
proposal for a CD program, and civil society should press it
to do so.
There is no doubt of the need for an instrument or instruments
addressing issues including- but going beyond- a ban on the future
production of “military” fissile materials. Some relevant
sources of information and analysis: In an upcoming report in the
Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists based on its updated
inventory, the Institute for Science and International Security
says that military stocks in India, Pakistan, and Israel continue
to grow. Further, the global stocks of plutonium and HEU, both “civil”
(but usable in weapons) and military continue to rise, with more
than 3,700 metric tons in about 60 countries at the end of 2003.
Based in part on concern about vulnerability of weapons-usable material
to terrorist acquisition, the recent Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace study, "Universal
Compliance" [p. 50,], proposes a ban on the production
of plutonium and HEU for any purpose - weapons, ship propulsion,
reactor operation. South Africa has proposed that an FMT would verify
the control and disposition of fissile materials declared "excess"
to military needs, thus tying the FMT to a process of reducing stocks
and warheads.
More broadly, in 1999, Zia Mian of the Program on Science and
Global Security at Princeton University proposed an agreement that
like the Climate Change Convention would establish a framework for
phased negotiations regarding reduction of weapons usable fissile
materials, summarized at http://lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/multilateralforumsandinstruments.htm
- John Burroughs and Michael Spies,
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy
mjspies@gmail.com
johnburroughs@lcnp.org
Nuclear Disarmament
In addition to the New Agenda resolution, A/C.1/58/L.22,
“Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”
(see A New Agenda report), six other resolutions
relating to nuclear disarmament have been tabled this past week.
Japan’s resolution, “A path to the total elimination
of nuclear weapons,” has, as they noted, been submitted annually
since 1994. For the most part, this year’s version, 59/L.23,
is nearly identical to last year’s version, 58/L.53
(A/RES/58/59), with a few notable exceptions.
In addition to slightly elongated preambular paragraphs, including
references welcoming Libya’s decision to disarm, Security
Council resolution 1540 and Cooperative Threat Reduction programs,
L.23 includes new elements to its operative paragraphs as well.
OP 3, which again “stresses the central importance of…practical
steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article
VI” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), now also
calls for “the inclusion of the principle of irreversibility
to apply to nuclear disarmament.”
OP 8, which again “stresses the importance of further development
of the verification capabilities”, now includes the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty verification regime as one which, in addition to
the IAEA, “will be required to provide assurance of compliance
with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance
of a nuclear-weapon-free world.”
Last year, some States voiced disappointment with the “weak
language” of this operative paragraph, and urged the 2004
version to adopt stronger language that conveys the high importance
most Member States place on the IAEA. With identical language again
this year, these States will likely remain disappointed.
Last year, 146
States approved the resolution. 16 abstained, with only India
and the United States voting against. While India did not give an
official explanation of vote (EoV), it is most likely the reverence
for the NPT in both preambular as well as operative paragraphs that
prevented India from supporting the resolution. The US, as stated
in their EoV, rejects “importance of urgent signature
and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, with
a view to achieving its early entry into force.” Using the
strongest language to date, they declared that, “The United
States…does not support the CTBT and will not become a party
to it.”
On Tuesday, Myanmar introduced draft resolution 59/L.26,
“Nuclear disarmament,” which carries 34 co-sponsors-
down from last year’s list of 50.
Among the concerns voiced regarding last year’s resolution,
some objected to the two preambular references to disarmament within
a specified time frame; these references have been retained in 59/L.26.
China,
the only NWS to vote in favor of last year’s draft resolution,
nevertheless maintained “the view that any nuclear disarmament
measures, including interim steps, must follow the principle of
maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security
for all countries.” Germany, too, supported the notion that
disarmament will be possible only through an “incremental
approach,” such as the plan outlined in the 13 Steps, which
remains the “performance benchmark” in the disarmament
process.
Norway
also supported a “balanced step by step incremental approach”,
noting that progress pertaining to the implementation of the 2000
NPT Review Conference Final Document was “lagging behind”,
and more must be done, including the reduction of tactical nuclear
weapons, as called for in Step 9 (c).
Russia, however, argued that fears over tactical nuclear weapons
are exaggerated; all nuclear weapons, they maintained, are equally
awful. Russia accredited their “responsible attitude”
toward tactical nuclear storage and other safety measures, noting
that there has never been an accident with tactical weapons.
