Hybrid vehicles
Dr. Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

After a long week of textual deliberations and helpful side events, and with a long holiday weekend looming, it would have been completely understandable for PoA delegates to have been a bit ‘short’ with each other on Friday afternoon. Instead, we were treated to a session characterized by kind and flexible discussions that were handled quite effectively by the Chair and even carried over a few minutes into vacation time.

In part due to the fact that this PoA review does not carry the weight of a treaty negotiation, such as many of us participated in just one month ago, tolerance of dissenting views during this first week has seemed quite high. There has been in evidence a spirit of problem solving during plenary meetings and in a series of helpful side events. Some delegations continue to recommend strict adherence to what they see as the original PoA intent, perhaps fearing the establishment of a precedent for change that might occur too quickly or with too little deliberation. But many others such as CARICOM are more than open to a discussion of ‘emerging issues’—a ‘hybrid’ of formerly agreed text responding to new implementation challenges.

The main topic for Friday afternoon was how often and in what context delegations would meet under a PoA framework prior to the next Review Conference in 2018. Many delegations were mindful of what the US and others called ‘meeting fatigue,’ perhaps reflecting the robust rate at which the UN disarmament community meets in formal and informal sessions each year. Thankfully, there was broad (though not universal) agreement on the need to incorporate meetings of government experts (MGE) to help supply a rigorous technical lens to implementation-related problems that are largely couched in political contexts during Biennial Meetings of States (BMS) and Review Conferences. Whether MGE sessions should be authorized as stand-alone obligations or built into ‘hybrid’ meetings which also take up political considerations will require more discussion, as will the role of non-government experts in such discussions (a point raised with enthusiasm by Norway).

Still, the interest by delegations in incorporating a process that can focus full attention on technical barriers to full PoA implementation was most welcome.

In this context, though, the delegation of Cuba offered what we believe (and many delegations seemed to believe as well) to be a necessary caution regarding efforts to advocate (as Global Action to Prevent War does) for an expanded schedule of MGEs. Participation of experts from developing countries at the first MGE was quite encouraging (as rightly noted by New Zealand) but still a bit less than optimal. This might have been a function of the ‘newness’ of the MDG format, or it might have been related to the level of available resources to bring experts to New York and provide adequate accommodation, etc. It might even have been a function of perceived imbalances in the levels of in-house technical expertise available to delegations, setting up the prospect of technical meetings being dominated by larger countries and the experts they bring or otherwise fund. Government experts far from New York might think twice about participation in a situation where they would feel overwhelmed and under-utilized.

Fortunately, there remains high sensitivity in the conference room to the notion that any schedule of meetings must take into account both the need for robustness on implementation and the need to ensure relatively balanced access. The UN, as we have mentioned often, can be a profoundly unlevel playing field, a factor which probably contributes to more state resistance to reasonable proposals for change than we might otherwise believe. Thankfully, through the generosity of several state donors, provisions were made and commitments reiterated.

continued on next page
Hybrid vehicles, cont’d

ed to help guarantee broad participation at future experts meetings.
As many delegates affirmed on Friday the PoA is an implementation-driven instrument. Frameworks have an important place, but success is ultimately a function of illicit weapons disposed, porous borders made more secure, weapons marked in ways that cannot be manipulated, etc. Diplomats can agree on a schedule of meetings and topics for deliberation that strike the balance we need to see between the political and technical dimensions of full implementation.

Thus, while this was not the intent of Friday discussions, there are actually several variants of ‘hybrid’ to consider as we move to the next phases of PoA implementation—not only the format of scheduled meetings, but the interplay of more traditional and emerging implementation concerns, the interplay of political and technical dimensions to full implementation, and the need to harmonize capacity support from the outside with strong policy and technical leadership from within.
It appears more and more that ‘hybrids’ are the key to sustainable development and fulfillment of PoA objectives.
What happened to the “review”?  
Marcus Wilson | IANSA

As the Second UNPoA Review Conference concluded its first week of discussions, it became clear that the only “review” taking place is that of an outcome document, drafted months ago, and circulated widely.

