THE CTBT: OBSTACLES TO ENTRY INTO FORCE

SEPTEMBER 2012

Reaching Critical Will
Foreword

Ray Acheson and Tim Wright

Today, more than 16 years after the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted, significant obstacles remain on the path to its full implementation. The Reaching Critical Will project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) has published this report on government positions on the CTBT to highlight why entry into force of the treaty should not be treated as a precondition to nuclear disarmament or to the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons completely.

While WILPF fully supports the objectives of the CTBT, the treaty must not be used as an excuse for continued failure by governments to take concrete action for nuclear disarmament. It is time for states to prohibit not only nuclear testing, but also the design, development, deployment, modernization, and possession of these indiscriminate and unacceptable weapons.

Military establishments must end their reliance on nuclear weapons as instruments of so-called “security” through “deterrence”, and as tools of the conduct of international relations. Governments and civil society alike have a responsibility to draw the global public’s attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons – and the urgent need for their elimination.

The CTBT is often described as a necessary step on the path to nuclear disarmament. Putting a definitive end to nuclear weapons testing would indeed constitute progress toward halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons – it would make it harder for states to develop nuclear weapons if they don’t already have them, and it would make it difficult for states with nuclear weapons to “improve” them.

However, a significant shortcoming of the CTBT is that it does not expressly forbid qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons through subcritical testing and other means. Since 1997, the United States has carried out over 20 subcritical nuclear tests at its Nevada Test Site. The United Kingdom and Russia have also conducted such tests. This loophole has meant that nuclear weapon states are able to undermine the CTBT’s stated objectives of disarmament and the prevention of further nuclear weapon modernization and subsequent arms races.
Furthermore, as this report shows, the achievement of CTBT ratification in some key countries depends politically on US ratification. Yet the US Senate has proven consistently hostile to the CTBT, and there is every reason to believe that, in exchange for ratification of this treaty, the military hawks in the Senate would demand further investment in the nuclear weapons complex, just as they did in exchange for ratification of New START.

For that treaty, which essentially changed the accounting rules on deployed warheads so that Russia and the United States could maintain their arsenals at present levels, the Obama administration committed US$185 billion over the next 20 years to the modernization and upgrading of US nuclear weapons, delivery systems and related infrastructure. This money could of course be put to much better use elsewhere to provide real human security.

Regional tensions, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, have also prevented the CTBT’s entry into force. The sections in this report addressing the positions of countries in these regions demonstrate the ongoing stalemate regarding progress on banning nuclear testing.

The international community cannot wait for or rely on the US Senate to ratify the CTBT (especially without anti-disarmament conditions), nor for regional tensions to be solved. While WILPF will continue to urge all Annex 2 states to ratify the CTBT without conditions, we believe it is also vital that the nuclear weapon possessors maintain their testing moratoria and cease subcritical testing immediately.

In addition, we demand that all of these states halt their plans for development of new nuclear weapons or modernization of existing warheads, delivery systems, and facilities. Furthermore, since the CTBT Organization has the capacity and infrastructure to implement the treaty, states parties should take the decision to allow on-site inspections and provisionally enter the treaty into force.

Ending nuclear testing and achieving nuclear disarmament are not just the responsibility of the nuclear-armed states. The international community cannot leave it up to them to decide when they are ready to ratify the CTBT or to disarm: the so-called “step-by-step process” has proven insufficient in achieving results.

It is up to non-nuclear weapon states to undertake concrete actions against nuclear weapons by creating political, economic and legal obstacles to their development, modernization, deployment and possession. A process to ban nuclear weapons completely should be initiated without further delay, and must not be conditional upon entry into force of the CTBT.

*September 2012*
Introduction

Eloise Watson

A permanent prohibition on nuclear weapons testing has long been sought. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the product of over 50 years of multilateral dialogue and negotiation on banning nuclear testing. A treaty that proscribes all nuclear test explosions constrains a state from confirming the validity of its nuclear weapon design, thereby hampering the development of new forms of nuclear warheads.

Beyond these immediate security gains, a test ban treaty also plays a significant symbolic role within the international security arena. Such a treaty codifies a global non-nuclear norm whereby nuclear weapons are delegitimized and stigmatized, and nuclear competition is minimized.

For decades, political scientists, historians and policy makers alike have been vociferous in their support of a test ban treaty. Particularly in recent years, there has been a rising tide of clamour for CTBT implementation. To date, 189 countries have signed the CTBT and 157 countries have ratified it.

However, more than 15 years after it was first opened for signature, 38 governments are yet to ratify the treaty, eight of which are Annex II states. Without the ratification of these eight Annex II states, the CTBT is barred from formal entry into force. Bringing the CTBT into full legal effect therefore hinges on the ratification of such states. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is urging universal adherence to the CTBT, having set the goal of bringing the treaty into force in 2012.

