Connecting the dots
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

During Tuesday’s discussion on the draft declaration for the UNPoA Review Conference, government delegations debated the necessity, nature, and content of such a document. A declaration would be a useful aspect of the conference’s outcome if it advances the implementation process by highlighting not just the successes but also the failures of implementation and vigorously renews commitments to meeting the challenges ahead. It should set the tone for the six-year implementation plans for both the UNPoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) by firmly outlining the core objectives of the UNPoA: ending the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and thereby reducing armed violence and associated human suffering.

However, not all delegations seemed to agree that the declaration should exist as such—the Arab Group, Cuba, and Pakistan argued it should merely be a preamble to the outcome document instead. However, the EU, Germany, Mexico, New Zealand, and others argued that a declaration voicing states’ political will to implement the UNPoA would be a much more powerful document than a preamble.

Turning to the content of the declaration, a few delegations contested the notion that the outcome of this conference should do anything other than reiterate the UNPoA verbatim. The US delegation pointed out that the UNPoA was adopted in 2001 and cannot be merely cut and paste into this document in 2012. The New Zealand delegate argued that no review conference in the UN’s history has set such strict restrictions on what it can and cannot include in an outcome document, noting that such an approach “does not resemble what we would interpret as a credible review conference.”

The draft also faced difficulties over its specific provisions, especially those related to the impacts and consequences of illicit SALW. When conducting a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the draft declaration, some delegations sought to weaken such provisions. The Indian delegation called for deletion of the reference in paragraph 1 that implementation of the UNPoA and ITI is undertaken “with a view to ending the human suffering caused by the illicit trade in and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons.” India argued that paragraph 1 sets the tone for the declaration and should not highlight specific “priorities” of certain delegations. The Indian delegation also called for deleting the examples of the “devastating humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences” of the illicit trade in SALW, arguing that there is a number of contributing factors to such issues and the links between them and SALW are not necessarily clear.

However, for most countries and civil society actors, the humanitarian consequences of the illicit trade in SALW constitute the main motivating factors for the UNPoA’s existence and continued relevance. Thus in response to the Indian delegation’s suggestions, CARICOM, ECOWAS, Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago emphasized that deleting or weakening the language related to the humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences of illicit SALW is unacceptable. The European Union, Belgium, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland sought to strengthen rel-

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**Connecting the dots, cont’d**

Relevant language, suggesting the addition of references to international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law, and/or the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. The Iranian delegation objected to such additions, arguing there is no reference in the UNPoA to human rights, while the Geneva Declaration is not an agreed document. Likewise, India’s delegation argued that armed violence and development are agenda items in other UN processes and therefore should not be “duplicated” here. A few delegations even called for the deletion of the phrase “armed violence” altogether in later paragraphs of the declaration.

It is just this type of separation or “silo-ing” of issues within the UN system that presents the fundamental challenge to achieving sustainable progress on any of these issues. The links between the proliferation of SALW and poverty, crime, and insecurity, as well as violations of IHL and human rights, have been acknowledged and substantiated on many levels inside and outside of the UN. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are based on the interlinkage of issues and the Geneva Declaration, which has been signed by more than 100 governments, recognizes that armed violence constitutes a major obstacle to the achievement of the MDGs. Suggestions that a political declaration aimed at reaffirming governmental commitment to combating the illicit trade in SALW should not refer to either armed violence or development, either alone or together, were shocking to some delegations and to most civil society actors.

Also surprising were requests by a few delegations, such as Algeria and Iran, to remove language suggesting follow-up to the meetings held over the last six years related to the UNPoA and ITI, such as the Biennial Meetings of States in 2008 and 2010 or the Meeting of Government Experts in 2011. They argued that the declaration should simply note that these meetings took place. But as other delegations questioned, what was the point of the past review cycle if the next one is not able to build upon its predecessor by implementing its outcomes?

