Implementing Article VI

**Action 1:**
All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

**Action 3:**
In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

**Action 4:**
The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

**Action 5:**
The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:
(a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;
(b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;
(c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;
(d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;
(e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;
(f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and

**Action 6:**
All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

**Action 22:**
All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
according to these figures, the total numbers of nuclear weapons
are decreasing due to Russian and US reductions of Cold War
 arsenals. However, all NPT nuclear-armed states, as well as other
non-NPT nuclear-armed states, continue to either produce new
or modernize current nuclear weapon systems. In addition, all
nuclear-armed states insist that nuclear weapons are essential for
their national security.

China

Size of nuclear arsenal: 250.
Arsenal reductions: None, increased by 10.
Role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines: Unchanged.
Alert status: No change, China keeps its nuclear weapons on low alert.
Risk reduction: No information available on new risk reduction efforts.

There are various estimates on the size of China’s nuclear
arsenal. According to FAS, China has a total stockpile of around
250 nuclear warheads, most of them in storage. Under the
guideline of China’s no first use doctrine and the principle of
a “lean and effective” nuclear force, the main goal of China’s
nuclear modernization, initiated in the 1980s, is reportedly
aimed at securing a “limited and reliable” second-strike nuclear
force to “deter” a nuclear attack. China’s current modernization
efforts are aimed at qualitative improvement, rather than mere
quantitative increase, as has been the case during the past
three decades. Specifically, China’s efforts are mainly aimed
at increasing the survivability of its nuclear force by replacing
older, liquid-fuelled missiles with solid-fuelled, mobile ballistic
missiles, constructing underground tunnels that can act as
missile bases, and expanding its sea-based systems.

Quantitative
In April 2013, China published a new white paper that gives an
overview of China’s military strategy and arms control policy.
As in previous defence papers and other official documents, the
white paper does not reveal any basic information on the size of
China’s current nuclear capability or nuclear arsenal. However it
does mention that a strategic task of its modernization efforts is
to build a strong defence and powerful armed forces.

According to information provided by the British American
Security Information Council (BASIC), in 2011 China was
reported to be phasing out its older missiles, the DF-3A and
the DF-4, and replacing them with new DF-21 medium range
missiles, approximately 55-60 of which are nuclear capable.
In addition, China has deployed four other nuclear-capable
ballistic missiles, the DF-5A, DF-31, DF-31A, and JL-2. These
developments in missile capability will both increase the range
and sophistication of land-based systems and nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines.

Estimates in November 2013, published in an article of the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, indicate that China has about 148
land-based nuclear ballistic missiles that can carry one warhead
each. China also has additional warheads for their submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as bombs for air
delivery. The warheads are thought to be stored in another
location than the missiles and many of the strategic nuclear
warheads are intended only for regional use.

Unlike the other NPT nuclear-armed states, which are
maintaining their current arsenal levels or are slowly decreasing,
China is believed to be slowly increasing the size of its nuclear
weapons arsenal. China has prioritized land-based ballistic
and cruise missile programmes and according to the US
Department of Defense (DoD) assessment, China has the leading
programme in the world. The 2014 DoD report also states
that China may be developing intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM) with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
(MIRV) capability, as well as other technologies to counter other
countries’ ballistic missile defence systems, such as decoys, chaff,
jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite weapons.

China has also been reported to be replacing its first generation
ballistic nuclear missile-carrying submarines. In March 2011
two SSBNs were seen at Xiaopingdao submarine base and
Satellite pictures taken by the Pentagon indicated that China has already launched three Jin-class SSBNs and have more under construction. In actual numbers the currently active three JIN-class SSBNs could carry 36 missiles (12 each), which is an increase from the maximum of 12 SLBMs that the old Xia-class submarine could carry. Up to five of this kind may enter service before China will proceed to the next generation of submarines over the next decade. The latest DoD report estimated that the first nuclear deterrence patrols with JIN-class SSBN would be conducted in 2014.

Some analysts have argued that China is currently modernizing its sea-based strategic force in order to secure a second-strike force. The 2011 white paper states that “the PLA Navy (PLAN) endeavours to accelerate the modernization of its integrated combat forces, enhances its capabilities in strategic deterrence and counterattack, and develops its capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters and in countering non-traditional security threats.” In the 2013 white paper the focus of PLAN’s accelerated modernization efforts are the forces for comprehensive offshore operations, the development of advanced submarines, destroyers and frigates, and the improvement of integrated electronic and information systems. Furthermore, it repeats the endeavours stated in the 2011 white paper.

**Security doctrines and policies**

China reaffirmed its no first use and negative security assurance policy in the 2011 white paper. However, in the 2013 white paper that was not the case. The paper does explain that should China come under nuclear threat, alert levels will be increased, and should it come under nuclear attack, a counterattack will be launched. As a result, shortly after the whitepaper was released a debate arose whether this meant China was turning away from its no first use policy, as it did not specifically rule out other uses. However, China reaffirmed its commitment to the policy of no first use in its report submitted to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee. Thus, China has not reduced the role of nuclear weapons nor can a change in China’s security doctrine be reported.

**Qualitative**

China’s white paper from April 2013 states, “Following the principle of building a lean and effective force, the PLASAF [People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force] is striving to push forward its informationization transform, relying on scientific and technological progress to boost independent innovations in weaponry and equipment, modernizing current equipment selectively by applying mature technology, enhancing the safety, reliability and effectiveness of its missiles, improving its force structure of having both nuclear and conventional missiles, strengthening its rapid reaction, effective penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection and survivability capabilities.”
France

Size of nuclear arsenal: 300
Arsenal reductions: None.
Role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines: Unchanged.
Alert status: No change, many weapons remain on high-alert.
Risk reduction: No information available on new risk reduction efforts.

France has both a sea- and air-based nuclear capability and has announced a total nuclear stockpile of about 300 weapons. 290 of the 300 warheads are for deployment on the four French nuclear submarines.29 In its latest white paper of April 2013, the French government reaffirmed its position that “nuclear deterrence” is a means of protecting France’s vital interests.27 France is also in the process of modernizing its nuclear forces.28

Quantitative
In 2010 the Le Triomphant-class SSBNs submarines were completed. However, France is still in the process of modernising its four nuclear submarines.29 From the last estimates made on France’s nuclear capacity, 80% of France’s 300 nuclear warheads are for delivery on three ballistic missiles submarines and the remaining warheads are on cruise missiles for delivery by land- and sea-based strike aircraft. The French stockpile is expected to decrease to around 290 warheads within the next few years.30

Although FAS estimates that it does have a small inventory of spare warheads.31

Qualitative
The new Le Triomphant submarines are a modernization of France’s sea-based nuclear weapon system and will ensure that it can maintain its capability until at least the 2030s.32 The new submarines are quieter and the M45 missiles are gradually being replaced with longer-range M-51 missiles. The TN75 warhead will be replaced, starting in 2015, with the Tête nucléaire océanique warhead.33 In addition to modernizing its submarine-based nuclear forces, France is also introducing new aircrafts and missiles to its nuclear air force capabilities. This modernization is expected to result in a quantitative reduction of nuclear-capable aircrafts. France is also introducing a new nuclear warhead to its air-based nuclear system (Tête nucléaire aéroportée) as it is to its sea-launched ballistic missiles.34

Estimates on French nuclear spending vary from $4.6-6 billion per year. Deficit cuts announced by the French government would only limitedly affect the spending on nuclear weapons.35

Security doctrines and policies
The French government says it relies on its nuclear capacity to protect the country’s “independence and strategic autonomy” as well as to defend its “vital interests,” which former French President Sarkozy described as “identity and our existence as a nation-state, as well as our capacity to freely exercise our sovereignty.”36 The French government argues that nuclear weapons protect its territory from a potential attack and deter aggressions against France by another state.37 France has not adopted a no first use policy and President Hollande stressed its nuclear force will protect France against all threats and allow it to “play a strong role on the world stage”.38

In April 2013, France released a new white paper39, which mainly confirmed the positions outlined in the previous one from 2008. Deterrence is one of the three main priorities, along with protection and intervention, identified in the paper.40 Deterrence is also listed as part of a global approach consisting of five strategic functions (knowledge and anticipation, protection, prevention, deterrence, and intervention) to ensure national security in the coming years.41 Nuclear deterrence is defined as a strictly defensive protection from aggressions by another state against France’s vital interests and, thus, the “ultimate guarantee” for the country’s sovereignty.42 However, vital interests are not specifically defined in the white paper. This suggests that the use of nuclear weapons is not necessarily limited to the sole purpose of deterrence.