This guide examines the policies of the 39 non-ratifying states on the question of the CTBT. While some governments express their intention to ratify, others indicate their unwillingness to ratify unless certain conditions are met, such as the establishment of enhanced CTBT verification measures or ratification by other states.
**INTRODUCTION**

---

26 states have signed but not ratified

- Angola
- Brunei
- Chad
- China*
- Comoros
- Congo
- Egypt*
- Equatorial Guinea
- Gambia
- Guinea-Bissau
- Iran*
- Iraq
- Israel*
- Myanmar
- Nepal
- Niue
- Papua New Guinea
- São Tomé & Príncipe
- Solomon Islands
- Sri Lanka
- Swaziland
- Thailand
- Timor-Leste
- United States*
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe

13 states have neither signed nor ratified

- Bhutan
- Cuba
- DPRK*
- Dominica
- India*
- Mauritius
- Pakistan*
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- Syria
- Tonga
- Tuvalu

* States with an asterisk are Annex 2 states, meaning that their ratification is necessary for entry into force of the treaty.
SUMMARY OF POSITIONS

**China:** Ratification appears conditional upon US and possibly Indian ratification.

**Cuba:** Signature and ratification appear conditional upon greater progress on disarmament, particularly by the US.

**Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:** Ratification is incompatible with its development of nuclear weapons.

**Egypt:** Ratification appears conditional upon Israeli ratification of the CTBT and/or the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

**India:** Ratification appears conditional upon Chinese, Pakistani and perhaps also US ratification.

**Iran:** Ratification appears conditional upon US and Israeli ratification.

**Israel:** Ratification appears conditional upon Iranian ratification, as well as the resolution of regional disputes.

**Mauritius:** Ratification appears conditional upon greater progress towards nuclear disarmament.

**Pakistan:** Ratification appears conditional upon Indian and US ratification.

**Saudi Arabia:** Ratification appears conditional upon Iranian ratification.

**Syria:** Ratification appears conditional upon progress on negative security assurances and nuclear disarmament.

**United States:** Ratification is supported by the administration but may not have support from two-thirds of the Senate.

**Zimbabwe:** Ratification appears to be conditional upon US ratification.

We are not aware of any obstacles or objections to ratification for the 26 remaining countries not listed here.
Government positions

Angola

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Angola signed the CTBT on 27 September 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.¹

Bhutan

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Bhutan has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT.² Bhutan voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.³

Brunei

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Brunei signed the CTBT on 22 January 1997. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.⁴

Chad

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Chad signed the CTBT on 8 October 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.⁵

---

1  Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
2  Vote on Resolution A/RES/50/245, 10 September 1996.
3  Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid.
China

*Ratification appears conditional upon US and possibly Indian ratification.*

China was one of the first states to endorse the CTBT, becoming a signatory on 24 September 1996, and has supported and co-sponsored recent resolutions relating to the treaty in the UN General Assembly. On several occasions, it has stated its support for the early entry into force of the CTBT. Particularly since July 1996, when it declared a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, China has said that it is working “unswervingly” for the CTBT’s early entry into force. In September 2009, Beijing stated that “China is the Treaty’s constant supporter and abides by its commitment to moratorium on nuclear test[ing]” and will “continue to work with the international community to facilitate the early entry into force”. It has established national monitoring stations on its territory, continues to participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO and regularly transmits relevant data to the Commission’s Provisional Technical Secretariat.

In February 2009, the Chinese government submitted the CTBT to the National People’s Congress for ratification. China has stated that it will “continue to do its utmost to have the ratification procedure completed by the NPC at an early date”. China voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to ratify the CTBT. Experts have explained China’s non-ratification of the CTBT as linked to the non-ratification by the US and perhaps India.

Comoros

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Comoros signed the CTBT on 12 December 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.

---

6 See for example statement by China in the First Committee Thematic Debate (66th Session of the UN General Assembly), New York, 7 October 2011; statement by China at the NPT Review Conference, New York, 4 May 2010.


8 Statement by China to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 23 September 2011.


10 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.