At the beginning of Tuesday morning’s meeting, the facilitator of the draft declaration noted that this text should set the tone and motivation for the implementation period ahead. She explained that its purpose is to articulate the political, security, humanitarian, and development impacts and consequences of illicit trade in SALW and governmental commitment to combat such trade. The draft declaration could be stronger, and many delegations contributed constructive feedback to that end. But the key elements must be retained and strengthened, not deleted. What is the point of a document that throws out everything that has been agreed or discussed since 2001 and goes back to the point of origin? The last eleven years must not have been in vain. •
Hall pass
Dr. Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

There is plenty to be done over the next three days to come to agreement on an outcome document for the Second Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action (PoA) and strengthen commitments to full PoA implementation until the next Review Conference in six-years time. But across the hall in Conference Room 4 this morning (5 September) there is another UN General Assembly (GA)-sponsored event for which the issue of illicit small arms is directly applicable.

In that room, government delegates and civil society will participate in an informal interactive dialogue on the “Report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: Timely and decisive response”. Such response refers to a wide range of tools and capacities—both preventive and coercive—that the UN both has and needs in order to be able to provide credible and effective response to the threats of mass atrocities.

The Responsibility to Protect norm (RtoP) was introduced into the UN system in 2005 at the World Summit, based on the notion that the international community has a ‘last resort’ responsibility to intervene to protect civilians when states prove unable or unwilling to protect their own. The norm has been the focus of intense scrutiny in light of its controversial application in Libya and its non-application in Syria. Among the issues that have been debated in previous GA sessions including the role of the Security Council, the need for more robust preventive capacities, gender dimensions of atrocity crime response, and the role of regional actors in preventing atrocity crimes.

The conversation about how best to prevent atrocity crimes leads naturally to a discussion of the threats to societies that can, if not properly addressed, lead to violence that can even rise to the level of such crimes. In this list of threats, the problem of illicit small arms rises quickly to the top. All summer long, delegates to the arms trade treaty and PoA processes have been reminded by government and civil society colleagues of the devastating impact of illicit small arms and diverted arms transfers on communities worldwide. The ready availability of weapons by an array of non-state actors greatly complicates state and international efforts to protect civilian populations and, even more, impedes efforts to restore peace and stability to communities that have been victimized by widespread violence.

The relationship between the presence of illicit arms and the commission of atrocity crimes might be contributory more than causal. But there can be little doubt that so many weapons in circulation finding their way into so many unauthorized hands creates profound security challenges for states and equally grave health, development, and participation-related problems for communities long past the end the shooting.

Global Action to Prevent War urges PoA delegations to pay attention to the RtoP process, including the discussion across the hall, as we consistently urge RtoP advocates to pay more attention to PoA processes. The need to prevent mass atrocities is one of the most compelling rationales for delegations in the PoA to take firm steps to eliminate illicit weapons and end the practice of diverting transfers. The clear and direct role of illicit weapons in the commission of the most horrific crimes should help motivate more compelling outcome language and more robust implementation commitments.

Small arms crossword answers
News in Brief  
Katherine Prizeman | Global Action to Prevent War

Declaration  
General comments  
• The facilitator noted that the Declaration should “set the tone” for the implementation documents and should be reflective and forward-looking as well as a combination of the realistic and aspirational.  
• Algeria, Iran, DPRK, the Arab League, Cuba, and Syria said they did not want a separate Declaration, but rather, a consolidated document.  
• Cuba, Pakistan, and the Arab League said the Declaration should function as the preamble of the outcome document.  
• The EU, Germany, Mexico, and New Zealand disagreed and said the Declaration must function more prominently than a preamble.  
• The US and Malaysia warned against extremes—repeating or going beyond the UNPoA.  
• New Zealand questioned the strictness with which states were approaching this outcome document and identified four functions of the Declaration—to reaffirm serious problems of the illicit trade in SALWs and the fundamental role of the UNPoA in addressing them; reaffirm the commitment of member states to full and effective implementation; to acknowledge, reaffirm and consolidate various agreements reached since 2001; and give a sense of what has been learned through charted broad principles.

Para 1  
• Cuba suggested deletion of “uncontrolled spread”.  
• Iran suggested separation of para 1 into two parts and treating the ITI in a separate paragraph.  
• India called for the deletion of the phrase beginning with “with a view to ending the human suffering...”