Where is the mandated ‘review of progress made in the implementation of the PoA’?  
In the lead-up to the Review Conference, there was a great deal of expectation (and some anxiety) of the potential outcomes of the meetings. Civil society, in line with the briefing paper written by Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand, had hoped that States would ‘draw some conclusions (however tentative) about the current state of [PoA] implementation, as well as about the implications of developments in the broader context in which implementation is occurring.’ Similar sentiment was expressed by the delegation of Syria, who reiterated the importance of maintaining the mandate to review implementation.  
So far, there has been little of this. Rather, we’re faced with another example of dissecting the English language to the point of weakening previous work and even the text of the very instruments we are here to review. This makes it even less likely that stronger mechanisms can be agreed in the future.  
Surely this Review Conference would benefit from the experience of BMS3, BMS4, and last year’s Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE), by using this opportunity to have substantive discussions on the successes and challenges of PoA implementation. As one delegate put it: “This is the only implementation support process we have, so we had better get it right.”  
Ambassador McLay called for the Review Conference to consider the outcomes of the MGE, and to incorporate further MGEs as a regular fixture of future PoA meetings. Why are we not spending this time ironing out what has worked, and what hasn’t, in terms of measurable implementation over the past ten years? Thus, enabling us to address these issues over the next ten.

Instead, we have days of deliberations over language, and very little in the way of tangible plans to help move the PoA forward and improve implementation. •

Small arms crossword

Across
5. Countries have committed to report every two years on the implementation of the PoA: true or false?
7. Marking, record-keeping, and cooperation in tracing are also known as ... in the UNPoA.
8. 90% of those killed by SALW are ...
9. Designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although can be used by a single person (2 words).
10. Disarmament programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Down
1. There are some 250,000 in the world today (2 words).
2. Discussed by experts at the MGE.
3. The UNPoA does not specify the frequency with which states should report, or the type of ... they should include in their reports.
4. Revolvers and self-loading-pistols are classified as ...
6. The Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts of the UNPoA was held in which month of 2011?

Small arms cryptoquote answer

“As long as the human security of affected populations remains unanswered, both in terms of personal and socio-economic security, the negative impact of small arms will continue to exist.” - Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon (S/2008/258)
Meeting cycle options
- Delegations held a discussion on the next six-year meeting cycle for the UNPoA, during which it was clear that the majority want meetings to include comprehensive coverage of issues while focusing on specific key areas, and that they want the meetings to be results-oriented.
- Most delegations expressed a preference for two Biennial Meetings of States (BMS) in 2014 and 2016 and one Meeting of Government Experts (MGE) in 2015, with a Review Conference in 2018 preceded by a Preparatory Committee (supported by CARICOM, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland).
- Another suggestion was that only two BMS be held and that one or both take the format of an MGE—known as a “hybrid” formula (supported by Norway).
- A third suggestion was that one BMS and one MGE be held intersessionally (supported by France, India, Italy, and US).
- A fourth suggestion was that two BMS be held (supported by EU, Iran, and Syria).

Meeting themes
- South Africa suggested the omnibus resolution in the General Assembly note the themes for subsequent meetings rather than the RevCon.
- Egypt, Pakistan, and Syria agreed it is too early to decide on themes, noting different governments have different priorities.
- South Africa supported stockpile destruction.
- Australia, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland supported stockpile management and security.
- Norway and Trinidad and Tobago suggested illicit trade in ammunition.
- Norway suggested border control.
- EU suggested performance indicators and measurable benchmarks.
- CARICOM called for discussion of emerging issues.
- New Zealand and Norway agreed with CARICOM.
- India also supported discussion of emerging issues but argued it is unclear because it is not certain what those issues are.
- Syria agreed it is difficult to determine emerging issues.

Regional approach
- India, Iran, and Syria expressed concern of the language regarding regional approaches to implementation.
- Australia, Norway, and South Africa supported including regional approaches.
- New Zealand suggested an alteration: “to consider, where relevant, to consider aligning regional cycle of meetings with global cycle...”

