Balancing the old and the new
Katherine Prizeman | Global Action to Prevent War

As the discussion moved from general statements to consultations on the revised drafts of the outcome document on Wednesday morning, a central debate emerged related to how to balance reiteration and re-commitment to the “old” language of the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) with infusion of “new” forward-looking language that addresses challenges related to national implementation that introduces concepts and recommendations not explicitly found in the original 2001 document. Incorporating language in the outcome document that enhances the UNPoA’s implementation is imperative to its continued and strengthened relevance in preventing and reducing armed violence.

Commenting on the consultations conducted by four facilitators appointed by the President during the inter-sessional period between the March Preparatory Committee and this Review Conference (RevCon), the delegate of Guyana noted that member states must strike an appropriate balance between UNPoA language and “new” language with a view towards better and more effective future implementation. These “new” recommendations and concepts must be incorporated into the outcome document in order to enhance implementation through tangible efforts to review not only progress made, but also identify gaps and challenges. As noted by the delegation of Japan, it is important to address “new” challenges that have arisen over the last 11 years.

Balancing the “new” and the “old” does not necessarily threaten the ability to review progress made on the existing provisions of the UNPoA nor does it require a “re-negotiation” of the UNPoA as some delegates seemed to claim. Rather, as aptly noted by the delegate of New Zealand, pursuing this ‘balance’ is a matter of adding energy and focus to implementation efforts by taking into account new and ongoing circumstances and providing practical guidance on how states can move forward. “Looking back” is certainly a useful exercise insofar as states can analyze pitfalls, a point made by the delegate of Trinidad and Tobago. Nonetheless, the outcome document must be forward-looking, which can only be accomplished with an appropriate amount of “new” recommendations and concepts that promises to enhance practical, national implementation measures.

Some delegations expressed their concern over inserting “novel concepts” into the outcome document, in particular references to ammunition and parts and components. Many delegations, including the US, Syria, Iran, Cuba, Canada, and Algeria, spoke against the inclusion of these references in the UNPoA draft outcome document. These delegations stated that as such items are not explicitly covered in the scope of the UNPoA, it would be inappropriate and unhelpful to include such “new” concepts. The Syrian delegate referred to the UNPoA as an “exhaustive document” adopted through a rigorous process of consensus. However, its inconsistent and incomplete implementation, not to mention its insufficient effects on global levels of armed violence, demonstrates that neither the document itself nor its implementation is exhaustive.

With this in mind, many other delegations expressed strong support for new or strengthened language. CARICOM, Peru, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Norway, and Kenya noted that many of the “new” references in the draft documents relate to issues that reflect the concerns of many states and refer directly to evolving national implementation priorities. The concern of some delegations regarding the possibility of “opening up” the UNPoA to a new round of negotiation should be alleviated by the understanding that the inclusion of “new” concepts, such as addressing regulations and administrative procedures related to ammunition and parts and components under national implement-
After the phrase “small arms and light weapons are the real weapons of mass destruction” came into fashion, it seems that the arms control world is on course to establish a new favourite cliché: “guns without bullets are nothing more than heavy sticks”. As it turns out, many clichés happen to also be true—and these two are indisputable. Why, then, does the PoA continue to exclude the very items that allow the illicit trade in SALW to have the negative human consequences the instrument was devised to tackle?

Experts in international agreements often highlight the importance of anti-circumvention: none of an instrument’s provisions can be allowed to undermine a party’s ability to fulfil its objectives. In a way, the PoA does precisely that by omitting a provision. One could argue that the knowing absence of ammunition in the PoA’s provisions is a clear avenue to circumvent commitments and undermine objectives. At times, omission becomes commission.

To pontificate about legal musings, of course, is not the issue. The issue is this: without ammunition, the governments charged with implementing the PoA are ‘shooting themselves in the foot’ in practical terms because they are knowingly refraining from a simple normative improvement that could help in achieving its human security objectives.

How many countries choose to self-inflict similar wounds nationally by ignoring or excluding ammunition from gun control legislation or procedures, domestic or export control lists? (Hint: not many). Regionally and sub-regionally as well, most instruments on SALW—whether on their licit or illicit trade—such as CIFTA, ECO-WAS Convention, SICA (Central America), Decision 552 (Andean Plan) —clearly recognize ammunition control and regulations as part and parcel of those for firearms. If the global instrument on small arms intends to tackle the issue in “all its aspects”, how can ammunition remain excluded when its widespread availability is one of the most important “aspects” rendering the illicit trade in SALW deadly? As this year’s edition of the Small Arms Survey illustrates, many non-state actors already have the tools of armed violence in their hands, using older generation weapons—it is therefore the illicit trade in ammunition that allow them to continue killing.