The United States, too, was on the defensive during Monday’s
thematic debate on nuclear weapons. The “unjust and untrue”
accusations of non-compliance with Article VI come “to our
surprise,” US delegate Thomas Cynkin declared, delving into
a litany of disarmament measures that make up “nearly 90%”
of the 1991 arsenal.
These measures comprise the text of draft resolution L.56,
“Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic
framework,” submitted jointly by the Russian Federation and
the United States. As a follow-up resolution to 57/68, L.56 welcomes
the entry-into-force of the Moscow Treaty and recognizes it as “an
important result of the new bilateral strategic relationship”
between the former superpower rivals. Other operative paragraphs
recognize reductions undertaken by both countries under the START
framework, as well as other steps taken towards disarmament, including
their mutual fissile material production moratoria.
India introduced two draft resolutions, L.29,
“Convention on the Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons”
and L.30, “Reducing nuclear
danger.” (See Disarmament Machinery report.)
L.29 calls upon the CD to “reach agreement on an international
convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
under any circumstances”, and, as noted by India in their
introduction of the draft, encompasses language adopted at the last
ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, and recalls the
International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality
of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.
The draft resolution on the ICJ Advisory Opinion, 59/L.39,
introduced by Malaysia, carries significantly fewer co-sponsors
this year, despite the near-verbatim repetition of the texts. Last
year’s resolution (L.31) was sponsored by 47 Member States;
only 25 sponsor this year’s version.
- Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will
rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org
Terrorism
This week at the First Committee, India introduced draft resolution
on “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction”. Draft 59/L.31
calls on all Member States to strengthen national measures to prevent
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
means and related materials and technologies. The draft invites
Member States to inform the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis,
of steps taken in this regard. It also asks the Secretary-General
to compile a report on measures already taken and to seek the views
of Member States on other ways to combat terrorism.
Last year, an
identical resolution was adopted without a vote in the First
Committee and the General Assembly. In explanation of the vote in
2003, Israel
and the US
made strong statements in support of the resolution pointing to
the urgent threat of the nexus of terrorism and WMD proliferation.
Pakistan voted in support of the resolution but stressed the need
to address the underlying causes of terrorism, namely suppression,
injustice and deprivation.
Although the proposed resolution is a strong statement in support
of multilateralism as the only effective way of addressing the threat
of terrorist groups acquiring WMDs, it does not explicitly call
for disarmament, non-proliferation or strengthening of export controls
to help prevent such as threat. Further, the resolution does not
include any enforcement mechanisms, and only calls for voluntary
reporting by Member States to the Secretary-General. The resolution
has some value as a political statement that shows universal support
from the UN’s members. But in practical terms it accomplishes
nothing.
Until 2004, this GA resolution was the only UN resolution to address
the issue of terrorism and WMD proliferation. But on April 14 the
SC unanimously adopted resolution
1540, calling on all States to “refrain from supporting
by any means non-State actors that attempt to acquire, use or transfer
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems.”
By adopting 1540, the Council decided that States must establish
domestic controls and adopt legislative measures to prevent proliferation
of weapons and means of delivery, including appropriate controls
over related materials.
The Council further decided to establish, for a period of no longer
than two years, a committee comprising all Council members, to monitor
the implementation of the resolution. The Committee Chair, Ambassador
Mihnea loan Motoc of Romania, reported late last month that it was
close to completing the first stages of its work and is fully operational
and functional. Noting the approaching October 28 submission deadline
for the first national reports, he stressed the need for all States
to report to the Committee in order for it to be effective in dealing
with new dimensions of terrorist threats. (To date only two States
have submitted their reports to the committee.)
Like India’s proposed GA resolution, SC Resolution 1540 is
a strong signal in favor of multilateralism, specifically to counter
the black market for WMD and related materials. The resolution addresses
the gap in international law in dealing with the risk of terrorists
and non-state actors acquiring WMD, but leaves the matter of specific
legislation to national action by States. The text also encourages
Member States that can’t afford to implement the resolution
to seek assistance from other States. The strength of 1540 is that
it is a binding obligation that applies without favor to all Member
States.
Yet, unlike the GA resolution, it is adopted by a body composed
of only 15 of the 191 Member States and is not the result of a universal
or open negotiating process. SC resolution 1540 is also inadequate
in that it places very little emphasis on the connection between
disarmament and non-proliferation, and contains no explicit language
on the importance of verification, security assurances and regional
security arrangements.