In February 2015, President François Hollande gave an address43 focused on nuclear deterrence, explaining the decision to maintain both air- and sea-based components of France’s nuclear force as part of the recent law on the military programme.44 This law allows for continued modernization of both components. In reviewing the role of nuclear deterrence, President Hollande reiterated previous assessments with regard to protection, stressed the complementary nature of nuclear to conventional...
forces, and highlighted the need for “continuity”. He also stressed that France’s “nuclear forces must be capable of inflicting absolutely unacceptable damage to the opponent on its centres of power, that is to say, its nerve centres, political, economic and military.”

Thus there is certainly no indication that France has reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its security doctrine in any way.

**Russia**

**Russian Federation**

- **Size of nuclear arsenal**: 8'000.
- **Arsenal reductions**: Reduction of around 5'500 warheads, mostly non-deployed.
- **Role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines**: Unchanged.
- **Alert status**: No change, many weapons remain on high-alert.
- **Risk reduction**: No information available on new risk reduction efforts.

Russia is estimated to have a total stockpile of 8000 nuclear warheads, of which about 3700 are awaiting dismantlement. Russia is also engaging in an extensive modernization of its strategic forces, as part of a broader rearmament programme focusing on various military systems in 2011-2020, $700 billion of which (about 10% of the total funds allocated for rearmament) will be spent on the modernization of nuclear weapon systems.

**Quantitative**

Russia has been retiring some delivery systems, such as old ICBMs, even before the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) entered into force. Most of the systems date back to the time of the Soviet Union, therefore the retirement is mainly due to the fact that their life expectancy has been reached. It has been retiring old missile systems—SS-25, SS-19, and SS-18—and replacing them with newer SS-27 (Topol-M) and SS-27 mod.2 (RS-24 Yars) ICBMs, deployed in silo or in road-mobile launchers. Old missiles, however, still account for the majority of deployed ICBMs and ICBM warheads. In total Russia has about 305 deployed ICBMs that can carry 1166 warheads. These include about 72 SS-25s, 60 SS-19s and around 46 SS-18 that together carry about 890 warheads. As for the newer ICBMs, as of January 2015 Russia is estimated to have 78 Topol-M and 49 RS-24 Yars missiles that could carry about 274 warheads.

Due to the retirement of older categories of ICBMs over the last few years, Russian numbers for these categories were already below the limits set by New START upon its entry into force. Data exchange under New START indicates that Russia has, as of 1 January 2015, 1'643 warheads deployed on 528 strategic delivery vehicles (the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers was 911). This means that since New START’s entry into force on 5 February 2011, Russia has increased its nuclear deployed delivery vehicles by 7, and its deployed warheads by 106 warheads. The total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers decreased by 46.

According to one estimate, Russia is dismantling about 400-500 warheads annually, with an estimated 200 or so warheads being replaced with remanufactured warheads, resulting in roughly 200-300 dismantled warheads annually. When US President Obama pledged during his State of the Union speech on 12 February 2013 to “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals,” the Russian Foreign Ministry responded that it was ready to study such proposals carefully. Similar calls made during President Obama’s speech in Berlin on 19 June 2013 were met with the same hesitation. The Russian administration has raised concerns with the status of non-nuclear weapons, such as the NATO missile defence system and the US conventional arsenal for a prompt global strike, in that connection. Additionally, it suggested including other nuclear-armed states in the process of arms reduction agreements.

**Qualitative**

President Putin announced in November 2013 that Russia should replace its Soviet-built arsenals with modern weapons to counter new evolving threats.

Future modernization and upgrading of the ICBMs focuses on deployment of multiple-warhead RS-24 Yars missiles. These ICBMs will replace the currently deployed Topol (SS-25) and UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) missiles. Being a multiple-warhead missile, RS-24 allows Russia to keep the number of deployed warheads at a relatively high level without the need to produce a large number of missiles. This modernization process is
expected to be completed in 2020. Russia is also working on other ICBM projects. For example, in 2011, the government made a decision to begin development of a new multiple-warhead liquid-fuel ICBM. This new missile is supposed to be ready for deployment in 2018. Russia has also been testing a new solid-propellant ICBM, known as Rubezh.

Russia is also upgrading its SSBN fleet with a planned construction of eight new submarines of Project 955 Borey class, each carrying 16 Bulava missiles. In September 2013 the lead Borey submarine joined the Russian Navy. As of January 2015 three submarines are accepted for service and three more are under construction. Russia is working on an overhaul of its current strategic bomber fleet and is also reported to have started preliminary work on a new-generation strategic bomber.

Russia’s modernization plans demonstrate that it is determined to maintain its strategic nuclear forces and to preserve parity with the United States in the number of warheads. Arms control and disarmament efforts could change these plans and result in a smaller force, but it is likely that most of the reductions would be done by reducing the number of deployed warheads rather than by eliminating strategic delivery vehicles.

Security doctrines and policies
Russia’s position on nuclear weapons is reportedly linked to a number of security concerns, such as US ballistic “missile defence,” US advantage in terms of conventional weapon systems, NATO expansion, and in the long run, China’s position in the region. When the 2010 military doctrine was released, the Russian president approved the “Principles of State Nuclear deterrence Policy to 2020,” but this document has not been released to the public. In February 2012 the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, said that Russia would use nuclear weapons in response to any imminent threat to its national security. Furthermore, he indicated that Russia’s nuclear “deterrent” is the cornerstone of “strategic stability” and Russia is in the course of modernizing the country’s nuclear triad. The latest Russian military doctrine was released on 25 December 2014 and reiterates the position laid out in the 2010 document, namely, “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in a case of an aggression against her with conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” Other changes are more of an editorial nature.

United Kingdom

- **Size of nuclear arsenal:** 225.
- **Arsenal reductions:** None.
- **Role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines:** Slight modification in October 2010.
- **Alert status:** No change, many weapons remain on high-alert.
- **Risk reduction:** No information available on new risk reduction efforts.

The United Kingdom reportedly has a total nuclear weapons stockpile of about 225 warheads, of which “not more than 120” are believed to be operational. In its 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the United Kingdom declared that the UK “can meet the minimum requirement of an effective and credible level of deterrence with a smaller nuclear weapons capability.” However the UK government also announced that it could not dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge. Its plan is to retain a “minimum requirement nuclear deterrent out until the 2060s.”