No wonder, then, that it is precisely the regions of the world most affected by gun violence at the forefront of the call for the inclusion of ammunition in the PoA (as well as rendering the instrument legally-binding for that matter; the same is true for the International Tracing Instrument). From Mercosur to CARICOM, from Central American to African nations, these countries know that said inclusion would improve the tools at their disposal to undertake efforts to help keep their citizens alive.

In July, the overwhelming majority of UN member states demanded the inclusion of ammunition in a legally-binding instrument, the future Arms Trade Treaty. While quite different in nature (yet complementary) to the PoA, the ATT proved that most countries are ready to shoulder obligations regarding measures to avoid the diversion and illicit trade of SALW ammunition—why wouldn’t all countries agree to at least have commitments? What are they afraid of?
Though the draft text presented by that Conference’s chairman was insufficient in how it (partially) included ammunition, the response to that insufficiency—especially from Africa, CARICOM, and Latin America—was quite telling. The resoluteness with which African countries pushed for the inclusion of ammunition in the scope of the ATT was particularly inspiring. Arguably one of the best statements of the month came from an African delegate who noted that, in fact, whether major conventional arms or SALW, the weapons themselves are no more than “delivery systems”—it is ammunition and munitions that kill and maim.

It was no surprise, then, that the outcome document of the regional PoA implementation meeting for Africa (Nairobi, 14–15 August) renders this statement: “We agree to interpret the Programme of Action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, as including small arms and light weapons ammunition. We will therefore continue to include ammunition controls in our own national and sub-regional implementation efforts.”

It may be true that “opening the text” of the PoA would create political difficulties—cue the “Pandora’s box” cliché—but the UN was devised precisely to overcome international political difficulties. At the very least, a concerted effort should be undertaken to seriously consider the feasibility and mechanics of formally including ammunition in the instrument.

Regardless of that effort’s outcome, as a recent UNIDIR study has rightly pointed out, “the PoA should not be viewed in isolation. Ten years after its adoption, it now stands as a framework document that is, effectively, supplemented by other instruments and processes that enhance and expand on its provisions”.

In other words, if the PoA text itself is deemed “sacrosanct” or a political “can of worms”, there are alternative ways to supplement, strengthen, and update it—including through RevCon Declarations and other supporting documents being circulated in plenary this week. As suggested by the African outcome document, it could come down to a matter of interpretation, practice, and precedent that eventually gets formalized.

Finding a way out of the quandary of how to effectively include ammunition in the PoA is up to governments to negotiate. But negotiate they must. Guns and bullets have a symbiotic relationship –—neither can fulfil their lethal mission without the other. Like the syringes and substances used for lethal injections, they are physically distinct components of a unitary and interdependent system developed to inflict damage to humans.

To treat their respective illicit trade as if unrelated is nothing short of absurd. Hopefully, when the 2018 Rev-Con rolls around, the international community in its entirety will have seen the truth in these clichés. •

Balancing the old and the new, cont’d

tation represent priorities for many states and do not necessarily “open up” the document to new negotiations. As the delegate of New Zealand explained, the inclusion of these concepts in the implementation plan at the national level provides a framework for states to deal with challenges that they have already identified as significant.

The discussion over “reviewing” the UNPoA is also significant. The delegation of Cuba stated that the mandate of the RevCon must be to review progress made in implementation of the UNPoA through sharing national experiences. Likewise, the delegate of Egypt stressed that the mandate of the RevCon is to review progress accomplished by states. While this is a valid part of the work to be done by the RevCon, it is not sufficient on its own. The delegation of China, among others, noted that the outcome should not just include “stock-taking,” but must also be forward-looking and provide guidance for states. Areas for improvement must be identified, which will require that member states look beyond a verbatim reiteration of the 2001 document. The Swiss delegate underscored that the outcome document must highlight objectives identified by delegations and adopt necessary measures to allow full implementation, in particular when it comes to bridging technical and capacity gaps.

While it is important to understand that ensuring full implementation of the UNPoA is the ultimate goal of this RevCon and subsequent meetings, this requires due attention to shifting, additional, and revamped themes and priorities that reference but do not necessarily duplicate the framework adopted in 2001. A simple reiteration or relisting of the measures provided for in the original document is not sufficient. If gaps and challenges are to be effectively identified in this RevCon, it is necessary to include “new” language that adequately addresses these “new” priorities in the context of a continuously changing security environment. •
Path mark
Dr. Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

One of the issues that will come up in the course of discussions on a final outcome document for the UN Programme of Action (PoA) Review Conference has to do with the role that might be played by Meetings of Government Experts (MGE). Many PoA delegates will recall the MGE last year which was presided over quite successfully by Ambassador McLay of New Zealand. That meeting was one of the more satisfying in my years of experience with disarmament-related events, in part because of its focused discussion, and in part because of the skillful way in which Amb. McLay handled the room. He seemed determined to make the best possible use of the allotted time and vigorously encouraged delegate participation in all aspects of the program.