Thus the international community now has two resolutions on WMD
proliferation and terrorism: one that is universal but toothless,
and one that has the force of international law but is incomplete
and lacking in legitimacy.
- Vina Nadjibulla and Seema Jalan,
United Methodist UN Office
pnadjibu@gbgm-umc.org
Regional Efforts
Ten draft texts affirming the importance of regional initiatives
were tabled at the First Committee this week, most of which containing
only minor revisions to similar resolutions adopted in the past.
Uzbekistan introduced draft decision L.7
on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia on behalf of
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In the 7 years since the
first GA resolution on a CANFWZ, the draft protocol intended for
signature by the Nuclear Weapon States has been completed, and,
as Uzbekistan noted, the Central Asian States are currently in the
midst of negotiating with the Nuclear Weapon States on accession
to that protocol.
Mongolia introduced draft resolution L.19
on “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free
status,” which contains new language in operative paragraph
2 that expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts
in support of their NWFZ status. Mongolia also noted partnerships
it has reached with its neighbors, including neighboring nuclear
China, and invites others to cooperate with the institutionalization
of its status at the international level.
Mexico’s draft resolution L.41,
the 2003
version of which was withdrawn from the 58th session, gives
support to the proposed conference of States Parties signatories
to the NWFZ treaties, to be held in Mexico prior to the NPT Review
Conference. The need for such a conference, maintained Mexico, is
“even clearer” in the light of terrorism.
States in the Mediterranean tabled draft resolution L.35,
on “Strengthening… security and cooperation” in
their region, the exact replica of A/RES/58/70.
L.47 on “Regional disarmament”
is also a carbon copy of the 2003 version, 58/38,
which was adopted without a vote last year. (See Conventional
Weapons report.)
Language contained in draft resolution L.55
on the “…good-neighbourliness, stability and development
in South-Eastern Europe,” reflects the progress that has been
made in the region since the last time the resolution was tabled
in 2002. The 2004 version also calls upon all States to “intensify
cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to” the
International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia, and to
“bring all at-large indictees to surrender to the Tribunal
in line with Security Council resolution 1503 (2003)”.
Bangladesh, Germany, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Macedonia,
and Ukraine have co-sponsored a draft resolution (59/L.46)
on “Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional
levels”, also extremely similar to last
year’s version, adopted by a 158
to 1 vote. L.46 notes the significance of regional and subregional
efforts regarding conventional arms control, and requests the Conference
on Disarmament to formulate principles “that can serve as
a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control”.
Pakistan’s draft resolution 59/L.45
on “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional
context” contains major revisions to last year’s text,
58/L.18,
which received less positive votes
than all of the negative and abstention votes combined. The new
text reflects many of the reservations that Member States voiced
last year when vote on the resolution was taken.
In addition to the omission of strong language in preambular paragraph
8 and the reference to the UN Charter in OP 1, the new text completely
omits an operative paragraph that had called upon Member States,
in high tension regions, to engage in open consultations “without
preconditions”. In exchange, there is a new operative paragraph
that “reaffirms the ways and means regarding confidence- and
security-building measures set out in the report of the Disarmament
Commission on its 1993 session.”
Most importantly, language stressing the importance of “the
maintenance of military balance” has been dropped in favor
of “objectives of strategic stability, consistent with the
principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armament”.
Lastly, Egypt introduced two draft resolutions dealing with the
Middle East, draft resolutions 59/L.8
and L.37.
Draft resolution L.8 on the
“establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East” calls for all countries of the region
to place all nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Previous
versions of this resolution have been adopted by consensus. L.37,
by contrast, focuses specifically on Israel in both preambular and
operative paragraphs, and calls upon it to accede to the NPT and
IAEA safeguards.
Israel, which remained largely silent throughout the First Committee
(and which holds, incidentally, the Vice-Chairmanship of the Committee),
exercised its right of reply on Friday. After States such as Oman
and the United Arab Emirates criticized Israel for failing to sign
the NPT, Israel rebutted, claiming that the NPT does not provide
the necessary security assurances for the country and that a NWFZ
cannot be a first step in the creation of peace, but rather a final
step to be taken after the development of a new framework for regional
security.