Para 2  
• Cuba suggested language following “reaffirm” that states: “...including the sovereign equality of states, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of conflict, the non-use or threat of use of force, and non-intervention in the affairs of states” based on language from para 8 of the UNPoA.  
• Cuba, supported by the DPRK, also suggested additional paragraph 2 bis and 2 ter related to the right to self-defense as based on article 51 in the Charter and the right to manufacture, import, and retain SALWs for self defense and security needs, respectively.

Para 3  
• Iran and India suggested changing “a” to “the global framework”.  
• Iran and Cuba supported the replacement of “human development” with “sustainable development”.  
• South Africa called for inclusion of the annual GA resolution on SALW.  
• CARICOM supported para 3, but noted that the references to socioeconomic and human development are vital and must be retained and should not be anything weaker than what is already in the UNPoA.  
• Switzerland expressed support for a reference to armed violence.  
• Iran suggested adding “reconciliation, safety, stability” before “security”.

Para 4  
• Cuba suggested replacing “aid” with “future terrorism” and deleting “and other”.  
• South Africa said to also refer to crime in general as this is separate from transnational organized crime.  
• India spoke against listing specific issues related to socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences.  
• CARICOM, ECOWAS, Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago argued this language should not be weakened.  
• The EU, Belgium, and Norway spoke in favor of adding a reference to human rights law.  
• Iran disagreed and said there was no reference to human rights in the UNPoA.  
• The Republic of Congo and Belgium said there should be a reference to the issue of looting natural resources.  
• The Arab Group said to include a reference to “transnational, human, and drug trafficking” and suggested an additional paragraph to “stress the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance, financial and technical, where appropriate.”

Para 5  
• ECOWAS supported the reference to regional cooperation.  
• Syria said the phrase “we remain mindful” is not appropriate and should be replaced with “continue to recognize.”  
• New Zealand, supported by Trinidad and Tobago, noted that the final phrase should read “...supporting and reinforcing national implementation.”  
• Iran suggested two additional paragraphs to underscore the responsibility of occupying powers in preventing, combating, and eradicating illicit trade in SALWs and preventing trafficking into other states (5 bis) and to stress the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance, financial and technical, to support and facilitate national efforts at local, national, regional levels (5 ter).
Switzerland, supported by Mexico, suggested language referencing the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence.

Iran disagreed and said the Geneva Declaration is not an internationally-agreed upon consensus document.

Mexico suggested a 5 bis paragraph that reads, “We recognize the value of addressing the illicit trafficking in SALW cross borders and support cooperation on this matter through an approach through common responsibility among states with full respect for each state’s sovereignty.”

Para 6/6 bis

Germany called for a reference to practical disarmament measures, including the “Matching Needs and Resources” program from UNODA as well as the Group of Interested States.

Iran called for the deletion of “considerable” in the first phrase as well as the reference to national action plans.

ECOWAS supported the reference to sub-regional organizations in 6 bis and called for a reference to the role of civil society.

The EU suggested strengthening 6 bis through the addition of “...and emphasize the need to further enhance the role of regional and sub-regional organizations, where appropriate, in implementing the PoA.”

Mexico, supported by Australia, suggested an addition to 6 bis that reads, “We reaffirm the necessity to consider ways to assess the effectiveness of cooperation and assistance to ensure and improve the implementation of the PoA and ITI.”

Para 7

Norway expressed dissatisfaction with the paragraph noting that it does not sufficiently capture that PoA implementation has been uneven.

ECOWAS asked for a listing of more specific obstacles and challenges.

Syria also called for more specific challenges as well as proposals on how to tackle such challenges.

Para 8

Algeria, supported by Iran, suggested replacing “underline” with “note.”

Iran proposed the deletion of “need to follow-up” and called for no reference to the outcomes of those meetings.

The EU suggested the rephrasing of the first sentence to “…discussions held and to implement recommendations...”

Switzerland expressed regret that there is no link to the themes addressed in the previous meetings and suggested the addition of “the prevention and reduction of armed violence” to the end of the paragraph.