Based on that experience, the New Zealand delegation has floated a proposal to identify and build support for a preferred pattern of meetings that can both “chart a clear path” for the PoA process moving forward and build technical and political capacity for enhanced implementation. The New Zealand statement on this subject respectfully affirmed the need for MGEs as an important means to enhance prospects for “practical implementation”. The delegation then listed several technical concerns to be taken up by an experts group, including enhanced management of SALW stockpiles, national frameworks to address illicit brokering and strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of customs and law enforcement agencies, and designing national action plans for implementing the PoA with the support of diverse stakeholders.

It seems to Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict (GAPW) that a schedule leading up to 2018 characterized by two MGE-style meetings, one in the context of a larger Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) (as seem to be inferred by the revised “implementation” paper provided by the Chair), is the best strategy for building momentum on implementation and preparing for a successful Review Conference in six year’s time. Regardless of the structure of meetings finally endorsed in the outcome document for this PoA, there will be gaps in attention to implementation by the international community that will need to be filled. However, we believe that the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs regional offices; a revitalized GIS process with a renewed commitment to “matching needs and resources,” focused First Committee meetings, and regional engagements by NGOs and other stakeholders are together more than sufficient to address those gaps and ensure a robust pattern of work leading to productive expert and plenary meetings.

We are convinced that the PoA process would be enhanced by more focused attention on the technical obstacles that impact the flow and impact of national and regional implementation efforts. There is certainly a need to revitalize political will and capacity assistance in that context, but a plan featuring alternate BMS and RevCon meetings as well as the ongoing work of the First Committee and other key stakeholders should be sufficient to keep governments and other stakeholders motivated and engaged.

One issue that will inevitably come up in suggesting a format with an expanded role for MGEs has to do with the role of NGOs. The context for this issue, of course, is that most of the NGOs who gather for events such as the RevCon have greater depth of policy awareness than the specific technical expertise needed to contribute significantly to the resolution of most of the issues raised in the New Zealand statement. Also, there are some states that prefer at times to hold discussions without NGOs in the room when involving experts from capitals, and that prerogative should be respected.

Nevertheless, it would be more than appropriate for states to designate NGOs on their expert teams for MGEs, in the same way that some delegations have done at this RevCon and for the ATT negotiations. And, depending on the sites designated for MGEs, it might also be wise to enlist regional or international NGOs whose job would be to monitor meetings and share summaries of key findings with diverse stakeholders and constituencies. There are pathways for negotiating the participation of advocates without distracting from attention to complex technical tasks.

In the end, our most important task as a PoA-related community is to enhance prospects for effective implementation of PoA objectives. A rational, predictable schedule of meetings that alternately prioritizes and then binds again the political and technical aspects of PoA implementation, seems to us to be both hopeful and viable. We urge diplomats at this PoA to affirm a “clear path” of meetings that wisely balances and integrates political and technical concerns and that finds the most appropriate spaces for meaningful stakeholder engagement.
Gender references continue as discussions on draft documents begin
Melina Lito, GAPW and Jasmin Nario-Galace, IANSA

On Wednesday, member states began discussing the draft outcome documents circulated by Ambassador Joy Ogwu, President of the UNPoA Review Conference. The draft UNPoA Implementation Plan for 2012–2018 calls for women’s involvement in the implementation process at the national level. Paragraph 8 reads: “To increase the participation and representation of women in small arms policymaking, taking into account the link between the Programme of Action and Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and GA resolution 65/69 and to explore means to eliminate the negative impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on women.”

Several delegations took the floor to express support for its inclusion, including those of Norway, Mexico, Nigeria, Chile, Belize, Switzerland, Peru, Austria, New Zealand, Japan, and Germany. Only Cuba dissented, arguing that the final document should not include elements that are not prevalent in the UNPoA. Cuba noted that the links to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) should not be included in the final document because it does not relate to the original commitments made in 2001.

In keeping with its statement yesterday, Mexico supported the inclusion of gender perspective as well as the link between the PoA and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and UN General Assembly Resolution 65/69.

