Mr. Chair,

We congratulate you on your election to preside over this important Subsidiary Body and we assure you the support of the Cuban delegation.

We fully support the proposals submitted to this Body by NAM.

Mr. Chair,

Allow me to begin with a brief consideration on the procedures that will guide our work. All States Parties are responsible for ensuring that the Review Conference meets its mandates in all its aspects. So, the necessary time should be devoted, including in this Subsidiary Body, both to review the implementation of the Treaty and to decide forward looking practical actions.

The importance of reviewing implementation cannot be diminished. The regrettable situation of the 2010 Review Conference, in which the Final Document section devoted to this issue was restricted to a mere opinion of the President, should not be repeated. I request that you take into due account these considerations.

In accordance to your request, I will comment now on the practical steps 1 to 6; 20 and 21 of the Plan of Action on Nuclear Disarmament.

Reality is unquestionable; 5 years after their adoption, such practical steps have not been met. What is even worse: we see no serious intentions to implement them in the near future.

This unacceptable situation applies, unfortunately, to the vast majority of the 22 practical steps on nuclear disarmament agreed upon in 2010.

The final document of this Conference should reflect, honestly and objectively, the implementation of the Treaty and decisions of previous Review Conferences in the last 5 years. This implies recognizing and in no way hide the following facts:
- Nuclear-weapon States and others covered by the so-called “Nuclear Umbrella” insist that the possession of nuclear weapons remains vital to their national security interests.

- Doctrines based on nuclear deterrence are still valid and with no prospect of change. NATO’s Strategic Concept includes, among its key components, nuclear deterrence and the possibility of using nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear-weapon States.

- Costly programmes for modernizing nuclear weapons continue to be developed.

- Nuclear weapons are kept in several States which are paradoxically considered non-nuclear-weapons States under the NPT.

- The Conference on Disarmament remains at a standstill, and no subsidiary body has been granted the mandate to carry on negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chair,

The lack of progress on nuclear disarmament is evident. Little has changed in the last five years. Debates at First Committee on nuclear disarmament resolutions are repeated again and again with the same voting patterns and similar explanations of vote of previous years.

The approach called “Step by Step” championed by some States Parties has become a synonym of indefinite deferral of nuclear disarmament. This way, they try to legitimize perpetual possession of nuclear weapons. In our opinion, such an approach is contrary to article VI of NPT.

This Review Conference should adopt transcendental decisions. In this speech, I will just mention four, which are of paramount importance for Cuba:

1- The proposal of some to conclude this Conference with a simple roll over of the 2010 Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament would not be acceptable. The adoption of this Plan was once a step forward, especially after the failure of the 2005 Conference, in which no document was agreed. At the same time, we emphasize that the 2010 Action Plan is extremely insufficient and limited.

2- The success of this Conference depends on achieving the adoption of a strengthened Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament with better defined and measurable practical actions with specific timelines for compliance. We believe that the total elimination of nuclear weapons should be attained within a term no longer than 20 years.

3- Our first priority should be the establishment of a clear commitment to start multilateral negotiations in 2015 for the adoption of a legally binding instrument on Nuclear Disarmament.

4- The Conference should establish a permanent and efficient mechanism to monitor the compliance of the agreed practical actions on nuclear disarmament.

Thank you very much.