Non-paper by the President

Indicative list of objectives of the verification of the completeness of its inventory of nuclear material and nuclear installations in States Parties that have manufactured, possessed or otherwise acquired nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices after 5 December 2001

During the first session of the Conference, a number discussed the option of providing for the possibility of providing a pathway, among others, for States to eliminate their nuclear weapon programme and to subsequently join the instrument, subject to accepting verification of the dismantlement of their nuclear weapon programme. Participants at the first session referred to this option as “South Africa-plus”.

In connection with the disclosure by South Africa of its former nuclear weapon programme, the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested the Director General to verify the completeness of that country’s inventory of nuclear material and nuclear installations (GC(XXXV)/RES/567 of 5 September 1991). In its report GC(XXXVII)/1075 on the Denuclearization of Africa, the IAEA set forth the objectives of its assessment of the status of that country’s former nuclear weapons programme.

It is suggested that a number of those objectives could form the basis for those required for the purpose of verification of the completeness of its inventory of nuclear material and nuclear installations in States Parties that have manufactured, possessed or otherwise acquired nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices after 5 December 2001, and included as a paragraph in Article 4 of the draft Convention as follows:

The objectives of the verification described in this Article are to:

(a) Provide assurance that all nuclear material used in a nuclear weapon programme has been returned to peaceful use and placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

(b) Assess that all non-nuclear weapon-specific components of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices have been destroyed, that all laboratory and engineering facilities involved in a nuclear weapon programme have been fully decommissioned and abandoned or converted to peaceful use, and that all nuclear weapon-specific equipment has been destroyed and that all other equipment has been converted to peaceful use;

(c) Obtain information regarding the dismantling programme, the destruction of design and manufacturing information, including drawings, and the philosophy followed in the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(d) Assess the completeness and correctness of the information provided by a State Party with respect to the timing and scope of its nuclear weapon programme and the development, manufacture and subsequent dismantlement of the nuclear weapons;

(e) Visit facilities previously involved in or associated with a nuclear weapons programme and to confirm they are no longer being used for such purposes.