Switzerland and Nigeria both recognized and supported the gender perspective in the final document, with Switzerland welcoming the inclusion of women’s participation and representation in small arms policy-making while Nigeria also supported the incorporation of gender and recognized the impact that armed conflict has on women and children. Austria also supported the inclusion of a gender reference in the final document, especially a reference on the role of women.

States such as Mexico, Germany, and Nigeria also stated that the draft document should make an explicit reference to children and the impact that armed conflict can have on the latter.

So far, we note that 27 delegations have made references to women. Truly, the link between sexual violence and the arms trade indicates a need to highlight the prohibition of violence against women as well as their participation in the implementation of the UN PoA.

As discussions move forward on the inclusion of gender language in the final document that will outline the next cycle, we hope that the references to women and children be kept separate, as each group has a different level of participation in policy-making and is impacted in different ways by armed conflict and illicit flow of arms.

Side event: OSCE efforts to fight illicit SALW through export controls
Rohie Drammeh | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) held a side event to present a template for an end-user certificate (EUC) on small arms and light weapons (SALW). The EUC template is designed to promote sustainable record-keeping to aid the work of states in the implementation of the UNPoA.

Dr. Gints Apals, Ambassador Latvia in Vienna and Chairman of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, opened the meeting. As some of the largest producers of SALW are OSCE participating states, Dr. Apals emphasized the responsibility that lies with the OSCE to work on a plan and to ensure a response to the worldwide spread of small arms. The OSCE presented the template for the EUC as a contribution towards fighting the proliferation of SALW. It is a template that could upgrade or replace current templates. It would be used and signed by those authorized to make additions to the record-keeping of states and thereby facilitate the record-keeping for SALW.

Ms. Maria Brandstetter, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, highlighted the overall work of the OSCE regarding export control challenges and opportunities for cooperation. Ms. Brandstetter also mentioned that the challenge in strategic trade control lies, among other things, in the difference in technical expertise. As states have different legislations and differ in their methods of operation, the EUC would have to be adjusted to the needs and legislation of the state in question.

Mr. Mark Bromley, SIPRI, presented the EUC in greater detail, with illustrations of the template. He also mentioned some additional verification measures for the EUC. For example, the responsibility for certifying the EUC should be assigned to a limited number of institutions and officials, to avoid forged EUCs that could be sold to those who trade in illicit SALW. Therefore the exchange of information on the authorized institutions and officials can help exporting authorities in their work with export controls, and even improve cooperation between states.

Mr. Anton Martyniuk, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre Representative and of the MFA of Belarus, explained procedures for electronic record-keeping for stockpiles of SALW and conventional ammunition. Among the key user requirements is the automation of SALW record-keeping operations. The planned project activities include a presentation of SALW inventory application to interested states (in Minsk 2012-early 2013), as well as individual expert meetings with interested states to check the compatibility of the SALW inventory application with the national technical requirements and follow-up on the procedural legislative side.
News in Brief
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The News in Brief is not a comprehensive summary of statements but a brief overview of key aspects of the discussion on the draft outcome documents conducted during the open meeting.

UNPoA Implementation Plan

Structure of document
- Algeria, Cuba, and Syria said the outcome should be one single document.
- China, India, and United States said they have no preference on the number of documents.

Nature of implementation plan
- Guyana explained that in conducting consultations and drafting the plan it tried to find a balance between issues addressed in the UNPoA and those other issues that are critical for its implementation, with a view to both taking stock of implementation but also providing forward-looking guidance to ensure it is relevant to present day realities.
- Algeria, Cuba, Iran, and Syria said the outcome should not go beyond the UNPoA itself.
- Austria, China, Japan, New Zealand, and Trinidad and Tobago argued that the RevCon should review progress but also generate a forward-looking document for future implementation.
- New Zealand noted there some general elements in the UNPoA that need elaboration to give greater guidance or suggest practical steps for future implementation.
- Japan said the outcome should address new issues, taking into account changes in the 11 years since the UNPoA’s adoption.
- China, Iran, and Pakistan said the RevCon should avoid “renegotiating” the UNPoA.
- Iran and Pakistan argued the UNPoA is a package and particular elements and principles cannot be selected while others are left out.
- Pakistan said the objectives of the UNPoA should be balanced with rights of states.
- Syria said the document should only review progress in implementation.

Paragraph 1
- Austria, CARICOM, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago supported the inclusion of ammunition, parts, and components.
- Canada, China, Cuba, India, and USA argued against including parts and components in the document.
- Canada, China, Cuba, Iran, and USA argued against including ammunition in the document.
- Cuba suggested including language against SALW diversion to unauthorized recipients.
- Mexico supported this suggestion.
- India said para 1 should not be overloaded with specific issues that can be reflected elsewhere.