Para 9

Cuba said, after the word “development”, to include “within the framework of the PoA.”

Syria, supported by Iran, said to insert the word “agreed” before “norms.”

Zimbabwe suggested language that reflects the role of illicit arms in the hands of non-state actors.

Norway, New Zealand, Australia, and Botswana supported the paragraph in its current form.

Para 10

Mexico, supported by Ghana, Mali, Madagascar, and Switzerland, proposed to include border control officials in the listing of competent officials.

Egypt said it could not accept the addition of border control.

Iran and Egypt said to delete “military,” while Switzerland said to retain it.

India said to replace “competent” with “relevant” officials.

Brazil, supported by Australia, suggested language that emphasizes the importance of sharing best practices as well as a reference to better coordination between national points of contact.

The EU suggested adding to the list of officials “arms transfer licensing authorities.”

Para 11

Germany said to add a reference to children in armed conflict.

Norway, supported by Denmark, suggested a restructuring of the paragraph to first address victims of armed conflict and then an element related to the gender perspective.

The EU said to also include a reference to the integration of a gender perspective that also reflects the effects of illicit trade on men and boys.

Iran said it could support the addition of a reference to men and boys.

The DRC called for the addition of youth to the groups of those victimized.

The Holy See called for the language of this paragraph to remain the same, but said it was not averse to expanding the list of persons to be included.

The Netherlands and Iceland said they would welcome references to women, peace and security and Security Council Resolution 1325.

Zimbabwe opposed references to gender norms.

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News in Brief, cont’d

- Syria said that violence based on religion, in particular xenophobia, should also be included if references to gender-specific violence are made.

Para 12/12 bis

- CARICOM and New Zealand suggested a separation of the references to civil society and industry.
- Algeria said there does not have to be a technical difference between civil society and industry and suggested language that is stronger than ‘recognizing’ the role civil society such as “encourage the partnership and contribution of...”
- Syria and Madagascar said it supported reference to the role of civil society, but not the language related to “partnerships.”
- New Zealand suggested adding UNODC to 12 bis, supported by Austria, and noted that UNODC and the regional centres are under-utilized.
- Pakistan said to delete 12 bis.

Para 13

- Cuba and Iran proposed deleting “armed” in line 2 and replacing “natural resources” with “precious minerals” in line 3.
- Trinidad and Tobago disagreed with the deletion of “armed” noting that there is violence unrelated to SALWs and that armed violence is a qualified type of violence that happens as a result of this illicit trade.
- Pakistan said this paragraph was redundant as these points are already addressed in para 4 and recommended placing “...simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective” at the end of para 5.
- The EU suggested adding “as well as the illicit trade in ammunition” following “natural resources.”

Para 14

- India expressed discontent with the language “clear and tangible results.”
- New Zealand and Switzerland disagreed and said the reference to “clear and tangible results” was vital to the level of commitment needed.
- The US said that part of the reason states are not further along in implementation is the lack of political will. Therefore, the US supported the reference to “clear and tangible results” and noted that if states cannot agree on a call to achieve results, then negotiating efforts will “ring hollow.”
- CARICOM, supported by Austria, suggested also anchoring the commitment to follow-up meetings in this final paragraph.
- Cuba reiterated its position that there is no need for additional implementation plans, as referenced in this paragraph, since the UNPoA and ITI are already programs that contain measures to be implemented.
Side event: The importance of national surveys in UNPoA National Action Plans
Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Eric Berman, Small Arms Survey (SAS) Managing Director, moderated Tuesday’s side event concerning the national surveys in UNPoA national action plans. The event, hosted by the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN and SAS, was based around a recent study jointly undertaken by the Kenyan Government and SAS: Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya: An Assessment (in this article referred to as the Assessment). Speakers discussed the survey as well as the importance of surveys and national action plans to assist with UNPoA implementation.

Ambassador Balslev expressed hope that the Assessment and the close collaboration would act as inspiration or point of reference for other states hoping to undertake national surveys. He stated that reliable data, also on causes and consequences, has the ability to act as a catalyst for action. Therefore, he contended, it is an integral component in strengthening the UNPoA.