12 Ibid.
Congo

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Congo signed the CTBT on 11 February 1997. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.\(^{13}\)

Cuba

*Signature and ratification appear conditional upon greater progress towards nuclear disarmament, particularly by the US.*

Cuba is one of two remaining states in Latin America and the Caribbean that have not yet signed or ratified the treaty. It has said that the final decision of its ratification of the CTBT will be made “in the context of the commitment to peace and multilateralism of the Cuban Government and people, and will be announced in due course to the international community”.\(^{14}\)

Cuba has maintained a position in support of the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing. In a letter sent to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons in February 2012, Cuba reiterated its opposition to nuclear weapons testing, stating that all nuclear weapons tests “must be stopped immediately and forever”.\(^{15}\) Cuba actively participated in the negotiations of the CTBT and voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.\(^{16}\)

Cuba has stated that the “lack of political will by some states to achieve actual progress on disarmament” is the primary cause for the paralysis currently afflicting much of the activity of the disarmament machinery.\(^{17}\) The treaty’s failure to reflect the commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons within a specified time is one reason for which the CTBT negotiations “did not respond to the interests and expectations of Cuba”.\(^{18}\)

Cuba is also opposed to other aspects of the treaty, such as its incapacity to halt the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. In particular, Cuba has said that it is disappointed by the treaty’s failure to prohibit non-explosive nuclear tests, which some nuclear powers currently use.\(^{19}\)

---

\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Email to ICAN from the Embassy of Cuba, Canberra, 9 March 2012.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.

\(^{17}\) Statement by H.E. Ambassador Oscar Leon Gonzalez to the First Committee General Debate, New York, 5 October 2011.

\(^{18}\) Email to ICAN from the Embassy of Cuba, Canberra, 9 March 2012.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

*Ratification is incompatible with the country’s development of nuclear weapons.*

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT, and has refrained from making any public statements about its CTBT intentions or justifications for its non-adherent stance. DPRK was the sole country that voted against the 2010 and 2011 UN General Assembly resolutions urging states to sign and ratify the CTBT.\(^{20}\)

Dominica

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Dominica is the other remaining state in Latin America and the Caribbean that has not yet signed or ratified the CTBT. Attempts to elicit a response from the Dominican government regarding its posture on the CTBT have so far been unsuccessful.\(^{21}\) Dominica voted on neither the 2010 nor 2011 UN General Assembly resolutions on the CTBT. Its most recent vote was in favour of the 2009 resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.\(^{22}\)

Egypt

*Ratification appears conditional upon Israeli ratification of the CTBT and/or the Non-Proliferation Treaty.*

Egypt signed the CTBT on 14 October 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.\(^{23}\) Egypt is a member of the New Agenda Coalition, a group of states striving for total nuclear disarmament.

In a statement made in the UN General Assembly’s First Committee in 2010, Egypt explained that Israel’s persistence not to join the NPT is a “significant obstacle facing the accession of Egypt to […] the CTBT”.\(^{24}\) It has argued that ratifying the treaty would “further widen the gap” between the commitments of the Arab states, all of which have been parties to the NPT since 1995, and Israel.\(^{25}\)

In a statement made in the First Committee in 2011, Egypt explained that the success of its nuclear disarmament efforts rests on “utilising the full implementation of the four action plans adopted by the NPT Review Conference in 2010”, which will “open the door for other actions towards … the full ratification of the CTBT”.\(^{26}\)

\(^{20}\) Vote on Resolution A/RES/65/91, 18 October 2010; Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.

\(^{21}\) “Dominica and Cuba Lone Caribbean Countries Refusing to Sign Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” The Dominican.net, 15 January 2012.

\(^{22}\) Vote on Resolution A/RES/64/29, 2 December 2009.

\(^{23}\) Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.

\(^{24}\) Statement in the First Committee Thematic Debate, 22 October 2010.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.

\(^{26}\) Statement by H.E. Ambassador Maged Abdel Aziz, Egyptian
Egypt has displayed a reluctance to assume further non-proliferation obligations that it perceives may impinge on its rights to peaceful nuclear technology. Egypt warned “we are not as non-nuclear states going to accept that each time there is progress in disarmament that we have to take more obligations on our side”.27

Equatorial Guinea

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Equatorial Guinea signed the CTBT on 9 October 1996. It voted neither on the 2010 nor 2011 UN General Assembly resolutions relating to the treaty. Its most recent vote was in favour of the 2009 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to ratify the CTBT.28

Gambia

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Gambia signed the CTBT on 9 April 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.29

Guinea-Bissau

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Guinea-Bissau signed the CTBT on 11 April 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.30

India

Ratification appears conditional upon Chinese, Pakistani and perhaps also US ratification.

India has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. Despite this, it was among the first nations to advocate such a treaty. India withdrew its support during the CTBT negotiations of the early 1990s on grounds of technical objection and national security concerns. For example, it was strongly opposed to Article XIV on entry into force,31 which it claimed would “only succeed in perpetuating a discriminatory status quo” by dividing the world into the “nuclear haves” and “have-nots”.32
Similarly, it deplored the treaty’s improvidence in failing to provide a time-bound framework for total nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states. India also argued it could not subscribe to the CTBT since it left a loophole for nuclear activity by banning only nuclear explosions as opposed to all types of nuclear tests. Finally, India’s CTBT resistance derived from its security concerns: “India cannot accept any restraint on its [nuclear] capability” while “countries around [it] continue their weapons program”.  