Paragraph 2
- Cuba called for deletion of the last lines after the term “weapons”.
- Egypt said the reference to border control is different from in para 15, which is the language it prefers.
- Mexico said it wants to retain the reference to border control.
- Iran argued that this is already reflected in the UNPoA and does not need to be reflected here.
- Iran questioned the rationale for bringing in the issue of national coordination agencies, arguing the para should take into consideration fact that many countries have already done so.
- Sudan suggested adding reference to development, infrastructure, media, cultural, and outreach institutions as well as NGOs.
- Algeria cautioned against including a list of national agencies because it should be up to each government to structure itself appropriately.
- Belgium said it is eager to retain the list of particular agencies, arguing that the language makes it clear it’s not a closed summing up but a partial list.
- CARICOM said the listing of agencies merely suggests those with high priority.

Paragraph 8
- Austria, Chile, Germany, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, and Switzerland supported the reference to the participation of women.
- Austria, Chile, Germany, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru said it is important to include a reference to the gender dimension of illicit SALW.
- Norway said para could also refer to other commitments on women and gender.
- Germany, Mexico, and Nigeria suggested including a reference to the impact of illicit SALW on children.

Reporting
- Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway said the language on reporting should be strengthened.
- Mexico called for an appeal for the submission of national reports in order to enable member states to review how they have been implementing the UNPoA and to make adjustments where necessary.
- Mexico called for comprehensive standardized data so that it can be analyzed and compared in order to identify deficiencies in implementation.
- New Zealand said states need to increase in quality
and quantity of national reports but also need to enhance ability of states to report.

- Norway noted reporting is not a matter of choice but necessity in order to show compliance with instrument and to assist other countries in identifying areas for cooperation.

**International cooperation and assistance**

- Australia and New Zealand said the language on international cooperation and assistance should be strengthened.
- New Zealand suggested language to be added on helping states more rigorously assess needs and priorities, including by providing tools to do so.
- Japan suggested the outcome support strengthened regional cooperation by mobilizing relevant organizations including UN regional centres.
- Sudan suggested language on enhancing the role of international organizations to enhance national capacity building.

**Other**

- Japan argued it is time to promote concrete activities to fulfill what states have decided in conferences and meetings.
- Kenya and Sudan said the document should address demand for arms.
- Kenya called for a reference to development aspects of illicit arms.
- New Zealand said the document should refer to measures to address flows of illicit weapons in conflict settings, such as support for arms embargoes monitoring mechanisms and support for peace support operations.
- Norway noted the UNPoA is about preventing future victims and thus state need to document victims and figure out how to assist them.
- Peru said the document should include a reference to a culture of dialogue and peace.
- Switzerland suggested introducing a reference to the theme of armed violence and development.

**Small arms crossword**

Across

1. Strategy for making women’s and men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, and social spheres.
2. The UNPoA mandates states to submit annual national reports: true or false?
3. Number of member states that have never reported on implementation of the UNPoA.
4. Prescribes the markings of small arms and light weapons at the time of manufacture.
5. There is enough ammunition manufactured every year to kill every person in the world how many times?
6. Transferred in violation of arms embargoes decided by the UN Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
7. What is it called when arms sales are initiated and carried out by governments?

Down

1. Considered by experts at the MGE.
2. The UNPoA recognizes the need to put in place comprehensive mechanisms to control ...
3. What is it called when arms sales are initiated and carried out by governments?
4. Management/control of ... continues to be a problem.
5.转移到联合国安理会决定的武器禁运的联合国宪章。
6.年度制造的子弹数量足以杀死世界上的每一个人多少次？
7. 管理/控制 ... 持续是一个问题。
Side event: Femicide: A global problem

Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The demographics of armed violence are often described in general terms. Men, particularly young men, are more likely to be the perpetrators and victims, while women, it is claimed, are victims or survivors who are left as single heads of households. Yet on closer examination these crude generalizations are found wanting. In recent years we have seen more detailed analysis of the global patterns of armed violence directed against women. While the term ‘femicide’ has been in circulation for centuries, most probably known to readers in the context of Diana Russell’s definition (gender-based killing of women based on her sex), researchers at Small Arms Survey have broadened the term to encompass any killing of a woman.

Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Research Director at Small Arms Survey (SAS), presented the recent research note from SAS, Femicide: A Global Problem at UN Women’s side event on this topic. On the basis of statistics collected at national and sub-national levels, SAS has created a comprehensive database on female victims of homicide, covering 56 per cent of the world’s female population in 111 countries and territories for the period 2004–09. Unfortunately, as explained by Alvazzi, information on many countries is missing and challenges to comprehensive data collection continue to hamper researchers. Issues include definitions discrepancies, limited capacity and resources, a lack of detail in statistical records, homicides not being reported because they are culturally “justified” (honor killings), and law enforcement agencies only collecting data on perpetrators, which is not always equivalent to number of victims (a perpetrator may murder multiple people). There is also virtually no available data on Africa, the Middle East, or Asia.

Despite the limitations of the data a number of interesting and important patterns can be extracted. The global extent of femicide is estimated at approximately 66,000 victims per year for the period 2004–09. More than half of the 25 countries with “high” and “very high” femicide rates are in the Americas: 4 in the Caribbean, 4 in Central America, and 6 in South America. The regions with the highest femicide levels largely correspond to the regions with the highest overall rates of lethal violence. However, the femicide rate in Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation appear disproportionally high with respect to homicides in general. Alvazzi also noted that countries with particularly high femicide rates tend to exhibit high levels of tolerance of violence against women; moreover, lack of resources or political will make criminal justice systems inefficient, thus femicide cases are often not fully investigated and prosecuted.

Countries with the highest levels of homicide generally show the highest rates of lethal violence against women. However, trends in the data show that while the overall homicide rate decreases, femicide remains what Alvazzi the “final frontier”. According to SAS research, the majority of perpetrators of femicides are male, frequently family members or friends of the victim, and often a current or former intimate partner. Alvazzi discussed the sample study of 54 countries and territories on the relationships between perpetrators and victims of femicide. This study illustrates that the proportion of lethal intimate partner violence (IPV) is lower in countries with high femicide rates than in countries with lower femicide rates. She also explained that the majority of IPV related femicide victims experienced prior violence and physical abuse from the same perpetrator.

How does all of this related to small arms and light weapons? Alvazzi argued that the display of firearms, to intimidate, threaten, or coerce someone, cannot easily be captured by statistics and therefore cannot be measured. However, it is a predictor of their actual use. Indeed, analysis not referenced at this side event, especially that done by the IANSA Women’s Network, has previously illuminated the relationship between gender-based violence and small arms.

During the post-presentation discussion, UN Women examined how it as an organization can better contribute to data collection and quality issue. Alvazzi called for future agreement on indicators of femicide and a developed a data set for international community to monitor trends. The room also agreed that there is a real necessity for organizations to understand why the violence is occurring and the interrelated issues surrounding violence, in order to better establish how it can be ended.
Side event: Approaches to preventing diversion of arms and ammunition
Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The meeting of the Group of Interested States (GIS), chaired by Peter Winkler at the German House on Tuesday evening, was designed to open dialogue between donors, recipient countries, implementing organizations, and NGOs. The event used the case studies of Sudan and South Sudan as an illustration of working towards disarmament despite political tensions.

The event was also an opportunity for Daniel Prins, UNODA, to launch the publication “Matching Needs and Resources”. He encouraged delegates to take a copy and think about how best to contribute.

The panel was made up of 13 speakers; this article will discuss only some of the issues raised.

Peter Croll of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) presented the Interactive Guide on Small Arms, which aims to facilitate access to existing information on SALW by providing an internet-based interactive database and a map application to enhance SALW control.

Eric Berman, Managing Director of Small Arms Survey, provided a short report on the surplus small arms in South Sudan and offered some analysis on the scope of the challenge. He spoke about the importance of continued research and training on stockpile management, especially in light of unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS), which have devastating effects on communities.

Dr. Mahmoud Zainelabdeen provided insight into the situation in Sudan and spoke about regional cooperation initiatives and agreements. Gen. Christo Simon Fataki provided the South Sudanese perspective and spoke about the challenges facing the new nation in regards to disarmament. He called for the development of policy, legislation, and strategy to ensure implementation of peaceful disarmament, particularly in the areas of stockpile management, regional cooperation, awareness raising, information gathering mechanism, capacity building, and sharing of tracing results to prevent further diversion. He also called for ammunition to be included in future agreements and argued that the proliferation of illicit SALW and ammunition is compounded by lack of capacity to monitor and control them.

Marius Kahl, technical advisor and researcher at BICC, presented his starter guide towards strong practices in arms and ammunition management. He argued that training, rules, and regulation and infrastructure are all integral to the success and cannot be done in an isolate approach. Wolf-Christian Paes of BICC argued that there is reason for hope, especially considering the initiative by group of states to create a mechanism for small arms and ammunition. He stated that regional mechanisms are very important for future success.