- Rhianna Tyson,
Reaching Critical Will
rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org
Disarmament Education
While disarmament and non-proliferation education was not specifically
addressed during the thematic debates until the Friday afternoon
session, references to education in dealing with export/import of
SALW and confidence-building measures have been made in a number
of draft resolutions throughout the week.
Mexico, speaking on behalf of twenty-three other countries, introduced
resolution A/59/L.53, emphasizing
the importance of education in nuclear disarmament and international
security and recognizing appreciation of civil society and NGOs’
work in implementing recommendations made by the UN Study on Disarmament
and Education.
Nigeria introduced draft resolution “United Nations Disarmament
Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services” (59/L.4).
The resolution acknowledges the contributions made by Nigeria’s
training programme for diplomats in the area of disarmament and
calls for Member States to consider gender equality while nominating
candidates for the programme. Nigeria expressed its gratitude to
the Member States and organizations that have continuously supported
the program. Since its establishment in 1978, the program has trained
a significant number of officials currently working for their respective
Governments in the field of disarmament and international security.
Japan,
in its statement on Friday, October 22nd, provided a list of its
past and current disarmament education activities. In conjunction
with UN Disarmament Fellowship Program, Japan has been hosting government
officials since 1983 on an annual basis. Ambassador Yoshiki Mine
expressed his hope that diplomats’ visit to Hiroshima and
Nagasaki this year would “provide an insight into the reality
of atomic bombing.” A UN Conference on Disarmament Issues
was held in Sapporo in July, 2004. The Conference was aimed at raising
awareness among local educators on the issues of disarmament and
non-proliferation. Experts, teachers, members of international organizations,
and civil society attended the seminars. Japan’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has published Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Policy, which they distributed across the room.
Canada expressed their support of efforts made by civil society
to promote disarmament education, and discussed the annual consultations
on non-proliferation and disarmament issues as an example of their
work. Canada listed awards for research on Peace and Disarmament
at the University of British Columbia and a program developed to
educate children in secondary schools as a couple of examples of
Canada’s attempts to promote education in the field of disarmament.
The representatives of the UN Centres on Peace and Disarmament
in Latin America and the Caribbean, in Africa, and in Asia, shared
their work in the field of disarmament education, which included
numerous capacity-building seminars and workshops, joint projects
among various states to enhance understanding of disarmament and
international security, etc. Centres are willing to cooperate with
each other and with other international organizations. A single
common problem that all the Centres addressed in their statements
was the lack of finances to carry out their programmes.
Due to time limitations, the discussion on Disarmament and Non-proliferation
Education was not finished on Friday, Oct. 22nd and will be resumed
on Monday, October 25th in the Conference Room 2.
- Maria Karapetyan,
Franciscans International
m.karapetyan@franciscansinternational.org
Negative Security Assurances
On Tuesday, Pakistan introduced draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.44,
“Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons.” While nearly identical to the last two years’
resolutions of the same name (A/RES/58/35
and 57/56),
the resolution gained eight new sponsors to those already signed
on: Brunei Darussalam, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
El Salvador, Indonesia, Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam, and Zambia.
In their introduction to L.44,
Pakistan asserted that the codification of security assurances is
“an obligation that arises from the Charter” of the
United Nations itself. The demand for NSAs, the Pakistani delegate
noted, started in the 1960s and “crystallized” during
the 1968 negotiations on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
again during the Treaty’s 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
Pakistan, like other vocal proponents of a legally binding instrument
on security assurances, insisted on Tuesday that the existing agreements
remain “inadequate,” including Security Council resolutions
255 and 984, the latter of which remains “insufficient, qualified
and partial.” Pakistan further referred to “open ended”
Article VI obligations, nuclear alliances, new doctrines of nuclear
policy that are contrary to SCR 255 and 984, and the emergence of
new nuclear powers other challenges that should expedite negotiations
on codified security assurances.
A number of states concerned with the promotion of NSAs also endorsed
resolution A/C.1/59/L.26,
“Nuclear Disarmament,” in which operative paragraph
8 “calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and
legally binding instrument on security assurances or non-use and
non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
States.” Operative paragraph16 also “calls for the conclusion
of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate
security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.” Algeria,
India, and Myanmar all voiced support for this resolution in their
statements.
While the EU recognized existing assurances as legally binding-
including those given through Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone protocols
as well as Security Council resolutions-, Cuba, Pakistan, South
Africa, and Nigeria directly called into question the effectiveness
of unilateral declarations. South Africa asserted that “multilaterally
negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by
nuclear weapon States” and should be discussed through a subsidiary
body of Main Committee I at the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT,
a call supported by Cuba.