Other
- Norway encouraged an enhanced role for NGO participation.
- Norway and South Africa suggested a reference to the role of civil society in the outcome document.
- Norway suggested some meetings be held in Geneva to show that UNPoA implementation is a global effort.
- Cuba expressed concern that developing countries had low participation in the MGE due to scant resources.
- USA said only two meetings should be held, regardless of whether they are called BMS or MGE, and argued that what is important is what happens at these meetings, noting that general exchange of views or discussion of reports isn’t very useful.
- Switzerland argued the next review cycle should develop tools for comprehensive assessment of progress in the implementation of the UNPoA.
Strengthening the outcome documents through specifics
Katherine Prizeman | Global Action to Prevent War

Last week, delegates began discussions on the outcome document for the Implementation Plan for the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) for the next review cycle from 2012 through 2018. While there have been proposals to include language that praises the progress made in implementing the ITI since its adoption in 2005, many delegates and NGOs have noted that language which does not add anything new to the discussion on how to more effectively and comprehensively implement the instrument is not sufficient.

In addition, during the “first reading” of the revised draft of the ITI Plan, the delegations of New Zealand and Switzerland cautioned against weakening existing ITI commitments through additional caveats and qualifiers. They were responding specifically to the proposal by the delegations of Cuba and Iran to include a reference to the different situations, capacities, and priorities of states as they relate to implementing ITI obligations. Such qualifiers seriously weaken the text and limit its ability to provide specific priorities that should be tackled by states over the next 6-year review cycle prior to the 2018 Review Conference (RevCon).

In order successfully identify gaps in implementation for the ITI, it is essential to use the outcome document as a means to highlight specific themes, priorities, and challenges that should be addressed by states. Both the US and the European Union offered concrete proposals that would contribute to the effective implementation of the ITI. The delegation of the US, with the support of Switzerland, suggested the inclusion of a deadline for identifying national points of contact prior to the 2018 RevCon. Likewise, the EU delegation called for concrete references to the implementation challenges identified during the 2011 Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE), given that they are well-detailed in the MGE Chair’s technical summary on marking, tracing, and record keeping. These are good examples of elements of a text that is forward-looking, concrete, and specific such that it directly contributes to more effective implementation measures over a well-defined time period.

As has been previously noted in this Monitor, a reiteration of the existing UNPoA and ITI documents is inadequate. The ITI, although a solid consensus document that offers specific definitions of relevant terms (such as ‘tracing,’ ‘small arms,’ and ‘illicit’), is still insufficiently implemented in all regions. There are many gaps remaining to be addressed in order to effectively fulfill all ITI obligations. The 2011 MGE provided states the opportunity to explore these specific gaps and discuss with governance experts, those who are directly responsible for ITI implementation, on ways to identify and address them. For example, the technical summary from the Chair, Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand, notes that challenges in marking include the development of ‘weapons families’ with similar design features that are vulnerable to misidentification as well as a trend towards regular adaptations of major components of weapons. Likewise, challenges related to cooperation in tracing were also discussed, including legal and bureaucratic impediments to timely provision of data and improving lines of communication between relevant national authorities. The MGE also explored gaps in recordkeeping such as the need to safeguard against unauthorized access to sensitive information.

These ‘specifics’ represent just a sample of the detailed challenges that should be effectively referred to in the ITI Implementation Plan. It would be a serious failure if at least some of these specific challenges were not taken up in this RevCon and subsequently referenced in the outcome document. The various components of the review cycle, including Preparatory Committees and MGEs, must be integrally connected so that they can carefully and incrementally build upon the specific findings and discussions of the preceding debate, in whichever form that takes. Only then will the outcome documents concretely contribute to the overall implementation of these instruments and, ultimately, the eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and the dire consequences associated with armed violence.
Pacific Paradox: Successess and struggles of PoA implementation in the Pacific
Marcus Wilson | International Action Network on Small Arms

The Pacific is often overlooked in discussions on the international small arms process, but look closer and the region is an example of what can be achieved through the Programme of Action (PoA). However, like other regions, the Pacific too struggles with sustainable, on-going attention to small arms issues. The future of the PoA, and the outcome of the Second Review Conference, must address the same issues. How to implement successful policies and practices to ‘prevent, combat and eradicate’ the illicit trade in small arms now, while sustaining long-term, effective, and measurable approaches to small arms control and the illicit trade?

The governments of Australia and New Zealand have, over the years, provided a great deal of funding and expertise to assist Pacific states with their PoA implementation requirements. But in a region that, when compared to others, is hardly ravaged by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the challenge arises when attempting to sustain action while remaining relevant to local concerns.