Although much of the session was devoted to best practices, assisting, and training none of the speakers spoke about gender mainstreaming or inclusion of a gender perspective in disarmament in their presentations. It was also noteworthy that out of the 13 panelists there was not one woman. •

Mainstream gender for the effective implementation of the UN PoA
NGO Statement: Civil society assessment of the UNPoA—looking back

Jasmin Nario-Galace | International Action Network on Small Arms, Philippines

On behalf of the global IANSA community, which the next two speakers and I represent, please receive our congratulations for your election. You can count on civil society’s support towards a meaningful conclusion of this Review Conference.

It is an honour to present the perspective of civil society organizations that witness the daily tragedies caused by firearms violence. These organisations undertake many efforts on the ground, including work related to the Program of Action.

Let us take a step back and remind ourselves of why we are here in the first place. The PoA was not developed because countries were “gravely concerned” about the illicit trade in small arms per se, but rather because they were “determined to reduce the human suffering caused by” this illicit trade. We hope you continue to possess such determination, as the unspeakable human suffering caused by small arms and light weapons has seemingly not diminished.

IANSA urges governments in their PoA assessments to pay greater attention to the humanitarian impact and human cost of firearms violence and its connections with the trade in weapons. The deaths and injuries caused by gun violence are well established; whether occurring in armed conflict, gang violence, drug-related, organized or common crime, hundreds of thousands of people are injured or lose their lives every year. Countless more have their homes and communities destroyed, or endure forms of violence in the home.

The PoA should therefore be seen as an important tool that must contribute to preventing, combating, and attempting to eradicate the deadly effects of the illicit trade and misuse of SALW. As such, special attention is needed to its track record and potential to assist vulnerable groups, individuals and communities that have already been victimized through the misuse of these weapons, or are at imminent risk of facing gun violence. It is therefore essential to prioritize action that focuses on children and youth, victims and survivors, and the gender dimensions of armed violence.

In addition to suffering disproportionately from the effects of firearms violence, children and youth have increasingly become actors in the illicit use of guns and in perpetrations armed violence. Steps must be taken within the framework of the PoA to promote initiatives for child and youth focused disarmament, and governments should increase efforts to discourage their use of arms, during and after armed conflicts, and in other violent contexts such as those gangs and organized crime.

Likewise, it is essential to consider the rights of victims of SALW violence when discussing the impacts of the illicit trade in such weapons, including a holistic approach to assistance and active participation in the production, implementation and supervision of local, national, regional and international measures to prevent small arms trafficking and misuse. Emphasis should be placed on families and communities as indirect victims of firearms violence, as well as all relevant socioeconomic and cultural implications. Also, DDR programs should be accompanied by community-oriented victim assistance in post-conflict settings.

Finally, there are specific gender dimensions to the impacts of small arms proliferation. To be consistent with the broader UN practice of mainstreaming gender in all frameworks, policies and programs, the PoA should recognize the specific impact of the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons on women (and on men). The presence of SALW facilitates and perpetuates gender-based violence, including sexual violence, although it is rarely women who use, own or transfer these weapons.

It is critical that PoA implementation directly address this reality by incorporating gendered language, and encouraging women’s participation in all phases of implementation. UN SCR 1325 affirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. As some delegates had pointed out and for which we are grateful, the PoA presents this opportunity for women’s increased representation and participation. We wish to underscore, as well, that attention be paid to understanding the linkages between guns and masculinity.

It has been rightfully noted that after more than a decade in existence, the PoA comes to a “crossroads” at this RevCon, and we urge governments to look back with clear and critical eyes to seriously scrutinize the instrument’s achievements and limitations.

We know the PoA has served as a framework, catalyst or inspiration for many important efforts, especially national and sub-regional gun control legislation and technical measures (stockpile security, marking, destruction, etc.). In this regard, we take note of the many programmes and projects which regional organizations and states have spoken of in your statements so far. Despite this positive evidence, it remains unclear whether, or how much, the PoA has impacted levels of gun violence on the ground.

My colleagues will refer to these concerns shortly, but in looking back at the last decade of the PoA, I would like to touch on a few limitations. One is the quality of PoA reports. As noted in a recent UNIDIR study, “…many of the explanations provided by states in their national reports as to why they are unable to implement the PoA lack specificity and give an incomplete picture of implementation challenges, suggesting that many states are struggling to identify the specific challenges they face. It is difficult to identify opportunities for addressing challenges to implementation if states themselves have not pinpointed or described in greater detail the specific reasons for their difficulty in implementing certain PoA commitments”.