Over a decade later, India’s anti-CTBT stance persists. As communicated by national security adviser M.K. Narayanan in 2007, “there is no question of [India] signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That position remains.” However, the terms of India’s CTBT debate have changed somewhat. For example, technical concerns with the treaty are no longer as decisive in its approach, particularly since it has now acquired nuclear weapons, rendering untenable its argument of “discrimination against have-nots”. Instead, India’s regional security calculations now represent the key obstacle to its ratification of the treaty. Situated between two nuclear-armed states (China and Pakistan) that share a cooperative nuclear weapons relationship, India has long felt vulnerable. Its apparent sense of trepidation has been intensified by Pakistan’s foreign and security policy, as well as by China’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy, economic pre-eminence and concomitant precipitous rise in military capabilities. From the Indian standpoint, such a perilous regional situation cannot be viewed with equanimity. Therefore, India believes it must retain a right to conduct more nuclear tests “which are necessary from the point of view of security”. In this way, China and Pakistan’s behaviour has an important bearing on India’s response to global arms-control agreements, including the CTBT. India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, affirmed this at a Japan–India Press Conference in 2009, in which he reportedly pledged that the ratification of China (and the US) to the CTBT would “create a new situation”, generating momentum within the country in favour of accession.

Assembly, New York, 9 September 1996.

33 India’s Statement by H.E Arundhati Ghose at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 20 June 1996.


35 For concerns expressed by India on Pakistan’s foreign policy, see Annual Report 2010-2011, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2011, p. 5.


38 India’s Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the Joint
India’s approach to the CTBT is equally influenced by US disarmament leadership (or lack thereof). Some scholars argue that India has a natural proclivity for changing its behaviour (concerning nuclear issues) based on the US example. In line with this thinking, New Delhi can be seen to have maintained its status as an outlier to the CTBT since the US has done the same. Likewise, a lack of US effort (under the Bush administration) to press India on its non-adherent posture, as well as the United States’ establishment of a 2008 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with India, has enhanced New Delhi’s disinterest in CTBT ratification.

By contrast, US ratification of the CTBT, in conjunction with a US-led drive to tighten non-proliferation and promote a nuclear-weapon-free world, would likely encourage India to ratify. This logic is promoted by many, notably Carl Paddock, a well-known political analyst and journalist, who contends that India will undeniably refrain from signing the CTBT before the US but will almost certainly sign it after the US. Similarly, Shashi Tharoor, a prominent Indian politician, suggests that “it would be unthinkable for India […] to hold out […] if the US signed.”

Iran

*Ratification appears conditional upon US and Israeli ratification.*

Iran signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 and continues to offer general support for it. It participated “fully and constructively” in the CTBT negotiation process. It has since acknowledged the inherent value of the treaty on several occasions, lauding it as an “essential element to implement Article VI of the NPT” (which related to disarmament), and advocating “consolidated efforts to facilitate [its] entry into force.”

Moreover, as explained by Annika Thuborg, CTBTO spokesperson, in a letter to *Arms Control Today*, Iran is “a very active member of the CTBTO [and] participates in all its meetings.” Tehran is also the bearer of one CTBTO primary seismic station and has two auxiliary stations, which are currently being tested.

Press Conference of Japan and India following the Japan-India Summit Meeting, New Delhi, 19 December 2009.


41 Shashi Tharoor, “Have No Fear, Things Won’t Be So Bad,” *Times of India*, Delhi, 9 November 2008.


However, Iran has refrained from ratifying the CTBT, conditioning its accession principally on the easing of geo-political tensions. Iran’s historical experience with its Middle Eastern counterparts has fostered deep misgivings within the state, creating a major stumbling block to Tehran’s ratification. For Iran, “the difficulty [of facilitating ratification] lies in the security doctrines [of other states]”. In particular, Tehran refers to Israel’s “policy of terror” (established through its nuclear weapons), which it censures as harmful to the organizational structure of the CTBTO and which it believes “[h]as created a situation [whereby...] arms-control instruments have failed to receive the full support [of Iran]”.

Iran is also critical of Israel’s refusal to join the NPT. It believes that Israel’s prompt accession to the NPT would be a “key factor in paving the way for entry into force of the CTBT”. Indeed, such an act would give credibility to Israel’s pronounced commitment to a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and assuage Iran’s fear of Israeli nuclear capability and strategic dominance. Similarly, if Israel ratifies the CTBT, Iran will likely follow suit, since “it will be increasingly difficult for Tehran [...] to successfully argue its dissenting stance”.