A priority issue in the region has been to address state stockpile leakage which exacerbated tensions and facilitated armed violence during instability in Fiji, the Solomon Islands, as well as on-going issues in Papua New Guinea. State stockpile facilities were upgraded across the region; in the Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Additional assistance projects include: collection and destruction campaigns; police, customs, and security training; demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; post-conflict reconstruction; capacity building of police, judicial and penal systems; and public awareness campaigns.

These areas were addressed because of their direct relevance to each national context. But relevancies change over time. Once stockpiles are upgraded, and staff trained, there is only so much on-going work that can be done. In many areas of the Pacific there is now an often justified sense of ‘job done’, ‘mission accomplished’; which is where the Pacific Paradox occurs. For many Pacific states, guns and illicit trafficking are simply not an issue. Convincing states to join a conversation on ‘small arms’ (not ‘guns’), in countries without armed forces and only an arm-full of WWII-era civilian rifles, where livelihoods are being affected by the destruction of fisheries and rising sea levels, is a challenge in itself.

But this forgets the PoA’s value as a preventative mechanism. Even states unaffected by small arm violence or trafficking should be encouraged or assisted to participate in the PoA implementation process. The key is to ensure on-going attention to prevent small arms accumulation and trafficking. The Pacific provides several cases of rapid accumulations of even small numbers of weapons among essentially unarmed civilian populations, creating instability and exacerbating insecurity among communities. So making the PoA relevant to different local contexts is an initial step to universal participation.

The Pacific is not all palm trees, turquoise water, and smiling faces. Papua New Guinea, the region’s most armed violence-affected state, faces devastating accumulations and movements of small arms among its tribal communities and within its capital Port Moresby. Modern tribal fighting and gun crime has threatened communities for decades as spears were set aside in favour of firearms. There is anecdotal evidence from locals, and claims from government officials, that weapons flow across its sea border from Australia, and land border from Indonesia. However, evidence of trafficking and smuggling is rare, and the accumulation of high-powered firearms is more likely due to diversion from official armouries through theft and corruption. But the results of small arm violence are undeniable—communities are ravaged by gun violence, emphasising the need for action on implementing measures aimed to eradicate it.

For the PoA to be universally successful over its next decade, implementation needs to be adaptable. It needs to be relevant to local and regional contexts. Measures need to be, well, measurable. And successful measures should be sustainable. The Pacific has been able to implement a great deal of the PoA provisions, but achieving on-going interest and activity is the battle. The fear is that a less-than-successful outcome of this Review Conference will further reduce interest. Tragically, there seems to be an attitude among states that not failing (as they did at RevCon 2006) will mean success. Slowing momentum, for regions like that Pacific, where capacity is strained at best, could create gaps for complacency to reverse the good work that has been done.
Qu’en est-il sur l’avenir des enfants démolisés dans un pays à risque des ALPC?
Jean Claude Kabuku | International Action Network on Small Arms

L’usage abusive des armes légères et de petit calibre a provoqué, au cours des décennies, la perte de vies de millions de personnes sur le continent Africain par exemple et, les plus touchés sont ceux dans l’incapacité de se protéger notamment les femmes et les enfants. Réfuter par les autres mais aussi accepter par les uns qu’il ya un lien entre la prolifération des armes de choix communément appelé “légère et de petit calibre” et les violences armées. Certes, il ya des évidences qui prouvent que la circulation illicite des armes et l’usage inappropriés causent les violences et l’intimidation. Cela va pour autant dire la que relation cause effet est évidente selon plusieurs analyses impartiales et des recherches empiriques.

L’évolution des Opérations de Maintien de la Paix (OMP) des Nations Unies a apporté un bon nombre de changement et de concept. Le cas du processus de Dé-mobilisation, Désarmement et Réintégration (DDR) qui devient en ce jour partie intégrante de consolidation de la paix après un conflit armé. Néanmoins, les questions continuent à être posées sur quel avenir pour ces enfants soldats démolisés, et, quelle réinsertion?