Also lacking has been the quantity of reports. In its March 2012 “Review of National Reports”, the Small Arms Survey notes that from the PoA’s adoption to the end of 2011, 35 States had not submitted a single report, 26 states only one – and more than half of the States that have issued reports have done so four or less times. Only 19 countries have reported more than six times, and only two reported the maximum possible nine reports.

Despite these unfulfilled commitments, we are not here today to bemoan what could have been. We make this assessment in order to share our thoughts on what we must do — now and in the near future—to overcome these obstacles. It is only with a clear, evidence-based diagnosis that one can offer detailed and effective prescriptions to treat a certain “disease”. As such, the following speakers will offer suggestions on what governments can do regarding PoA implementation—in the coming seven days—and beyond.
Side event: Launch of the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS)
Eloise Watson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

In a side event organized by the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) was launched. Chaired by Mr. Daniel Prins, Secretary General of the PoA Review Conference, the session included keynote presentations by Ms. Hannelore Hoppe (Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) and Mr. Stan Nkwain (Chief of Policy and Planning, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)). Mr. Patrick McCarthy (ISACS Inter-Agency Support Unit) gave a succinct overview of the ISACS, followed by Mr. Sharif Baaser (UNICEF) and Jean-Philippe Morange (CTED), both of whom shared their perspectives on the future application of ISACS within their related fields.

Ms. Hoppe presented a brief background on the development of ISACS. The project, initiated in 2008, was designed by an array of UN entities to provide comprehensive and practical guidance on implementing commitments contained in the UNPoA, ITI, and Firearms Protocol in order to strengthen and bring coherence to the UN’s response to the illicit trade of SALW. The UN system is intended to be the primary user of such standards, though they were also developed with practitioners and policymakers in mind (for example, governments, international and regional organizations, the private sector, and civil society).

Mr. Nkwain shone light on the value of the ISACS in their contribution to helping states grapple the scourge of armed conflict and the misuse of light weapons. According to Mr. Nkwain, the standards will permit a greater understanding among states of how such weapons hamper development, will strengthen government controls, and assist law enforcement agencies to prevent arms trafficking by tracing illegal weapons back to the last illegal owner.

Mr. McCarthy informed the audience about the core elements of the ISACS. CASA engaged in an inclusive, global consultation in order to develop the ISACS, which were then compiled by both consultants and an expert group so as to enhance the quality of the guidance of the standards. As Mr. McCarthy explained, the ISACS comprise 24 individual standard modules divided into six different series, including guidance on implementation of legislative and regulatory mechanisms. He assured the audience of the vigorous effort undertaken to ensure all modules provide guidance that incorporates a gender perspective. Finally, he emphasized that these standards are not set in stone, but rather, are designed to evolve over time. To help manage their evolution and ensure their subsequent continued validity, devices aimed at regular monitoring and feedback provision on these standards will be established.

After lauding the ISACS for their key role in strengthening regulatory frameworks for preventing armed violence, Mr. Baaser described the two ways in which UNICEF plans to use the standards: in advocacy and awareness raising, and in programming. He also highlighted the importance of translating the ISACS to national standards, and ensuring that they feed into policy and programming work different countries. Similarly, Mr. Morange commended the ISACS before articulating the ways in which they will be applied within the realm of counter-terrorism, for example in workshops on border controls, or in the drafting of regional or national counter-terrorism strategies.

Discussion during the Q&A session proved more heated than expected. Several comments expressed disappointment regarding the outcome of the ISACS, notably, the alleged inclusion of numerous errors in terms of technical, practical, and policy issues. One participant in the forum vehemently argued that the ISACS represent a ‘lost opportunity.’ He suggested that they equate to little more than political statements by special interest groups, having failed to take into account the varied aspects of the issue of SALW. The panelists acknowledged that views differ on the accuracy of statistics and facts.
# Calendar of events for Thursday, 30 August 2012

<table>
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<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00–13:00</td>
<td>Consultations on the draft outcome document</td>
<td>Conference Room 1</td>
<td>North Lawn Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Implementation of the UN-POA in Central America</td>
<td>Conference Room 1</td>
<td>North Lawn Building</td>
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<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Applying ISACS: a knowledge management software prototype</td>
<td>Conference Room E</td>
<td>North Lawn Building</td>
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<td>UNIDIR and The Monterey Institute of International Studies</td>
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<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Meeting of the Group of Interested States</td>
<td>German House</td>
<td>871 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00–18:00</td>
<td>Consultations on the draft outcome document</td>
<td>Conference Room 1</td>
<td>North Lawn Building</td>
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