Mr. Patrick McCarthy of the UN Development Programme and the International Small Arms Control Standards project (ISACS) spoke about the importance of evidence-based policy and development of Small Arms Module 5.10. He argued that the nature of data collection has developed from studies with limited scope that focused on the weapon itself, to larger more rigorous studies that take a big picture approach. While small studies have their benefits, he reasoned that this trend all points to the natural next steps—continued data collection.

Mr. Francis Wairagu of the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) focused on the development, process, and experiences of national action plans (NAPs). He illustrated the importance of thorough analysis of small arms and light weapons (SALW) situations to inform policy response. Wiragu reasoned that by establishing a comprehensive list of challenges, concrete solutions can be identified. He spoke about the problems of not including local people in data collection and analysis process, using as an example a government having data but no idea where the numbers came from. He argued that the involvement of local research teams provides added value to NAPs, as research capacity is enhanced at national level. He also called for new mapping to be undertaken frequently to ensure emerging issues are responded to.

Mr. David Kimaiyo, Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) on SALW, explained Kenya’s NAP and how it was developed. Kenya’s NAP examines policy and legislation, stockpile management, public education and awareness, regional and international co-operation, and broader control issues. Kimaiyo stated that KNFP is committed to addressing the issue of sales, strengthening partnerships, cross-border initiatives and the need to address demand and supply. He also commented that civil society organizations and other stakeholders play a significant role in the process.

Ms. Anna Alvazzi del Frate, SAS, spoke about the practicalities of undertaking a survey like the Assessment. The study adopted a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods involving approximately 2,500 interviews with households, representatives of civil society organizations, law enforcement agents, and other key informants from 31 out of the 47 counties of Kenya. She argued that while these projects are time and resource intensive, they provide instrumental information.

However, perhaps the most important aspect of this particular study is the establishment of a Kenyan survey team. As Wairagu stated earlier in the discussion, enhancing capacity at a national level is vital to local disarmament capacity-building. Berman opened the session by claiming that national arms mapping surveys provide policy-makers with evidence-based data upon which to establish agendas, develop policies and programs, and evaluate interventions. Many of the speakers commented that they hope the exercise in cooperation and collaboration would serve as a positive case study for others to draw from. Let us hope that this is true, and funding and opportunities are provided to local communities to participate in collection of data for such survey/projects, as well as the decision-making processes, that affect their lives. •
Side event: Czech national system of marking, record-keeping, and tracing
Eloise Watson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya and the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations jointly organized a side event to discuss and evaluate their national experience in keeping and maintaining records on and monitoring the movement of firearms and ammunition. Chaired by Ambassador Edita Hrda, Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the UN in New York, the session was opened by Mr. Simeon Lesrima (Assistant Minister for Provincial Administration and Internal Security of Kenya). Mr. Lesrima gave a presentation on the system used by Kenya to record and monitor the movement of small arms and light weapons. Mr. Jaroslav Hruska (Czech Republic Ministry of the Interior) summarized the Czech Republic’s long history of manufacturing firearms and ammunition, before Mr. Petr Habarta (Czech Republic Ministry of the Interior) gave an overview of the structure and efficiency of the Czech Republic’s system for marking, record-keeping and tracing SALWS.

After emphasizing the grave security challenges posed by the illicit trade of SALW to Kenya, Mr. Lesrima outlined Kenya’s efforts to implement the UNPoA. According to Mr. Lesrima, under a Kenyan police act, all Kenyan firearms are categorized as either ‘state-owned,’ ‘civilian owned,’ or ‘authorized dealers’. Within the country, state-owned firearms movement is controlled through several mechanisms, including arms registries at respective police headquarters and daily physical inspections of arms held in armories at police stations, where reports are then made. By contrast, civilian owned and authorized dealers’ weapons are registered through the Central Firearms Bureau. He noted that the record and licensing process method is controlled from the point of import (including inspection at arrival and provision of information on the manufacturer and mode of entry).