L’avenir des enfants vis à vis de ce fléau causé par la circulation des armes illicite est affecté à cause du manque de développement, d’opportunités, de croissance économique et cette insécurité crée un obstacle pour l’investissement. Le continent African qui est parmi les affectés, a besoin de éléments primaire pour son développement y compris la sécurité. Cette sécurité est compromise à cause de la circulation illicite et la prolifération des ALPC. Les jeunes sont parmi le plus concernes par manque de contribution valable de la nation dans leur vies et leurs droits comme l’éducation et les opportunités pour une meilleure croissance. Malgré ces cris alarmants, généralement les jeunes continuent à être victimes et marginalise dans les débats, forums et décisions ayant traits aux sujets de sécurité.

Le contrôle des armes après un conflit armé apparait nécessaire, mais, il existe certain fléau en ce jour qui attire l’attention de tous. Le cas de ré-enrôlement volontaire ou forcé des enfants démolisés pour faire la guerre. Vu, l’âge et le manque de maturité de ces gamins, il ya peu ou presque pas d’alternatives aux armes. Les Institutions Internationales, en dépit des normes qui assure la protection des enfants, doivent engager un processus et une nouvelle politique pour assurer la sécurité des enfants. D’où, la démolisation effective et de mécanismes durables doivent être créés car pour ces enfants, c’est une impérative en ce jour.


A travers le monde, les Nations Unies agissent en ce sens. Mais, les inquiétudes demeurent quant au suivie des enfants démolisés dans un pays ou le risque de conflit est imminent, le cas alarmant est l’est de la République Démocratique du Congo. L’analyse du contexte général de ladite situation est nécessaire, et la mise en action de nouveaux mécanismes de protection pour un suivi efficace après la démolisation est imminente.

Il faut également noter que toutes les violations des mesures internationaux qui existent et celles qui peuvent être préconisés doivent avoir une des sanctions pour les diverses violations. Diverses sanctions peuvent s’énérer comme; - A défaut de la prise de responsabilité ou de neutralité de l’Etat, le statut de la CPI de 1998 qualifie de crime de guerre, l’utilisation des enfants de moins de 15 ans dans les conflits armés.

Les mécanismes de protection doivent être développés d’une façon innovatrice en renforçant un engagement effectif de la Communauté Internationale, pour; - Imposer dans toutes les sphères le respect de toutes les normes qui recommandent le respect et protection de l’enfant, - renforce et modernise les instruments de protection des enfants : en matière de démobilisation et de la réintégration, - Accorde et amplifie le rôle primordial à l’UNICEF comme principal acteur de la situation, - Reconnaître et renforcer le mandat des organes des Nations Unies, la co-ordination entre agence, programmes et les ONG.

Il est donc impératif pour assurer le succès de la protection de population civile homes, jeunes et vieux puisse être précédé des mesures d’accompagnement et beaucoup d’engagement de la part de Nations Unies, mais les risques de récidives restent très élevés, que faire ? Les propositions sont tels que; la création et financement des structures d’accompagnement et d’encadrement, - une politique fiable de la consolidation de la paix, - formation continued on next page
The Swiss sponsored side event on Friday addressed the issue of small arms control investment by donors and governments of arms-affected countries. Philip Alpers, Pacific Small Arms Action Group and Alistair Gee, Act for Peace, presented their latest initiative that seeks to create a portal for SALW control investment and project data. For a comprehensive outline of this project please see Alistair Gee’s article printing in today’s Monitor.

Authenticity, accuracy, integrity, and timeliness of data continue to plague SALW data collections. A number of side events at this UNPoA RevCon have been devoted to information dissemination that relies on data collection—as too does much of the current policy work undertaken rely on evidence-base decision making. The idea of creating another collection—this time in the format of a portal designed to provide governments, civil society, and journalists with a comparison of investments in conflict prevention and reduction, peace, and security (CPS) projects around the world—raise a number of questions.

Alpers and Gee argued that while other sectors routinely consider and publish investment data, impact, and targets, there is no equivalent analysis for CPS. Therefore, it is important that this gap be appropriately filled, especially considering that almost half of the world’s poorest people live in conflict-affected countries, and only one percent of global aid goes to CPS projects in these countries.

The audience expressed enthusiasm for the website due for release in late October 2012. However, a number of valid issues were raised in response to Alpers and Gee’s portal, including data selection, collection, analysis, handling, reporting, and publishing, as well as data ownership. Questions were also posed as to whether there would be any criteria for input into the portal, how data definitions would be decided, and whether investments would be weighted. Both Alpers and Gee were open to feedback and requested that people provided further input.