The US posture on the CTBT also has some influence on that of Iran. Tehran argues that it “cannot act in isolation”, denouncing the US Senate’s 1999 rejection of the CTBT, which it says “[h]as enormously affected the overall CTBT ratification process” and “[h]as damaged the prospect of the entry into force of the treaty”. Additionally, Iran states that nuclear-weapon states, particularly the United States, will “have to ratify the treaty first” before it contemplates doing the same.

However, it appears that if the US alone were to ratify, it would have “a tremendously positive impact” on Tehran’s nuclear calculus and subsequent inclination for ratification. This was insinuated by one Iranian diplomat in 2007, who claimed that US ratification of the CTBT would be “a positive step towards restoration of [Iran’s] confidence” and reconsideration of its CTBT stance.

46 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
Iraq

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Iraq signed the CTBT on 19 August 2008. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.\(^{54}\) It associated itself with the statement made by Indonesia in 2011 on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement acknowledging that universal adherence to the CTBT is vital for realizing nuclear disarmament.

Israel

Ratification appears conditional upon Iranian ratification, as well as the resolution of regional disputes.

An early signatory to the CTBT (25 September 1996), Israel has repeatedly expressed its “unequivocal” support for the treaty at international forums, extolling it as “an indispensable element of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime”.\(^{55}\) In addition, Israel has consistently voted in favour of annual CTBT resolutions due to “the importance it attaches to the objectives of the CTBT”.\(^{56}\) Its strong backing of the treaty is also evinced by its vigorous participation in, and financial contribution to, the activities of the CTBTO, particularly those pertaining to the CTBT verification regime.

Despite this stated support for the treaty, Israel remains reluctant to ratify it. Israeli diplomats consistently cite the same three justifications for such reluctance, two of which are technical in nature. Firstly, before it ratifies, Israel demands the “right to sovereign equality” within the CTBTO Executive Council – the organization’s principal policymaking body. As specified in the treaty’s text, the 51 seats on the Executive Council are assigned on the basis of six geographical regions. Israel’s inclusion in the Middle East and South Asia grouping (MESA) is staunchly opposed by several states, especially Iran.

Refusing to participate in any group of which Israel is a member, Iran has prevented MESA from its proper functioning in the CTBTO Preparatory Committee meetings, and consequently has stymied Israel’s efforts to work within the group. Israel laments this “regrettable situation”, which it claims has “impact[ed] on [its] national policy regarding the ratification of the treaty” and has “jeopardized the prospects for early entry into force of the treaty”.\(^{57}\) Alon Bar, former director of arms control in Israel’s foreign

\(^{54}\) Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.


\(^{56}\) Israel’s Statement by Eyal Propper, Explanation of Vote on Resolution L48 to UNGA First Committee, New York, 27 October 2010.

\(^{57}\) Israel’s Statement by Dr. Itshak Lederman at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Vienna, 17-18 September 2007.
ministry, suggests that the Israeli government “is highly sensitive to the tolerance exhibited by multilateral frameworks to blatant discrimination against its country”. It is no wonder, then, that Israel “attaches high value” to the resolution of the “equal status” issue, insisting on a depoliticized organizational infrastructure which will “guide its approach towards [CTBT] ratification”.

A second technical objection relates to a lack of confidence in the CTBTO’s monitoring and compliance mechanisms. Israel is of the firm belief that the treaty’s current surveillance system is vulnerable to misuse by states; it alleges that the treaty’s verification procedures may be exploited by hostile states to make false accusations of nuclear testing as a way to gain access to Israel’s sensitive facilities.

As such, a further prerequisite for Israel’s ratification is the “readiness of the verification regime” – especially that of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the On-Site Inspections (OSI) – and its “immunity to abuse”. Accordingly, Israel consistently exhorts “additional efforts” to plug the gaps in the verification regime, of which “the completion [... would] constitute a major consideration for [its] ratification”.

Israel’s CTBT deliberations are also mired in geostrategic concerns. At several biannual Article XIV conferences, the delegation has deplored the precarious regional security situation of the Middle East, which it describes as a key obstruction to its CTBT ratification. Recent regional developments have rekindled a sense of vulnerability in Israel’s strategic thinking. Such developments include the 2006 Lebanon war, political upheavals like the Jasmine Revolution and the Arab Spring, and the aiming of missiles and rockets at Israel.

In light of the prevailing regional atmosphere, Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, rightly claims that the prospects for CTBT ratification by Israel (among other Middle Eastern holdouts) are “inexorably entwined with the complexities and nuances of [its] security situation”. The Israeli government affirms

59 Israel’s Statement by H.E. David Danieli at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, New York, 24-25 September 2009.
60 Israel’s Statement by Eyal Propper at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, New York, 23 September 2011.
61 Israel’s Statement by Eyal Propper, 2010.
62 See for example Israel’s statement by H.E. David Danieli, 2007; and Israel’s Statement by Eyal Propper, 2010.
this, maintaining that “nuclear issues […] can only be realistically addressed within the regional [security] context”. Therefore, Israel’s inclination towards CTBT ratification “will be influenced by […] the adherence to and compliance with the CTBT by states in the Middle East”. Iran’s acquiescence to the treaty, in particular, would provide significant inducement so as to increase Israel’s propensity for CTBT ratification. Shlomo Brom gives credence to this premise, explaining that such an act might help to “neutralize the Iranian threat […] which would] allow the Israeli leadership to be more open to arms control ideas”.67

Mauritius

Ratification appears conditional upon greater progress towards nuclear disarmament.

