Strengthening implementation, not rewriting the Programme
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During Tuesday’s discussions on the draft declaration, the Syrian delegation questioned a phrase in paragraph 7 that says states “resolve to tackle” the remaining challenges for full implementation of the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). The Syrian delegate argued that states first have to identify what these challenges are and then propose solutions to tackle them. This should, of course, have been the key exercise of this Review Conference: to identify challenges and determine how to overcome them. Unfortunately, this crucial work has not been undertaken at this conference. Furthermore, attempts to strengthen future reviews have also been undermined by skepticism of some delegations, which will only hurt the UN small arms process going forward.

As noted by Marcus Wilson’s article in Small Arms Monitor Vol. 5, No. 6, this conference has reviewed its draft outcome document, not implementation of the UNPoA or ITI. One could argue that the preceding cycle of meetings—two Biennial Meetings of States (BMS) and one Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE)—undertook a review of the relevant instruments’ implementation. Indeed, the MGE did an excellent job of highlighting challenges as well as opportunities for further progress in implementation of the ITI. The Chair’s summaries of the MGE and the two BMS provide instructive information and reflection on the elements necessary for the UNPoA and ITI to achieve success in their objectives.

Unfortunately, some delegations have expressed reservations with making any reference to the outcomes of these meetings. Iran and Cuba called for the draft declaration, for example, to simply note that these meetings took place without any reference to the need of following-up on their outcomes. Other delegates thus questioned the point of holding meetings at all if their outcomes cannot be used or built upon later. It is a relevant question to keep in mind while working on this RevCon’s outcome document, especially its implementation plans for the UNPoA and ITI.

A cautionary note has already been sounded with the delegation of Cuba objecting to the use of “implementation plans” for the relevant aspects of the RevCon’s draft outcome documents. On Tuesday, the Cuban delegation argued that the UNPoA itself sets out its implementation plan and therefore new plans are unnecessary. Of course, the original UNPoA was adopted in 2001. Eleven years later, there are many new dynamics, technologies, tensions, and opportunities to strengthen that implementation plan, which is the core objective of any review conference, especially one that seeks to address practical implementation measures, the success of which are inherently dependent on changing circumstances and dynamics.

While most delegations are taking the opportunity of these two weeks to draft a robust strategy for the years ahead, some governments have remained skeptical about referencing anything that they view as going “beyond” the UNPoA. Unfortunately, this has also meant that many of these delegations have opposed language referring to documentation, measurability, assessments, evaluations, or indicators. Most vocally, Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Iran, and Syria called for deletion of many such references, arguing that they are vague or that they are beyond the scope of the UNPoA.

However, as the Swiss delegate emphasized, in order to be able to review achievements or identify challenges in implementation, the international community needs tools to gauge its progress. Switzerland argued that every time states have the opportunity to strengthen the monitoring of progress that has been achieved, it is a good idea to do so. The Mexican delegation likewise supported the added value brought to continued on page 3
Bombs away
Dr. Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

There seems to be very good progress towards an acceptable and actionable outcome document for the PoA, in part because of the excellent work of the facilitators, one of the most effective groups that Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW) has ever witnessed. The hope, as in all disarmament-related matters, is that the work of the facilitators results in a document that promotes more robust implementation and does not merely produce more normative frameworks to encourage optional activity.

Once this Review Conference has run its course, PoA diplomats will turn their attention to the opening of the General Assembly and, following that, their First Committee assignments. Unlike this RevCon, First Committee requires delegations to weigh in on a wide range of disarmament-related issues, everything from cluster munitions to nuclear weapons modernization.

A foretaste of responsibilities to come will take place this morning (6 September) in Conference Room 4. There will be an Informal Meeting of the General Assembly to Mark the Observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests. Nuclear testing in and of itself is not a high priority item for many delegations, but the occasion will surely allow delegations to renew their interest in promoting a nuclear weapon free world.

Sadly, there is often a shocking lack of interest by NGOs working on nuclear or conventional weapons in the issues and challenges of the other. For their part, some diplomats gravitate to nuclear discussions as the states they represent do not possess nuclear weapons and therefore discussions on such weapons—while critically important—do not necessarily require non-possessing states to make changes in their own defense policies.