In contrast to the other NPT nuclear-armed states, the United Kingdom only operates a single nuclear weapon delivery system: four Vanguard submarines armed with Trident missiles. Until 2010 each of the Vanguard class submarines carried between 12 and 14 operational Trident II D5 missiles and a maximum of 48 warheads. The UK Ministry of Defence announced it would...
reduce these “over the next few years” to eight missiles and a maximum of 40 warheads per submarine.\textsuperscript{73} The decision to deploy 40 warheads on eight missiles will require an increase in warheads per missiles, from three to five.\textsuperscript{73}

Currently the UK maintains some operational warheads in reserve, in addition to those on submarines. In January 2015, it was announced to the British Parliament that all submarines “on continuous at-sea deterrent patrol now carry 40 nuclear warheads and no more than eight operational missiles. We have therefore achieved our commitment to reduce the number of operationally available warheads to no more than 120,”\textsuperscript{78} which is the same as the new maximum number for three armed submarines.\textsuperscript{77}

**Qualitative**

In May 2011, the UK government decided to move forward with the preparatory work for renewal of its Trident submarine fleet. The “Initial Gate Parliamentary Report” stated that the UK would move forward into the “Assessment Phase,” where the design will be finalized and preparation for the main build will take place. In 2016, the government will sign the main construction contracts and also decide whether “continuous at sea deterrence can be delivered by three or four boats.”\textsuperscript{78}

On 22 May 2012 the UK Ministry of Defence announced the award of a contract to BAE Systems, Babcock, and Rolls Royce worth £350 million for the design of successor submarines. The key contract, worth £328 million, was awarded to BAE Systems.\textsuperscript{79}

On 18 June 2012 the Secretary of State for Defence informed the House of Commons that his Ministry had signed a contract with Rolls-Royce Engineering over approximately £1.1 billion for an 11-year programme of work at its nuclear reactor core facility in Raynesway, Derby. The site regeneration will cost about £500 million, the remaining £600 million will sustain reactor core production at the facility until March 2023 including the production of reactor cores for the Astute class and the next generation nuclear deterrent successor SSBN submarines if approved.\textsuperscript{80}

If the Trident renewal programme is approved, the delivery of the first submarines will take place in 2028. The former British Secretary of State for Defence, Dr. Liam Fox, said that the new submarine “will incorporate the latest safety technologies and ensure our future nuclear-armed submarines have the performance required to deliver our minimum credible deterrent out until the 2060s.”\textsuperscript{81}

Because of financial constraints, the UK’s decision on Trident renewal has been put off until after the next election in 2015.\textsuperscript{82} Despite the fact that no formal decision has been made on the outcome of the project for new submarines, the Ministry of Defence is already spending £2 billion on new nuclear weapons plans. The plans include a £734 million facility for dismantling and assembling of warheads, a £634 million plant that will handle enriched uranium, and a £231 million high explosive factory. Other similar facilities are being built as part of the Atomic Weapon Establishment development plan for 2005-2015 and the cost of two more are being kept secret for commercial reasons. The new spending has caused some debate in the UK on how crucial military spending decisions can be pushed through parliament without a proper parliamentary procedure.\textsuperscript{83}

In December 2012 the UK Ministry of Defence published the first progress report on the successor nuclear submarine programme as a follow-up report on the "Initial Gate Parliamentary Report". The report gives a superficial summary of the above-mentioned developments and does not include the £1 billion per year expenditure on Aldermaston.\textsuperscript{84} The 2013 Update to Parliament of “The UK’s Future Nuclear Deterrent” in a similar fashion lays out the developments since the last report and lists additional financial commitments the UK government entered into, both for the submarine itself as well as for the warheads, missiles, and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{85} The 2014 Update to Parliament summarises the developments since the last report and outlines additional fiscal implications, such as an increase of £0.3 billion of the total for the so-called Assessment Phase from 2011-2016.\textsuperscript{86}

In July 2013 the Cabinet Office of the UK Government released a “Trident Alternatives Review,” which looked at “credible” alternatives to a submarine-based system and the effect of any such alternatives on the “credibility” for “deterrence.”\textsuperscript{87} However, it did not consider the option of not replacing its Trident system.\textsuperscript{88}

The Trident Commission, comprised of eight senior UK political figures, concluded its final report in June 2014. It had examined three questions\textsuperscript{89} in connection with the renewal of the Trident submarines and concluded that if “there is more than a negligible chance that the possession of nuclear weapons might play a decisive future role in the defence of the United Kingdom and its allies, in preventing nuclear blackmail, or in affecting the wider security context within which the UK sits, then they should be retained.”\textsuperscript{90}

In the beginning of 2015, during a parliamentary debate, more critical opinions were expressed.\textsuperscript{91} The Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru, and the Green Party had called the renewal of Trident submarines and concluded that if “there is more than a negligible chance that the possession of nuclear weapons might play a decisive future role in the defence of the United Kingdom and its allies, in preventing nuclear blackmail, or in affecting the wider security context within which the UK sits, then they should be retained.”\textsuperscript{90}

**Security doctrines and policies**

While stating in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review that the UK should retain a “credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent,”\textsuperscript{92} the government also restated that the UK makes it clear that it will only use its nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of its NATO allies. The 2010 review also stated that the United Kingdom would retain and renew its independent nuclear deterrent – “the United Kingdom’s ultimate insurance policy in this age of uncertainty.”\textsuperscript{94}
The “minimum nuclear deterrent” policy announced in 2010 was previously mentioned in the 1998 Defence Review and its 2003 update. The 1998 Review stated: “We will retain our nuclear deterrent with fewer warheads to meet our twin challenges of minimum credible deterrence backed by a firm commitment to arms control.”95 Furthermore the 1998 Review states that the UK will “not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state not in material breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, unless it attacks us, our Allies or a state to which we have a security commitment, in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.”96 Although the concept of a “minimum nuclear deterrent” is not new for a UK security policy, the language in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review is stronger in language than previous reviews.

United States

United States

**Size of nuclear arsenal:** 7,315.

**Arsenal reductions:** Reduction of around 3,185 warheads, mostly non-deployed.

**Role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines:** Unchanged.

**Alert status:** No change, many weapons remain on high-alert.

**Risk reduction:** Several reports about security and safety problems at nuclear missile bases. No information available on new risk reduction efforts.

As of December 2014, the United States is reported to have a total nuclear weapons stockpile of 7,315 warheads, of which about 2,500 warheads are awaiting dismantlement.97

**Quantitative**

In accordance with the obligations under New START, in 2011 the US was reportedly planning to maintain up to 420 land-based ICBMs, each equipped with one warhead each, 240 SLBMs with multiple warheads each, deployed on a fleet of 12-14 SSBNs, and finally 60 heavy bombers, long-range B-2s and B-52s,98 with capability to deliver gravity bombs or cruise missiles.99 In accordance with the US’ plans for its land-based ICBM force, this means that many of the warheads attached to the ICBMs today will be removed from the missiles. The removed warheads will not necessarily be destroyed, but kept in storage.100 The US also has a number of non-strategic weapons that are addressed in the section on non-strategic nuclear weapons below.

The Arms Control Association estimates that the current US nuclear delivery systems will remain operational for another 20-30 years.101 As of 1 January 2015, the United States deployed 1,642 warheads on 794 strategic delivery vehicles and the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers was 912.102 This is a reduction of 158 warheads, 88 delivery vehicles, and 212 deployed and non-deployed launchers since 5 February 2011.103 By adding the numbers of warheads not covered by New START, the United States possesses around 7,315 warheads.104

The administration has been reported to be “making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions.”105 On 19 June 2013 President Obama announced in Berlin that his administration would, together with its NATO allies, seek “bold reductions in US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.”106 As during the State of the Union address on 12 February 2013, no numbers were mentioned in the Berlin speech, but White House officials at the time of the State of the Union were quoted to be considering cuts that would take the US arsenal to just above 1,000 deployed nuclear weapons.107 The Russian government is reportedly ready to study such proposals carefully, though continues to express certain scepticism towards about further bilateral reductions prevails.108 This is mainly due to Russian concerns with US development and deployment of non-nuclear weapons and “missile defence” systems.109 Due to the increased tensions resulting from the crisis in Ukraine, the prospects of a new agreement have decreased significantly.

**Qualitative**

While reductions under New START are taking place, in 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen stated: “Over the next decade, the United States will invest well over $100 billion in nuclear delivery systems to sustain existing capabilities and modernize some strategic systems. US nuclear weapons will also undergo extensive life extension programmes in the coming years to ensure their safety, security, and effectiveness.”110

The ratification of New START by the US Senate included a 10-year plan to maintain US nuclear warheads supporting
In July 2012 increased costs for the B61 life extension project were announced, from $4 billion to $11 billion, with production delayed until at least 2020. The project consolidates the existing B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10 to one upgraded model of the B61-4, the B61-12. FAS estimates that about 400 B61-12s are planned, resulting in $28 million per bomb including the cost of tail kit, one of the costliest elements of the modernisation of the B61 and intended to increase accuracy of the new B61. In January 2014, US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, confirmed that the modernized B61 will have improved military capabilities to attack targets with greater accuracy and less radioactive fallout. Since the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) pledged that nuclear weapon life extension programmes “will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities,” this confirmation violates the NPR pledge and contradicts US and NATO goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. More details can be found in the section of this report on NATO.