Something that has struck this author at a number of UNPoA side events about data is not just the issue of authenticity, but how and where the data is collected. It is not my intention to question the methodology of the statisticians rather to question who is responsible for the data definitions? And how can it be ensured that they are consistently used throughout the world? More importantly perhaps, is who is assisting the people who enter the data, to ensure that “apples are compared with apples”? In a world where funding is always scarce, who is ensuring that the women and men entering the data are provided with the appropriate resources to ensure its’ quality? •

Children and armed conflict, cont’d

Children and armed conflict, cont’d

Who invests what in SALW control?
Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

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SALW control investment and project data

Alistair Gee | Conflict Peace Security Initiative

According to official OECD Creditor Reporting System data, US$165.5m of aid was invested by donor governments in SALW control and reintegration projects in the most recently reported year (2010).

Investments in SALW control over the last five reported years are (in USDm):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>185.5</td>
<td>284.4</td>
<td>284.1</td>
<td>128.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor countries other than the US</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilaterals</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Donors, Total</td>
<td>128.1</td>
<td>251.3</td>
<td>402.7</td>
<td>411.3</td>
<td>165.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2010 total is made up of 141 project entries, all of which have publicly available project descriptions and details about the donor, recipient and amounts. For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Channel Of Delivery</th>
<th>Description by donor</th>
<th>Amount (USDm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>National NGOs</td>
<td>Small Arms Light Weapons - Convention Weapon Destruction (CWD) [through Mines Advisory Group]</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This sort of information is too rarely considered. Further, there is an absence of information about investment by developing country governments in their own country and about the impact of each project.

To help facilitate additional consideration of the existing data and to pursue reporting of the missing data, a new initiative will be launched in October 2012 at www.conflictpeacesecurity.org. The initiative, being set up by Act for Peace NCCA and GunPolicy.org seeks to be a portal for information about investments and opportunities for Conflict prevention and reduction, Peace and Security (‘CPS’) projects in every country and every region. Such projects include six sectors, one of which is SALW control. The website will link to existing info-bases, such as the PoA ISS matching mechanism and seek to not duplicate existing information.

Both before and after the launch of conflictpeacesecurity.org we are keen to hear your views and suggestions. Further information regarding the initiative and a consultation survey can currently be obtained via the ‘new report’ tab at www.actforpeace.org.au. Please provide any suggestions on what information and research you would find most useful through the Conflict Peace Security initiative by email to: cps@actforpeace.org.au.

1. $197m of this is for two projects in Central Asia: Building renovation and equipment installation, including the Pathogen Access Control System; and the Proliferation Prevention Initiative Program.
2. $229m of this is for the above two projects. There was no funding for them in 2010.

Investment in SALW control as a share of total donor aid budgets (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Aid to SALW Control (USDm)</th>
<th>Total aid - all sectors (USDm)</th>
<th>Aid to SALW control as % of total aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3,720.0</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>665.9</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2,098.1</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3,905.8</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,731.9</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,079.5</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,522.5</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
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Unweighted average 0.07%
Calendar of events for Tuesday, 4 September 2012

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<tr>
<th>When</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00–13:00</td>
<td>Consultations on draft outcome document</td>
<td>Conference Room 1 North Lawn Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Czech National System of Marking, Record-keeping and Tracing of SALW</td>
<td>Conference Room A North Lawn Building</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN</td>
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<td>Cont: Ladislav Steinhubel</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:Ladislav_Steinhubel@mzv.cz">Ladislav_Steinhubel@mzv.cz</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>The Importance of National Surveys in PoA National Action Plans: Lessons Learnt</td>
<td>Conference Room B North Lawn Building</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN and Small Arms Survey</td>
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<td>Cont: Mads Juul-Nyholm</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:madjuu@um.dk">madjuu@um.dk</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Seance De Travail Reunissant La Cote D’ivoire, Le Liberia, La Guinee Conakry, La Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Conference Room E North Lawn Building</td>
<td>IANSA in partnership with Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Proliferation et la Circulation illicite des Armes legères et de petit calibre and GIZ</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Contact: Michele Poliacof</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:newyork@iansa.org">newyork@iansa.org</a></td>
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