But most diplomats thankfully understand the inter-relationships defining the broad disarmament agenda and the presence of the GA session tomorrow should serve as an important reminder of the ways in which PoA discussions intersect with wider security priorities.

While Reaching Critical Will has recognizable robustness on both nuclear and conventional weapons, GAPW’s nuclear work has been confined to promoting nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs). In this work, we have made clear distinctions between state responsibilities to support specific NWFZ obligations, and work to preserve the security sustainability of the zone which a treaty defines. ‘Sustaining the Zone’ is a concept which we expound in order to remind governments that not possessing nuclear weapons does not absolve states from related responsibilities to end diverted transfers, eliminate illicit small arms, and create stable, transparent, and reliable security sectors.

These multi-dimensional and inter-related obligations bind all states in work to make our collective security arrangements in all aspects more effective, dependable, and trustworthy. The illicit weapons we eliminate, the reforms in our security sector that we can enact, yes, even the nuclear testing and modernization that we can prevent, all contribute in our view to more hopeful conditions for our planet.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the contributing authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the supporting organizations.
Side event: The link between armed violence reduction and arms control
Rohie Drammeh | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) organized a side event to explore the link between armed violence reduction and arms control. Experiences in Mexico, South Sudan, and in El Salvador were presented and a brief introduction was given to the work of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

The illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Mexico has had severe consequences in the country. In its work against illicit SALW the government has established programmes to prevent young adults and children from falling into organized crime. Since the implementation of these programmes, homicides in the country have dropped by 77%. The work against illicit SALW has also included the encouragement of other countries, especially neighbouring ones, to work on the prevention of SALW within their national borders. That would mean the decrease of illicit SALW crossing over national borders. In Mexico, future plans involve the continuation of implementing the PoA, to actively promote the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and to continue supporting the Geneva Declaration.

In South Sudan there was a significant number of automatic weapons in civilian hands during prolonged wars that ended with the signing of the CPA in 2005. The vision for South Sudan today is a secure and peaceful country in which communities are free and protected from the harmful impact of SALW. In the work against SALW, the Bureau for Community Security of SALW was established in the country. The key programme areas include development policy, legislation and strategy on small arms control, and to enhance security at community levels through effective community-based policies. South Sudan has collaborated with organizations to fight illicit SALW. For example, together with the UNDP, South Sudan has had country consultations in six states to identify drivers of SALW and has started food security projects for women and youth. The challenges that are still faced in the country include the lack of policy and legislation on SALW, the lack of legal framework for civilian disarmament, and negative armed forces within the country. Potential areas for partnership were suggested, which included record-keeping and tracing.

In 2011, the number of women murdered had increased by 12% from the previous year in El Salvador, and 70% of the homicides in the country involve firearms. In the prevention of SALW and the work towards a safer country, the government of El Salvador has dialogues with gang leaders through the Catholic Church. An arms reduction strategy has also been developed, which includes the strengthening of the arms registration and control system, and the implementation of demonstration activities in municipalities. There is also knowledge and information management in the form of research and awareness programmes, the development of opportunities for children and youth, and leadership and empowerment of women. Among the main impacts of these programmes is the increased confidence of the people in public institutions and increased security awareness.

The discussions and general comments after the presentations were interesting and kept the dialogue going in the room. The issue of gender-based violence was lifted to the fore as it is an important topic in relation to SALW, and the importance of justice in the region, especially regarding holding perpetrators responsible for their actions.

Strengthening implementation, cont’d

implementation by the establishment of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

Tools that allow the international community to monitor and measure implementation also allow it to assess and evaluate the impacts of both problems and solutions. Such mechanisms should not be viewed as threats to state sovereignty but rather as tools to increase the effectiveness of implementation strategies, which will ultimately save resources while more efficiently achieving the objectives of the instruments in question.
Schedule of meetings
Paras 1-6
• Algeria, Cuba, and Syria called for their deletion.
• CARICOM, Argentina, Austria, India, Liberia, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, and Uruguay supported retaining these paragraphs.