Mauritius has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. It abstained from voting on both the 2011 and 2010 UN General Assembly resolutions urging states to sign and ratify the treaty. In a letter sent to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons in April 2012, Mauritius explained that it has “so far not signed the CTBT mainly because the treaty allows nuclear weapons states to continue to have their stockpiles of nuclear weapons while it prohibits others from acquiring such weapons”. It further stated that it “would like all the present nuclear weapons states to make a firm commitment on total nuclear disarmament”.69

Myanmar

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Myanmar signed the CTBT on 25 November 1996. It has lauded the “crucial role [of the CTBT] in realising nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”.71 It has urged non-ratifying Annex II states to ratify in order to “achieve the earliest entry into force of this important treaty”.72

---

65 Israel’s Statement by H.E. David Danieli, 2009.
66 Israel’s Statement by Dr. Itshak Lederman, 2007.
68 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011 and Vote on Resolution A/RES/64/29, 2 December 2009.
69 Letter to ICAN by Mrs. Mirella Chauvin, High Commissioner for the Republic of Mauritius to Australia, 23 April 2012.
70 Ibid.
71 Statement by H.E. Mr U Maung Wai, Permanent Representative of Myanmar to Geneva, to the First Committee General Debate of the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 7 October 2011.
72 Ibid.
In a letter sent to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons in March 2012, Myanmar noted that its non-ratification of the treaty should not be construed as having the intention or capability of nuclear weapons. In the same letter, it stated that once Myanmar’s democratizing process crystallizes, this will pave the way for “the necessary domestic processes for legislation, and capacity-building will follow in line with the new State Constitution with regard to all international commitments including the ratification of the CTBT”.

**Nepal**

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Nepal signed the CTBT on 8 October 1996. It “strongly believes in the elimination of nuclear weapons to attain nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation once and for all”. It associated itself with a statement made by Indonesia in 2011 on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement acknowledging that universal adherence to the CTBT is vital for realizing nuclear disarmament.

**Niue**

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

The Pacific Island state of Niue is the smallest and most recent signatory to the CTBT (9 April 2012). At a 2011 conference, it stated that “although Niue is small, we support the community of 182 countries which have signed the treaty”. At the same conference, it was concluded that Kalayatagaloa T.A. Morrisey, assistant external affairs officer, would report back to the Niue’s parliament, “where [...] ratification of the Treaty [would] be discussed.”

**Pakistan**

*Ratification appears conditional upon Indian and US ratification.*

Pakistan has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. However, it signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and started out as an avid proponent of the CTBT. After active engagement in the negotiation process, it looked set to sign the treaty in 1996. However, it did not do so, attributing its defection to national security concerns.

---

73 Letter to ICAN from H.E. Mr. Paw Lwin Sein, Ambassador of Myanmar to Australia, 14 March 2012.
74 Ibid.
75 Statement by H.E. Mr Gyan Chandra Acharya, Ambassador of Nepal to the UN, to the First Committee General Debate of the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 6 October 2011.
76 Statement made by Indonesia and the Non-Aligned Movement.
77 Statement by Talatitaama Talaiti, Niue’s Associate Minister for External Affairs, at a brief fact-finding visit to the headquarters of the Preparatory CTBTO in Vienna, 17 August 2011.
78 Ibid.
particularly those derived from the perceived Indian threat and the rejection of the CTBT by India. As Pakistan’s former foreign minister Sarder Aseff Ali explained in 1996, “the CTBT without India would be meaningless for South Asia”.79

Today prospects for Pakistan’s ratification are increasingly dim. According to Pakistani diplomats, while the country is “not opposed to the objectives and purposes of the treaty”,80 it “has no plan to sign the CTBT”.81 Pakistan’s foreign minister from 2002 to 2007, Kurshid Kasuri, explained that the country’s ratification of the CTBT would be “unrealistic to expect” since it would “lower the threshold of [its] security”.82

India presents the most considerable South Asian security challenge to Pakistan. Enmity between the two neighbours has continued unabated for decades, largely rooted in territorial disputes and issues of national identity. The overwhelming conventional (and economic) imbalance between the two states (in India’s favour) has also increased fear and garnered antipathy in Pakistan. Therefore, as long as India remains outside the CTBT, Pakistan has “sufficient company, as well as the perceived necessity, to maintain its current [anti-CTBT] course”.83