Nigeria
maintained that “by transforming the disparate assurances
declared by the nuclear powers into a unified, legally-binding obligation,
the nuclear powers will not only be fulfilling part of their commitments
towards these States but also reinforcing the non-proliferation
regime against possible future setbacks.”
The NAC,
too, voiced their support for NSAs, calling upon the NWS to “continue
to uphold and reiterate their commitments with regards to security
assurances, pending the conclusion of legally binding security assurances
for all non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT.”
- Rhianna Tyson and Laura Humphrey,
Reaching Critical Will
rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org
laura@reachingcriticalwill.org
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
One of the most important commitments of the 2000 NPT Review Conference,
as affirmed by the New
Agenda Coalition, was to pursue the early entry into force (EIF)
of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Four years
later, it is reaching “quasi- universality” according
to Brazil, speaking on behalf of MERCOSUR.
Sweden
and Nigeria
noted with satisfaction the signature and ratification of the CTBT
by three Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), Japan
welcomed the ratification by the Congo and the EU
welcomed Libya’s accession to the Treaty.
However, 11 of the 44 Annex II States whose ratification is essential
for the EIF of the Treaty still have to sign and/or ratify it (see
CTBT
report, week 1).
In the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, a draft resolution on
the CTBT (A/C.1/59/L.25) was
again presented by New Zealand, Australia
and Mexico, stressing the importance of the CTBT. Japan described
the Treaty as a major pillar of the NPT regime. The EU, MERCOSUR
and the Republic of Korea also expressed their belief that the CTBT
has an essential role in the nuclear disarmament and non proliferation
regime by preventing the proliferation of materials, technologies
and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons. The General
Joint Ministerial Declaration of September 23rd, initiated by Australia,
Finland, the Netherlands and Japan, also affirms this role.
Other draft resolutions devoted to nuclear disarmament including
L4, L8,
L22 and L23
have mentioned the importance of the CTBT.
The draft called for the urgent EIF of the Treaty. It calls upon
all states that haven’t ratified it yet to do so and to respect
their moratoriums on NW test explosions or other explosions.
In this respect, the EU, Sweden, Canada,
Nigeria, Norway, Switzerland, South
Africa and Russia reiterated their call for the EIF of the CTBT
as soon as possible. And the EU, MERCOSUR, Canada, the Republic
of Korea, Nigeria, Japan and Norway
called on those states that haven’t yet signed or ratified
the treaty, especially the 11 Annex II countries, to find the political
will and do so without conditions or delay. Sweden asked the two
remaining NWS to do the same.
The EU, Brazil, Sweden, Nigeria and Japan agreed on the need to
uphold the moratoria. However, Norway thinks that “such unilateral
steps cannot substitute the significance of the legally binding
commitment provided by the CTBT.”
Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT
Organization (PCCTBTO) Wolfgang Hoffmann spoke on the cooperation
between the United Nations and the PCCTBTO at the First Committee
and at a DPI/NGO briefing on October 21st. He noted that the 11
States which have not yet signed (North Korea, India and Pakistan)
or ratified the CTBT (Indonesia, Vietnam, Colombia, China, the USA,
Israel, Iran and Egypt), have not yet done so for administrative,
legal, financial or political reasons.
Ambassador Hoffmann explained the four elements of the CTBT global
verification regime: the International Monitoring System (IMS) which
will detect evidence of possible nuclear explosions; a consultation
and clarification process; the possibility by a State Party to request
an on-site inspection of possible test explosion and confidence
building measures useful to resolve compliance concerns. He also
developed all additional benefits that these technologies have the
potential to offer, such as seismic and infrasound data.
A vote on the draft resolution is expected to take place early
next week.
- Laure Abado,
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Missiles
Two resolutions on missiles were officially introduced this week:
Iran, on behalf of Indonesia and Egypt, introduced L.6,
entitled “Missiles”, and Chile
introduced L.50, entitled “Hague
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”.
In the preamble, L.6 states its conviction that missiles need to
be approached in a comprehensive, balanced and non-discriminatory
manner, taking into account the security concerns of Member States
at regional and international levels. It also recalls the resolutions
establishing the first two Panels of Governmental Experts, reaffirms
the centrality of the United Nations in the field of arms control
and disarmament, and notes the complexity of the issue of missiles
in all its aspects, a factor which some Member States said prevented
the second governmental panel from reaching consensus on a final
report this year.