Other US nuclear warheads are also undergoing modernisation and so-called life extension programmes. They are set to be replaced by new warheads and bombs as part of the so-called “3+2” stockpile plan. Estimates based on the latest Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan of 2014 put the cost for this enterprise at $275 billion over the next 25 years. These financial commitments in light of budgetary difficulties face more and more doubts from all sides. The 3+2 plan is widely considered to be off the table. Modernization of some related facilities are facing budgetary challenges, while plans for others have been scrapped entirely. Over the past years, several reports and studies on the cost of the US nuclear programme and possible options for savings have been published.

In December 2013 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published a report assessing the projected costs of the US nuclear forces for the 2014-2023 timeframe. According to CBO estimates the US will spend $152 billion on maintaining current generation of systems and $89 billions to modernise or replace those systems. However, as most modernisations efforts are still in the initial phase, annual costs are expected to increase over that time period. In January 2015, the CBO increased its estimate for 2015 - 2024 to $348 billion, as cost for the DoD and the Department of Energy have increased.

In early 2014, US experts have estimated $1 trillion to be spent over the next three decades. These costs include an estimated $100 billion for 100 long-range strategic manned nuclear bombers alone, with additional connected costs rising to $30-40 billion; $20-120 billion for a new generation of land based ICBMs; and $350 billion in funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration which is already carrying out the 3+2 plan. During the planning of the budget for FY2015, the timelines of all modernization projects for both warheads and delivery systems have been extended in an attempt to spread out costs and decrease the amount of yearly spending on modernization.

Security doctrines and policies

The US 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the US will keep relying on its nuclear weapons as an important part of its national security and will also do this for the foreseeable future. In spite of this, the NPR states that “improvements” in US conventional weapon forces together with major improvements in “missile defence” has enabled the US to rely less on nuclear weapon without jeopardizing its “deterrence” capacity. The NPR also states that with the changing security climate the US will “better align” its nuclear policies, so it can better deal with other priorities such as preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. It acknowledges that nuclear weapons are not adequate to address today’s main security threats, such as terrorism and other countries seeking nuclear weapons. Furthermore the NPR specifically addresses the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy.

The 2002 NPR was not publicly released due to classification considerations. The foreword submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 states that the NPR “puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming our strategic posture.” Since no other information is publicly available it is difficult to compare the two NPRs. However, the 2010 NPR does introduce some new elements, in particular by stating that the fundamental yet not sole purpose of nuclear forces is to deter a nuclear attack.

The same day of President Obama’s speech in Berlin, the US administration published a report on its employment strategy of nuclear weapons outlining President Obama’s new guidance on this issue. Among other things, the US reaffirmed that “as long as nuclear weapons exist,” it will maintain a “safe, secure and effective arsenal for its protection and that of its allies.” The new guidance also highlights that all plans must “be consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict,” including the principles of distinction and proportionality. Accordingly, the US will, for example, not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects. Additionally, the Department of Defense is directed to “strengthen non-nuclear capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks” as well as examining options for reducing the role of “Launch Under Attack” in US planning, while retaining the ability to Launch Under Attack if directed. In the same vein, the new guidance reiterates “the intention to work towards” making deterrence of nuclear attacks the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons over time.
On 30 June-1 July 2011, the five NPT nuclear-armed states met in Paris for a meeting to discuss nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for the first time since the adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan. The meeting focused on transparency, nuclear doctrines, and verification. Furthermore, the participating states approved the establishment of a working group that will pursue work on definitions for key nuclear terms, in order to facilitate future consultations and discussions. They met again in June 2012 in Washington to further discuss above-mentioned issues. In their joint statement after their fourth meeting hosted by Russia in Geneva, Switzerland in the context of the 2013 NPT PrepCom, they announced that further discussions on various topics have been held and that their relevant activities across all three pillars had “advanced.” The NPT nuclear-armed states met again in Beijing on 14-15 April 2014, to discuss the implementation of 2010 NPT commitments and shared their respective reports to the 2014 NPT PrepCom. At their latest meeting in London 4-5 February 2015, the NPT nuclear-armed states reiterated their shared understanding “about the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and underlined their resolve states met again in Beijing on 14-15 April 2014, to discuss the all three pillars had “advanced”. They met again in June 2012 in Washington to further discuss above-mentioned issues. In their joint statement after their fourth meeting hosted by Russia in Geneva, Switzerland in the context of the 2013 NPT PrepCom, they announced that further discussions on various topics have been held and that their relevant activities across all three pillars had “advanced.” The NPT nuclear-armed states met again in Beijing on 14-15 April 2014, to discuss the implementation of 2010 NPT commitments and shared their respective reports to the 2014 NPT PrepCom. At their latest meeting in London 4-5 February 2015, the NPT nuclear-armed states reiterated their shared understanding “about the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and underlined their resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening,” but also stressed the need to take into account “all factors that could affect global strategic stability.” They also met with members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), Australia, Canada, Mexico, Netherlands, and the United Arab Emirates, and representatives of civil society for the first time.

The Royal United Service Institute has published a report on the so-called “P5-process”, for which it conducted interviews with officials and experts of NPT nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-armed states. The report concludes, among other things, that progress has been too slow to demonstrate many concrete outputs and that the greatest risk of the process was “insufficient ambition to overcome inevitably difficult steps” as well as poor communication that was kept to an unnecessary minimum.

None of these meetings seemed to include any specific proposals or discussions on nuclear doctrines or other issues they are mandated to discuss under action 5 of the 2010 Action Plan. Despite submitting national reports on implementation of action 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT action plan, NPT nuclear-armed states did not share new information.

New START: Russia-United States

On 8 April 2010, President Obama and President Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Under this Treaty both states have until February 2018 to reduce their nuclear capacity from 1950 to 1550 deployed nuclear warheads and limit their deployed missiles strategic launchers and heavy bombers to 800. The US senate ratified New START in December 2010 and the Russian Federal Assembly in January 2011.

By 9 February 2015 the United States and the Russian Federation have conducted 7877 notifications under the Treaty since its entry in to force in February 2011. The notifications track the movement and changes in the status of treaty-covered systems, for example if a heavy bomber were to be out of its home territory for more than 24 hours. The US and Russia have conducted 72 on-site inspections each, since February 2011. This is the first time that the two countries have exchanged data on re-entry vehicle loadings. The two countries are also required to exchange a comprehensive database, every six months, of exactly where weapons systems are located if they are undergoing maintenance or have been retired.

Seven sessions of the Bilateral Consultative Commission under New START took place in Geneva on 28 March-8 April 2011, 19 October-2 November 2011, 24 January-7 February 2012, 11-21 September 2012, 6-19 February 2013, 11-21 November 2013, and 18–28 February 2014. During these consultations, the United States and Russia discussed a number of practical issues related to the implementation of the Treaty. During the third session of consultations the United States and Russia agreed on the sharing of telemetric information and other issues relating to ICBMs and SLBMs. The number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs was agreed upon during the fifth meeting in February 2013.

However, New START has some problematic aspects. Among other things the aggregate numbers do not cover thousands of additional warheads, such as non-deployed and non-strategic warheads. Furthermore dual-capable bombers are counted as both one delivery vehicle and one warhead. Each bomber is also counted as only carrying one warhead, which means that “[a] force of 60 bombers loaded at their maximum capacity of 1,136 bombs and cruise missiles would only count as 60 weapons.”

