Statement by

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Mr President,

I align myself with the Statement by the EU and with the NPDI positions regarding the second pillar of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A rock-solid non-proliferation regime is one of the crucial preconditions for our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. This Conference should thus acknowledge progress achieved in connection with non-proliferation crises.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, the Conference should take note of the substantial progress achieved during the review cycle. It goes without saying that Germany, as a member of the E3+3, welcomes the agreement between the E3+3 and Iran on parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached on 2 April in Lausanne. Between now and 30 June this needs to be crafted into a final text for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. A lot of work still lies ahead of us.
But it is well worth the effort, for such a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would dispel the international community’s concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. Let me underline in this context the importance of the continued effective implementation of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action by the E3/EU+3 and Iran and the essential role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying the nuclear-related measures. We reaffirm our strong support for the IAEA’s ongoing efforts to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. At the same time we commend those states which contributed financially to the IAEA’s crucial monitoring and verification work in Iran.

Unfortunately, there is little progress to report with regard to the Syrian case of non-compliance. Germany deplores Syria’s ongoing non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations. The Conference should call on Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA by providing access to the information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Syria that the Agency has requested.
Regarding North Korea, the Conference should again condemn in the strongest possible terms North Korea’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and its aggressive nuclear messaging. This includes the restart of the 5MWe plutonium-production reactor, the operation and expansion of the uranium-enrichment facility, and the activities at the light-water reactor at Yongbyon, as well as ballistic missile launches. North Korea must refrain from further nuclear testing, immediately cease all nuclear activities and launches using ballistic missile technology, and abandon all nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner as required by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Conference should urge North Korea to take concrete steps to honour its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to come into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations.
Ladies and gentlemen,
It almost goes without saying that a robust nuclear non-proliferation system depends on the IAEA’s safeguards system and its effective implementation. The IAEA must have adequate resources and political support to fulfil its safeguards mandates. The Conference should promote an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol as the international verification standard, which should be taken into consideration during decisions on supplying nuclear fuel, equipment or technology. The Conference should call upon all States which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force an Additional Protocol and, where relevant, adopt the modified Small Quantities Protocols.
Member State’s Safeguards Support Programmes aim at supporting the IAEA’s safeguards mission and include not only development of equipment and procedures, but also development of safeguards approaches, training of Agency inspectors, development of safeguards evaluation methods and the appointment of cost-free experts to the IAEA. Germany is proud to have supported the IAEA within the framework of the German safeguards support programme with an estimated voluntary contribution of 1.32 million euros in 2014.
The Conference should also lend support to the goal of strengthening export control regimes, which are an essential and complementary part of the international non-proliferation system. Therefore, States Parties should be encouraged to adhere to the multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and best practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee in developing their domestic export control systems.

Ladies and gentlemen,
In our turbulent times, the risks and challenges emanating from terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and regional conflicts add up to a dangerous combination which needs to be addressed with resolve. We must be aware of the challenges of maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear security. The 2010 Action Plan contains important recommendations in that regard. In Germany’s view, this Conference should take stock of progress achieved on this important issue and encourage further progress. Undoubtedly, there has been progress in the field of nuclear security during the last couple of years, not only in substance, but also in raising awareness in our civil societies.
The series of Nuclear Security Summits has played an important role in that respect. Maintaining nuclear security is a complex task under peaceful and stable conditions - and a serious challenge under crisis conditions. Germany has supported nuclear security projects in other countries, particularly within the framework of the Global Partnership, but also by supporting IAEA activities in the field of nuclear security. Much has been achieved in terms of structures, know-how and standards. It is now up to the international community and to the relevant organisations and initiatives to make sure that these achievements are put into practice. This Conference should send a strong signal to this end. It should underline the importance of an effective and sustainable international nuclear security architecture which strengthens cooperation between the various stakeholders in making progress towards our shared vision of a world without nuclear threats.
Ladies and gentlemen,

Last but not least, a few comments on the extremely important regional issue to be discussed in this main Committee: the question of a zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other WMD and their means of delivery in the Middle East. Germany remains committed to the objective of a Middle East free of WMD and their means of delivery and stands by the pertinent decisions taken in the context of the NPT. Germany commends the ongoing efforts of the Facilitator and co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States), particularly the five rounds of consultations held among the regional States. Germany strongly regrets that, despite these persistent efforts, it has thus far not been possible to convene the Helsinki Conference. As stated in the 2010 Final Document, a prerequisite for a successful meeting is that the regional parties engage freely and actively with one another in order to reach a consensus on a date and an agenda for the Helsinki Conference. Germany believes that, thanks to the several rounds of consultations, progress has been made on which it should be possible to build. This Conference should send a strong signal of support for advancing this important issue.

Thank you!