To address this problem, the resolution requests for the first
time this year that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of
UNIDIR, identify areas where consensus can be achieved, and then
establish a new Panel of Governmental Experts in 2007 “to
explore further ways and means to address within the United Nations
the issue of missiles in all its aspects” and then submit
a report to the General Assembly. Said Iran, “This mandate,
in contrast with the mandates of the previous panels which were
general, has been narrowed down for the purpose of enabling the
Group of Governmental Experts to be more specified and focused in
their discussions.”
With 104 co-sponsors, L.50 is the first resolution to be introduced
in the First Committee on the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC). In its
preamble, L.50 notes the increased security challenges caused by
the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMDs,
as well as the role of the UN in international peace and security.
If passed, it will affirm the General Assembly’s conviction
that the HCOC will contribute to enhancing transparency and confidence
among states, while confirming the rights of the use of space for
peaceful purposes. The draft also encourages “the exploration
of further ways and means” to deal with missiles.
Critics of the HCOC argue that it is not universal or legally binding,
but proponents see it as a first step with a great deal of support.
In its statement this week, Chile said, “The HCOC is a political
undertaking intended to contribute positively to international security
and to strengthen all Disarmament and Arms Control Treaties and
mechanisms. Negotiated in a transparent manner and open to all the
United Nations Members, the Code asserts its multilateral vocation
and purpose.”
- Jennifer Nordstrom and Ludivine Venturini,
Global Action to Prevent War
jennifer@globalactionpw.org
venturiniludivine@yahoo.com
Disarmament and Development
Whether Member States addressed the problem of illicit arms trade/trafficking,
establishment of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, confidence-building
measures, or any other issue of the thematic debates last week,
many of them emphasized the nexus between the disarmament and development
in their resolutions.
Malaysia, on the part of the Non-Aligned (NAM), introduced draft
resolution entitled “Relationship Between Disarmament and
Development.”(A/59/L.28)
The resolution requests the United Nations, through its appropriate
organs, to implement the action programme of the International Conference
on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (1987).
The resolution suggests the incorporation of disarmament into the
strategies on achieving the Millennium Development Goals and encourages
international organizations, NGOs, research institutes, etc. to
take into account the report of the Group of the Governmental Experts
(GGE) on the relationship between disarmament and development. The
representative of NAM expressed concern “at increasing global
military expenditures, which could otherwise be spend on development,
poverty eradication and elimination of diseases, in particular in
the developing countries.”
Mexico, in its draft resolution “UN Regional Centre for Peace,
Disarmament, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean,”
(A/59/L.18) expresses its “strong
support” for the Regional Centre and acknowledges the importance
of the Centre’s work in promoting cooperation in the region
in dealing with nuclear weapons and conventional arms, including
SALW. Mexico calls upon all Member States (especially the ones in
the region), international organizations, NGOs, etc. to provide
(or increase) financial support needed for the Centre to carry out
its programme on disarmament and development. Mexico also made a
reference to the report of the Group of the Governmental Experts
(A/57/65), which highlights the role of the Regional Centre in promoting
economic and social development as they relate to peace and disarmament.
Resolution 59/L.18 also includes
a welcoming remark on the Centre’s effort to include “gender
perspective” in its work.
Some States (including countries of ECOWAS and Mediterranean) brought
attention to the problem of regional conflicts possible due to availability
of mostly conventional arms. Ambassador Owoseni (Nigeria) began
his statement with: “The problem of illicit trade in small
arms and light weapons is of particular concern to Nigeria as it
constitutes a major impediment to peace, stability, security and
economic development of many developing countries.”
- Maria Karapetyan,
Franciscans International
m.karapetyan@franciscansinternational.org
Panel: Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration
On October 19, 2004, UNIFEM and the Permanent Mission of the Republic
of Benin to the UN hosted a panel to discuss disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration and to launch UNIFEM’s new publication,
“Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration.” The publication serves
as an evaluation of the extent to which gender has been mainstreamed
throughout DDR efforts undertaken by the UN system.
