Thank you Madam President.

The issues dealt with under Article 3-5 are essential to make sure that this treaty or convention leads the world to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We propose that the three articles should be rewritten as a “package” to provide a simpler and more straightforward framework for stockpile destruction and elimination. There are three main challenges.

The first is to create a mechanism for accession of nuclear-armed States. The treaty should provide nuclear-armed States a “join and destroy” pathway on the basis of irreversible, concrete, time-bound, verifiable plans of action of stockpile destruction, which must be accepted by State Parties.

The second is to verify the process of stockpile destruction internationally. Effective cooperation between nuclear-armed States and States without nuclear weapons will be key, to be facilitated by relevant international organizations. This is an unprecedented challenge for the international community. The treaty should provide the basic principle so the practical details should be completed in the process after the treaty's adoption.

The third is to sustain the absence of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs through strong safeguards. As we envision a world free of nuclear weapons, safeguards standards need to be much stronger than today's standards, for both States that had but eliminated nuclear weapons and States that have never had nuclear weapons, without discrimination.

The treaty must clearly provide that States Parties are not allowed to weaken safeguards standards to which they are already bound elsewhere, including those of the NPT and CTBT. It should also encourage States Parties to work to adopt higher standards in a continuous manner. This should not be understood as an additional burden on States. Rather, it is a requirement to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

It is true that the prohibition would not be credible without proper verification. But it is not wise to weaken the prohibition in the areas that the verification capacity is yet to be developed. We should first provide a comprehensive prohibition and the obligation of elimination in an unambiguous manner, so technical challenges can be tackled and solved in the process to come.

For further concrete suggestions, I would like the delegates to pay attention to the Peace Boat's working paper, WP.42.

Thank you, Madam President.