Para 7
• Arab Group called for deletion of the MGE.
• Algeria, Iran supported holding two BMS, one of which could be for technical issues.
• CARICOM, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, DRC, Ecuador, India, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and Uruguay supported holding two BMS and one MGE.
• Ecuador supported holding one BMS and one MGE.
• Cuba, Iran, and Syria supported holding two BMS.
• USA supported holding two MGEs.
• New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland noted that 2 BMS + 1 MGE is same as last meeting cycle so is not indicative of meeting proliferation and should be the minimum of meetings considered.
• USA said problem isn’t number of meetings but making them more useful, arguing political discussions aren’t as valuable as technical ones.
• CARICOM said it is reluctant to convert political meetings into technical ones, arguing the political forum is still important.
• CARICOM, Argentina, Cuba suggested differentiating between the BMS and MGE mandates.
• Algeria, Pakistan, and Syria called for deletion of last sentence.
• New Zealand said it is flexible on this sentence and states could agree on nature of BMS later.
• India, supported by Brazil, suggested last sentence say “specific topics” instead of “technical aspects”.
• Brazil called for including a reference to exchange of best practices.
• Japan suggested adding a new language to 7 or 7bis: “Decide to request states to ensure participation of the real experts in line with the topic or theme of potential MGEs to enable in depth discussions.”
• Japan suggested synchronizing future meetings with development assistance committee of the OECD.

Para 8
• Argentina called for addition of month and year for PrepCom, suggesting it be held soon before the 2018 RevCon.

Para 9
• Algeria, Cuba, India, Pakistan, and Syria called for deletion of “consideration of relevant and emerging issues”.
• Ghana, Norway, South Africa, and Switzerland said this reference should be retained.

Para 10
• EU, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa, Sweden, and USA welcomed call for identification of topics well in advance.
• Cuba proposed: “Note the importance of identifying well in advance the relevant topics related to the PoA and ITI to be considered in their meetings in order to facilitate preparation and participation of states.”
• Iran suggested deleting the entire paragraph though would accept Cuba’s phrasing.
• Syria said it would accept Cuba’s phrasing as long as language was added to specify that topics would be chosen with the participation of all delegations.
• Arab Group, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Iran, said specific topics should not be listed here.
• New Zealand and Norway supported inclusion of list of topics.
• Malaysia noted the list here is non-exhaustive and topics will have to be agreed by consensus.
• Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland supported inclusion of stockpile management.
• Norway called for ammunition to be added to the list of topics.
• Iran, supported by Ecuador, called for private ownership to be added to the list of topics.
• Ecuador suggested: trade and brokering; marking, record-keeping, and tracing; armed violence; misuse of small arms and trade in ammunition; problems with storage; and importance of tracing ammunition found in conflict settings.
• USA, supported by EU and Austria, suggested calling on governments to send appropriate experts to each meeting.
• Algeria argued representation from countries is a sovereign issue.
• India said USA’s phrase should also include officials.
• CARICOM suggested adding “relevant” in front of “emerging issues”.

Para 12
• Argentina, Nigeria, and Norway welcomed reference to regional approaches.
• Cuba, supported by New Zealand, argued the reference to regional approaches is covered elsewhere and the para should only retain the call for regional meetings.
• Syria said regional meetings should not be dictated by this RevCon.
News in Brief, cont’d

- Peru said regional meetings should be held on technical issues.
- Peru, supported by Ecuador, called for a reference on the role of regional centres for peace and disarmament.
- Ghana, Liberia, and Uruguay supported the para as is.

Para 13
- Cuba called for deletion of everything after the word “meetings”.
- Cuba called for deletion of the word “maximum”.
- South Africa, supported by Brazil, suggested deleting notion of aligning agendas so the para only refers to aligning meetings.
- Switzerland said it is flexible on language but work on the regional and international levels should be synchronized.
- Pakistan called deletion of the paragraph due to its unnecessary micromanagement.
- Uruguay supported the paragraph as is.

Para 14
- Argentina, Kenya, Nigeria, Norway, and Uruguay welcomed reference to civil society.
- South Africa said language from para 2c of the PoA follow-up should used here.
- Syria called for deletion of this para and inclusion of reference in preamble of the consolidated document.
- Pakistan said this paragraph is redundant.

Para 15
- Norway said reporting should be more extensive in the next cycle.
- Iran and Syria called for deletion of word “quality”.
- Liberia argued the quality should be improved.
- Pakistan said the contents here can be captured in the implementation plan.