Former Pakistani prime minister Shaukat Aziz acknowledged this when he allegedly refused to “unilaterally” sign the CTBT since his country “shares a border with India”.84 However, given Pakistan’s “Indo-centric” security policy, an Indian ratification of the CTBT would likely generate a mirror action from Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan argues its ratification “will be facilitated when major erstwhile proponents of the CTBT” – an undeniable reference to India – “decide to restore their support”.85

Another leitmotif in scholarship concerning Pakistan’s CTBT non-adherence is the influential role of the United States. In 1999, Pakistan’s willingness to ratify the treaty significantly waned following the US Senate’s rejection of the CTBT. Pakistani leadership argued, “if the largest power is out of this, it’s all over […] the treaty is dead”.86

79 The Muslim, (Delhi), 4 August 1996, quoted in Bhumitra Chakma, “The NPT, the CTBT and Pakistan,” 276.
80 India’s Statement by H.E. Shahbaz at the ‘Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the CTBT, Vienna, 17-18 September 2007.
81 Statement by Abdul Basit, Spokesman Briefing: Record of Press Briefing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 18 June 2009.
85 Pakistan’s Explanation of Vote on Resolution L28, 17 October 2007.
86 Quoted in Donald McNeil, “Weight of US Treaty Vote Emerges at
The influence of the United States in shaping Pakistan’s CTBT stance is also highlighted when scrutinizing Islamabad’s response to the US–India nuclear deal. Pakistan strongly opposes Washington’s nuclear cooperation with India, censuring it as “discriminatory” and “a dangerous development”. As a result of the deal, foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Basit said that “new realities have to be considered. I can tell you at this point [...] there is no consideration to sign the CTBT”. Washington’s behaviour has demonstrably fuelled Pakistani conviction that CTBT ratification is unwarranted.

Papua New Guinea

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Papua New Guinea signed the CTBT on 25 September 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty. It believes that “every effort must be made to bring into force the provisions of the CTBT”, and is currently in the process of formally ratifying the treaty.

Papua New Guinea affirmed this in a letter sent to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons in March 2012, stating that “[t]he Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Papua New Guinea has commenced work on preparing necessary paperwork, including consultations with concerned line agencies/departments to facilitate the ratification of the Treaty”. However, it stated that ratification may “take longer than expected ... due to the current political situation and the forthcoming general elections in PNG”.

Saudi Arabia

Ratification appears conditional upon Iranian ratification.

Saudi Arabia has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. However, it voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty. Saudi Arabia’s stance on the CTBT hinges to a large degree on resolution of the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme. Saudi Arabia is perturbed by the alleged

---

87 India’s Statement by Raza Tarar at the Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons, First Committee of the 66th Session of the UNGA, New York, 13 October 2001.
89 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
90 Statement by H.E. Mr Robert Aisi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of PNG to the UN, at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NPT, New York, 6 May 2010.
91 Letter to ICAN from Charles Lepani, Papua New Guinea High Commissioner to Australia, Canberra, 16 March 2012.
92 Ibid.
93 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
Iranian threat, and has suggested it will “look into ... obtaining these weapons”. In a statement made in 2011, Saudi Arabia explained that it “seriously considers the commitments and respect of ... Iran to its obligations concerning the prevention of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region”.

São Tomé and Príncipe
No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.
São Tomé and Príncipe signed the CTBT on 26 September 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.

Solomon Islands
No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.
The Solomon Islands signed the CTBT on 3 October 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.

Somalia
No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.
Somalia has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. However, it voted in favour of the 2010 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the CTBT.

Sri Lanka
No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.
Sri Lanka signed the CTBT on 24 October 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.

Swaziland
No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.
Swaziland signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.

94 “Prince Turki floats N-option against Israeli, Iran threats: Nervous Gulf stresses unity,” Arab Times (Riyadh), 6 December 2011.
95 Saudi Arabia’s Statement to the First Committee, 11 October 2011.
96 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Vote on Resolution A/RES/65/91, 18 October 2010.
100 Ibid.
Syria

Ratification appears conditional upon progress on negative security assurances and nuclear disarmament.

Syria has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. It abstained from voting on both the 2010 and 2011 UN General Assembly resolutions on the treaty. In its explanation of vote in 2011, the Syrian delegation explained that the CTBT ignores the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear weapon states about receiving negative security assurances. Furthermore, Syria argued that the CTBT does not require the nuclear weapon states to disarm within a reasonable period of time; nor does it explicitly stress the illegitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of use.