The New START verification regime is, in comparison to START I, less intrusive and burdensome. This is largely because the New START ceilings and limitations are relatively simple. Furthermore the Treaty does not include the Russian Federation’s estimated 2000 and the United States’ 200 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
The issue of missile “defence” has further complicated discussions on follow-on measures in relation to New START. The 2010 NATO decision to push ahead with the alliance’s missile “defence” project has created tension between Russia and NATO members. On 24 November 2011 Russia announced that it “reserves the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures,” such as withdrawal from New START and deployment of new nuclear weapons if the US progresses with its anti-missile plans in Europe without Russian cooperation. In its latest Deterrence and Defence Posture Review from May 2012, NATO stated that its “missile defence is not oriented against Russia nor does it have the capability to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent.” US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel repeated this position in December 2013. That month Russia had deployed a missile system closer to Lithuania and Poland. The US is on schedule to deploy 24 interceptors and one radar station in Romania by 2015 as part of a “phased adaptive approach” for European missile defence.

“New START”

Agreement between: Russian Federation and United States.
Entry into force: 5 February 2011.
On-site inspections: US – 72 inspections, Russia – 72 inspections.
Bilateral consultations: seven rounds of consultations have taken place since the entry into force.
Notifications given since entry into force: 7877 Follow-up measures: No discussions of further reductions, tactical nuclear weapons, or missile defense yet.

In January 2014, the US declared Russia to be in violation of its obligations under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. Russia highlighted the lack of proof, and stressed that the US failed to address Russian concerns about US compliance in turn.

France-United Kingdom

In November 2010, France and the United Kingdom joined in a collaboration of developing equipment and technologies for the next generation of nuclear submarines. The co-operation is aimed to “sustain their combined industrial base” and “generate savings.” The cooperation also includes a new warhead simulation facility that will open in 2015 and a joint Technology Development Centre in Britain to provide scientific and engineering expertise to support both countries’ stockpiles. In 2013, Defence Minister Philip Dunne confirmed that £21 million have already been spent on a facility at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The total cost for that specific project has been estimated at £48.7 million.

United Kingdom-United States

Since 1958 the United States and the United Kingdom have been collaborating on the basis of the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement. The agreement was last renewed in 2004 and extends to 2014. The Agreement enables the US and the UK to exchange classified information with the objective of improving each party’s nuclear weapons design, development, and fabrication capability. In July 2014, an amendment to the Agreement was signed by both parties that will last for the next ten years and refers among other things to the potential threats of state or non-state actors. The document itself is not public.

The nuclear warhead deployed on the UK submarines today is partly American made. The UK has also purchased the rights to 58 Tridents missiles out of the existing American pool of missiles.

In December 2006, after an exchange of letters between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair on the renewal/replacement of Trident, a new wave of enhanced collaborations with the US into how to refurbish or replace the UK Trident warhead began. The two countries are also working together to develop the new ballistic-missile submarines. If the renewal goes ahead as planned, the first British vessel is due to enter service in 2028 and the last could still be at sea in 2060. The first new US submarine is scheduled for 2027 and some of the vessels are due to remain in service until 2080.

Successful tests have been carried out in the US on a new warhead firing system to arm the UK’s nuclear missiles, making them more accurate and more capable. Because of the very close collaboration and dependence on US technology for components the UK’s Trident system is very dependent on the US, which could complicate further reductions. In March 2013 Chiefs of Staff of both the UK and US met to discuss the strategic future of the military alliance. What was discussed during that meeting was not revealed to the public; however, the US is reportedly concerned about the UK remaining an able military partner in non-nuclear missions. In December 2014, the UK government, in its update to parliament on the trident renewal, announced that collaboration with the US will continue on nuclear propulsion and strategic weapon system, with modernisation efforts for components on-going.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

United States and NATO

In preparation for the NATO summit in 2010, the United States announced that its “non-strategic” or “tactical” nuclear weapons (TNW) deployed in Europe would not be unilaterally withdrawn. These weapons are as of yet under no international arms control regime. US President Obama stated at the signing ceremony of New START that his administration is interested in
Further discussions with Russia on reducing both strategic and tactical weapons. He again voiced similar intentions in his speech in Berlin; however, no such discussions have yet taken place.

The United States possesses approximately 500 B61 warheads, 200 of these are deployed on US military bases in five European countries, namely Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey (see section below on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)).

Furthermore, the US-NATO nuclear capacity is undergoing modernization. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review announced that the United States would be retiring all nuclear Tomahawk land attack sea-launched cruise missiles, half of which were earmarked for NATO support. However, the NPR also announced plans on making the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft nuclear-capable so that the US can replace the F-15E and F-16. Two states with NATO nuclear strike missions, Italy and the Netherlands, are planning on acquiring JSF aircraft over the next 15 years. Costs for developing the JSF have spiraled out of control. With estimated total present and future programme costs approaching $400 billion, the F-35 is the costliest weapons system ever.

In comparison with the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept document, the 2010 version places less importance on US TNW as an essential military and political link between Europe and North America. However, the new NATO concept makes further reductions in US nuclear weapons in Europe conditional on reciprocal actions by Russia. This was not the language used in the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, in which the US discussed removal without mentioning Russia. Previously, Russia has stated that the US would have to remove all of its TNW from Europe before it would even consider discussions on its own TNW. The argument for this has been that since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia took sole responsibility for collecting all USSR nuclear weapons spread out in the former Soviet Union states and Russia has been waiting for the US to do the same with its European TNW. The new 2012 DDPR could not agree on the removal of the non-strategic weapons from Europe and as before tied any further "significant reductions" to reciprocal actions by Russia.

Russia

Official information on the Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons or TNW is rare and to a great deal based on estimations by experts. Russia declared that all operational non-strategic weapons are in central storage.

In an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists more detailed estimations are made. According to these estimates, Russia possesses around 2000 non-strategic nuclear warheads. Of these, 730 are assigned to non-strategic aircrafts, 700 to naval forces and circa 170 remain for short-range ballistic missiles and 430 are assigned to air-defence forces, ballistic missile defence and costal defence forces. Additionally, a small force of nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missiles is retained by Russia for "coastal defence". Russia is currently modernizing some of its SU-24 (Fencers) aircrafts, but will be replacing it with the SU-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers. In December 2013 the first of eight to ten new nuclear-capable nuclear powered guided-missile attack submarine was delivered in December 2013. These submarines are and will be equipped with non-strategic nuclear weapons.

These non-strategic nuclear weapons are believed to be stored in about a dozen different storage facilities. They are located in central and western Russia as well as on the Kola Peninsula relatively close to bases with delivery systems. Experts estimate that Russia’s inventory is declining and will continue doing so for the next decade.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The alliance retains around 200 US B61 nuclear weapons on American bases in five non-nuclear-armed states of the NPT, namely Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. These arrangements have been criticized repeatedly as being not in compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations.

At NATO’s Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept and a Summit Declaration that outline the alliance’s future nuclear policy. In the new concept, titled “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” NATO for the first time committed itself to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.” The concept explains that this goal must be pursued “in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.” At the same time, the Strategic Concept states, “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

Building on the 2010 NATO Strategic Review, NATO members conducted a DDPR in order to define an “appropriate mix” between nuclear and conventional weapons and missile defence needed to uphold Alliance commitments to collective self-defence. During the first phase of the DDPR process, ten member states offered suggestions on how to collaborate with Russia on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).

The 2012 DDPR concluded that NATO's nuclear force posture met "the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture" and nuclear weapons are declared a "core component" of its overall capabilities. However, it also stated "circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote". Regarding negative security assurances, the 2012 DDPR acknowledges the unilateral commitments made by the three NPT nuclear-armed states members to NATO and recognised the conditions each states attached to them, such as the right to self-defence.

In the 2012 DDPR NATO declared that it "will ensure that all components of NATO's nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure and effective," which in this context is seen as a “green light” for the
modernization of the B61s currently also deployed in Europe. It also concluded that the existing nuclear force meets an effective deterrence and defence posture, despite this the B61 bomb is currently undergoing major modernization and the costs of the B61 modernization programme have grown far beyond original estimates, from $4 billion to $10 billion with production delayed until at least 2020. In addition several hundred millions more will be needed to integrate the modernized B61-12 on five different aircraft, including Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and Turkish fighter-bombers.