Para 16
- Arab Group, Iran, and Syria suggested adding “unconditional” before financial assistance.
- Arab Group, Iran called for clarification on wide participation.
- Norway noted the sponsorship programme is a way to motivate and facilitate further action.

UNPoA implementation plan

Para 1
- Mexico called for reinsertion of language on parts, components, and ammunition.
- Germany suggested adding language that “states should also take advantage of new technological developments in the fight against illicit SALW”.
- Syria suggested adding “light weapons” after diversion.

Para 2
- CARICOM said it wouldn’t accept weakening this text.
- Mexico welcomed language on borders.
- Syria suggested deleting issues not within the PoA.

Para 4
- EU and Ireland supported language on authorization of transfers.
- Iran called for wording from the NAM working paper: “To establish and maintain controls over the private ownership of SALW and to ensure in line with PoA that international transfers of SALW are authorized by governments and limited only to governments or entities duly authorized by governments.”

Para 5
- Mexico supported the text as is.
- Cuba, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe objected to phrase “end use”.
- USA explained it meant for document to say “end use OR end user”.
- Switzerland welcomed the clarification and accepted text as is.
- Iran, supported by DPRK, suggested adding private ownership after control over production.
- Canada and USA argued private ownership goes beyond PoA and should not be added.
- Pakistan, supported by Egypt, suggested deleting “verification of information”.
- Pakistan suggested replacing language just before “on strengthening certification” with “including by strengthening the national system of export and import licencing or authorization”.
- USA accepted Pakistan’s language.

Para 6
- CARICOM, EU, Belgium, and Norway supported retaining text.
- Algeria, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria called for its deletion.
- Cuba suggested rewording this para in line with para 2 of the PoA.
- Norway, supported by Peru, suggested adding language such as “to explore steps”.

Para 7
- Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland supported retaining text as is.
- Algeria, DPRK, Iran, and Syria called for its deletion.

Para 7bis
- Netherlands and Switzerland supported text as is.
- Algeria called for deletion of wording after “post-conflict situations”.

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News in Brief, cont’d

- Cuba suggested adding “where possible” and eliminating “particularly within the framework” and replacing that with “post-conflict situations”.
- Iran and Pakistan added “where appropriate”.
- Pakistan, supported by Ghana, suggested ending after word “programmes”.

**Para 9**
- EU, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, Netherlands, and Norway called for reference to gender mainstreaming and/or gender perspective.
- Peru accepted language as is.
- Iceland said previous version was stronger and said it should call for equal participation.
- EU called for reference to children in armed conflict.
- Netherlands and Norway did not support listing women and children as vulnerable groups.
- Iceland and Norway supported reference to UNSCR 1325 and UNGAR 65/69.
- Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Pakistan called for deletion of reference to UNSCR 1325 and UNGAR 65/69.
- Norway, supported by Germany, Iceland, and Mexico, suggested creating new paragraphs to deal with vulnerable groups and children in armed conflict.
- Germany suggested language for the new para on children: “To undertake to better address devastating consequences of illicit trade of SALW on children including children in armed conflict especially in respect to relevant provisions of UNSCR 1612.”
- Syria supported new para on children but said it should be same language as in PoA.
- Algeria, Cuba, Iran called for deletion of call for documentation of negative impacts of illicit SALW.
- India said it was flexible on language that doesn’t go beyond PoA commitments and keeping in mind that the PoA isn’t a development document.
- Iran and Syria said text should say “to increase” rather than “to encourage” women’s participation.
- Holy See, Iran, and Zimbabwe said they are not in favour of references to gender.
- Egypt said it has reservations about use of term “vulnerable groups”.
- New Zealand said language here should be coordinated with language on gender in the declaration.

**Para 9bis**
- Iran suggested adding “voluntary” and deleting last part from “taking advantage”.
- Syria suggested instead of “to increase” it should say “to continue” and last part of the para be deleted.
- Mexico welcomed this text.

**Para 10**
- Australia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland supported text as is.
- Algeria called for deletion of “mechanisms for measuring impact”.
- Mexico and Switzerland called for retention of “mechanisms for measuring impact”.
- Cuba suggested adding “subject to constitutional and legal systems of states”.
- Iran called for deletion of National Action Plans.
- Pakistan and Syria said reference to NAPs is fine but the text shouldn’t get into what these plans should or shouldn’t include and thus para should stop after “national priorities”.
- Ghana said language can be simplified because a NAP can’t be developed on anything other national priorities.