The publication includes two in-depth case studies, on Liberia
and on Bougainville-Papua New Guinea; lessons learned and recommendations;
and a Standard Operating Procedure on Gender and DDR, developed
in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and
UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery as part of an inter-agency
process to develop a coherent UN approach to DDR.
The panel, chaired by the Republic of Benin, included Joanne Sandler,
Deputy Director of UNIFEM; Dyan Mazurana, author of "Where
Are the Girls?"; Sam Barnes, Deputy Director of the Bureau
of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP; Comfort Lamptey, Gender
Adviser, Best Practices Unit, DPKO; and Espérance Kanani,
President of the Ndabaga Association in Rwanda (the first association
of Female ex-combatants in the Great Lakes region). After an introduction
of armed conflict, DDR, and DDR at the UN by the Republic of Benin,
each panelist presented her view on the status of engendering DDR,
as well as recommendations for what must be done.
Sam Barnes and Joanne Sandler gave overviews of DDR as related
to women and girls, as well as an overview of UNIFEM’s role
in DDR. Ms. Lamptey spoke of the DPKO’s Gender Resource Package
and of the lack of female military observers as a problem in inclusion
of women in the DDR process. Ms. Lamptey also noted the great need
to re-define the traditional definition of “combatant”-
a topic many of the panelists touched on.
Ms. Mazurana spoke extensively of girls as part of government,
militia, paramilitary and/or armed opposition forces in 55 countries,
and their involvement in armed conflict in 38 of those countries.
In the 55 countries where they are present, girls were recruited
by the fighting forces. She elaborated on the exclusion of women
and girls from DDR programs for a variety of reasons- not being
with a ‘family’, girls being held on to longer than
boys, or the requirement of trading arms for entry.
The panel served as an informative introduction to UNIFEM’s
new publication and the panelists clearly delineated the need for
greater attention to women and girls in DDR for long-term success.
A comparison of Liberia and Burundi highlighted the difference in
improvement based on engendering DDR, underscoring that this is
issue of utmost importance. “Getting it Right, Doing it Right:
Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration”
is an important step forward in the process of including a gender
perspective in the process of disarmament and reconstruction, and
is available at http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/gettingitright.pdf
- Sunita Palekar
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
sunita@peacewomen.org
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Three draft resolutions on chemical and biological weapons have
been submitted this week.
Poland submitted a draft resolution, “Implementation of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/59/L.16)
to the First Committee. The resolution notes that since last year,
eight additional States have ratified or acceded to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), increasing the total number of States
parties to the Convention to 166. Also, the resolution emphasizes
the universality of the Convention and the importance of implementation
and verification mechanisms. Poland, the sole sponsor, asked for
the approval of the draft resolution without a vote, as was given
last year.
Mr. Da Rocha Paranhos, representing the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) States, stated a need for improvement of verification
mechanisms of the CWC and noted Libya’s accession to the Convention.
MERCOSUR States organized a technical meeting for customs officials
in Buenos Aires from September 6-8, which discussed customs control
on the importing and exporting of chemicals.
Romania expressed support for the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and hosted a meeting of national authorities
of the Easter European States parties to the CWC in May. The participants
at this meeting reviewed the status of the Convention’s implementation
in Eastern Europe and focused on monitoring. At this meeting Romania,
with the United States, launched a program that aims at making software
available to national authorities who need legal and practical support
in implementing CWC provisions.
Hungary’s resolution, “Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” (A/C.1/59/L.17),
also submitted this week, requests that the Secretary-General assist
the government implementation of decisions made at the Review Conferences
for the Biological Weapons Convention.
Speaking on behalf of the European Union, Chris Sanders of the
Netherlands outlined several actions the EU has been taking to implement
the CWC and the BTWC. They include financially supporting OPCW programs
and the consideration of giving support to OPCW States Parties,
hosting a seminar on challenge inspections (for the CWC), restricting
the trade of materials that can be used to make biological weapons,
and searching for ways to strengthen compliance with the BTWC.
Malaysia, on behalf the Non-Aligned Movement, submitted a draft
resolution entitled “Measures to uphold the authority of the
1925 Geneva Protocol.” This resolution renews the call to
member states to adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. Kwang-Chullew,
of the Republic of Korea, expressed his country’s support
for this resolution.
Italy emphasized that Cooperative Threat Reduction isn’t
only relevant to nuclear disarmament, but also “regards other
weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological, and radiological.”
- Carol Longenecker,
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
disarmtimes@igc.org
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