Next to the B61 modernization programme NATO has invested over $80 million since 2000 to secure nuclear weapons storage sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. This amount is expected to increase as the US Department of Defense budget request for FY2015 more money is allocated to secure infrastructure at the European military bases. "NATO funds infrastructure required to store special weapons within secure sites and facilities," notes the budget request document. "Since 2000, NATO has invested over $80 million in infrastructure improvements in storage sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Another $154 million will be invested in these sites for security improvements to meet with stringent new U.S. standards."

The NATO Wales Summit Declaration from September 2014 states that "[t]he strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Alliance." Furthermore it highlights that "[t]he circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote."

While for a brief period after the 2010 NPT RevCon, had been increasing signs from numerous NATO member states that there was greater scepticism towards NATO’s relationship to nuclear weapons, in particular to the current deployed TNW on US NATO bases in Europe, with the crisis in the Ukraine, calls from many eastern European NATO members for more reassurance have increased and more troops to be deployed. The debate around the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has also drawn attention back to existing commitments under alliances such as NATO.
The UNGA First Committee annually discusses and adopts resolutions on nuclear disarmament issues. The table below shows the changes in support for the most important resolutions since the adoption of the NPT Action Plan in 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A/RES/69/43: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A/RES/69/69: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A/RES/69/48: Nuclear disarmament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A/RES/69/41: Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A/RES/69/42: Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
No significant trend away from the usual voting pattern before the adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan can be discovered here. The nuclear weapon possessing states continue to vote in a similar way and provide similar explanations of votes as before the adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan. Some resolutions have seen a slightly decreased number of no votes, mostly from non-nuclear-armed states. However there is a clear pattern of solidarity to vote in the same way as nuclear weapon possessing states, to the extent possible. In cases where the latter are voting no, a significant number of non-nuclear-armed states abstain.

Nuclear disarmament discussions in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

Since the adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, the CD has not been able to adopt a programme of work. However, there have been some attempts by states to move the issue forward and start negotiations on the substantive issues on the CD’s agenda.

Revitalizing the work of the CD

In 2011 a new resolution, “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations,”241 put forward by the Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland, was adopted by consensus in 2011. This resolution offers space for continuing the dialogue on breaking the impasse at the CD, though it unfortunately does not contain any mechanisms itself for breaking that impasse.242 The resolution was turned into a draft decision in 2012 and again tabled in 2013 and 2014.243

In addition, in July 2011 at the UNGA plenary meeting on revitalizing multilateral disarmament negotiations, the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters released a report, which contained three recommendations: that the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) continue to encourage the CD to achieve a breakthrough; that if a panel of eminent persons be established to consider the stalemate at the CD, the UNSG should ask the panel to make recommendations on ways to revitalize the United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole; and that the UNSG should continue to raise public awareness and encourage civil society and NGOs to offer input on ways to overcome the stalemate at the CD.244 No such panel of eminent persons has been established yet.

Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations

A draft resolution “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations” was put forward during the 2011 session of the UNGA's First Committee by Austria, Mexico, and Norway but was not submitted to a vote once it became clear that it would not gain enough support from key states. It received criticism from the nuclear-armed states and some key non-nuclear-armed states, which argued that it would undermine the CD.

While this was not supported in 2011, “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”, A/C.1/67/L.46, was tabled by Austria, Mexico, and Norway in 2012 and adopted with a vote of 134-4-34. All NPT nuclear-armed states voted against the resolution except China, which abstained. The resolution established an open-ended working group (OEWG) to “develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.” The opposing nuclear-armed states expressed concern that such new processes as the OEWG might jeopardize the 2010 consensus on the NPT Action Plan.245

The OEWG convened in Geneva on 14-24 May, 27 June, and 19-30 August 2013. During the meetings, participants exchanged views on the current situation of nuclear weapons and the role they have in today’s international security. Member states and civil society developed proposals about how these traditional views could be challenged in order to lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. While the discussed issues and proposed solutions were mostly familiar concepts, the new format integrating civil society and empowering non-nuclear-armed states allowed participants to focus on concrete ways forward.

The nuclear-armed states did not participate in the meetings.246 On 30 August 2013 the OEWG adopted a report to the UNGA reflecting the discussions held and proposals put forward.247

The report summarizes the proposals into six main sections focusing on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, including approaches; elements; reviewing the role of nuclear weapons in the security context of the twenty-first century; the role of international law; the role of states and other actors; and other practical actions.

While the different sections contain quite a bit of overlap and includes many items already agreed upon in the NPT context, it also acknowledges new proposals, such as a prohibition of the possession, stockpiling, development, or transfer of nuclear weapons; the idea of undertaking a study of the evolution of international law relevant to nuclear weapons, including international humanitarian law, human rights law, environmental law, and in the legal realm of the International Criminal Court; the need to challenge the status and perceived value attached to nuclear weapons; and focusing on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the report notes that all states have a responsibility to act “in the light of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.” These paragraphs also mention in particular that non-nuclear-armed states have a role in promoting global nuclear disarmament.

During the 2013 First Committee “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations,” A/C.1/68/L.34, was tabled again and adopted by a vote of 151-4-21 with France, Russia, UK, and US voting no.248 The resolution had been updated to include the work of the OEWG and a request to the UNSG to seek the views of member states on how to take forward multilateral disarmament negotiations and to submit it to the 69th session of the UNGA. It also called on the UNSG to submit the OEWG report to the CD and Disarmament Commission. However, it did not schedule another meeting for the working group in 2014, but retains the option of an OEWG.249
The 2014 version, resolution A/C.1/69/L.21, contained technical updates as well as welcomed the report of the OEWG and the report of the UNSG containing the views of member states on how to take forward negotiations, including the steps that member states have already taken to that end. It also requests the UNSG to transmit that report to the CD and the Disarmament Commission. It was adopted by a vote of 152-4-22, again with France, Russia, UK, and US voting no.

High-level meeting on nuclear disarmament

The resolution “High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament,” A/C.1/67/L.19, adopted 165-0-5, was submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement. France, Israel, the UK, the US, and Ukraine abstained. The resolution convened a one-day high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013. The abstaining nuclear-armed states questioned the value of holding such a high-level meeting (HLM) and wondered how it would further the goals of implementing the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

The HLM on nuclear disarmament was held on 26 September 2013. 74 heads of state and government, ministers, and representatives spoke during the meeting and great number of states decided to use this opportunity to condemn the continued existence of nuclear weapons and demand immediate action to ban and eliminate these weapons. All nuclear-armed states of the NPT participated in the meeting and criticised recent efforts such as the HLM as a distraction from existing processes.

In a defensively worded joint statement by France, the United Kingdom, and United States, the three nuclear-armed states expressed “regret” that some states and civil society have decided to highlight the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. “While we are encouraged by the increased energy and enthusiasm around the nuclear disarmament debate, we regret that this energy is being directed toward initiatives such as this High-Level Meeting, the humanitarian consequences campaign, the Open-Ended Working Group, and the push for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.” They argued that energy should instead be directed to existing processes and making progress on the step-by-step agenda. On the other hand, the majority of participating states clearly voiced their frustration with the perpetual lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and expressed their sense of urgency at achieving concrete goals. Several called for a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons and most countries focused their statements on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and new initiatives to eliminate nuclear weapons such as the OEWG.

During the 2013 UN First Committee the Non-Aligned Movement introduced resolution A/C.1/68/L.6/Rev.1 entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament,” which was adopted by a vote of 129-28-19. This resolution established 26 September as the “International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” and scheduled a follow-up meeting no later than 2018 to assess progress made on nuclear disarmament. With regard to the work of the CD, the resolution called for the commencement of negotiations in the CD on a nuclear weapons convention (NWC). Additionally, it requested the UN Secretary-General to seek the views of member states on way to achieve the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, particularly elements of a NWC, and present a report during the sixty-ninth session. The resolution also included a reference to article VI of the NPT in preambular paragraph eleven.