**Para 11**
- Cuba said to replace “including” with “in particular”.
- Iran, supported by Syria, suggested adding “by their states parties” after “legally binding”.
- Algeria, supported by Syria, suggested deleting “and processes” and adding, after encourage, “on a voluntary basis”.

**Para 13**
- Australia suggested “within and between regions”.
- Iran and Syria suggested deleting “model” before legislation and “best” before practices.
- New Zealand, supported by CARICOM and Peru, called for reinserting reference to regional centres and distinguishing between them and organizations.

**Para 14**
- Cuba and Syria said language should stick to PoA.
- New Zealand supported the formulation.
- Algeria suggested deleting the words “cooperation, coordination, and information sharing” and “government agencies”.
- India suggested deleting words starting from “in particular” and the reference to arms transfer licencing authorities.

**Para 16**
- Cuba suggested after word “stocks” adding “by competent national authorities”.

**Para 17**
- New Zealand suggested post-conflict settings.
- Brazil, supported by Algeria and India, said surplus stocks should include reference to “as defined by national competent authorities”.

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News in Brief, cont’d

Para 18
- New Zealand called for reference to identifying groups and individuals to only be associated with Interpol.

Para 19
- Cuba suggested eliminating “in particular”.

Para 20bis
- Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, and India called for its deletion.
- Australia suggested adding language to indicate that peer review mechanisms, indicators, and standards are to promote increased effectiveness to mobilize additional resources.
- New Zealand welcomed the text.

Para 20ter
- Cuba suggested adding “on a voluntary basis” to reports to the Register.
- Germany said “where relevant” can be deleted.
- Germany suggested adding language: “States should consider establishing SALW as an eighth category of the Register.”
- Algeria, Brazil, and India called for para’s deletion.

Para 20qua
- New Zealand and Peru supported the text.
- Algeria and India called for this para’s deletion.

Para 21
- Australia suggested adding a reference to North-South before South-South.
- India called for simplifying this para.

Para 21bis
- NAM welcomed inclusion of language from its working paper but noted there are now many caveats.
- USA spoke against reintroduction language on ISACS.

Para 22
- Cuba and Indonesia suggested deleting “enhanced monitoring, measurement, and analysis of small arms casualties”.
- Australia welcomed references to monitoring, etc. but suggested rephrasing to say “...including of small arms casualties”.

Para 23
- Brazil, Cuba, and Indonesia suggested deleting “monitoring and evaluation frameworks”.
- Australia and New Zealand supported the text.

Para 24
- Philippines suggested adding “long term” before “sustainability”.
- Australia said para may contain redundancies and suggested: “To explore in cooperation with relevant regional, international organizations, including the UN Secretariat, means of ensuring long term sustain-
ability of assistance, including in ensuring alignment of assistance with national priorities, building enduring capacity, and integrating sustainability strategies in national plans and requests for assistance.”
- New Zealand welcomed reference to UN website and said as long as there are no obligations there shouldn’t be a problem with listing a reference tool.
- NAM called for increased clarity on the trust fund.
- Algeria called for deletion of reference to support programmes.

Para 25
- Philippines and USA supported the language on a multi-donor facility.
- NAM questioned what that language on the facility refers to.
- NAM said language on sustainability could be more concise and argued that assistance needs to be aligned with national priorities of the state requesting it.

Para 26
- Ghana supported the text.

Other issues section
- Cuba expressed doubts about the relevancy of this section and said if it is retained it should include all controversial issues then it should also include regulating civilian possession and prohibition of transfers to non-state actors.
- Algeria, India, and USA called for this section’s deletion.
- New Zealand supported its inclusion.
- New Zealand and USA noted that MANPADS aren’t outside the PoA.