Mr. Habarta shared the current legislation used to regulate firearms and ammunition in the Czech Republic. Like Kenya, the Czech Republic categorizes all firearms (for example, category A: prohibited firearms, category B: firearms subject to authorization, category c: firearms subject to declaration, and so on). All firearms within the country are to be registered by the police or recorded by traders and retailers. Mr. Habarta bemoaned the imperfections which exist within this current monitoring mechanism; namely, that little Czech Republic record keeping is available online since most of it is done via paperwork, rendering the system ‘impractical, unwieldy and difficult to monitor efficiently.’ As such, the Czech Republic is developing a new recording and tracing management system, the ‘Central Register of Firearms,’ to be properly implemented by 2014. As Mr Habarta explained, such an instrument is designed to enable police and businesses to keep electronic records, permitting real-time updating of data on and giving a real-time overview of the current status of firearms and ammunition within the country.

During the Q&A session, having listened to the challenges faced by the Czech Republic with respect to shifting to online record keeping, Mr. Lesrima elucidated Kenya’s own record-keeping difficulties. As he indicated, Kenya’s main problem lies in its lack of resources and small budget, resulting in inadequate training of personnel in the implementation of marking and legislation. He suggested this could be addressed through increased cooperation, collaboration and support from other countries.
Side event: Seance de travail réunissant la Côte d’Ivoire, le Liberia, la Guinée, la Sierra Leone, et Niger

Rohie Drammeh | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The International Action Network on Small Arms, in coordination with the Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération et la Circulation illicite des Armes légères et de petit calibre and GIZ, organized a side event regarding small arms and light weapons (SALW) in West Africa. The general objective of the event was to exchange experiences and practices in the fight against illicit SALW. Five countries—Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Niger—had speakers present who summarized the work that has been done in each country.

Among the challenges of SALW faced in Côte d’Ivoire, for example, are physical security and stockpile management of weapons, cross-border trafficking, and a lack of control of home-made manufacturing of weapons. The ComNat-ALPC Côte d’Ivoire has the role of assisting the government in the design and implementation of the national policy in the fight against illicit SALW, to raise awareness about the dangers of proliferation and circulation of illicit SALW, and to supervise and organize the collection and destruction of SALW. Other actions against illicit SALW include the implementation of community security programmes; the collection and the destruction of SALW; training in stockpile management, tracing, weapons destruction, and border controls; and the marking and registration of weapons.

In Sierra Leone, after the end of the ten-year war, a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme was undertaken. Ex-combatants were disarmed, arms were collected and destroyed, community programmes for the collection of arms were started, and a national action plan was developed for future work against SALW. There are additional projects in progress, such as a plan to issue licenses for weapons to traditional hunters and farmers who require these in their day-to-day work; to destroy all weapons still stored since the collection of weapons began; and an arms registry programme to control the weapons within the borders of the country.

Representatives from Liberia, Guinea, Niger, and Mali also presented facts, challenges, and actions plans of their nations in the fight against SALW. The challenges of the West African region; such as regional instability, high conflict potential, and the presence of armed groups, facilitates the illicit trade and use of SALW in the region. It is therefore essential to have open dialogues and to exchange experiences in the field of prevention of these for future purposes.

Art by Lin Evola
Calendar of events for Wednesday, 5 September 2012

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<tr>
<th>When</th>
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<tr>
<td>10:00–13:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Conference Room 1 North Lawn Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Practical implementation lessons: armoury and stockpile assessment in Africa</td>
<td>Conference Room 1 North Lawn Building</td>
<td>UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and MAG Contact: Josephine Dresner <a href="mailto:Jo.Dresner@maginternational.org">Jo.Dresner@maginternational.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>The link between armed violence reduction and arms control</td>
<td>Conference Room E North Lawn Building</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN, UNDP Contact: Stephanie Winet <a href="mailto:stephanie.winet@eda.admin.ch">stephanie.winet@eda.admin.ch</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>“PoA Implementation Monitor” and “Advocacy and Action in the UN Small Arms Process”</td>
<td>New Zealand Mission 600 Third Ave, 14th Floor bw 39th and 40th Sts</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00–18:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>Conference Room 1 North Lawn Building</td>
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