During the 2014 UNGA session the resolution A/C.1/69/L.44 was adopted with a vote of 135-24-18. In their explanation of negative votes, France, UK, and US regretted that their views expressed during the HLM were not reflected in the resolution, and that the meeting itself did not address non-proliferation as well and argued that another conference in 2018 “risks weakening commitment among states to securing a successful outcome” of the 2015 review conference. In their view, the resolution’s reference to the NPT was “insufficient, incidental and unbalanced.” They, together with the delegations of the Netherlands and Spain speaking on behalf of seventeen and nine states respectively, stressed that nuclear disarmament was only one among four issues on the agenda of the CD. China, though voting in favour of the resolution, stressed that the principles of maintaining global strategic balance should be considered and the countries with the largest arsenals should lead on nuclear disarmament. Then once the conditions are ripe, others could join.

On the other hand, Ireland, speaking on behalf of six states that had voted in favour of the resolution, saw the resolution as “entirely consistent with, and supportive of” the NPT as well as the 2010 NPT Action Plan. Therefore, any nuclear disarmament effort should consider the important ongoing discussion regarding the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons detonation, which L.44 acknowledges. The seven states remained favourably disposed towards “any set of effective measures to achieve the objective of complete nuclear disarmament, regardless of how such measures might be elaborated.”

In December 2014, Cuba proposed to establish an OEWG during the 2015 UNGA First Committee with the mandate to negotiate and recommend a draft nuclear weapons convention, which would be presented to the HLM established under A/RES/68/32 for its consideration and adoption.

Informal Working Group of the CD

On 16 August 2013 the CD established an Informal Working Group (IWG) “to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation.” During the 2013 session the IWG met three times to discuss possible elements of a programme of work for the CD based on a “food for thought” paper that was circulated before the second meeting. The work of the IWG did not result in a programme of work for 2013.
In 2014, member states took a dual track approach to agree on a programme of work. The IWG was re-established on 3 March and a schedule of activities for informal discussion on the CD’s agenda items was adopted 26 March. However, no agreement on a programme of work could be reached in the 2014 session of the CD.

Disarmament education

During the current review cycle, only 14 states have reported on disarmament education efforts

175
14

UNGA resolutions

In 2002, the UNGA unanimously adopted 34 recommendations in the UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. The UN Secretary-General (UNSG) issues a report on the implementation of these recommendations biennially. Unfortunately, not many member states contribute to the report. Only nine member states contributed to the 2012 report. Two years later, ten member states submitted information for the 2014 report. The United Nations Disarmament Affairs has a section on its website for disarmament education.

In October 2010, First Committee adopted two biannual resolutions on disarmament education: “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education” and “United Nations Disarmament Information Programme”. Both resolutions were adopted again without a vote during the UNGA in 2012 and 2014 sessions. While education is not a controversial topic compared to others during the First Committee, implementation of these resolutions is still very limited.

Japan

During the 2010 session of the UNGA First Committee, the Japanese delegation highlighted the fact that the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference included for the first time a reference to the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Japan and the United Nations University (UNU) submitted a working paper to the 2010 NPT Review Conference that encouraged cooperation between governments and civil society on relevant education initiatives. Japan and UNU indicated they would “initiate dialogue” to this end. Japan announced to the First Committee 2010 that together with the UNU they intend to hold “the Global Forum on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education” in March 2011 in Japan. Due to the earthquake on 11 March 2011 the forum had to be postponed and was held on 10-11 August 2012 in Nagasaki.

During the final week of First Committee in 2011, Japan hosted a side event where Special Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons spoke for the first time in their new role. The Special Communicators status has been thus far given to hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) in recognition of their work for nuclear disarmament.

Japan has raised the issue in different disarmament fora and encouraged states to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the UN Secretary-General regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. NPDI, of which Japan is a member, recognized the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as an integral part of their joint work. The group submitted working papers to both the 2012 and 2013 NPT PrepCom on this issue. Austria and Japan submitted a separate one as well as to the 2012 NPT PrepCom. At the 2014 NPT PrepCom, Japan spoke on behalf of 36 states highlighting the recommendations contained in Action 22.
India, Israel, and Pakistan.

For example Hui Zhang has estimated the total number of nuclear warheads to be 166. See H. Zhang, 'China', in Reaching Critical Will, 2012, p. 20; or H. Zhang, How US restraint can keep China's nuclear arsenal small, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2012, p. 74-79.


Ibid.


I. Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), November 2011.


I. Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), November 2011, p. 1.


H. Kristensen & R. Norris, Chinese nuclear forces, 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2013, p. 84.


Ibid, p. 8. Also note, that these patrols have most likely taken place in December 2014. However, judging from news reports, it still cannot be confirmed.


References:
The NPT Action Plan Monitoring Report March 2015

Strategic Fleet, Yuri Dolgorukiy to join the Northern Fleet

The Project 955 submarine is also reported to be able to carry long-range cruise missile.

Russia continues tests of new ICBM, named Rubezh

The NPT Action Plan Monitoring Report March 2015

Strategic Rocket Forces will be armed with new missile systems by 2012,

A. Anishchuck, Russia signals nuclear arms cuts will not come easy, Reuters, 19 June 2013; http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-obama-berlin-nuclear-russia-idUSBRE95I0ZP20130619.

President Putin, Meeting an implementing state armament programme for nuclear deterrence, Sochi, 26 July 2012; http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/4220


U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, 1 January 2015.

Comparison of the 1 June 2011 New Start Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms to the ones available on 1 January 2015.


The Project 955 submarine is also reported to be able to carry long-range cruise missile. For further information: Project 955 submarines to carry long-range cruise missiles, RussianForces.org, 11 January 2013; http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/01/project_955_submarines_to_carr.shtml (2014-02-25).

Yuri Dolgorukiy to join the Northern Fleet, RussianForces.org, 4 September 2013; http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/09/yuri_dolgorukiy_to_join_the_no.shtml (retrieved 2014-02-25).

Strategic Fleet, RussianForces.org, 8 January 2015; http://russianforces.org/navy/ (retrieved 2015-02-09).


Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in


Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in


Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in


Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in
Ibid.

Status of world nuclear forces, Federation of American Scientists, December 2014.


I. Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), November 2011, p. 10.

Ibid.


U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, 1 January 2015.


Remarks by the President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate – Berlin, Germany, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 19 June 2013; http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany.


A. Anischuck, Russia signals nuclear arms cuts will not come easy, Reuters, 19 June 2013.

I. Kearns, Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), November 2011, p. 11.


Ibid.

127 Ibid p. 6.
129 Ibid, p. iii.
132 Ibid, p. 4.
135 Ibid, p 5.
140 Ibid.
144 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
146 US Department of State, Fifth Session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission Under the New START Treaty, 19 February 2013 Both sides decided on one launch of an ICBM or SLBM conducted by each party from 1 January – 31 December 2012.
149 A. Arbatov, Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control, Carnegie Moscow Center, March 2011, p. 3.
156 U.S. Department of State, Fifth Session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission Under the New START Treaty, 19 February 2013 Both sides decided on one launch of an ICBM or SLBM conducted by each party from 1 January – 31 December 2012.

190 H. Kristensen, and R. Norris, Russian nuclear forces 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 014, Vol. 70(2), pp. 82.


195 Ibid.

196 Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Slovenia.


199 Ibid.

200 Ibid, par. 24.

201 Ibid, par. 10.


208 Ibid.

209 Including Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Norway.

210 Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey.


212 For further information on these resolutions, please visit Reaching Critical Will’s website.

213 Changes in voting behaviour compared to 2009.

214 Chad (first and only vote since May 2010 (fv)), Ethiopia (first vote since May 2010 (fv)), Guinea-Bissau (fv), Kazakhstan, Solomon Islands (fv), Tajikistan, Timor-Leste (fv), Tonga (fv) and Tuvalu (fv) voted yes in 2010; Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cabo Verde (fv), Comoros (fv) and Ukraine voted yes in 2011; Cyprus and South Sudan (fv) voted yes in 2012; Kyrgyzstan voted yes in 2013; Marshall Islands, Sweden and Togo voted yes in 2014.

215 Albania and Denmark voted no in 2010.

216 Iceland, Norway and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia abstained in 2010; Georgia, Montenegro and Tajikistan abstained in 2011; Albania, Belarus and Ukraine abstained in 2012; Palau, Serbia, Sweden and Togo abstained in 2013.