Additional issues
- Switzerland proposed reintroducing a paragraph on armed violence into the national implementation part of the PoA implementation plan, arguing that while the concept of armed violence may not be clear and precise for some states, other concepts like terrorism or organized crime are not always internationally defined yet they are accepted.
- Pakistan, supported by Syria, proposed a 5bis: “To develop adequate national legal or administrative procedures, where they do not exist, to regulate the activities of brokers in SALW. These legislations or procedures should include measures such as regulation of brokers, licencing, or authorization of brokering transactions as well as penalties for all illicit brokering activities undertaken in state’s national jurisdiction or control.”
- Germany suggested adding a paragraph on the Group of Interested States.
Side event: “PoA Implementation Monitor (Part 1),” and “Beyond 2012: Advocacy and Action in the UN Small Arms Process”
Katherine Prizeman | Global Action to Prevent War

O
n the side lines of the discussions on the follow-up mechanism and schedule of meetings for the next review cycle of the UNPoA, the mission of New Zealand hosted a side event to mark the launch of two publications from Small Arms Survey (SAS), “PoA Implementation Monitor (Phase 1)” and “2012 and Beyond: Advocacy and Action in the UN Small Arms Process”. In light of the debate on Wednesday morning on the type and number of follow-up meetings as well as national reporting commitments for 2012–2018, this event was a relevant discussion of how to help ensure effective and comprehensive implementation of the UNPoA. The delegation of New Zealand noted during the morning plenary that the implementation process is highly dependent on a clear schedule of meetings and such meetings must be substantive with clear mandates and adequate work programs. These are comments which give good context to the importance of not only follow-up meetings, but also the need for frequent submission and high quality of national reports that contribute to a beneficial work program.

The launch event of these two publications from SAS focused on contributing to more robust future UNPoA implementation through national report analysis as well as offering recommendations for future policy actions in the UN small arms process. SAS Senior Researcher Sarah Parker presented her report (authored with Katherine Green) of phase 1 of the project “PoA Implementation Monitor” (POAIM). The POAIM is a multi-year project with the objective of providing a comprehensive review of UNPoA implementation and is divided into three phases (national reporting analysis, verification, and assessment of impact). Ms. Parker presented the findings of the first phase whereby all states that have submitted national reports between 2002 and June 2011 were evaluated and given a score out of 56.75. This score was developed using a methodology formulated by the researchers according to the specific commitments found in the PoA and ITI that they have labeled as “firm,” “conditional,” or “encouraged practice”. The top “scorers” were Portugal, Mexico, Croatia, Switzerland, and Germany, while the bottom “scorers” were the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Barbados, and Equatorial Guinea. Ms. Parker noted that the objective of the project is not to “name and shame,” but rather to recognize the facility of national reporting. She also stated that individuals are better able to assess quality of reporting rather than implementation as it is unclear if low scores indicate poor reporting or poor implementation. Nonetheless, it is evident that without better information, progress cannot be properly assessed.

Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand then presented the second publication, a paper he authored on broad themes of this UNPoA Review Conference and the larger UN small arms process. Ambassador McLay stated that there are a range of factors hampering implementation efforts, including distrust and suspicion of UN processes as well as the distinct, but related, arms trade treaty (ATT) process that failed to reach consensus in July and has undoubtedly diverted energies from the UNPoA process. Practical steps for a successful UNPoA Review Conference that were outlined include: acknowledgement of the role of regional and sub-regional organizations; proper engagement of relevant international organizations such as INTERPOL and UNODC; better promotion and awareness of the UNPoA with the aim of garnering more implementation resources; a clearer and more systematic schedule of meetings including one Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE); and further efforts for monitoring and assessing national implementation as well as international assistance and cooperation. Lastly, Ambassador McLay noted the need for striking a proper balance between substantive ambition and political reality in the outcome document. It is clear that any outcome document that truly adds value to the UNPoA process must be substantive and address current challenges of UNPoA implementation rather than merely reiterate 2001 commitments. Ambassador McLay and New Zealand have been strong proponents of institutionalizing technical meetings such as Meetings of Government Experts to provide a forum for practical discussions in addition to the political discussions held in the Biennial Meeting of States format.

The interactive segment of the event focused largely on the methodology of the scoring of the POAIM. Some participants questioned if marking was more heavily “weighted” than other activities such as record-keeping. Ms. Parker stated that it is not a matter of “weighting,” but rather commitments are broken down into percentage of the total commitments found in the UNPoA and ITI. Another participant questioned why international assistance and cooperation was not included in the study. Ms. Parker explained that this could be not be assessed without a separate rubric for determining which states “should” be providing assistance for small arms policy.

