Mr. Chairman,

I congratulate you on your appointment to chair this Committee, and wish you every success in that effort.

We come to these conferences with a wide range of political perspectives and differing priorities. But underlying those differences is a broad convergence of interests, because this Treaty is important to the security and development of all Parties. This convergence is the essence of the NPT bargain.

Nonproliferation stands at the center of the NPT architecture. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is important by itself. All states benefit when they know that other states, particularly their own neighbors, will not acquire nuclear weapons. As the Preamble states, “the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war.”

These nonproliferation benefits have a direct, positive influence on the other pillars. Measures that impede proliferation make it more likely that we can achieve progress on disarmament. It is difficult to conceive that any state would completely liquidate its nuclear stockpile in an environment where other states are seeking to acquire them.

And states would be much less willing to cooperate in civil nuclear applications without strong barriers against the diversion of the fruits of such cooperation to weapons programs. Nonproliferation is essential to achieving the “fullest possible exchange” of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Zero-sum thinking that treats the pillars of the NPT as competing interests is wrong. These pillars will always stand stronger in combination than they would separately. In this case, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts.

Mr. Chairman,

International safeguards play an indispensable role in the NPT regime. The Treaty requires that non-nuclear-weapon states accept comprehensive safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. These IAEA safeguards provide vital assurances that materials and technology in civil nuclear programs are not diverted for weapons, and that there are no clandestine nuclear programs. They help ensure that the benefits of nuclear cooperation will remain solely in peaceful use.

IAEA safeguards have evolved in response to past proliferation challenges. The Additional Protocol is a key part of our response to revelations of clandestine nuclear programs. With 125
adherents, the Additional Protocol has become the widely accepted standard. Without it, the IAEA itself has said it cannot provide assurances that states declarations are complete, as required under the Treaty’s comprehensive safeguards system.

When the NPT was negotiated, the U.S. pledged to accept the same safeguards measures on our civil nuclear facilities that non-nuclear-weapon States would be required to accept. When the Additional Protocol was negotiated, we made the same pledge. We kept both pledges. We accept those safeguards measures, excluding only those facilities, activities, locations, and information of direct national security significance to the United States. Today, there are nearly 300 facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards in the U.S. This year, we will report on over 300 locations and activities under our Additional Protocol.

IAEA safeguards must continue to evolve in a way that respects their basic purposes and principles. They must remain technically credible and impartial. Effectiveness must remain paramount, despite growing demands that strain IAEA resources. Recent debates over the further evolution of safeguards have reinforced these key principles and provided welcome transparency into the safeguards system. We look forward to further progress along this path.

The IAEA deserves our full support in its safeguards mission. It needs our financial support to carry out essential projects like the recent upgrade to the safeguards laboratories, and to fulfill the IAEA’s responsibilities in Iran and elsewhere. It needs technical support from States with relevant expertise to keep pace with evolving challenges. The IAEA also needs our political support, which we can provide by adopting and fully implementing the highest safeguards standards.

Mr. Chairman,

Safeguards have proven essential both in providing assurance of compliance and in identifying and responding to noncompliance. IAEA safeguards can sound the alarm when there are well-founded indications of possible noncompliance. But sounding the alarm is not enough. To preserve this Treaty that we depend upon for our common security, we must ensure that violators know they will be caught and will not benefit from their violations.

The vast majority of NPT Parties comply fully with their NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. Unfortunately, a small number have not, and several of those cases remain unresolved to this day. We will address this further in the Subsidiary Body on regional issues.

Export controls are another essential element of the nonproliferation pillar. The basic provisions are in Article III.2 of the Treaty. But like safeguards, export controls cannot stand still while proliferation challenges evolve. Nuclear suppliers have established more comprehensive lists and guidelines to ensure that peaceful nuclear cooperation and exchanges of dual-use technology do not contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons.

Recognizing these challenges, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540, requiring all States to adopt and enforce effective measures to control materials, equipment and technology that can contribute to weapons of mass destruction. This resolution also recognizes that many states will need help in implementing their obligations. Such controls enable Member States to effectively implement other UN-mandated sanctions adopted in cases of noncompliance with the Treaty.
Mr. Chairman,

The threat of nuclear war has abated since the end of the Cold War, but proliferation risks remain and the threat of nuclear terrorism has grown. This threat affects us all and requires concerted international efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and take the necessary protective measures.

President Obama convened the first Nuclear Security Summit to bring attention to this challenge at the highest levels and give greater impetus to worldwide efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and prevent illicit trafficking. Five years later, this collective effort has succeeded in removing over two-and-a-half tons of weapons-usable nuclear material, enough for 100 nuclear weapons. Since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, all highly enriched uranium has been removed from 11 countries and Taiwan. The long-term success of these efforts will require enduring commitment by all and by our international institutions.

Mr. Chairman,

All these measures – safeguards, export controls, and nuclear security measures – require dedicated resources. This is a challenge, particularly for developing countries with limited resources. These requirements are relatively modest for states with limited nuclear activities, but they grow as states pursue more advanced nuclear programs.

The U.S., the IAEA, the UN, and others offer assistance to help states develop the capacity to meet these requirements. This is done to ensure that states that pursue peaceful nuclear programs can do so responsibly, and to ensure that these requirements do not impede States from realizing the benefits of peaceful nuclear programs. We encourage all states that need assistance to take advantage of the resources available, and encourage all states in a position to do so to offer such assistance.

Mr. Chairman,

Questions have been raised about NATO nuclear policy. This issue was addressed when the NPT was negotiated. NATO’s basing arrangements were made clear to negotiating delegations and were made public when the NPT was negotiated. They are fully compatible with the NPT obligations of NATO Allies. NPT articles I and II do not prohibit nuclear basing or planning arrangements. Weapons assigned to NATO remain under U.S. control at all times and are never transferred.

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is truly a common effort that benefits all of us, and to which all of us can contribute. I look forward to the deliberations of this Committee on how we can advance that effort together.

Thank you.