217 Equatorial Guinea (fv), Gabon (fv), Guinea-Bissau (fv), Kazakhstan, Seychelles (fv) and Uganda (fv) voted yes in 2010; Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde (fv), Chad (fv), Comoros (fv) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (fv) voted yes in 2011; Tajikistan and Ukraine voted yes in 2012; Central African Republic (fv), Gambia (fv), Kyrgyzstan and South Sudan (fv) voted yes in 2013; Marshall Islands voted yes in 2014.

218 Ukraine voted no in 2013; Georgia voted no in 2014.

219 Georgia abstained in 2010; Tajikistan abstained in 2011.

220 Kazakhstan, Seychelles (fv), Sierra Leone (fv) and Uganda (fv) voted yes in 2010; Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde (fv), Chad (fv), Comoros (first vote) and Gabon (first vote) voted yes in 2011; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (first vote) and South Sudan (fv) voted yes in 2012; Equatorial Guinea (fv), Gambia (fv), Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan voted yes in 2013; Marshall Islands voted yes in 2014.

221 Republic of Moldova and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia voted no in 2010.

222 Guinea-Bissau (fv) and New Zealand abstained in 2010; Montenegro and South Africa abstained in 2012; Liechtenstein abstained in 2014.
Panama (fv) voted yes in 2010; Cabo Verde (fv), Chad (fv), Comoros (fv), Solomon Islands (fv) and Ukraine voted yes in 2011; El Salvador voted yes in 2012; Gambia (fv) and South Sudan voted yes in 2013; Georgia voted yes in 2014.

El Salvador abstained in 2011; South Sudan (fv) abstained in 2012; Tonga and Ukraine abstained in 2013.

Belgium (fv), Bhutan, France, Nicaragua (fv), Nigeria (fv), Paraguay (fv), San Marino (fv), Senegal (fv), Seychelles (fv), Sierra Leone (fv) and Uganda (fv) voted yes in 2010; Cabo Verde (fv), Chad (fv), Comoros (fv), Liberia (fv), Mexico and Solomon Islands (fv) voted yes in 2011; Namibia (fv), South Africa, Tuvalu (fv), Venezuela and Zimbabwe voted yes in 2012; Bolivia, Gambia (fv), Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua and South Sudan (fv) voted yes in 2013; Ecuador and Nauru (fov) voted yes in 2014.

Brazil, Guinea-Bissau (first vote), India, Mauritius, Mexico, South Africa and Syria abstained in 2010; Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Zimbabwe abstained in 2011; Nicaragua abstained in 2012; Egypt, Russian Federation, Uganda and Zimbabwe abstained in 2013.

Afghanistan (fv), Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde (fv), Chad (fov), Colombia, Comoros (fv), Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (fv), Sierra Leone (fv) and Vanuatu voted yes in 2011; Cameroon, Central African Republic (fv), El Salvador, Gambia (fv), Guinea-Bissau (fov), South Sudan (fov), Tuvalu (fv) and Uganda voted yes in 2013.

Panama (fv) voted no in 2011.

Cameroun, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Pakistan and Uganda (fv) abstained in 2011; Sierra Leone abstained in 2013.

Central African Republic (fv), Gabon (fv), Guinea-Bissau (fv), Marshall Islands (fv), Seychelles (fov), Sierra Leone (fv) and Turkmenistan (fv) voted yes in 2010; Cabo Verde (fv), Comoros (fv) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (fv) voted yes in 2011; Gambia (fv) and South Sudan (first and only vote) voted yes in 2013; Chad (first and only vote) voted yes in 2014.

United Kingdom voted no in 2011; Russian Federation voted no in 2012.

Albania, Benin (fv), Comoros (fv), Guinea (fv), Honduras (fv), Kyrgyzstan, Niger (fv), Saint Lucia (fv), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (fv), Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia voted yes in 2012; Cabo Verde (fov), Chad (fov), Croatia, Czech Republic, Gabon (fov), Gambia (fov), Liberia (fov), Marshall Islands, Nauru (fov), Netherlands, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda (fov), Slovakia, Somalia (fov) and Ukraine voted yes in 2014.

Russian Federation voted no in 2012.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (fv) and Ukraine abstained in 2012.

Gabon (first vote), Guinea-Bissau (fv), Kazakhstan, Seychelles (fov) and Sierra Leone (fv) voted yes in 2010; Azerbaijan, Cabo Verde (fv), Chad (fv), Comoros (fv), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (fv), Uganda (fv) and Vanuatu voted yes in 2011; Central African Republic (fov), Gambia (fv), Kyrgyzstan and South Sudan (fov) voted yes in 2013; Marshall Islands and Tajikistan voted yes in 2014.

Grenada voted no in 2014.

Georgia abstained in 2010.

Algeria, Bangladesh, Cabo Verde (fv), Cambodia, Gambia (fv), Georgia, Guinea-Bissau (fv), India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lithuania, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Rwanda (fv), Seychelles (fov), Sri Lanka, Tonga (fv), Tuvalu (fv), Uganda, Ukraine (fv) and Zimbabwe (fv) voted yes in 2013; Bolivia (fov), Chad (fov), Marshall Island, Nauru (fov), Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (fov) voted yes in 2014.

France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States voted no.

Estonia and Marshall Islands (fv) abstained in 2013; Cyprus, Haiti and Norway abstained in 2014.

A/C.1/66/L.39, UNGA First Committee resolution.

Ibid.

UNGA First Committee draft decision A/C.1/67/L.31, UNGA First Committee draft decision A/C.1/68/L.24 and UNGA First Committee draft decision A/C.1/69/L.19.

B. Fihn, Disarmament Machinery, First Committee Monitor, Reaching Critical Will, 12 November 2012.

Pakistan and India as nuclear possessors' states outside the NPT did participate in the meetings.


UN Document A/AC.281/2, Report of the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

B. Fihn, Disarmament Machinery, First Committee Monitor, Reaching Critical Will, November 2013.

Resolution contained in UN Document A/C.1/68/L.34, Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.

M. Gendenberger, Nuclear Weapons, First Committee Monitor, Reaching Critical Will, October 2014.

UNGA First Committee Voting Chart for A/C.1/69/L.21, 29 October 2014.

B. Fihn, Disarmament Machinery, First Committee Monitor, Reaching Critical Will, 12 November 2012.


Statement behalf of the France, United Kingdom, and the United States to the United Nations General Assembly High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament, delivered by Minister Alistair Burt, UK Parliament Under Secretary of State, on 26 September 2013.
Ibid.


Statement to the UNGA First Committee on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, delivered by United States in October 2014.

Ibid.

Statement on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, delivered by the Netherlands in October 2014; and Statement on behalf of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain, delivered by Spain in October 2014.


Statement to the UNGA First Committee on behalf of Austria, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, and San Marino, and Sweden, delivered by Ireland in October 2014.

Ibid.


M. Gandenberger, Informal Working Group re-established, Reaching Critical Will, 3 March 2014.

M. Gandenberger, CD adopts schedule of activities before 6-week break, Reaching Critical Will, 26 March 2014.

UNG A resolution A/57/124.

Austria, Colombia, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama.

UNSG report A/67/138. In July 2010 when the previous report (A/65/160) was released, only five countries - Burkina Faso, Japan, Mexico, Spain and Ukraine - submitted information.

Argentina, Austria, Cuba, El Salvador, Germany, Iraq, Japan, Mexico, Panama, and Portugal.

UNSG report A/69/113*.

A list of the various activities and resources is available: http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/index.shtml.

UNG A resolution A/RES/65/77.

UNG A resolution A/RES/65/81.


B. Fihn, Disarmament education, First Committee Monitor, Reaching Critical Will, October 2010.

The Forum was cancelled due to the earthquake that hit Japan on 11 March 2011.


Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, delivered by Japan on 28 February 2012 and to the NPT on 3 May 2012.

Statement Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to the NPT Preparatory Committee 2012, on 28 April 2012.