The POAIM as well as Ambassador McLay’s recommendations represent good contributions to achieving the objective of the full implementation of the UNPoA and contributing to a robust future program of work. Such “forward-looking” recommendations and “backward-focused” studies are beneficial contributions.
Side event: Practical implementation lessons: armory and stockpile assessment in Africa

Eloise Watson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

In coordination with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) arranged a side event to present two MAG assessment tools to support states in their efforts to reduce the risk of unplanned explosive events at munitions sites and to prevent the diversion of state-held weapons to the illicit market.

Chaired by Mr. Richard Tauwhare, Head of Arms Export Policy Department, the event provided an opportunity for MAG to demonstrate the instruments now available that are designed to help stakeholders address the challenges appurtenant to SALW and which remain central to the transparent and effective implementation of the UNPoA.

Mr. Chris Loughran (Head of International Development and Evaluation Team, MAG) gave a summary of MAG before touching on the organization’s approach to the UNPoA. Mr. Daan Redelinghuys (Senior Technical Advisor, MAG) and Ms. Louise Skilling (Regional Community Liaison Manager, MAG) introduced the two MAG assessment tools, outlining the potential purposes they can serve.

For 10 years, MAG’s work has concerned not only landmines, but also SALW and armed violence reduction, with a range of efforts having been undertaken across Africa and in Iraq. According to Mr. Loughran, the last four years has specifically focused on placing such work under the UNPoA, engaging with national authorities to design proactive programs that tackle SALW issues. MAG’s Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) program is based on several elements: national ownership, linkage to the ISACS, development of nationally specific plans, the harnessing of existing systems, and incremental and scalable programming. As conveyed by Mr. Loughran, the utility of the MAG instruments lies in their capacity to establish the system currently in place, inform policy and strategy development, support prioritization of activities, support the matching of needs and resources, and facilitate monitoring and evaluation.

Mr. Redelinghuys gave a brief yet thorough presentation of the Armory Assessment (ARA) tool, a mechanism that enables implementers to estimate the potential probability of danger in a given armory and clearly identify the most cost effective corrective action by providing a cost-benefit analysis of potential interventions. Mr. Redelinghuys sought to avoid time-consuming explanations of the tool’s technicalities, though what was made clear was the stepped approach of the ARA in assessing intervention; the level of danger, probability, infrastructure, weapons management training, risk and cost of intervention are all identified and scaled by the instrument.

Ms. Skilling described the second MAG instrument, the Ammunition Stockpile Risk Assessment (ASRA). Similar to the ARA, the ASRA evaluates the current situation of a given stockpile using a variety of data collection tools, conducts a risk assessment, and lastly, ascertains possible intervention options (for example, relocation of armory) and their concomitant costs. In summarizing the results of the ASRA, Ms. Skilling drew the audience’s attention to the tool’s important identification feature; the ASRA can identify immediate security and safety measures, unsafe SALWS in need of destruction, training needs and wider programming synergies.

Mr. Tauwhare concluded the session, reiterating the intended functions of the MAG assessment instruments. Such instruments are not designed to be prescriptive. Rather, they are designed to allow for a range of options based on context (capacity and funding available, for example). During the Q&A session, panel members conveyed additional appealing aspects of the tools. Firstly, the ARA and ASRA are capable of conducting their assessments of medium-sized armories in a relatively short timeframe—one day at most. Secondly, built out of an excel platform using Google Earth, these tools are deliberately designed in a basic way that anyone can use on any laptop without needing to introduce sophisticated (and complicated) software.

Small arms cryptoquote

Decipher the following jumbled quote by a UN ambassador.

QEE DIYL WJY VDLEG, TPQEE QLPT CH WJY VLD-HM JQHGT GYTWLDZ ECIGT QHG ECITECJDGGT, CPKGY KYQFQ YSSDLWT, JCHGJL JBPFQHCWQLCQH QCG, SQFCECWQWY WJY CEEFCW WLQGY CH HQLFDWCFQ QHG DRTWLBFW CHITYTWPYHW CH KYDKEY. WJY KLDLQPPY DS QFWCDH CT Q ME-DRQEEZ TQQLYG YTLDHTCRCECWZ WD CHFLYQTY FYFBLWZ QHG SĐTWYL GYIYEDKPYHW SDL QEE. QPRQTQGDL KQRED PQFYGD.