The CTBT, Syria argued, is confined to forbidding nuclear explosions without discussing ongoing nuclear developments and new types of weapons and their production. Syria also argued the treaty’s monitoring provisions could be politically abused. It made reservations on all paragraphs contained in resolutions adopted at the UN General Assembly that mention the CTBT.

Thailand

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Thailand signed the CTBT on 12 November 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty. It has stated that it has cooperated closely with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and lent support to CTBT-related activities. Thailand approves of a prohibition on nuclear testing, and therefore “supports the early entry into force of the CTBT”. It has stated that it is “working to complete [its] internal process required for the ratification of the CTBT”.

Timor-Leste

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Timor-Leste signed the CTBT on 26 September 2008. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty. In 2010 it stated that it “intends to ratify [the CTBT] in due course”.

101 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011; and vote on Resolution A/RES/65/91, 18 October 2010.
102 Explanation of Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 28 October 2011.
103 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
108 Statement by Mr Isilio Coelho, Director General for External Relations.
**Tonga**

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Tonga has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. However, it voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.\(^{109}\)

**Tuvalu**

*No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.*

Tuvalu has neither signed nor ratified the CTBT. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.\(^{110}\) It has emphasized the binding character of the treaty.\(^{111}\)

**United States of America**

*Ratification is supported by the administration but may not have support from the requisite two-thirds of the Senate.*

The United States signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996. According to then-President Bill Clinton, the CTBT represented a “giant step forward” that would “help prevent the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and dangerous weapons”.\(^{112}\) The treaty was initially put to the US Senate for ratification in 1999; it did not gain the necessary two-thirds majority and was not ratified.

However, the “safeguards” that the Clinton administration attached to the treaty when seeking ratification, which included a commitment to maintain an extensive array of nuclear weapons research, testing, and production facilities, were implemented even though ratification of the CTBT was rejected.

This resulted in “billions of dollars for intensive innovation in nuclear weapons science and simulation, no test ban treaty, and no international mechanism to monitor and enforce a prohibition on nuclear weapons tests”.\(^{113}\) The Senate’s failure to consent to ratification of the treaty was the first rejection of a major international agreement since the League of Nations accord.

President George W. Bush strongly opposed the CTBT, and did not bring the treaty before the Senate during his term. President

\(^{109}\) Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.

\(^{110}\) Ibid.


\(^{112}\) Bill Clinton, Remarks to the 51\(^{st}\) Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 September 1996.

\(^{113}\) Reclaiming the Comprehensive Test Ban: The Senate CTBT Vote and the Road to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Western States Legal Foundation, at <http://www.wslfweb.org/nukes/reclaim.htm>.
Barack Obama, however, supports the CTBT. His administration set about to "immediately and aggressively" pursue US ratification, which it considers an "administration priority". An array of official statements and government actions highlight this commitment. The US also provides extensive financial support to the CTBTO, being the single largest financial contributor to the organization.

However, US ratification of the CTBT continues to face major opposition from Republicans, and the requisite two-thirds majority support in the US Senate significantly curtails the likelihood of an expedited ratification by the US. Treaty opponents predominantly centre their objections on the CTBTO’s (lack of) verifiability, the (in)ability to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of the US stockpile in the absence of testing, and the (limited) extent to which the treaty actually enhances the non-proliferation agenda.

In a 2009 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategy Posture of the US, it is stated that half of the Commission’s members believe that “the passage of the treaty would confer no substantive benefits for the country’s nuclear posture and would pose security risks”.

In line with its goal to secure the US Senate’s ratification, the Obama administration has commissioned several reports, including an updated National Intelligence Estimate and an independent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report, aimed at engaging the US Senate and the public on the merits of the CTBT, particularly in light of the considerable technological advances of the last decade.

However, many non-governmental experts are concerned that a renewed effort to seek Senate ratification would result in another multi-billion-dollar deal for nuclear weapon modernization, just as the ratification of New START did in 2010.

The US voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty.

114 Barack Obama, Remarks By President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, Washington DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 April 2009.
118 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
Yemen

No apparent obstacle or objection to ratification.

Yemen signed the CTBT on 30 September 1996. It voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty. 119

Zimbabwe

Ratification appears to be conditional upon US ratification.

Zimbabwe signed the CTBT on 13 October 1999. It supports the goals of the treaty and believes that it “will be an important contribution towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”. 120 Zimbabwe has said that it is “encouraged by the invigorated efforts to bring its entry into force” and endorses US President Barack Obama’s commitment to pursuing US ratification of the CTBT. 121 Zimbabwe voted in favour of the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to sign and ratify the treaty. 122

---

119 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.
120 Statement by H.E. Mr Boniface Chidyausiku to the First Committee General Debate (64th Session of the UN General Assembly), New York, 12 October 2009.
121 Ibid.
122 Vote on Resolution A/RES/66/64, 14 October 2011.